Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Malkarjun Mahadev Belure v. Amrita Tukaram Dambare

Bombay High Court
Feb 27, 1918
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.

Batchelor, A.C.J:— This is a suit brought on behalf of an infant for possession of immovable property. The circumstances attending the suit are these:—

2. One Doji Giram, who died some time before 1897, left two widows, Kashibai who died in 1902, and Rangubai who died in 1903. He left also two daughters, the elder, Santabai who died in 1907, leaving the present plaintiff her son, who was born in 1905, and Triveni, who died in 1911. In March 1897, the senior widow Kashibai sold the property in suit to defendant 1. In July 1902, Kashibai died. Thereupon her surviving co-widow Rangubai took the property for a widow's estate, and the reversion did not fall in until the death of Rangubai on 17th January, 1903. On the occurrence of that event the reversioners were the two daughters, Shantabaiand Triveni, and under the law in this presidency they took severally an estate absolute. The lower Courts have dismissed the suit on the ground that it is barred by time. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Coyajee's first contention was that the article of the limitation act correctly applicable to the suit was 141, and not 144. That argument however cannot in my opinion be substantiated in the circumstances which I have set out. The plaintiff claims as the heir of Shantabai and the suit is not in my opinion one brought by a Hindu entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu female. This Article, as the decided cases show, is restricted to suits by a plaintiff whose right and title to sue for possession occurs upon the death of a female holding the limited woman's estate. The point was so decided in Azam Bhuyan v. Faizuddin Ahamed(1) by Wilson, J. and Ghose, J. and these learned Judges, in considering the argument now under notice observed that:

“Article 140, (Lim. Act) dealing with remaindermen, reversioners and others deal with a class of persons who claim under a title quite independent of the particular limited estate upon which the remainder, reversion or other estate is dependent and we think the case is the same under Article 141… We think it refers to persons who claim under an independent title on the death of a Hindu or Mahomedan female. It would be straining the language and introducing a rule inconsistent with the principle of the Act, if we were to hold that this article applies to the case of a person suing on the very same cause of action which accrued to a Hindu female and who acquires his right to sue as her heir.”

3. To the same effect is the decision in Hashmat Begum v. Mazhar Husain(2). On this point, therefore the argument for the appellant must be disallowed. But secondly it his contended that even if Article 144, applies the defendant has not had that 12 years' adverse possession against the plaintiff which under the Article, would be required for the invalidity of the plaintiff's suit. Here I think the plaintiff is entitled to succeed. It may be conceded that the defendant's title was adverse to Rangubai until her death in 1903 and as contended by the learned Advocate General, it would have been open to the presumptive reversioners even during the lifetime of the widows to sue for a declaration that the alienation by the elder widow was void. That however in my opinion is not enough. The classical definition of the term “adverse possession” is that given by Markby J. in Bejoy Ghunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee(3), where the learned Judge said:

“By adverse possession I understand to be meant possession by a person holding the land on his own behalf of some person other than, the true owner, the true owner having a right to immediate possession.”

4. These last words are of capital importance because as pointed out by Batty, J. in Tarubai v. Venkatrao(4), they express the well-known rule which is conveyed in the maxim contra non-valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, that is to say prescription does not run against a man during the time when he is not entitled to immediate possession. The learned Advocate General frankly admits that he cannot urge that during the lifetime of the widows any of these reversioners would have been entitled to immediate possession. That being so the defendants' possession however adverse against Rangubai cannot be regarded as adverse against the plaintiff. The suit therefore is in time.

5. The result is that the appeal is allowed the decree of the lower Court is set aside and the suit must be remanded to the trial Court to be heard out and decided according to law. The appellant must have his costs of this appeal, This judgment disposes also of Second Appeal No. 988 of 1916.

6. Kemp, J.:— I agree that Article 141 does not apply to the facts of this case and assuming that the possession of the defendants was adverse to Kashibai still I consider that no adverse possession runs against the plaintiff until the death of Rangubai on 17th of January 1903. The suit is therefore within time.

G.P/R.K

7. Appeal allowed.