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Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua

Calcutta High Court
Mar 14, 1927
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam, referred questions to the Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 concerning whether various sources of income related to land (such as rents from fisheries, ground rents from potteries and brickfields, fees from tying up boats, cart stands, and market stalls, and certain nazar payments) are agricultural income exempt from income tax under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act. The reference also asked whether income from such sources not considered at the time of fixing the jama under the Permanent Settlement is assessable, and whether income derived from land in permanently-settled estates is liable to income tax. The case originated from the district of Goalpara in Assam, encompassing estates settled under the Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1793. The questions arose in light of conflicting judicial opinions from prior cases, including Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua and Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar, which involved differing views on the taxability of income from fisheries and land uses within permanently-settled estates. The matter was heard by a Full Bench following referral by a Division Bench due to these conflicts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the specified sources of income are agricultural and exempt from income tax under section 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922.
  2. Whether income derived from such sources not taken into consideration at the time of fixing the jama under the Permanent Settlement is assessable for income tax.
  3. Whether, given the terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1793, income derived from the above sources in permanently-settled estates is liable to assessment to income tax.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The Permanent Settlement fixed the jama (revenue assessment) irrevocably and forever, so no additional taxes, including income tax, can be imposed on income derived from permanently-settled estates.
  • Lord Cornwallis’ assurances at the time of the Permanent Settlement guaranteed zemindars that no further demands or augmentations of public assessment would be made on their lands.
  • The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 does not expressly repeal or modify the Permanent Settlement, and general words in the income tax statute should not be construed to override a special and earlier statutory engagement without explicit intention.
  • Zemindars are not immune from all taxation but cannot be taxed on profits derived from land in permanently-settled estates as it would violate the fixed public demand principle.
  • The income from certain items (such as fees for storing crops, nazar payments by tenants, and fees for petitions to the zemindar) fall within the definition of agricultural income and are exempt.

Crown's Arguments

  • No promise was made to exempt zemindars from all future taxation beyond fixing the land revenue (jama) forever; only the revenue assessment was fixed, not immunity from all taxes.
  • The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922, with its wide charging sections, includes income from land in permanently-settled estates subject to statutory exemptions.
  • The rule that a later general statute does not repeal an earlier special statute without express intention is limited, especially where the subject-matter of the two statutes differs financially and economically.
  • The Permanent Settlement fixed the land revenue but did not bar the legislature from imposing income tax on profits derived from land.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua Whether income from fisheries and sthaljat was agricultural income exempt from tax or liable to income tax despite Permanent Settlement. Illustrated conflict of opinion; one judge held income taxable despite Permanent Settlement, the other held it exempt; senior judge's opinion prevailed.
Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar Whether income from fisheries included in land revenue assessment was exempt from further income tax assessment. Held that if income was included in land revenue for Permanent Settlement, it was not liable to further income tax.
Seward v. Vera Cruz General words in later statutes do not repeal special earlier statutes without clear intention. Supported assessee's argument that Permanent Settlement should not be indirectly repealed by the Income-tax Act.
Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti Effect of Income-tax Act on Madras Regulation XXV of 1802 exempting certain lands from alteration of assessment. Held no express repeal of exemption; relevant for construing Permanent Settlement vis-à-vis Income-tax Act.
Associated Newspapers, Limited v. City of London Corporation Interpretation of exemption from taxes and assessments, especially future taxes. Held exemption extended to all local taxes, present and future, unless expressly repealed.
Pole-Carew v. Craddock Exemption from all taxes includes future parliamentary taxes such as income tax. Supported the principle that exemptions from taxes apply to future general taxes unless expressly excluded.
Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Finance and Customs Distinction between tax on profits and tax on commodities; general words may not extend exemption to all forms of taxation. Distinguished from present case; held that general tax on profits was different from specific export tax exemption.
Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Mussumat Sokheemoney Dossee Settlement with Government as to revenue does not establish proprietary right in land if not pre-existing. Clarified that Permanent Settlement related to revenue claims, not absolute proprietary rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature and effect of the Permanent Settlement of 1793, focusing on whether it fixed only the land revenue assessment (jama) or also exempted zemindars from all future taxation on income derived from their lands. The Court reviewed the historical background and language of Regulation I of 1793 and related Regulations, noting that the Settlement fixed the revenue payable to Government irrevocably and permanently, but did not expressly or by implication exempt the income or profits derived from land from other forms of taxation such as income tax.

The Court acknowledged the assurances given by Lord Cornwallis that the public demand (land revenue) would be fixed and unalterable, and that zemindars would enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry without augmentation of the public assessment. However, it found no indication that the Government relinquished the right to impose general taxes on income irrespective of the land revenue settlement.

The Court analyzed the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922, observing that the legislature was well aware of the Permanent Settlement and the controversies surrounding it. The Act's charging sections apply broadly to income from all sources, including land, subject to exemptions such as agricultural income. The Court held that the legislature, by clear and unambiguous language, included profits from land in permanently-settled estates within the scope of income tax, either expressly or by necessary implication.

Regarding the principle that a later general statute should not repeal an earlier special statute without express intention, the Court found that the subject-matters of the two statutes differ financially and economically—one dealing with fixed land revenue, the other with income tax on profits—and thus they could coexist without repugnancy. The Court also considered earlier income tax enactments and judicial decisions interpreting similar exemptions, concluding that the Permanent Settlement does not exempt income from land from income tax.

In dissent, one Judge held that the Permanent Settlement should be construed as exempting income from permanently-settled estates from income tax, but the majority disagreed, emphasizing the legislature's clear intent and the distinctions between the nature of the taxes.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that income derived from land in permanently-settled estates, subject to statutory exemptions (notably agricultural income), is liable to assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922. Consequently, the answer to the questions referred is that such income is assessable to income tax.

The decision resolves conflicting judicial opinions and clarifies that the Permanent Settlement fixed only the land revenue and did not grant immunity from general income taxation on profits derived from land. The ruling affirms the legislature's power to tax income from land in permanently-settled estates and confirms that the Income-tax Act applies to such income subject to its exemptions. No new precedent altering the fundamental principles of taxation or the Permanent Settlement was established, but the decision has the direct effect of upholding the taxability of income from such lands.

Show all summary ...

Ghose, J.:— On the 12th March, 1926, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam, referred to this Court for decision, under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922, the following questions:—

I. Whether the following sources of income are agricultural and, therefore, exempted from assessment to Income-tax under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act:—

(i) Jalkar or rents received from fisheries.

(ii) Ground rent from land used for potteries.

(iii) Ground rent from land used as brickfields.

(iv) Pees received from the tying up of boats against the assessee's land.

(v) Fees received from land used for storing purchase of crops (paiali).

(vi) Fees received from cart stands.

(vii) Panyaha nazar or nazar paid, by tenants of agricultural holdings at the beginning of the zemindari year.

(viii) Nazar for petitions presented to the zemindar dealing with questions of successions; settlement and partition.

(ix) Ground rent for permanent shops at hats and bazars.

(x) Stall fees paid by temporary (daily) sellers at hâts and bazars.

II. Whether income derived from such of the above sources as were not taken into consideration at the time of fixing the jama at the Permanent Settlement is assessable for Income-tax purposes.

III. Whether, having regard to the terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulation, income derived from the above sources in permanently-settled estates, is liable to assessment to Income-tax.

This Reference came on for hearing before the late Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rankin, as he then was, on the 21st May, 1926, when the attention of the learned Judges having been drawn to the conflict of opinion, as disclosed in the judgments in the cases of Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua and Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar, questions I and III were referred by the learned Judges to a Full Bench for decision. The earlier case (1) was before a Division Bench, consisting of Mr. Justice Rankin and Mr. Justice Page. Mr. Justice Rankin held that income derived from fisheries and from sthaljat (i.e, land used for stacking timber) was not “agricultural income” or income derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, within the meaning of sections 2 and 4 of the Income-tax Act, and that such income was liable to Income-tax, notwithstanding the Permanent Settlement Regulations of 1793. Mr. Justice Page held that such income was not assessable to Income-tax by reason of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. There being this difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, the opinion of the senior Judge, Mr. Justice, Rankin, prevailed under section 36 of the Letters Patent.

The other case was before a Division Bench, consisting of Mr. Justice Cuming and Mr. Justice Page, and it was there decided that where income from fisheries lying within an estate was included in the assets upon which land revenue was assessed, under the Permanent Settlement Regulations, income from such fisheries was not further liable to assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act.

The two questions referred to us are of very great importance, and we have had the advantage of hearing thereon Mr. Sircar on behalf of the assessee, and Sir Binode Mitter, on behalf of the Crown, at length. We desire to express our acknowledgments to them for the great assistance which they have rendered to us. Question I is not before the Full Bench, but Mr. Sircar mentioned that his client contended that items (v), (vii) and (viii) came within the definition of “Agricultural income” in the Income-tax Act and were therefore exempted from assessment to Income-tax under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act. This matter is not before us and it will have to be considered hereafter.

The case comes from the district of Goalpara in Assam which, including the Garo Hills, but excluding the Eastern Dooars, was originally part of the extensive collectorate of Rangpur and as such formed part of the province of Bengal, which by the Moghul Emperor's firman of the 12th August, 1765, was transferred to the East India Company. From 1765 to 1822, the old thanas of Goalpara, Dhubri and Karaibari formed part of the Rangpur district, known as the Rangamati district Under the provisions of Regulation X of 1822, these thanas were cut off from Rangpur and formed into a separate district with headquarters at Goalpara [See Sir Edward Gait's “History of Assam”, second edition, page 298; Baden-Powell's “Land Systems of British India”, volume III, page 430; Sir William Ward's “Introduction to the Land Revenue Manual, Assam, 1905”]. It is not and cannot be disputed that the assessee's estates, in respect of which the present question has arisen, were settled under the Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1793. [See Sir William Ward's “Introduction” referred to above, page liv and McNeil's “Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces of Bengal”, page 44.]

