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Ramgopal Ghose v. Dhirendra Nath Sen And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued for Rs. 2,026-13-4 as the balance due under two promissory notes in his favour (one for Rs. 1,500 dated 15 November 1916; the other for Rs. 500 dated 23 November 1921). Both notes purported to have been signed by Narendro Nath Sen (Naren) and the defendant Dhirendra Nath Sen (Dhiren). Naren was the karta of an undivided Hindu joint family governed by Dayabhaga law; the other co-parceners included Jitendra Nath and the defendant Dhirendra Nath. Naren made certain payments toward the notes, the last of which was on 12 February 1923, and died in June 1923. The plaintiff sought recovery against Dhiren and against Naren's heirs (the second and third defendants). The central factual findings by the court were that Naren, not a trader, signed the promissory notes as karta to obtain funds for legitimate family purposes and that the loan proceeds were so applied.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a karta of a Hindu joint family, who signs a promissory note in his own name for family purposes, thereby binds the other members of the family or the family property.
- Whether the plaint was presented within limitation given an initial verification alleged not to comply with Order VI, rule 15(2), and whether the date of presentation should be treated as 25 August 1925 or 8 December 1926 after amendment.
- Whether the defendant Dhirendra Nath (Dhiren) signed the promissory notes or had his name placed thereon without authority.
- Whether the plaintiff's cause of action was based solely upon the promissory notes or whether there existed an independent agreement (dehors the notes) entitling the plaintiff to sue on the original debt and to charge the joint family property under Hindu law.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments Raised on Behalf of Dhirendra Nath (Dhiren)
- Procedural/limitation argument: The plaint's verification did not comply with Order VI, rule 15(2) until it was amended on 8 December 1926; consequently, the suit should be regarded as first presented on that date and therefore barred by limitation because the cause of action arose on 12 February 1923.
- Signature/no-authority argument: Dhiren contended that he did not sign either promissory note and that his name had been placed on them without his authority or consent.
- Substantive argument (as defendant): Once it was established that the promissory notes were signed only by Naren in his own name and without qualification as to liability on behalf of anyone else, Dhiren argued that no liability could be imposed upon him solely because of the karta's signature.
Arguments Raised on Behalf of the Plaintiff
- The plaintiff relied on authorities (including Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar and later following cases) to support that a karta executing a promissory note for family purposes can bind the other members of the joint family and their shares in family property.
- Procedurally, the plaintiff relied on earlier cases (e.g., Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath and a cluster of authorities) to argue that the initial presentation date of the plaint was 25 August 1925 and that an irregular verification could be amended without affecting the original presentation date.
- The plaintiff contended, implicitly, that the promissory notes created enforceable obligations against the named signatories and that recovery could be sought against co-parceners or family property under Hindu law where appropriate.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baroda Prosad Bose v. Girija Nath Roy Chowdhury | Authority on return of a plaint for amendment under section 53(b) of the Civil Procedure Code when verification is imperfect. | The court held the decision no longer binding in view of Order VI, rule 17 permitting amendment at any stage; it rejected the defendant's limitation contention based on late amendment. |
| Sidebotham v. Holland (per Lindley L.J.) | Quoted maxim against deciding cases on trivial technicalities ("splitting of a straw"). | Used as persuasive support for not deciding the case on a mere technical defect in verification. |
| Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath | Authority supporting that defects in verification are irregularities curable by amendment and do not alter the original presentation date of a plaint. | Placed among authorities to hold that the plaint must be taken as presented on 25 August 1925 (the original presentation date), not on the date of amended verification. |
| Fatehchand v. Mansab Rai | Authority cited with similar purpose as Rajit Ram regarding curable irregularities in verification. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that the plaint's presentation date remains 25 August 1925. |
| Basdeo v. John Smidt | Authority cited on verification/amendment of pleadings. | Applied as part of the cluster of authorities establishing that verification defects are amendable and do not shift presentation date. |
| Shibdeo Misra v. Ram Prasad | Authority cited concerning amendment of defective verification. | Used to support that the plaint was presented on its original date despite subsequent amendment of verification. |
| Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das | Authority cited in the same context of amendable verification defects. | Included among cases supporting the original presentation date of the plaint. |
| The Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. v. Dharanidhar Sardar | Authority cited with the other verification/amendment cases. | Applied as supporting precedent that the plaint should be taken as presented on 25 August 1925. |
| Charan Das v. Amir Khan | Authority cited on amendability of verification defects. | Applied to support treating the plaint as presented on the original date. |
| Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan | Listed among authorities about whether obligations under earlier agreements merge into negotiable instruments or remain distinct causes of action. | Referenced in discussing whether the plaintiff had an alternative cause of action apart from the promissory notes. |