On behalf of the assessee, the case is put in this way: it is argued that it is clear that according to the engagement entered into at the time of Permanent Settlement, the “jama” then fixed cannot be altered. It was declared by the Governor-General in Council that the zemindars and other proprietors of land and their heirs would be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever (see Regulation I of 1793, section iv), and that the orders fixing the amount of the assessment were to be considered irrevocable and not liable to alteration by any persons whom the Court of Directors might appoint to the administration of the affairs of the East India Company. (section vii). At the conclusion of the Permanent Settlement, the Governor-General in Council expressed his confidence that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, would exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands under the certainty that they would enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry and that no demand would ever be made upon them for the augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates. It is pointed out that until the Proclamation of the 22nd March, 1793, relative to the limitation of the public demand upon the lands in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the public demand upon each estate was liable to annual or frequent variation at the discretion of the Government. The amount of it was fixed upon an estimate formed by the public officers of the aggregate of the rents payable by the raiyats or tenants for each bigha of land in cultivation, of which, after deducting the expenses of collection, ten-elevenths were usually considered as the right of the public and the remainder the share of the landholder. Refusal to pay the sum required of him was followed by his removal from the management of his lands and the public dues were either let in farm or collected by an officer of Government and the abovementioned share of the landholder or such sum, as special custom or the orders of Government might have fixed, was paid to him by the farmer or from the public treasury. (See Preamble to Regulation II of 1793). When the country came under British administration, two fundamental measures essential to the attainment of increase and improvements in agriculture and consequently of the increase in the wealth of the country were decided upon, namely, that the property in the soil was declared to be vested in the landholders and the revenue payable to Government from each estate was fixed for ever. (See Preamble to Regulation II of 1793). The object, therefore, of the Permanent Settlement of 1793 being to limit the public demands upon lands in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, call it by whatever name you like, is, it is argued, an additional public demand upon the lands which were settled under the Permanent Settlement of 1793, and is, therefore, a violation of a positive statutory engagement made with the zemindars at the time of the Permanent Settlement. In other words, it is suggested that it is a breach of a promise made by Lord Cornwallis when the latter had exhausted the resources of language to assure the zemindars that the rate then assessed on their lands was irrevocably fixed for ever and that they should, in all future time, be “free from any further demand for rent, tribute or any arbitrary exaction whatsoever”. It is further argued that the provisions of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal have in no way been repealed expressly or impliedly by the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922, and that, therefore, the generality of the words used in the charging sections of the Income-tax Act is inappliable to zemindars whose, lands lie in permanently-settled estates and with whom a binding engagement was entered into by the State in 1793. It is not suggested that zemindars as a body are immune from all taxation, but the contention is that they cannot be made to pay taxes on profits derived from lands in permanently-settled estates, because such taxes are in reality additions to the burdens of land which were fixed in 1793 and which were to remain unalterable for ever. It is urged that the Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1793 being an earlier statute on a special subject and the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 being a subsequent enactment of a general nature, the Court will not hold that the earlier and special legislation has been indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of general words used in the subsequent legislation, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. [See Seward v. “Vera Cruz,”.] On all these grounds, the assessee has contended before us that the answer to the third question referred to us should be in the negative, the question being slightly altered in manner following, namely, whether, having regard to the terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulation, income derived from land in permanently-settled estates subject to the exemptions provided by the Legislature is liable to assessment to Income-tax. The assessee has suggested the slight alteration indicated above in the third question, because his argument is that whether any particular items of income were or were not taken into consideration at the time of fixing the jama at the Permanent Settlement, income derived from land in permanently-settled estates subject as stated above is not and cannot be made liable to assessment to Income-tax.

On behalf of the Crown it has been strenuously contended before us by Sir Binode Mitter that there was no such promise made to the actual proprietors of lands which were settled at the time of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa as alleged on behalf of the assessee; that there are no words in Regulation I of 1793 or in the other Regulations promulgated in the same year from which the inference can be legitimately drawn that there is a statutory obligation not to impose on holders of such lands any other tax whatsoever; that all that was decided in 1793 was that the jama or revenue on lands should be treated as fixed for ever and, therefore, could not be enhanced or altered; that the Legislature is competent to assess the income derived from land in permanently-settled estates, subject to exemptions provided for by the Legislature itself, to Income-tax; that the words used in the charging sections of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, are very wide and that they must include income from land in permanently-settled estates, subject to the said exemptions; that the rule about a subsequent enactment of a general nature not being held to affect in any manner an earlier statute on a special subject cannot be pushed too far, inasmuch as the subject-matter of taxation under the later statute is different from the subject-matter of taxation under Regulation I of 1793, i.e, the subject-matters of taxation under Regulation I of 1793 and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, are financially and economically different, and that, having regard to the express specification of certain exemptions only, the present assessee's claim must fail.

These being the respective contentions of the parties, the first question that arises is what was the nature and effect of the Permanent Settlement of lands under Regulation I of 1793, under which, roughly speaking, about 1,20,000 out of the whole area of 1,40,000 square miles of the Lower Provinces of Bengal were settled. Was it a settlement merely of the revenue derivable from land which was declared to be fixed and unalterable for ever, or was it, in addition to this, a general absolution to holders of land under the Permanent Settlement, declaring their immunity from all further taxation in respect of profits derived from land? The answers to these questions must depend primarily and principally upon the language used in Regulation I of 1793 and in the connected Regulations: but to understand the nature of the transaction embodied in the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, it may be useful and indeed desirable to refer briefly to certain antecedent transactions which are matters of history. From the period of the East Indian Company's accession to the financial administration of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by the Dewany Grant of 1765, one settlement of land revenue only, that of 1772, was concluded by Warren Hastings for a term of five years; and this was made chiefly with farmers, to the exclusion of the hereditary landholders. With this exception, the settlements of revenue, mal and sayer, were in general adjusted from year to year, in some instances with the landholders and in others with farmers, e.g, the settlements for 1777, 1778, 1779 and 1780. When the zemindars or landholders declined to enter into engagements in respect of the revenue demanded from them, the rents payable by the undertenants were collected immediately from them under what was known as khas management by the officers of Government, an allowance, usually 1-10th of the actual receipts from the lands, when held khas, being given to the dispossessed zemindar or landholder. It was a system which was described by the Court of Directors as inimical to the general prosperity of the country and a striking provision in Pitt's India Act of 1784 (24 Geo. III, c. XXV) declared that “and whereas complaints have prevailed, that divers Rajas, zemindars, polygars, talukdars and other native landholders within the British territories in India have been unjustly deprived of or compelled to abandon and relinquish their respective lands' jurisdiction, rights, and privileges, or that the tributes, rents, and services required to be by them paid or performed for their respective possessions to the said united Company, are become grievous and oppressive; And whereas the principles of justice, and the honour of this country, require that such complaints should be forthwith enquired into and fully investigated, and if founded in truth effectually redressed: Be it, therefore, enacted, that the Court of Directors-of the said united Company shall, and they are hereby accordingly required forthwith to take the said matters into their serious consideration, and to adopt, take and pursue such methods for enquiring into the causes, foundation and truth of the said complaints, and for obtaining a full and perfect knowledge of the same and of all circumstances relating thereto, as the said Court of Directors shall think best adapted for that purpose; and thereupon, according to the circumstances of the respective cases of the said Rajas, zemindars, etc. to give orders and instructions to the several Governments and Presidencies in India, for effectually redressing, in such manner as shall be consistent with justice and the Jaws and customs of the country, all injuries and wrongs which the Rajas, zemindars, polygars, talukdars and other native landholders, may have sustained unjustly in the manner aforesaid, and for the settling and establishing upon principles of moderation and justice, according to the laws and constitution of India, the permanent rules by which their respective tributes, rents and services shall be in future rendered and paid to the said united Company”. Thereafter enquiries and investigations followed, and in 1790–1791 a complete Code of Regulations for the conclusion of a new settlement of the land revenue for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was promulgated by Lord Cornwallis. Decennial Settlement of 1790–1791 was made permanent by Regulation I of 1793. The settlement embraced, roughly speaking, the tracts of the country now comprised in the divisions of Burdwan, the Presidency, Rajshahi, Dacca, Chittagong, Patna and Bhagalpur, exclusive of part of the Santal Parganas. It also extended to Hazaribagh and Manbhum districts in the Chhota Nagpur Division and to Jalpaiguri and Goalpara, then forming part of the Rangpur Collectorate. Whether this arrangement was the one best adopted to obtain the greatest income with the least pressure and whether a temporary, instead of a permanent settlement, would not have been more advantageous to all parties are questions which have given rise to much discussion; but they lie outside our province and are not germane to the present enquiry.

Prior to the Decennial Settlement, the zemindar was in reality merely a bead receiver or collector of the Government land revenue from the under-tenants. He was never at any time the absolute proprietor of the estates held by him. There was no fixed principle governing the rate of rent, or the mode of its recovery from the under-tenants. This want of settled rules and practice led to extortion, fraud and concealment; and to remedy this unsatisfactory state of land management, the Decennial Settlement was determined on and was, as stated above, eventually made perpetual. On the zemindars was thrown the onus of paying the revenue, they being considered persons of substance. The punctuality of payment from the zemindars was enforced by the penalty of confiscation of their estates in case of delay, but powers were given to the zemindars to collect from the raiyats.

These being the circumstances leading to the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, let us now turn to the language used in Regulation I of 1793 and examine whether there is any foundation for the contention that, having regard to the bargain made at the time of the Permanent Settlement, income derived from land in permanently-settled areas is not assessable to Income-tax. It is, therefore, necessary to find out at the outset what was the precise language used by Lord Cornwallis in Regulation I of 1793 taken as a whole. The material provisions are as follows:—

“I. The following articles of the Proclamation relative to the limitation of the public demand upon the lands, addressed by the Governor-General in Council to the zemindars, independent talukdars, and other actual proprietors of land paying revenue to Government, in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, are hereby enacted into a Regulation, which is to have force and effect from the 22nd March, 1733, the date of the Proclamation.

“II. Article I.—In the original Regulations for the decennial settlement of the public revenues of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, passed for those provinces, respectively, on the 25th September, 1789, the 25th November, 1789, and the 10th February, 1790, it was notified to the proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement might be concluded, that the jama assessed upon their lands under those Regulations would be continued after the expiration of ten years and remain unalterable for ever, provided such continuance should meet with the approbation of the Honourable Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company, and not otherwise.

III. Article II.—The Marquis Cornwallis, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Governor General in Council, now notifies to all zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land paying revenue to Government, in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, that he has been empowered by the Honourable Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company to declare the jama, which has been or may be assessed upon their lands under the Regulations abovementioned, fixed for ever.

IV. Article III.—The Governor General in Council accordingly declares to the zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been concluded under the Regulations abovementioned, that at the expiration of the term of the settlement no alteration will be made in the assessment which they have respectively engaged to pay, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever.

V. Article IV.—The lands of some zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land, having been held khas, or let in farm, in consequence of their refusing to pay the assessment required of them under the Regulations abovementioned, the Governor General in Council now notifies to the zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land whose lands are held khas, that they shall be restored to the management of their lands, upon their agreeing to the payment of the assessment which has been or may be required of them, in conformity to the Regulations abovementioned, and that no alteration shall afterwards be made in that assessment, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors, shall be permitted to hold their respective estates at such assessment for ever; and he declares to the zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land, whose lands have been let in farm, that they shall not regain possession of their lands before the expiration of the period for which they have been farmed (unless the farmers shall voluntarily consent to make over to them the remaining term of their lease, and the Governor General in Council shall approve of the transfer), but that at the expiration of that period, upon their agreeing to the payment of the assessment which may be required of them, they shall be reinstated, and that no alteration shall afterwards be made in that assessment, but that they, and their heirs and lawful successors, shall be allowed to hold their respective estate at such assessment for ever.

VI. Article. V.—In the event of the proprietary right in lands that are, or may become, the property of Government being transferred to individuals, such individuals, and their heirs and lawful successors, shall be permitted to hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be transferred for ever.

VII. Article VI.—It is well known to the zemindars, independent talukdarars and other actual proprietors of land, as well as to the inhabitants of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, in general, that from the earliest times until the present period the public assessment upon the lands has never been fixed, but that according to established usage and custom, the rulers of these provinces have from time to time demanded an increase of assessment from the proprietors of land; and that, for the purpose of obtaining this increase, not only frequent investigations have been made to ascertain the actual produce of their estates, but that it has been the practice to deprive them of the management of their lands, and either to let them in farm, or to appoint officers on the part of Government to collect the assessment immediately from the raiyats. The Honourable Court of Directors, considering these usages and measures to be detrimental to the prosperity of the country, have, with a view to promote the future case and happiness of the people, authorised the foregoing declarations; and the zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, are to consider these orders fixing the amount of the assessment as irrevocable, and not liable to alteration by any persons whom the Court of Directors may hereafter appoint to the administration of their affairs in this country.

The Governor General in Council trusts that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the jruits of their own good management and industry, and that no demand will ever be made upon them, or their heirs of successors, by the present or any future Government, for an augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improve me it of their respective estates”.

The words “public assessment being fixed”, “under the certainty that they would enjoy exclusively” and “that no demand would ever be made upon them for an augmentation of the assessment” were stressed by learned counsel on behalf of the assessee and it was argued that the same principle which prevented an augmentation of the assessment ought equally to preclude the taxation of the landholders in respect of the rent or produce of their estates, because such taxation must necessarily prevent them from enjoying—exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry. No doubt, the words used by Lord Cornwallis in Regulation I of 1793, taken by themselves and apart from what has been called their historical setting, may lend a certain amount of colour to the contention put forward on behalf of the assessee: but, in my view, the settlement made in 1790–1791 by Lord Cornwallis, commonly called the Decennial Settlement differed in no respect from an ordinary settlement of land except that it was made for 10 years in place of being annual, as was then the practice. The Court of Directors approved in 1792 that it should be made permanent and Lord Cornwallis' issued a Proclamation fixing the 10 years' settlement for ever. The clear purport of the declaration made in Regulation I of 1793 is, in my judgment, nothing more than this, viz., that the reassessment of the estates in question was for ever barred. In other words the land assessment then formed was to be considered the permanent and unalterable revenue of the territorial possessions of the East India Company in Bengal so that no discretion might be exercised by the Company's servants in any case of introducing any alteration whatsoever. By Regulation XIX of 1793 it was stated that by the ancient law of the country the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the produce of every bigha of land (demandable in money or kind according to local custom) unless it transfers its right thereto for a term or in perpetuity, or limits the public demand upon the whole of the lands belonging to an individual, leaving him to appropriate to his own use the difference between the value, of such proportion of the produce and the sum payable to the public, whilst he continues to discharge the latter”. As I read these words and the words used in Regulation I of 1793, along with the words in Regulation VIII of 1793, which provided that the assessment should be regulated as to leave to the proprietors a provision for themselves and families equal to about 10 per cent, on the amount of their contribution to Government, the conclusion, to my mind, is irresistible that what was levied in 1793 was by virtue of a; substantive and paramount title vested in the State. Regulation I of 1793, therefore, was so framed as to operate as an ample and complete guarantee that no resettlement of the estates referred to therein should ever take effect. But it seems to me that no guarantee was ever given that the proprietors of those estates should never, at any time, be called upon to aid in the relief of the future necessities of the Government of the land. (See in this connection the significant words used by Lord Cornwallis in the second clause of Article VII of Regulation I of 1793.) The conclusion I have come to is, in my opinion, amply supported by the terms of Regulation XIX of 1793, which, be it noted, was passed on the same date, namely, the 1st May, 1793, and which laid clown the rules by which rent-free tenures should be held valid. In the case of a valid rent-free tenure, Regulation XIX provides that no revenue at all should be demanded, just as Regulation I of 1793 provided that in the case of a permanently-settled estate no additional revenue should at any time be assessed. Both these Regulations treated the same subject-matter, viz., revenue: and they treated in the same way, namely, by barring future assessment. Would it be or could it be contended that the proprietors of valid rent-free tenures held under Regulation XIX of 1793 were and are absolutely exempted from liability to contribute to the general taxation of the country. The answer to that question must, in my judgment, be in the negative in the clearest manner possible. When Lord Cornwallis spoke of the “public demand” being fixed and made permanent and being limited, for ever, what is it that he meant? Lord Cornwallis held the view, as is clear from the Regulations, that the true wealth of a Government lay in the growing wealth of its people and the fiscal system which must encourage the accumulation and enjoyment of capital in private hands, must in the long run be the one most profitable to the State. In this connection I desire to adopt, if I may, as part of my judgment, a few words from the despatch of the Secretary of State for India in Council, dated the 12th May, 1870, being the same despatch from which my brother Page quoted a few extracts in his judgment in the case Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua. The Duke of Argyll then observed as follows:—“The great object and purpose of that settlement (the Permanent Settlement of Bengal), as clearly defined and described in Article VI, must govern our inter pretation of its terms. That object as this Article explains at length, was to be an end for ever to the practice of all former Governments of altering and raising the land taxes from time to time, so that the landholder was never sure for any definite period what proportion of the total produce of the soil might be exacted by the State. This uncertainty was to be set at rest for ever. The ‘public demand’ was to be fixed and permanent”. Such was the promise: and “its scope and object were clearly explained in the concluding exhortation addressed to the landholders that ‘they would exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands under the certainty that they would enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and that no demand would ever be made upon them or their heirs and successors by the present or any future Government for an augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates’”. These last words quoted by the Duke of Argyll, I. repeat, illustrate the whole force of the argument: there is to be no increase of the public demand levied upon the zemindars in consequence of the improvement of their estates. The implication, farther, is (although the Legislature is all powerful) that there cannot be, without being guilty of a singular and signal breach of faith, a “special tax” on zemindars with whom the Permanent Settlement was concluded, which would operate as an increase of the “public demand” levied in respect of land upon zemindars in consequence of the improvement of their estates: but in my judgment, there was no promise or engagement of any description whatsoever by which the Government of the day surrendered their right to levy a “general” tax upon incomes of all persons irrespective of the fact whether they are zemindars with whom the Permanent Settlement was concluded or not. A “general” tax is no doubt a public demand but it is one which is levied upon a wholly different principle and in respect of a wholly different kind of liability: such a public demand is no doubt a demand made upon zemindars with whom the Permanent Settlement was concluded, but it is made upon them in company with other classes of the community and with no exclusive reference to the source from which their incomes are derived. On these grounds, I am of opinion that the first contention urged before us on behalf of the assessee must fail, and it is accordingly negatived.

But assume that I am wrong in the conclusion to which I have come: it is then necessary to examine whether the words used in the charging sections of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, subject to the exemptions provided for by the Legislature itself, are sufficiently wide in support of the contention that income from the profits, of land in permanently-settled estates, subject to the said exemptions, is liable to be assessed to Income-tax. To start with, it is, in my opinion, unreasonable to hold that the Legislature, in enacting the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had not had its attention directed to the terms of, Regulation I of 1793. The Permanent Settlement of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa has been the subject of acute controversy ever since the days of Lord Dalhousie and the question of the immunity of zemindars in permanently-settled areas from taxation has been canvassed so often and at such length that to suggest that the Legislature, in enacting the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was unmindful of the Permanent Settlement, is to state a proposition which carries its own refutation. The position, therefore, is that the Legislature, with the full knowledge of the existence of the Permanent Settlement and with the further knowledge, with which it must be credited, that the precise point now raised had been raised in the past, had deliberately chosen, subject to the exemption of “agricultural income” (the other exemptions need not be considered in this case) to say that the Indian Income-tax. Act, 1922, shall apply to all incomes, profits or gains as described or comprised in section 6, from whatever source derived, accruing or arising or received in British India or deemed under the provisions of this Act to accrue, or to arise, or to be received in British India. In section 6, it is provided that “Save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income, profits and gains shall be chargeable to income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing, viz., (i) Salaries, (ii) Interest on Securities, “(iii) Property,(iv) Business,) Professional earnings, (vi) Other sources”. Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 define the heads of income referred to above other than “Other sources”. Section 12 defines the expression “Other sources”, and it runs as follows: “The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head ‘Other sources’ in respect of income, profits and gains of every kind and from every source to which this Act applies (if not included under any of the preceding heads)”. As I read these provisions, it is abundantly clear that the Legislature, notwithstanding the solemn covenant, which, it is alleged, Lord Cornwallis entered into with zemindars in permanently-settled areas, has deliberately included income from profits of land wherever situate, be the area permanently settled or non-permanently settled, as being assessable to Income-tax. It may be that the Legislature has not said in the direct manner suggested by the assessee in the course of the argument that to the extent to which income from profits of land in permanently-settled areas is assessable to Income-tax, the Permanent Settlement is repealed or abrogated or derogated from: but, on looking at the matter purely as question of construction of the charging sections in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, taken along with the exemptions, I am of opinion that the Legislature has said in the most direct manner possible and in clear and unambiguous language that the profits of land in India (by which expression I must include land in permanently-settled areas) are subject to statutory exemptions assessable to Income-tax. But even if it be held that the Legislature has not directly, said so, there is no escape from the conclusion that, by necessary implication, the Legislature has said that.