| Payana Reena v. Pana Lana | Listed in relation to the merger/alternative cause of action point. | Used to illustrate principles concerning whether pre-existing obligations survive or merge into negotiable instruments. |
| Sadusuk Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad | Privy Council authority on negotiable instruments: a person whose name appears on the instrument cannot rely on an undisclosed principal; and on the import of sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act. | Held pivotal: court treated it as decisive that where a promissory note names a person, the maker's admission of acting for an undisclosed principal is not a valid defence; applied to hold that a karta signing in his own name unconditionally cannot bind other co-parceners unless their names appear on the instrument. |
| Hari v. Sourendra | Cited among cases concerning negotiable instruments and the effect of naming parties on the instrument. | Referenced as consistent authority for the proposition that the instrument must disclose the person to be charged. |
| Parbati Charan Mukherjee v. Amarendra Nath Bhattacharjee | Listed among authorities on merger/alternate remedies vis-à-vis negotiable instruments. | Referred to in the discussion whether obligations independent of a promissory note could be sued upon. |
| Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Bungshi Chandra Saha | Statement of Hindu law principle that a co-parcener's share in family property is liable for debts contracted by the karta for urgent necessity or legitimate family purposes. | Cited to explain that if the debt were sued as a debt contracted on behalf of the family (other than under the promissory note), the family property (including Dhiren’s share) could be liable; but distinguished from the situation where the plaintiff's sole cause of action is the promissory note. |
| Vithalrao v. Vithalrao | Cited in relation to whether plaintiff's cause of action was confined to the promissory note. | Used to support that, given the pleadings, the suit was framed on the promissory notes alone and no issue was allowed on independent agreement. |
| Sreelal Mangtulal v. The Lister Antiseptic Dressing Co., Ltd. | Cited among authorities concerning negotiable instruments and their interpretation. | Listed as a supporting authority consistent with the principles drawn from Sadusuk Janki Das. |
| Thaith Ottathil v. Purushotam Doss | Cited among authorities on negotiable instruments. | Referred to as consistent authority for the court's interpretation of negotiable instrument law. |
| Subba Narayana v. Ramaswami Aiyar | Cited in the same cluster about negotiable instruments' effect and interpretation. | Used as supporting authority in the court's survey of case law on negotiable instruments. |
| Govindan Nair v. K. Nama Menon | Cited with other negotiable-instrument authorities. | Referenced among cases supporting the principles applied from Sadusuk Janki Das. |
| In re Adansonia Fibre Co. | Authority (and James L.J.'s observations) that no body is liable on a bill unless its name appears on the face or back of the bill. | Applied to reject the notion that the karta's signature can be taken as the family's signature or that the family's liability can be inferred without the family's name appearing on the instrument. |
| Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar | Leading case relied upon by the plaintiff to show that a karta's promissory note can bind the family; judgment of Shephard and Subrahmania Ayyar, JJ. was followed in later cases. | The court criticised aspects of this decision, found difficulty in discerning the precise legal basis of parts of the judgment, and expressed that if the decision was to the effect that co-parceners can be bound by a promissory note to which they are not parties, it ought not to be followed in view of Sadusuk Janki Das. |
| Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu | Cited as follow-up authority to Krishna Ayyar. | Noted as one of the later cases following Krishna Ayyar; the court observed that such cases do little more than follow Krishna Ayyar's ratio. |
| Baisnab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor | Relied on by plaintiff; decision turned on absence in the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act of provisions similar to section 23 of the English Act. | Distinguished and held no longer helpful after the Privy Council decision in Sadusuk Janki Das. |
| Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyaswami Pillai | Cited among plaintiff's authorities following Krishna Ayyar. | Referenced as one of the cases upon which the plaintiff relied; court treated them collectively and analysed Krishna Ayyar as the pivotal authority. |
| Krishnanand Nath Khare v. Raja Ram Singh | Held that a promissory note executed by the karta is in effect signed by the family because the karta is head of the family. | Rejected by the court as "altogether too fanciful"; the court refused to accept the reasoning that the karta's signature equates to a family signature absent the family's name on the instrument. |
| Raghunath Singh v. Sri Narain | Cited among plaintiff's supporting authorities. | Listed as one of the cases relied upon; court did not accept the general proposition that such authorities displace the principle in Sadusuk Janki Das. |
| Nicholson v. Ricketts | Authority that an association without a name cannot draw, accept or endorse bills of exchange; supports the requirement that the name of the body liable must appear. | Cited through James L.J.'s observations to bolster the proposition that liability on negotiable instruments requires the name of the person or body to appear on the instrument. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps anchored in fact-finding and legal principle:
- Fact-finding: The court found that Naren, as karta, executed the promissory notes in his own name to obtain funds for legitimate family purposes, and the proceeds were applied to family use. The family was not a trading firm and the notes were not executed in the course of a family trading business.