But it is said that the repeal or abrogation of the Permanent Settlement should have been in so many words and that the rule is that, in the absence of such words, the Court will not hold that the earlier legislation on a special subject has been in any way affected by the subsequent enactment of a general nature. Now, it is particularly important when one examines the nature of the contention herein put forward to keep in mind the subject-matters of the legislation in 1793 and in 1922. As I have already said, what Regulation I of 1793 did was to fix the jama which had been assessed on the lands of zemindars and other actual proprietors for ever. The word “taxation” was not used or referred to in any way. The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 has in no way increased the jama which was fixed in 1793. As has been said, the financial policy of 1793 was not and could not have been the same as the financial policy in 1922 and, in these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the rule referred to above can possibly apply in the present case.

The general rule, no doubt, is that where two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant, the latest expression of the will of the Legislature must prevail, provided the Court is satisfied that the repeal of the prior enactment must flow from necessary implication. From this rule, it follows that if one statute enacts something in general terms, and afterwards another statute is passed on the same subject, the subsequent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the former statute. In certain cases again “special” Acts have been held impliedly to repeal a prior general Act. But in each case it depends on the particular terms of the statute in question. There is again the further rule that prior statutes are not to be held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant, in cases where the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general. In support of this last-mentioned proposition, learned counsel on behalf of the assessee has quoted the well known case of Seward v. “Vera Cruz”, where Lord Selborne observed as follows:—“Where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so”. There are numerous authorities laying down the same proposition in similar words and the guiding rule is that each enactment must be construed according to its own subject-matter and its own terms. There is, however, a further proposition which has been recognised in several cases that the rule referred to above, namely, the rule in Seward's case, must not be pressed too far and that a general statute may repeal a particular statute if the subject-matter of the two legislations is one and the same. The test also is—Are the provisions of a later Act so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together? In which cases the maxim Logs posteriores contraria abrogant must apply? But where the Legislature passes a later Act without reference to an earlier Act and that earlier Act is one which has been in force for a long time and is, therefore, well known, it seems reasonable and proper that we should try to construe the two Acts consistently, if it is possible to do so. In this case, as I have already said, the subject-matters of the two legislations are different: the later statute is on a subject which is financially and economically different from that dealt with in the statute of 1793: one deals with revenue assessed on lands, the other is a tax on profits: therefore in terms there is no contradiction [see in this connexion Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co. Ld. v. Minister of Finance and Customs. Is it not, therefore, right and reasonable to allow the two enactments to stand side by side as not being inconsistent?

In my opinion, it is not only desirable but necessary to see how the Legislature has interpreted or observed the fixity of public demand referred to or promised in 1793. I am not unmindful of the contentions which have been advanced by learned counsel on behalf of the assessee in this connexion, namely, that in most of the previous statutes, such as the Cess Acts referred to in the judgment of Mr. Justice Mallik in the case of the Maharajadhiraj Of Darbhanga v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax*, there was a direct reference to land, in permanently-settled areas: but I have, in my mind, at the present moment the various Income-tax Acts imposed in India since 1860. The Income-tax Act of 1860, which was for a period of 5 years only and which imposed a 3 per cent, tax, made no distinction between agricultural income and non-agricultural income and it included income derived from land in India wherever situate. Such income was taxed directly. The Act of 1860, as I have said, ceased to operate in 1865. In 1867 it was again brought into operation and this time the Act excluded agricultural income. In 1869, what was known as the Certificate Tax Act was converted into a general Income-tax Act and it included, agricultural income. Thereafter it appears that for some time there was no tax on incomes. In 1872, an Act was passed for imposing duties on incomes arising from offices, properties, professions and trades, to be in force for one year only. Section 21 of this Act is important. By that section it was provided that owners of lands or houses occupying the same should be chargeable in respect of the annual value thereof at 9-10ths of the fall rent at which such lands or houses were worth to be let for the year. It was further provided that the local Governments may, with the sanction of the Governor General in Council prescribe for the whole or any part of the territories, subject to such local Government's special rules for the assessment of income derived from land, at an amount bearing a fixed proportion to the revenue assessed thereon. Then came in 1886, the Income-tax Act of that year: and taxes on incomes were made permanent. The Act of 1886 (the Legislature bearing no doubt in mind the fact that land from which agricultural income was derived was already subject to the payment of cesses under Act X of 1871) excluded agricultural income. It was described as an Act for imposing a tax on income derived from sources other than agriculture. It dealt with the question of land by way of exemption in section 5, but subject to the exemptions prescribed in that Act, income from land, wherever situate, was assessed to Income-tax. Then, followed the Act of 1918 and this, with a slight alteration, was followed by the present Act of 1922. It is argued that the main question now before us is whether, having regard to the language of the Act of 1922, there is or is not an exemption of all income derived from permanently-settled estates. I agree that is the question to be solved: but in arriving; at a solution of the question, it is, in my opinion, permissible to us to consider how the Legislature has hitherto regarded the validity or otherwise of the contention put forward by the assessee. The point has been so exhaustively dealt with by Mr. Justice Rankin and by Mr. Justice Mallik in the two cases one in this Court and the other in the Patna High Court, and their conclusions have been laid down so clearly that I think it will be a work of supererogation if I elaborate it further. I will content myself by quoting one passage only from the judgment of Mr. Justice Rankin, with which I respectfully agree. His Lordship observed: “An express exemption which is large enough to cover all permanently-settled estates, and which covers them to the full extent of agricultural purposes, if not somewhat further, cannot readily be taken as applying only to estates not permanently settled, or as an addition to an implied exemption of all permanently-settled estates for all purposes whatsoever.”

The matter really comes back to this, viz., has the Legislature in enacting the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, sufficiently expressed itself in declaring that income from land (by which expression I include revenue-free as well as revenue-paying lands) is assessable to Income-tax. In my view, the Legislature has so expressed itself and it has expressed itself in a manner as to leave no room for doubt. Our attention has been drawn to the case of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti, where their Lordships had to consider the effect of the Income-tax Act, 1918, upon the Madras Regulation XXV of 1802, which declared “that no alteration would be made in the assessment which the proprietors have engaged to pay but they and their heirs and lawful successors would be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever”. The Madras High Court held that there was no express modification or repeal of the exemptions existing under the Madras Regulations in the Indian Income-tax Act of 1918 (the Income-tax. Act of 1922 is substantially similar in terms to that of 1918 for the purposes of the present argument). It was further held that it was impossible to treat as a legal and effective abrogation of the exemption by the words of section 3 of the Income-tax Act, 1918. Their Lordships referred to the case of the Associated Newspapers, Limited v. City of London Corporation. What happened in that case was this. By Statute VII, Geo. Ill, C. 37 certain lands in the city of London, reclaimed from the river Thames, were declared to vest in the owners, free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever. In 1848, i.e, about 80 years later, the City of London Sewers Act was passed, which imposed a new rate upon every occupier of a house or building within or partly within the city of London, whether such person shall be now liable in respect of such, house or building to be assessed to the relief of the poor or be not liable in respect thereof by reason of such house or building being situate in any precinct or extra parochial place or otherwise. The House of Lords held that these words did not take away the express exemption granted by the earlier statute. This case has been discussed in the case of Pole-Carew v. Craddock. There the facts were as follows. A ferry was established by and maintained under an Act of 1790, which was to be deemed to be a public Act and which contained a provision that the then proprietors or their respective heirs or assigns shall not be rated or assessed for or towards the payment of any tax, rate or assessment whatsoever, parliamentary or parochial for or in respect of the said ferry. The question arose whether the exemption granted by the statute extended to parliamentary taxes in existence at the date of the Act and whether it included Income-tax which was first imposed subsequently to the passing of the Act of 1790. It was held that the exemption extended to parliamentary taxes whether in existence at the date of the Act or not and, therefore, it included Income-tax. Lord Sterndale, in his judgment, observed as follows:—“I think it is laid down quite clearly that, where there is an exemption from all rates, taxes and assessments, or all rates, taxes and assessments, whatsoever or whatever, if there is any difference, that exemption has to be looked at in connection with the subject-matter of the Act in which it is contained, and also in connection with the context in which it occurs. It may be that when so looked at it may become necessary to limit the very wide terms in which the exemption is framed. An instance of that is to be found in the cases which have been decided upon the Act of Parliament which has been often under discussion, the Act of 7 Geo. 3, c. 37 which gave exemption to certain persons who reclaimed land from the river Thames for the purpose of the building of Black friars Bridge. The words of that exemption were ‘free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever’. It has been quite clearly laid down with regard to that exemption that it applies only to local taxation and in a great measure upon this ground, that the Act was in the nature of what has been sometimes called a bargain. It, came into existence in these circumstances. The Corporation of London, who promoted the Bill, were anxious to get this land reclaimed, and they offered terms to the persons who would do it, in the Act of Parliament. Looking at those circumstances and also at the context in which the words occurred, it was held that the Corporation could only have been offering an exemption from taxes which they had the power to impose, and that inasmuch as they had no power to impose what is called Imperial taxation or general taxation, the exemption could not refer to such taxation. That is an instance on the one side. To take an instance on the other side, in Duke of Argyll v. Inland Revenue Commissioners where the exemption was from all taxes, it was held that included all taxes of all description, and from the subject-matter it is difficult to see how the decision could have been otherwise. We start, therefore, with this that in construing, the exemption you have to look to a certain extent to the subject-matter of the Act in which it is contained and to the context in which it occurs. But of course there is in this Act a very important difference in the language, and while you have to look at the circumstances and the context you must not omit to look also at the language. The language of the Act of 1790 is not ‘all rates, taxes and assessments’ simply, but ‘any tax’ rate of assessment whatsoever, parliamentary or parochial, for or in respect of the said ferry etc.’…. It seems to me it is quite clear that the words ‘payment of any tax-rate or assessment whatsoever, parliamentary or parochial, mean what they say, that the exemption is not to be confined to parochial taxation or parochial rating, but extends to general parliamentary taxation such as is defined in the cases to which I have referred, and such general parliamentary taxation includes the income-tax”.