- Heirs' liability: Because Naren signed the notes and undertook obligations for non-immoral family purposes, the court held that Naren's heirs (defendants 2 and 3) had no defence to the claim and that a decree would pass against them to the extent they were or had been in possession of property as Naren's heirs.
- Verification and limitation: The court examined the challenge that the plaint's verification was defective until amended on 8 December 1926. Relying on existing procedural authority and the principle that defects in verification under Order VI, rule 15 are irregularities curable by amendment (and that Order VI, rule 17 allows amendment at any stage), the court concluded the plaint was presented on 25 August 1925 (the original presentation date) and not on the date of amendment; thus the limitation defence based on late presentation failed.
- Signature issue: The court reviewed evidence and found that Dhiren neither signed the promissory notes nor authorised anyone to sign for him.
- Cause of action — promissory note versus independent debt: The court analyzed whether the plaintiff's cause of action was confined to the promissory notes or whether an independent agreement survived that could support a claim against the joint family property. The court determined, on the pleadings and evidence, that the cause of action as framed was solely upon the promissory notes and that no issue would be permitted about a pre-existing independent agreement.
- Interaction of Hindu law and negotiable instruments law: The court emphasized the policy of negotiable instrument law that liability must be clear and that the person to be charged must be disclosed on the instrument so that third parties can readily identify the party liable. The court treated the Privy Council decision in Sadusuk Janki Das as decisive on the point that where a promissory note names a person, it is impermissible to show that the signatory was acting for an undisclosed principal to impose liability on others not named.
- Consequence for co-parceners: Applying the negotiable instruments principles, the court concluded that a karta executing an unconditional promissory note in his own name for family purposes cannot, by that execution alone, bind other co-parceners or the joint family property unless the names of the other members to be charged appear on the instrument in a manner that would, on fair interpretation, disclose them as liable. Thus a suit against a co-parcener who was not a signatory (or did not consent to be signatory) and whose name did not appear on the note could not succeed when the plaintiff's only cause of action was the promissory note itself.
- Alternative remedies and election: The court explained that the plaintiff had an electoral choice: (a) sue on the negotiable instrument against the party/parties named on it (with the remedies and limitations attendant on negotiable instruments law), or (b) in a properly framed suit, sue on the original debt as a family obligation under Hindu law and seek to charge the family property — but pursuing the latter would expose the plaintiff to defences under Hindu law, including that the debt was not contracted for family purposes. The plaintiff chose to sue on the notes; having done so, he was confined to the remedies available on those instruments.
- Final application to Dhiren: Given the pleaded cause of action (solely upon the promissory notes), the court held that Dhiren could not be held liable because his name either did not appear as a party on the instrument in a manner disclosing him as liable or he did not sign the notes. Accordingly, the suit against Dhiren failed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ordered that the suit against Dhirendra Nath (Dhiren) fails and is dismissed with costs. At the same time, a decree was directed to pass against Naren's heirs (defendants 2 and 3) to the extent to which they are or have been in possession of property as his heirs. The plaintiff undertook to pay the costs of the guardian ad litem and may add those costs to his claim against Naren's estate.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: The plaintiff may recover from Naren's estate (the heirs) to the extent of their possession, and the plaintiff must bear guardian ad litem costs (but can add these to the claim against the estate). The claim against Dhiren is dismissed.
- Doctrine applied: The court held that, insofar as the plaintiff's case was based solely on the promissory notes, a karta's unconditional signature in his own name does not bind other co-parceners or their shares in the family property unless those co-parceners' names appear on the instrument in a way that discloses them as liable. This limits enforcement against non-signatory co-parceners in actions founded only on negotiable instruments.
- Election of remedies emphasised: The opinion clarifies that holders of negotiable instruments who lent to a karta for family purposes can either sue on the instrument or, in an alternative suit properly framed, sue on the underlying debt under Hindu law; but choosing to sue on the instrument confines the plaintiff to remedies and defences inherent in negotiable instrument law.
Page, J.:— The decision in this suit depends upon whether the karta of a Hindu joint family, who for family purposes signs a promissory note in his own name, thereby binds the other members of the family, or the property belonging to the joint family. The plaintiff claims Rs. 2,026-13-4 as the balance due under two promissory notes drawn in his favour, one for Rs. 1,500 and the other for Rs. 500, dated respectively 15th November 1916 and 23rd November 1921. Each of these promissory notes purports to have been signed by Narendro Nath Sen, and the defendant Dhirendra Nath Sen.
It is not disputed that certain sums were paid to the plaintiff by Naren in reduction of liability under the said notes. The last payment in respect of each note was made on the 12th February 1923.
In 1916 Naren was 30 years of age, and at all material times was the karta of an undivided Hindu family living joint in estate and commensality under the Dayabhaga Law. The other co-parceners were his brothers Jitendra Nath and the, defendant Dhirendra Nath. Naren died in June 1923, and the second and third defendants are his heirs. Upon the evidence I am of opinion that the members of this joint family were not a trading firm, and that the promissory notes in suit were not drawn by Naren as the manager of, or in the course of carrying on, a family business; but. I find as a fact that Naren signed the promissory notes in suit as the karta of the family in order to obtain funds to be expended for legitimate family purposes, and I also find that the proceeds of the loans Wire so applied.
Naren having signed the promissory notes and having undertaken the obligations thereby created for purposes that were not immoral, the defendants 2 and 3, as his heirs, have no defence to the plaintiff's claim under the promissory notes; and a decree will pass against them to the extent to which they are or have been in possession of property as the heirs of Naren.
The controversy in this suit is with respect to the liability of the defendant Dhiren, and learned counsel for Dhiren has raised several defences on his behalf. In the first place, it is contended that inasmuch as the plaint was not duly verified within Order VI, rule 15(2) until the 8th December 1926, the plaint must be taken to have been presented for the first time on that day; and as the cause of action accrued on the 12th February 1923 that the suit is barred by limitation. The plaint was presented originally on the 25th August 1925, and the verification was in the following form:—
“I, Ramgopal Ghose, the plaintiff abovenamed, do declare that the statements contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the foregoing plaint are true to any knowledge, information and belief. I sign this declaration at 19A, Bagbazar Street, in Calcutta, this 24th day of August 1925”.
An objection having been raised that the verification was not in accordance with Order VI, rule 15(2), the verification was amended on the 8th December 1926 pursuant to an order of the Court, and as amended ran as follows:—
“I, Ramgopal Ghose, the plaintiff abovenamed, do declare that the statements contained in paragraphs 1 to 7 of the foregoing plaint are true to my knowledge and those contained in paragraph 8 are based on information received by me which I believe to be true. I sign this declaration in the Court House this 8th of December 1926”.
In support of his contention learned counsel for Dhiren relied upon the case of Baroda Prosad Bose v. Girija Nath Roy Chowdhury. The decision in that case turned upon the provisions of section 53(b) of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), under which a plaint, if not duly verified, might at the discretion of the Court “at, or at any time before, the settlement of issues be returned for amendment”. As the order for amendment in that case had not been made until after the issues had been settled it was held to be incumbent upon the Court to order either that the plaint be removed from the file of registered, suits, or that the suit be dismissed. Having regard to Order VI, rule 17, however, the Court may now allow a pleading to be altered or amended at any stage of the proceedings, and the case of Baroda Prosad Bose v. Girija Nath Roy Chowdhury no longer can be regarded as ad rem or a binding authority. I feel strongly that the rights of litigants ought not to be decided upon “the splitting of a straw”, [per Lindley L.J in Sidebotham v. Holland] and I am glad that I find myself able to hold that there is no substance in this contention. In my opinion, when a pleading does not conform to the provisions of Order VI, rule 15, the defect therein is a mere irregularity that can be cured by amendment, and the plaint in this case must be taken to have been presented on the 25th August 1925, and not on the 8th December 1926 when the verification was amended (Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath, Fatehchand v. Mansab Rai, Basdeo v. John Smidt, Shibdeo Misra v. Ram Prasad, Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das, The Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. v. Dharanidhar Sardar(8) and Charan Das v. Amir Khan(9).