His Lordship then referred to the case of the Associated Newspapers Limited v. City of London Corporation and stated that as he understood the decision in that case, it did away entirely with the meaning which had been attached to the earlier cases, namely, the meaning that unless altered by express words, an exemption from taxation related only to present and not to future taxation. In the view I have taken of the words used in the Permanent Settlement Regulations of 1793, the two cases last cited have really no bearing. The language used in 1793 is very different from the language used in the old English Statutes referred to in the cases before the House of Lords and before the King's Bench Division. I desire to repeat again that before effect is given to contentions founded on the cases just referred to, it is very important that the exemption claimed should be looked at in connexion with the subject-matter of the Act in which it is contained and also in connexion with the context in which it occurred. Indeed this has been emphasized by Lord Sterndale, and if the matter is looked at from this point of view, the present case would rather seem to be within the line of cases of which the case of Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co. v. Minister of Finance and Customs is an example.

The language used in Regulation I of 1793 may not inaptly be compared with the language used in section 4 of 23 Geo. II, c. XVI, which ran as follows:—“And it is hereby enacted by the authority aforesaid that all and every contributor and contributors upon this Act duly paying the consideration or purchase money at the rate aforesaid at or before the respective days or times in this Act before limited in that behalf for such annuity or annuities as aforesaid or such as he, she or they may appoint his, her or their respective executors, administrators, successors or assigns, shall have received and enjoyed and be entitled by virtue of this Act to have received and enjoyed their respective annuity and annuities so to be purchased out of the moneys by this Act appropriated or appointed for payment thereof as aforesaid and shall have good and sure estates and interests therein for ever, subject only to the proviso or condition of redemption in this Act afterwards contained concerning the same; and that all the said annuities to be purchased on this Act and the principal moneys paid for the same and every of them during the continuance thereof shall be free from all taxes, charges and impositions whatsoever”. Now, the first English Income-tax Act was Mr. Pitt's Act in 1798, 5 years after Lord Corn-wallis's proclamation, (incidentally it may be remarked that in 1793, Income-tax was not thought of anywhere in the British Empire, nor merely in India, but not even in the British Islands); but nobody has ever contended that notwithstanding the provisions of the Loan Act referred to above, by which the English National Debt was contracted, that in a general tax upon income the exemption referred to above was at all applicable. The case of the present assessee is nowhere near so strong. In one sense, I agree that every form of taxation is indirect taxation of income from land of whatever character it is or may be; but if it is indirect taxation of land, it is certainly not within the pledge which was given in 1793, assuming that, on the words used, the inference may be legitimately drawn that a pledge such as the assessee argues was given.

On all these grounds I am of opinion that income from land, subject to the exemptions in the Income-tax Act, is liable to be assessed to Income-tax and that the answer to the third question, subject to the said exemptions, is in the affirmative. The answer to the second question, subject as stated above, is also in the affirmative.

Buckland, J.:— I concur.

Suhrawardy, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgment to be just delivered by my learned brother, Mukerji, J., and I agree with him in his reasonings and conclusions.

Panton, J.:— I agree in the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Mr. Justice Ghose.

Mukerji, J.:— The two questions referred to the Full Bench are:—

“II. Whether income derived from such of the above sources as were not taken into consideration at the time of fixing the jama at the time of the Permanent Settlement is assessable for Income-tax purposes?

“III. Whether, having regard to the terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulation, income derived from the above sources in permanently-settled estates is liable to assessment to Income-tax.”

The “above sources” referred to in these questions are:— (i) Jalkar or rents received from fisheries, (ii) Ground rent from land used for potteries, (iii) Ground rent from land used as brickfields, (iv) Fees received from the tying up of boats against the assessee's land (v) Fees received from land used for storing purchases of crops (paiali), (vi) Fees received from cart stands, (vii) Punyaha nazar, or nazar paid by tenants of agricultural holdings at the beginning of the zemindari year, (viii) Nazar for petitions presented to the zemindar, dealing with questions of succession, settlement and partition, (ix) Ground rent for permanent shops at hats and bazars, and (x) Stall-fees paid by temporary (daily) sellers at hats and bazars.

To answer these questions, it is necessary to appreciate the true nature and effect of the settlement that was meant by the Permanent Settlement. This, no doubt, has to be gathered primarily from the Regulation dealing with it, viz., Regulation I of 1793, but there are expressions used in that Regulation, to realise the exact import and significance of which, reference must be made to some of the other Regulations that were passed at the same time and a brief survey also of the history of events that led up to them is more than necessary; e.g, such expressions as the following: “the limitation of public demand upon the land (Section I); the jama assessed, upon their lands under those Regulations would be continued after the expiration of ten years and remain unalterable for ever” (Section II, Article I; “to declare the jama, which has been or may be assessed upon their lands under the Regulations abovementioned, fixed for ever” (Section III, Article II); “at the expiration of the term of the settlement, no alteration will be made in the assessment which they have respectively engaged to pay, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever” (Section IV, Article III); “they, and their heirs and lawful successors, shall be allowed to hold their respective estates at such assessment for ever” (Section V, Article IV);. “such individuals, and their heirs and lawful successors, shall be permitted to hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be transferred for ever” (Section VI, Article V); “from the earliest times until the present period the public assessment upon the land has never been fixed and the zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, are to consider these orders fixing, the amount of the assessment as irrevocable, and not liable to alteration by any persons whom the Court of Directors may hereafter appoint to the administration of their affairs in this country” (Section VII, Article VI); “from the limitation of the public demand upon the lands, the net income, and consequently the value (independent of any increase of rent obtainable by improvements), of any lauded property,…, will always be ascertainable by a comparison of the amount of the fixed jama assessed upon it” (Section X, Arcticle IX).

Up to 1793, no general code of law had been enacted for India; rules and orders were passed from time to time, but no systematic Code was framed. Regulation I of 1793 was passed on the 1st May, 1793, and on the same day forty-seven other Regulations were passed. The Regulation consisted of the proclamation of Lord Cornwallis of the 22nd March, 1793 and was made law from that date. The proclamation was addressed to the “zemindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of land paying revenue to Government in the provinces of Bengal “Bihar and Orissa”. The opening words of “Regulations XIX and XXXVII of 1793 and the first paragraph of Regulation II of 1793 explain the basis of the Permanent Settlement: “By the ancient law” (custom perhaps would have been a better word; “of the country the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the produce of every bigha of land (demandable in money or kind, according to local custom), unless it transfers its right thereto for a term or in perpetuity, or limits the public demand upon the whole of the lands belonging to an individual, leaving him to appropriate to his own use the difference between the value of such proportion of the produce and the sum payable to the public, whilst he continues to discharge the latter” (Regulation XIX of 1793, Section I; see also preamble to Regulation XXXVII of 1793); and “As being the two fundamental measures essential to the attainment of it, the property in the soil has been declared to be vested in the landholders, and the revenue payable to Government from each estate has been fixed for ever” (Regulation II of 1793, Section 1). What is this “public demand” or “revenue” that was intended to be limited or fixed for ever, and what was the “jama” or “assessment” that was so fixed?

When, by virtue of the grant of the Diwani in 1765, the task of administering the land and the revenue devolved, upon, the Company's servants, they found it too difficult for them to perform. They had been previously occupied solely in pursuit of trade and had very little opportunities of acquiring the requisite knowledge and experience, and accordingly they were placed in an extraordinary position. They followed for some time with little or no change the system of administration which had obtained before. It would be tedious to set out the changes that were introduced as regards the machinery of collection or the supervision that was to be exercised in that behalf, between then and the time of the Permanent Settlement, and this need not be done for our present purposes. It is noteworthy that in 1769 a letter of instruction was issued to the supervisors who were just then appointed to superintend the Indian officers employed throughout the country in collecting the revenue and administering justice,—a memorable document, setting forth with remarkable perspicuity and scrupulous care the duties that they had to discharge, chief amongst which was to hold some elaborate enquiries. The two main objects of these enquiries, so far as land revenue was concerned, were to fix the amount of what the zemindar received from the raiyat as his income or emolument, and to secure to the raiyat, after he had supplied the legal dues of the Government, the enjoyment of the remainder. The task was too much for those by whom it was to be performed, and the enquiries were looked upon with suspicion by those for whose benefit they were meant. Accordingly the directions were countermanded and minute scrutinies were prohibited. The condition of the country was as unhappy as ever, and notwithstanding the great famine of 1770 and the consequent mortality and the decrease of cultivation, the standard of collection of revenue was maintained, nay it rather improved in consequence of violence and oppression and imposition of assessment on existing raiyats to cover the loss that had been sustained by reason of the death or absconsion of others. In 1771, the Court of Directors sent out instructions to stand forth as the Diwan and by the agency of the Company's servants to take upon themselves the entire care and management of the revenues. From 1765 to 1771, with the exception of the 24-Parganas, Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong, the other districts were left under Indian management. Bihar had been settled for a term of years, but the settlement for the revenue, mal and sayer, in Bengal and Orissa had up to this time been from year to year. These settlements were made in some instances with landholders, in others with farmers, or when the former declined to engage for the revenue and no adequate proposal was made by the latter, the rents payable by the under-tenants used to be collected by the officers of Government under khas management. This fluctuating system was impolitic and fraught with evil. The old assessment at which revenue was collected was found to be too much for the country to bear and accordingly in 1772 measures were adopted with a view to make a quinquennial settlement of Bengal and Orissa. This settlement was made for the most part with farmers, as it was thought that the real value of the country could be better ascertained by letting it out in farm for a term of years to the highest bidder. Speculators having no idea of the real capabilities of the country and incited by hopes of making the same large profits as could be reaped under the old system which was not particularly keen about punishing extortion or oppression, intervened and readily agreed for sums which eventually they were unable to pay. Experience thus showed the quinquennial settlement to be a mistake. In 1776, the Governor General in Council submitted to the Court of Directors, for approval, a scheme for making life-settlements with the zemindars, but it was not approved for certain “weighty reasons”. In 1777, and thereafter, annual settlements were again made under the orders of the Court of Directors, preference being now given to zemindars, whenever they were agreeable to a reasonable-assessment.