The defendant Dhiren further contended that he did not sign either of the two notes, and, that his name had been placed thereon without his authority or consent.
[His Lordship then discussed the evidence on this issue, and having found that the defendant Dhiren neither signed the promissory notes himself, nor authorised any one else to sign them on his behalf proceeded as follows:—]
Learned counsel for the defendant Dhiren further contended that the plaintiff's cause of action in this suit as set out in the pleadings was based solely upon the obligations created under the promissory notes, and that, as the promissory notes were signed by Naren in his own name without any condition or qualification of his liability as the maker thereof appearing on the document, be alone was liable to pay the amount due according to the apparent tenor of the notes. In my opinion this contention must prevail. It is well settled according to the principles of Hindu Law that the share of each co-parcener in the property of a Hindu joint family is liable for debts contracted by the karta for urgent necessity or for any legitimate family purpose; and the rule is the same whether the family is governed by the principles laid down in the Mitakshara or in the Dayabhaga. Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Bungshi Chandra Saha.
Now, the fundamental basis of this principle of Hindu Law, I venture to think, is the unity of the family, and the doctrine that where one of the members suffers all the members should suffer with him; but it follows from this conception of family union and responsibility (apart from debts contracted by the karta or other member of the family in the course of managing a family trading business, with which I am not concerned in this suit) that the amenability of family property to meet family commitments depends upon whether the debts have been contracted or the proceeds of the loan applied for family purposes. Whenever proceedings have been taken for the purpose of attaching the interest of a co-parcener in the family property to liquidate a debt contracted on behalf of the family, it has always been open to the co-parcener to repudiate liability upon the ground that the debt was not contracted on behalf, or for the benefit, of the family. This plea, if made out, would provide a valid defence to such proceedings; and I have not been able to trace in the rules laid down by the Hindu Sages, or in any commentary upon the principles of Hindu Law, any statement or opinion which would lead me to believe that according to Hindu Law the doctrine of family responsibility for family obligations would attach to a transaction in which such a defence would not be available to a coparcener.
Now, when the plaintiff lent to Naren as the karta of the joint family the monies in respect of which the promissory notes were given, did Naren contract to repay the monies lent by an agreement that was independent of the obligations which he undertook by signing the promissory notes? If he did, it was open to the plaintiff in proceedings aptly framed to sue him either upon the promissory notes, or in the alternative upon the independent agreement into which he had entered. On the other hand, if Naren's obligations under any pre-existing independent agreement to repay the monies lent had become merged, in the contract created under the promissory notes, or the receipt of the promissory notes was the consideration for the loans, the plaintiff has no cause of action for money lent, and he cannot recover otherwise than upon the terms of the contract contained in the promissory notes; his sole cause of action being based upon the notes. Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan, Payana Reena v. Pana Lana, Sadusuk Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad, Hari v. Sourendra, Parbati Charan Mukherjee v. Amarendra Nath Bhattacharjee.
Further, if the plaintiff in this suit is entitled to recover the monies lent as a debt contracted by Naren as karta otherwise than under the promissory notes: it cannot be doubted that the property of the joint Hindu family, including Dhiren's share therein, is liable for the debt (Dwarkanath Chowdhnry v. Bungshi Chandra Saha). On the other band, if the plaintiff's sole cause of action is upon the promissory notes, in my opinion, the suit against Dhiren must be dismissed. At the hearing I refused to allow an issue to be raised upon the footing that Naren had contracted to repay the loans under an agreement independent of the promissory notes for, having regard to the pleadings, I am of opinion, that the cause of action in this suit as framed is based solely upon the promissory notes. (Sadusuk Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad) Vithalrao v. Vithalrao.
What, then, are the plaintiff's rights under the promissory notes? Now; the demands of the Law merchant and the exigencies of business require that the obligations of a person who executes a negotiable instrument should be stringent and precise, and that the rights and liabilities of the parties to a negotiable instrument should be clearly defined and well understood.
“It is of the utmost importance that the name of a person or firm to be charged upon a negotiable document should be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document, so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognised as the document passes from hand to hand…. It is net sufficient that the principal's name should be “in some way” disclosed; it must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name, is the real name of the person liable upon the bill. Their Lordships' attention was directed to sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the terms of those sections were contrasted with the corresponding provisions of the English Statute. It is unnecessary in this connection to decide whether their effect is identical. It is sufficient to say that these sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rules, that in an action on a bill of exchange of promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument, it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal.”
Sadusuk Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad.
The decisions of the Courts in India prior to this case must now be read in the light of the above observations. Further, if it is proved that legal consideration was given for a bill of exchange or promissory note, the Court will not further enquire into the nature or the adequacy of such consideration nor in a suit upon a bill of exchange or promissory note is the Court concerned with the purpose for which the defendant contracted liability under the instrument, or the use to which the consideration for executing the instrument was put (vide e.g, sections 28, 32, 36, 38, 43, 44, 78 and 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881). If the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note was not able to ascertain, upon a perusal of the document and without further investigation, the persons who were the parties to it, and the extent of their liability, the purpose for which negotiable instruments were brought into being would be frustrated, and their usefulness seriously impaired. It follows, therefore, that the karta of a joint Hindu family, by executing a promissory note unconditionally in his own name for family purposes, cannot thereby bind the other members of the family, or the interest of any other member in the joint family property. The other members of the joint family would only be bound by a promissory note or bill of exchange signed by the karta for family purposes if the name of each member of the joint family to be charged appears on the instrument itself, and is
“disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bill”.
“(Sadusuk Janki Das v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad Sreelal Mangtulal v. The Lister Antisepitc Dressing Co., Ld., Hari v. Sourendra, Thaith Ottathil v. Purushotam Doss, Subba Narayana v. Ramaswami Aiyar, Govindan Nair v. K. Nama Menon, Vithalrao v. Vithalrao, In re Adansonia Fibre Co..
Learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, cited inter alia the following cases in support of his contention that the karta of a joint Hindu family can bind the other members of the family by signing a promissory note for family purposes: Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar, Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu(10), Baisnab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor(11), Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyaswami Pillai(12), Krishnanand Nath Khare v. Raja Ram Singh(13), Raghunath Singh v. Sri Narain(14).
Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar, is the leading case, and the later cases upon which the plaintiff relies do little more than follow the ratio decidendi of the judgments of Shephard and Subrahmania Ayyar, JJ. in Krishna Ayyar's case. I must confess, however, that I find it difficult to discover the real ground upon which Subrahmania Ayyar, J.'s decision was based in that case, for his Lordship held that
“the rule stated above is not applicable to the present case as the promissory note in question is not a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881”.
And with all due respect to these learned Judges I find it equally difficult to ascertain the reason which led Shephard, J. in that case to hold the property of the other members of the joint family liable for the debts contracted by the karta. After holding that the members of the family who were not parties to the promissory note were not liable upon the note his Lordship observed that—
“The liability of persons in the position of the appellants, which arises on its being shown that a debt has been properly incurred in the management of the family affairs, is founded on Hindu Law and not on the Law of agency”.
and that it is—
“a liability which is, so to speak, external to the obligation arising on the making of the promissory note”.
The learned Judge then added that—
“It is argued that the present suit was strictly confined to a demand for payment of the note and that the plaint did not include a demand in respect of the original debt. It appears to the on reading the plaint that it contains all the allegations that are needed in order to charge the appellants with liability. The charge is that the debt was incurred for the expenses of the family, and that they are bound to discharge it. There can be no doubt that the Courts below as well as the appellants understood fully the case which the plaintiff was seeking to establish”.
On the other hand, Davies, J. in a dissenting judgment, held that the plaintiff's cause of action was based solely upon the promissory note, and his Lordship observed that—
“the name of no one but the first defendant appears in the plaint promissory note, and he does not purport to make it on behalf of anyone else but himself. Therefore, no one but the first defendant can be held liable to discharge it”.
If the ratio decidendi of the decision of Subrahmania Ayyar and Shephard, JJ. was that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount as a debt contracted for family purposes by a member of the family otherwise than under the promissory note cadit quœstio; but if the real ground of the decision in that case was that the shares of the other co-parceners in the joint family property were liable to defray a debt contracted under the promissory note to which they were not parties, I am of opinion that case was wrongly decided, and having regard to the decision of the Privy Council in Sadusuk Janki Ds v. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad ought not to be followed.