In 1784, Statute 24 Geo. III, C. 25 was passed by the British Parliament, section 39 of which required, to give orders “for settling and establishing upon principles of moderation and justice, according to the laws and constitution of India the permanent rules by which the tributes, rents and services of the rajas, zemindars, polygars, talukdars, and other native holders should be in future rendered and paid to the United Company.” In obedience to these requirements, orders were transmitted two years later to the Government of India for making inquiry into the condition of the landholders and other inhabitants, residing under their authority and for the establishment of permanent rules for the settlement and collections of the revenue and administration of justice founded on the ancient laws and usages of the country, so as “to fix a permanent revenue on a review of the collections of former years, and that the settlement should, in every practicable instance, be made with the zemindars, rules being at the same time made for maintaining the rights of other classes according to the usages of the country” and they sent orders for a decennial settlement in the first instance with a view to be made permanent on their approval. On receipt of these orders most careful local enquiries were again made in order to obtain all possible and available information as to the past and present state of the country. The nature, extent and scope of these enquiries and the nature of the settlement that was made by the decennial settlement may best be gathered from, what Mr. Harrington says about them in his Analysis of the Bengal Regulations, Vol. II, pp. 174-177. He says thus:—

“On receipt of these instructions the most particular local enquiries were set on foot, to obtain all possible information of the former and present state of the several districts; the condition of the land-holders and tenants of every description; their rights under the Moghul Government before its decline; the laws and usages which had since prevailed in settling the rents payable by the raiyats, dependent talukdars, and other under-tenants to the zemindars, independent talukdars, and other superior landholders; what new impositions and exactions had been introduced under the “Company's administration; what rules were required for securing the inferior occupants and immediate cultivators of the soil against oppression and extortion; and generally what measure should be adopted to remedy existing defects and abuses in the adjustment and collection of the land rents; as well as in the gunge, hat, bazar, and other duties levied, under the general denomination of sayer. Detailed accounts of the assessment, and actual collections, in past years were also procured; with every other document which appeared material for determining a standard revenue for future years, such as the orders of the Court of Directors prescribed, and the landholders might be able to pay without distressing their tenants; and the voluminous reports of the Collectors, Board of Revenue, and other public officers, upon the inquiries made by them, were abridged and brought forward in a collective view, by a member of the Government, eminently distinguished for his talents, knowledge and experience; whose minute on the settlement of Bengal, recorded the 18th June 1789, was subsequently noticed by the Court of Directors as a “comprehensive and masterly dissertation”, which not only exhibited and methodised the most material parts of the reports from the Collectors of the Bengal province, but afforded new and important communications from himself; supplying, in various respects, what they wanted; delineating with great clearness the past financial system, and history of Bengal; examining with candour those points in it which have been subjects of controversy; investigating with, patient judgment the best system for that country; the difficulties which may attend it; the means of obviating them; and in fine, proposing from the whole a set of regulations for carrying into execution the orders of the Court respecting the Decennial Settlement so as to secure justice both to the Government and to the subject; and to prevent, in future, those abuses, which either exist or may be apprehended, in the detail of the collection. On consideration of this document, with the papers which accompanied, it, and a farther minute from the same Member of Government, on the settlement of Bihar, recorded 18th September, 1789, the Governor General in Council passed the rules, afterwards incorporated with amendments,……. in Regulation VIII of 1793……. The primary rule directs that ‘a new settlement of the land revenue shall be concluded for a period of ten years, to commence with the “Fussily, Villaity, and Bengal year 1197, for Bihar, Orissa, and Bengal respectively.’ And by the succeeding rule it is at the same time, notified to the “proprietors of land, with whom the settlement may be concluded, that the assessment fixed by the Decennial Settlement, will be continued after the expiration of the ten years and remain unalterable for ever; provided such continuance shall meet with the approbation of the Honourable Court of Directors, but not otherwise”.

Then followed that memorable controversy between Lord Cornwallis and the members of his Government, in which he put forward cogent arguments for fixing “the Government demand” as the first measure necessary to be adopted to afford an opportunity to the landholder “of increasing his profits by the improvement of his lands”. He was of opinion that the potta regulations and a general reservation of the right of the Government to interfere for the protection of the raiyats and the prohibition of new abwabs and such other small remedial measures would sufficiently protect the raiyats and that the view of his opponents did not warrant the postponement of a measure which he deemed “best calculated to promote the substantial interest of the Company and of the British nation as well as the happiness and prosperity of the natives of Indian. The Court of Directors, on examining the materials placed before them, were strongly in favour of a permanent settlement and signified their approval of the Decennial Settlement being made permanent. They wrote back to that effect, expressing their intention in these words: “It being our intention in the whole of this measure, effectually to limit our own demands, but not to depart from our inherent right, as sovereigns, of being the guardians and protectors of every class of persons living under our Government”, etc. The Decennial Settlement was, thereupon, made permanent by the proclamation, dated the 22nd March, 1793, and subsequently enacted into Regulation I of 1793 as already stated. As regards the effect of the Permanent Settlement, in so far as its broad features are concerned, as affecting the relations between the State, the zemindar and the raiyats, two radically distinct views are sometimes taken. The advocates of one view say that before the Permanent Settlement there was a declaration by Government that it was necessary to secure the raiyats in the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands, that of the three parties concerned, viz., the State, the zemindar and the raiyat, the raiyat's was the dominant right, that is to say, he was proprietor and the demand upon him was that of the State for a gross amount limited by custom and this was specifically limited by the Regulation of 1793, out of which the State remunerated the zemindar; that the State was not the proprietor of the soil, its rights were limited by custom to the money value of a specific proportion of the produce of the land, and the authors of the Permanent Settlement limited it further by enactments, which, if carried out according to the intention of the Legislature, would have given the same immunity to the raiyat as is enjoyed by the zemindar, against enhancement of rent from a rise of prices; and that the so-called proprietary right of the zemindar was a very limited one, and it was so greatly restricted that it was not dominium but servitus—a rent charge or, strictly speaking, a revenue charge upon property which belonged to another and which the zemindar had no power of turning to any use without buying it from the other, who was the proprietor. The advocates of the other view maintain that there was no well-defined customary law, no known or settled rates of rent in existence in 1793; that the legislation of 1793 left the rights of the cultivator of the soil as indefinite and undefined as they were before; that the Government deliberately refrained from undertaking the difficult task of defining these rights and contented themselves with reserving a general power of interference in case of oppression; that the property in the soil, which had never before been formally declared to be vested in the landholder, was declared to be vested in them; and that the reveneue payable to Government from each estate was fixed for ever.

The rights and duties of the zemindars, in so far as they were declared by the Permanent, Regulations, may be matters of doubt. Whether, when the English settlement was originally established in India, they were owners of the soil subject only to a tribute to. Government as was the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in Freeman v. Fairlie], or whether they had only certain restricted proprietary rights in the revenue which may fairly be considered rights in the produce of the soil and so in the soil, itself, may be a matter of controversy. Whether by the mere description and enumeration of the classes to be settled with and by the recital of such settlement (e.g, the Regulations of the 23rd November, 1792, Regulation II of 1793, and Regulation VIII of 1793) it was intended to take away the rights of the actual cultivators and possessors of the soil and vest them in the zemindars may be a debatable question, though it seems to be now settled that a settlement with a person for the purposes of revenue does not establish any proprietary right in the land in favour of the person settled with, if he did not already possess that right, but is made with Government only as to their claim to the revenue: Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Mussumat Sokheemoney Dossee. Whether the rights of the cultivators of the soil were left as uncertain or unsettled as before or whether they were sufficiently protected in accordance with the original Intention of the Court of Directors or of Lord Cornwallis himself are matters on which there may be two opinions. Opinion is also divided on the question of the justice, expediency or equities of the measure. The fact, however, that the Government limited its own demand upon the zemindar in so far as that demand related to the income that was derivable from the lands, is a matter which can scarcely be doubted or disputed. The true view of this fixity of assessment is this: In the time of the Moghul and Mahomedan Governments the share of the State was uncertain, and so the share of the zemindar; the Permanent Settlement fixed and made certain the former, but left the latter as uncertain as ever. The zemindars thus came to know to a penny what they had to pay to the State at all future times. The second part of Section VII, Art. VI of Regulation I of 1793 runs in these words: “The Governor General in Council trusts that the proprietors of land sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry, and that no demand will ever be made upon them, or their heirs or successors, by the present or any future Government, for an augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates”. No words can be clearer, no promise more definite. If language has any meaning, the declaration means that whatever may be the income or profits of the zemindar, by reason of his having improved his estate, the same will not be further touched or taxed.

But was the public assessment not to be augmented in any way in future? The answer must be sought for in the declaration itself and the declaration answers it in this way: It could be augmented in any way, so long as the method adopted did not mean to take away a portion of this income or profits, qua such income or profits. Indeed there are the clearest possible indications within the Regulations themselves to the effect that nothing was further from the minds of the authors of the Permanent Settlement than to forego for ever the right to impose fresh taxes or cesses. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the sources from which this augmentation was contemplated.

The right of establishing sayer or internal duties was expressly reserved by Section VIII, Art. VII, Clause (2) of Regulation I of 1793 and it was expressly stated that one of the consequences which the Government expected from retaining the privilege in its own hands was a future opportunity of augmenting the revenue in that way.

The Regulations upon this subject were re-enacted in Regulation XXVII of 1793. This Regulation purported to re-enact, with alteration and modifications, the rules passed by the Governor General in Council on the 11th June and on subsequent dates, for the resumption and abolition of the sayer or internal duties and taxes, throughout Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and for adjusting and paying the deductions and compensations directed to be granted to the proprietors and farmers of estates paying revenue to Government and the holders of property exempt from the payment of revenue to Government on account of the duties and taxes abolished. The rules for the resumption of the sayer passed on the 11th June, 1790, were re-enacted in section II of this Regulation. By these rules, the right of the zemindars to collect the sayer was taken away, compensation being given for the loss thus caused to them and the revenue derived from these collections was consequently excluded in assessing the jama at the time of the Decennial and Permanent Settlements. The rules for the abolition of the sayer passed on the 28th July, 1790, were enacted in section IV of this Regulation. This section enacted: “The privilege of imposing and collecting internal duties has been resumed from the landholders, and taken exclusively into the hands of Government for the purpose of reforming abuses in these collections, and thereby affording benefit to the commerce of the country, as well as general case to its inhabitants. For the more effectual attainments of these objects, the Governor General in Council has now resolved that all duties, taxes and other collections coming under the denomination of sayer (with the exception of the Government and Calcutta customs the duties levied on pilgrims at Gaya and other places of pilgrimage, the abkari or tax on spirituous liquors, which is to be collected on account of Government agreeably to former orders, the collections made in the gunges, bazars and hats situated within the limits of Calcutta, and such collections as are confirmed to the landholders, and the holders of gunges, bazars and hats, by the published resolutions of the 11th June, 1920, namely, rent paid for the use of land or for houses, shops or other buildings erected thereon, or for orchards, pasture-ground or fisheries, sometimes included in the sayer under the denomination of phulkar, bunkar and julkar) whether made by Europeans or natives either on their own or the public account, in the gunges, bazars, hats or other places within the provinces, be forthwith abolished, and that the compensations to be made in consequence, be regulated by an average of the net produce stated in the past accounts, for as many years as they can be procured not exceeding ten (excluding therefrom such collections as have been prohibited by Government) and be adjusted, with regard to the collections in malguzary and lakhiraj lands respectively according to the principles already laid down in the resolutions of the 11th June, 1790”. It was thus made clear that rent paid for the use of land, or for houses, shops or other buildings erected thereon or for orchards, pasture-ground or fisheries, sometimes included in the sayer, under the denomination of phulkar, bunkar or jalkar was not sayer within the meaning of the Regulations.

That the right to taxation generally was not given up is amply clear upon other materials, but it is equally clear that the income or profits derivable from the lands was not to be taxed as such.

Lord Cornwallis' Minute of the 3rd February, 1790, which was sent in circulation on the 7th and recorded on the 12th, also shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Government of 1789–1793 contemplated and expected that the improved condition of all classes would enable the expenses and requirements of Government to be provided by other forms of taxation. He said: “There is this further advantage to be expected from a fixed assessment, in a country subject to draught and inundation that it affords a strong inducement to the landholder to exert himself to repair as speedily as possible the damages which his lands may have sustained from these calamities; for it is to be expected that when the public demand upon his lands is limited to a particular sum, he will employ every means in his favour to render them capable of again paying that sum and as large a surplus, for his own use” ………. “The maxim that equality in taxation is an object of the greatest importance, and that in justice all the subjects of a state should contribute as nearly as possible in proportion to the income which they enjoy under its protection does not prove the expediency of varying the demand of Government upon the lands; on the contrary, we shall, find that, in countries in which this maxim is one of the leading principles in the imposition of taxes, the valuation of the land on which they are levied is never varied. In raising a revenue to answer the public exigencies, we ought to be careful to interfere as little as possible in, those sources from which the wealth of the subject is derived. Agriculture is the principal source of the riches of Bengal; the cultivator of the soil furnishes most of the materials for its numerous manufactures. In proportion as agriculture declines, the quantity of those materials must diminish, and the value of them increase and consequently the manufactures must become clearer, and the demand for them be gradually lessened. Improvement in agriculture will produce the opposite effects. The attention of Government ought therefore to be directed to render the assessment upon the lands as little burdensome as possible: this is to be accompanied only by fixing it. The proprietor will then have some inducement to improve his lands; and as his profits will increase in proportion to his exertions, he will gradually become better able to discharge the public revenue. By reserving the collection of the internal duties on commerce, Government may at all times appropriate to itself a share of the accumulating wealth of its subjects, without their being sensible of it. The burden will also be more: equally distributed; at present the whole weight rests upon the landholders and cultivators of the soil.”

Almost contemporaneously with the Permanent Settlement, on the 6th March, 1793, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Court of Directors: “We think this a proper opportunity to observe, that if, at any future period the public exigencies should require an addition to your resources, you must look for this addition in the increase of the general wealth, and commerce of the country and not in the augmentalion of the tax upon the land. Although agriculture and commerce promote each other, yet in this country, more than in any other, agriculture must flourish, before commerce can become extensive. The materials for all the most valuable manufacturers are the produce of its own lands. It follows, therefore, that the extent of its commerce must depend upon the encouragement given to agriculture; and that whatever tends to impede the latter, destroys the two great sources of its wealth. At present almost the whole of your revenue is raised upon the lands; and any attempt to participate with the landholders in the produce of the waste lands would (as we have said) operate to discourage their being brought into cultivation and consequently prevent the augmentation of articles for manufacture or export. The increase of cultivation (which nothing but permitting the landholder to reap the benefit of it can effect) will be productive of the opposite consequences. To what extent the trade and manufactures of this country may increase under the very liberal measures which have been adopted for enabling British subjects to convey their goods to Europe at a moderate freight, we can form no conjecture. We are satisfied, however, that it will far exceed general expectation; and the duties on the import and export trade (exclusive of any internal duties which it may in future be thought advisable to impose) that may hereafter be levied, will afford, an ample increase to your resources without burdening the people or affecting in any shape the industry of the country.”

In 1811, the Court of Directors said: “It was indeed imagined at the period of the establishment of the Bengal Settlement that in proportion as the effects naturally to be expected from an enlarged and liberal policy were developed, in proportion as the land was improved, activity given to commerce and as the people were enriched, our Government would be able, by means of taxation on the necessaries or luxuries of life not only to indemnify itself for the sacrifices it had made and for any contingent loss which it might sustain from the depreciation of money but that our revenue might be made to advance in equal proportion with the prosperity of the country and that both would go on flourishing in rapid progression”.

Thus at the time and within 20 years of the Permanent Settlement, the source of such fresh taxation was clearly indicated. The italics in the extracts given in the above three paragraphs are mine.

A reservation of a right to impose further tax on the income or profits of the land which was given to the zemindar, as the fruits of his own labour, cannot be gleaned from any quarter. Whether a portion is taken as revenue and another under the head of Income-tax, both are demands of the State, and when, in assessing the revenue, a guarantee was given of its fixity and a declaration was made that the balance will not be altered at any time, to impose a further tax on the income or profits, does away with that fixity and alters that which was guaranteed to be unalterable. The question whether the income or profits now made was then taken into account, or the sources from which they are now made were in these days unknown or not in existence does not affect the matter, in view of the preamble to Regulation II of 1819 and the Preamble as well as section 31, Cl. (2) of Regulation VIII of 1819.

The argument that it was only the revenue payable by the lands and not the entire demand of the State for all income or profits referable to the estates was fixed by the Permanent Settlement loses sight of the fact that income or profits from fisheries were taken into account. The object of the settlement in exempting from further burden income which had already paid toll to the State in the shape of land revenue was primarily to protect and improve agriculture, as that then was the chief source of income, and the exemption of agricultural income from the operation of the Income-tax Act perhaps indicates a continuity of policy on the part of the Legislature in that respect. This, to my mind, is the inwardness of the doubt expressed by the learned Judges who constituted the Full Bench in the case of Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti as to meaning of “agricultural income”. The words of the settlement, however, are clear enough as indicating an intention to leave untouched for all times to come, the surplus that the landholders will be also to derive as income or profits from the lands of his estate.

It may not, perhaps, be right as a matter or method of construction, in order to construe the Income-tax Act, XI of 1922, to put it side by side with Regulation I of 1793, without taking into account the events that have happened during and the changes that have been wrought by the long years that separate the two enactments, but such a comparison is not altogether without its purpose. If the Income-tax was sought to be levied upon Permanent Settlement zemindars, while Regulation I of 1793 was yet in sight, would it not have been understood as having taken away from the fixity of the State demand and altered the income and profits, the unalterable character of which the Regulation had assured?

The above, in my opinion, is the relation between the two enactments; but we are yet on the thresh-hold of the enquiry. It is not disputed that the Legislature has absolute right to abrogate, modify or destroy any right or privilege, even if it be of its own creation. What we have then to consider is whether the Legislature has done so, expressly or by necessary implication, in this particular case.

As a guide to the construction of this Act, to argue on the basis of other Acts, e.g, the Zemindari Dak Cess Act, the Road Cess Acts, the Public Works Cess Act, the Embankments Act, the Drainage Act, the Bengal Municipal Act, the Court of Wards Act, the Village Chaukidari Act, the Court Fees Act, the Stamp Act, the Bengal Settled Estates Act, the Probate Act and the like, enactments relating to what is said to be direct or indirect taxation, is, I say with all respect, to argue on the strength of a palpably false analogy, so long as the absolute privilege of the Legislature to which I have referred is not disputed. These legislations, most if not all of them, may be justified as imposing taxes in return for services rendered, facilities offered or benefits conferred. In some of them reference is made to “land” or the income or profits arising or derivable therefrom as affording a basis for calculating the amount of the imposition. In others, the imposition is, no doubt, an additional burden on the lands, or, viewed in another way, forms a deduction from the income or profits of the lands, but the language that is used leaves no doubt as to the intention that the imposition should operate as such. If, justly or unjustly, these enactments have been passed and the intention to interfere with the zemindar's income of profits from the lands permanently settled with him is clear, what help does it afford us in construing Act XI of 1922? In my opinion it is of very little consequence if the Legislature has put a different meaning on “the fixity of public demand,” from what it obviously bears, or chose to violate the fixity more than half a century after, if it be established that it has done so.