The other cases upon which learned counsel for the plaintiff relied all purport to follow Krishna Ayyar's case, although in these cases also it is not always made clear whether the learned Judges were basing their decision upon the liability of the co-parceners for the debt contracted under the promissory note or for a debt under an agreement dehors the promissory note. In Baisnab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor the decision turned upon the absence in the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act of provisions similar to those to be found in section 23 of the later English Act (15 and 46 Victoria, Chapter 61); but since Sadusuk Janki Das's case such an argument will not help the plaintiff.
A contention that prevailed in Krishnanand Nath Khare v. Raja Ram Singh that a promissory note executed by the karta of a joint Hindu family is in fact signed by the family as the maker thereof because the karta is the head of the family, with all due respect appears to me to be altogether too fanciful to be accepted. Certain observations passed by Lord Justice James in In re Adansonia Fibre Co. will, I think, be found apposite in this connection. His Lordship observed that—
“it is the law of this country, and it has always been the law of this country, that no body is liable upon a bill of exchange unless his name, or the name of some partnership or body of persons of which he is one, appears either on the face or on the back of the bill. That is the clear law of this country. It was decided in Nicholson v. Ricketts, if authority be required for such a proposition, that an association which is absolutely without a came has no name by which it can draw, accept or endorse bills of exchange. It was suggested, and the argument appears to have prevailed with the Vice-Chancellor, that where the members of such an association, or the firms constituting such an association for the purposes of that association, draw or accept bills in their individual names or in the names of their partnerships, that for that purpose, and for the purpose of doing equity, or of reaching the real principal, it might be assumed that the name of the partner upon the bill, or the name of the partnership upon the bill, might be considered as being pro hac vice the name of the association. That, in my opinion, is a mere fictio juris; and although it used to be said in fictions juris consistit acquitas, I think that in these prosaic lays and in the old age of the Court, we do not indulge in those flights of imagination which our predecessors did.”
Learned counsel for the plaintiff further urged that a decision that Dhiren was not liable under the promissory notes would run counter to the Hindu doctrine of family responsibility for family debts. In my opinion, however, that doctrine would be violated if a decree in this case were to be passed against Dhiren; for, as I have ventured to point out, an essential ingredient of that doctrine is that in proceedings brought for the purpose of rendering the share of a co-parcener in family property liable for a debt contracted by the karta it should be open to the co-parcener to prove that the debt was not contracted or the consideration applied for a legitimate family purpose. But if the joint family in the circumstances of this case was deemed to be in law the maker of the promissory notes—and it is upon this footing only that either Dhiren or the family property could be made liable under the promissory notes—such a defence would not be available to the defendant Dhiren in an action by the plaintiff as the holder against Dhiren as one of the makers of the notes. In my opinion, a debt contracted under a promissory note signed by a karta for family purposes does not attract the Hindu doctrine of family responsibility for family debts, and such a doctrine is incompatible with the object and effect of the law relating to negotiable instruments. I see no hardship to the plaintiff in so holding. If a person has lent money to the karta of a joint family for family purposes upon the security of a promissory note, he is entitled to recover the full amount due under the promissory note, irrespective of whether the money was or was not borrowed or applied for family purposes; but if he elects to pursue this course, hers restricted to the remedy that he possesses against the party to the promissory note, and must follow the special procedure provided in respect of negotiable instruments. On the other hand, in a suit aptly framed he may claim in the alternative the amount of the original debt for which the promissory note was given as security, and may proceed under the Hindu Law against the property of the joint family as a whole; but if he chooses to adopt this alternative (which may involve the consideration of very different issues) the co-parceners will be entitled to raise the defence that the debt was not contracted, or the proceeds of the loan applied, for family purposes. In short, the plaintiff in such a case may enforce the rights that he possesses either under the law relating to negotiable instruments or under the Hindu law; but whichever remedy he pursues he is bound by the rules of the Code that he invokes. For these reasons, in my opinion, the suit against Dhiren fails and must be dismissed with costs.
As regards the heirs of Naren, the plaintiff has undertaken to pay the costs of the guardian ad litem, and may add those costs to his claim against the estate of Naren.
Attorney for the plaintiff: B.B Newgie.
Attorneys for the defendants: G.N Bait & Co. & A.D Banerjee.
B.M.S
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