A consideration of the earlier enactments relating to Income-tax is perhaps more profitable. To turn then to the earlier enactments. In Act XXXII of 1860, section 1 provided that “there shall be collected and paid…… for and in respect of the property and profits mentioned in the several schedules”. Schedule I ran in these words: “For and in respect of the property in, and profits arising from, all lands and houses in India”. Schedule II ran thus: For and in respect of the annual profits arising to any person residing in India from any kind of property whatever whether situate in India or elsewhere…….” The rules applicable to Schedule I are contained, in Part VII and they expressly refer to lands permanently settled (vide rules 1 and 4). This Act remained in force from the 1st of July, 1860 to the 1st of August, 1865. There can be no question that this Act referred to “All lands and houses in India”, “any kind of property…. in India”, and the rules provided for computing the assessment on permanently-settled lands. The next important Act, to which reference need be made, is Act VIII of 1872. The preamble says: “For the purpose of imposing duties on income and arising from offices property, professions and trade.” The mode of assessment is differently provided for as regards “Duties on Offices” (Part II), “Duties on Profits of Companies (Part III), Duties on Interest on Government Securities” (Part IV), while Part V deals with “All other income”. Section 16 says: “A yearly duty of two pies for every rupee shall be levied upon all incomes of one thousand rupees per annum or up-Wards not chargeable under Part II, Part III, or Part “IV of this Act.” Section 21 says: “Owners of lands or houses, occupying the same, shall be chargeable in respect of the annual value thereof at nine-tenths of the full rent at which such lands or houses are worth to be let for the year.” Then follows a provision for making special rules for calculating the assessment, when the income; is derived from land paying-revenue. This Act made all incomes, including those derived from lands, assessable to tax, and there is no reason to suppose that it intended to exclude permanently-settled lands. This Act remained in force for one year only. To take Act II of 1886 next. In this Act, a marked departure is noticeable; the preamble states. Whereas it is expedient to impose a tax on income derived from sources other than “agriculture.” The charging section is section 4. The exceptions are mentioned in section 5, in which “land is mentioned byway of exception and it points to the sources of income as specified in the first” column of the second schedule. This schedule is divided into four parts. Part I relates to Salaries and Pensions, Part II, Profits of Companies, Part III, Interest on Securities and Part IV, Other Sources of Income. This last is stated to be “any source of income not included in Part I, Part II or Part III of the schedule”. The provisions of the Act relating to mode of assessment and collection say nothing as to revenue whether temporarily or permanently settled. The word “lands” does not come in at all as a source of income, unless it comes under “Any source” in Part IV. The language of Act VII of 1918 need not be separately considered, as it is repeated with but slight alteration in Act XI of 1922. The structure of this Act again is radically different from the Acts of 1860 and 1872 and there are also points of difference between it and the Act of 1886. The preamble is neutral. It states “Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to Income-tax and Super-tax” and the schedule of enactments repealed refers to the Act of 1918, and the amending Acts of 1919 and 1920. “Total Income” is defined in section 2(15) as meaning total, amount of income, profits and gains from all sources to which the Act applies, computed in the manner laid down in section 16. If one looks for the sources to which the Act applies, one finds a negative in the eight classes of income specified in section 4, sub-section (3) as being the income to which the Act does not apply. The affirmative is found in the charging section, which is section 4. That section says “Save as hereinafter provided, this Act shall apply to all income, profits or gains, as described or comprised in section 6, from whatever source derived, accruing, or arising, or received in British India or deemed under the provisions of this Act to accrue, or arise or to be received in British India”. The section, therefore, refers only to section 6, which instead of definitely exhausting all the sources of income, merely says, “Save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income, profits and gains, shall be chargeable to Income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing: (i) Salaries, (ii) Interest on securities, (iii) Property, (iv) Business, (v) Professional earnings, (vi) Other sources-Ordinarily one should have expected profits from land to come under the head of property, but section 9, which provides for the mode of assessment of property, clearly limits it to buildings or lands appartenant thereto. Income or profit from lands, permanently or temporarily settled, therefore, must come, if at all, under the head of “Other sources”. Why then should not “Other sources” include only those sources as are taxable, and why should the expression be taken as comprising the income or profits of all lands irrespective of whether they are taxable or not? The policy of the shortlived measures of 1860 and 1872 need not necessarily have been continued in 1886 and for the matter of that there is nothing to indicate a continuity of policy from even 1886 to 1922. We are not permitted to speculate as regards the policy or the intention of the Legislature. What we find for certain is that the Act of 1922 does not make all persons taxable, nor all lands taxable, all income taxable, nor again all sources or all other sources taxable.

To this view two objections are possible. One is the difficulty created by the definition of agricultural “income” as contained in section 2, sub-section (1), which includes such income from permanently, as well as non-permanently, settled estates. This difficulty, however, is more apparent than real, because if income or profits from permamently-settled estates were meant to be kept outside the purview of the Act, the definition will cover only such land as is assessed to land revenue and is not permanently settled. The other difficulty is as regards income from lakhiraj or revenue-free lands. But is this a difficulty? A review of the law relating to lakhiraj grants, of which the foundation is Regulation XIX of 1793, is to be found in the case of Hurryhur Mookhopadhya v. Madub Chunder Baboo. If these lands have been exempted from revenue for ever, the Act will not apply to them, that is all. There is no equity about the tax and no equitable consideration can come in on the question of construction of a taxing statute.

Canons of construction laid down in authoritative decisions, to which our attention has been drawn, are very difficult of application in particular cases: they depend upon so many considerations; but it is just as well to refer to some of them here.

One of the cases upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the assessee is Associated Newspapers, Limited v. Corporation of the City of London. In that case what happened was this. Section 51 of 7 Geo. III C. 37 vested the lands reclaimed from the river Thames under the provisions of the statute in the owners of the adjoining lands and wharves, free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever. Section 169 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1818, enacted that every sewer rate and consolidated rate should be levied upon every occupier of any house or building in the City “whether such person shall be now liable in respect of such house or building to be assessed to the relief of the poor or be not liable to be assessed to the relief of the poor in respect thereof by reason of such house or building being situate in any precinct or extra parochial place or otherwise”. The House of Lords held that the exemption granted by 7 Geo. III C. 37, though limited by the context to local, as distinguished from imperial taxes, extended to all local taxes and assessments, whether present or future, except so far as any Act imposing a new tax qualified or repealed the exemption. It was held that the words “free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever” were not repealed by the words of the Act of 1848. It was observed that in London Corporation v. Netherlands Steamboat Company, the same statute was construed as not repealing the exemption contained in some statutes of 1812 and 1813. It was thus held that it is competent to the Legislature to withdraw or modify such an exemption by a subsequent enactment, but that it could only be done expressly and not in general terms or by Implication. The cases of Kutner v. Phillips, and Thorpe v. Adams, Attorney-General v. Horner, and Barker v. Edger, have been cited in support of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant and as illustrative of the principle that a repeal by implication is only effected when the provisions of the later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannot stand together, in which case the maxim leges posteriores contrarias abrogant applies, and unless the two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied. Reference has been made to In Re Smiths Estate: Clements v. Ward and Fitzerald v. Champneys, in the latter of which cases Sir W. Page Wood V.C observed: “In passing the special Act the Legislatures had their attention directed to the special case which the Act was meant to meet and considered and provided all the circumstances of that special case: and having done so they are not to be considered by a general enactment passed subsequently and making no mention of any such intention, to have intended to derogate from that which by their own special Act, they had thus supervised and regulated”. The words of Lord Coke in Foster's Case have been referred to: “It must be known that for as much as Acts of Parliament are established with such gravity, wisdom and consent of the whole realm, for the advancement of the commonwealth they ought not, by any constrained construction out of the general and ambiguous words of a subsequent Act, to be abrogated”. There are two other cases upon which the assessee specially relies. One is Garnett v. Bradley in which Lord Blackburn said. “There is another rule which has been laid down, which I think is a good rule if it is properly applied, namely that where there has been a particular rule established either by custom or by statute, where there is some particular law standing, and a subsequent enactment has general words which would repeal that particular law or particular custom, if they were taken in all their generality, yet nevertheless the first particular law is not to be repealed unless there is a sufficient indication of intention to repeal it. It is not to be repealed by mere general words; the two may stand together; the first, the particular law standing as an exceptional proviso under the general law. The other case is Pole Carew v. Craddock. In this case a ferry was established by and maintained under an Act of 1790 (30 Geo. III, C. 61) which was deemed to be a public Act and contained a provision that the then proprietors or their respective heirs or assigns Shall not be rated or assessed for or toward the payment of any tax rate or assessment whatsoever, parliamentary or parochial for or in respect of the said ferry”. It was held that the principle of Associated Newspapers, Limited v. City of London applied to Imperial taxes and that the exemption granted by the statute extended to parliamentary taxes whether in existence at the date of the Actor not, and therefore included Income-tax, although that tax was first imposed subsequently to the passing of the Act of 1790.

On behalf of the Crown, the most important of the cases cited is Nova Scotia Steel & Coal Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Finance and Customs. In this case, under an agreement with the Government, confirmed by a statute of 1910, the Company paid a tax on each ton of ore exported by them and were exempt from paying any further charge or tax “upon or in respect of the said ore”. By the Business Profits Act, 1917, annual tax was imposed on the net profits of business. On the question of exemption by reason of the agreement of 1910, it was held that the tax upon the profits was not a tax upon or in respect of the ore exported. It was pointed out that in general a tax on profits and an export tax on commodities are different imposts, financially and economically, and cannot be identified even by the indefinite expression “in respect of”. Mersey Docks v. Cameron, has been referred to but there is hardly any room for the application of that principle here. The case of Attorney General v. Exeter Corporation has also been referred to, but Hamilton, J. while referring to Foster's case and the other cases in support of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant held that the maxim was inapplicable to the case before him.

On a consideration of the authorities referred to above, the conclusion I have come to is that there is a clear distinction between Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Finance and Customs and the case here. The immunity in that case extended only up to the exportation of the ore and by the general words “in respect of” could not extend further) that is to say, to such profits as would be derived by business on it. This is pointed-out in the decision itself. In the present case, all income or profits that the zemindar derived from his permanently-settled estate was exempted from further taxation as such income or profits for ever. The two enactments, in my judgment, are not necessarily inconsistent or repugnant to each other and, in the words of Lord Blackburn, I venture to think that the Permanent Settlement Regulation, I of 1793, may very well stand as an exceptional proviso under the Income-tax Act, XI of 1922.

The effect of this conclusion, it has been pointed out, will have far-reaching consequences, as it will follow that royalty on minerals in permanently-settled tracts will not be taxable. I am not so sure that this will necessarily follow: the royalty may be viewed in quite a different light and, in and case, the zemindar's right to the minerals under the Permanent Settlement has yet to be authoritatively decided: See Secretary of State for India v. Raja Jyoti Prashad Singh.

There is a further consideration which has weighed with me in arriving at the opinion that I have formed. The case of the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zemindar of Singampatti, was decided by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court so far back as February 1922. I do not think it makes any difference that there was a sanad in that case, as the sanad did not profess to go beyond the Regulation, viz., XXV of 1802. The law, so far as that presidency is concerned, must be taken to have been settled then. In January, 1924, the law so far as the province of Bihar and Orissa is concerned was settled much in the same way. The Income-tax Act, which is an all India enactment has been amended so recently as in 1926 (Act XXIV of 1926) and yet no attempt has been made to get rid of those decisions. It is said that a provision for an appeal has now been made; but does that meet the point? It is hardly reasonable to suppose that a fiscal enactment has been left neglected in that way.

For the reasons given above, I regret I am unable to share in the view taken by my learned brother C.C Ghose, J. I would, though, not without a good deal of hesitation, answer question III. in the negative, in respect of all the ten items, which in my opinion are income or profits derivable from or referable to lands. In view of this answer to question III, question II does not arise.

One word more I desire to add. The Income-tax Act, like other statutes, must be read according to the ordinary and natural construction of the words, with only such aid as is afforded from within the four corners of the statute itself read as a whole, and my conclusions are based on the statute itself, though to test their correctness I have been guilty of digression somewhat unpardonable.

[The Reference to the Full Bench is, therefore, disposed of in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Court. No order is made as to the costs of this Reference.]

S.M