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Kumaraswami Asari An... v. Poojari Lakshmana Go...
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit originated in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Salem concerning the Sri Kandaswami (Subramania Swami) temple. Three worshippers, having obtained the required sanction of the Collector under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, filed a representative suit seeking a scheme, recovery of temple properties, and removal of the then Dharmakartha in possession and management. The 1st defendant contended that the temple was private, not public.
The High Court initially differed on the question of whether the temple was public; on Letters Patent Appeal the Full Bench held that the temple was public. The Privy Council affirmed that judgment. The suit was remanded to the Subordinate Judge, who framed a scheme but held that certain valuable properties (alleged to yield income and valued nearly two lakhs) belonged to the 1st defendant privately.
Two of the worshippers presented an appeal against that portion of the decree on 22 (or 24) April 1926, which was returned for re-presentation on 23 July 1926 to correct formal defects; it was not re-presented. After proceedings concerning the receiver (the 1st defendant) took an unexpected turn and alleged charges against the receiver were not pressed on 30 July 1926, other worshippers suspected improper conduct. The non-re-presentation of the appeal led to an application by other worshippers for leave to appeal and for excuse of delay, accompanied by allegations that the original appellants had been paid (allegedly Rs. 10,000) and thus allowed the appeal to drop.
The respondent denied misconduct and challenged the petitioners' competence, arguing they were not worshippers within the meaning of Section 92. The High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to take evidence on whether the petitioners were worshippers. The Subordinate Judge found that the petitioners were worshippers within Section 92. After receipt of that finding, the High Court heard the petitions and issued the decision summarized below.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners are worshippers of the temple within the meaning of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether they have locus standi to apply).
- Whether the delay in re-presenting the appeal (the appeal having been returned for re-presentation) can be excused—whether the appeal should be treated as pending for the purposes of relief or as a fresh appeal requiring relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- Whether the non-re-presentation of the appeal was bona fide or the result of improper motives (including allegations of payment/bribery to the original appellants), such that the Court should admit the present appeal despite the non-representation.
- Whether parties not formally on record (other worshippers) can apply to prevent prejudice to the institution and have the appeal re-presented or admitted.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- They alleged that the original plaintiffs/appellants had been "won over" and paid a large sum (allegedly Rs. 10,000) which caused them to fail to re-present the appeal returned on 23 July 1926.
- They contended that the failure to re-present the appeal was not bona fide and that if the appeal were not re-presented/adjudicated, valuable temple properties would be lost to the institution.
- They asserted they had the right, as worshippers and constructive parties to the representative suit, to require the appeal to be re-presented and adjudicated for the benefit of the general body of worshippers.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent denied any misconduct or improper motive in connection with non-re-presentation of the appeal.
- The respondent argued that the present petitioners were not worshippers within the meaning of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore lacked competence to apply or to prefer an appeal.
- The 1st respondent stated (in affidavit) that he consulted vakil friends who advised him that there was not much chance of altering the scheme; the Court noted that the vakil now appearing is not the same vakil and treated the statement as vague.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai | Authority for the proposition that persons not actually on record have a right to apply to prevent parties on record from compromising to the detriment of an institution. | Quoted to support the Court's power under Section 92 to protect institutional interests and to justify allowing non-record worshippers to seek re-presentation/admission of the appeal so that the institution's interests are not prejudiced by compromises or withdrawals by parties on record. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, strictly following the record and findings set out in the opinion:
- Competence/Locus standi: Because the question whether the petitioners were worshippers would determine competence, the High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to take evidence on that specific issue. The Subordinate Judge's subsequent finding, after reviewing witnesses, concluded that the petitioners were worshippers within Section 92. The High Court found no reason to disturb that finding and accepted that the petitioners had locus standi to apply.
- Procedural posture of the appeal: The Court noted that two worshippers had timely presented an appeal that was returned for re-presentation on 23 July 1926 to correct formal defects and was not re-presented. Because this was a representative suit filed for the benefit of the general body of worshippers, the appeal — if prosecuted — would bind the general body. The Court treated the appeal as effectively pending until the High Court determined otherwise and concluded that other worshippers (constructive parties) have a right to require re-presentation.
- Examination of facts suggesting improper motive: The Court observed contemporaneous procedural events. Proceedings concerning the 1st defendant's receivership were going on; allegations against the receiver were not pressed on 30 July 1926 though they had been previously prosecuted. The Court found it "easy" to assume an intimate connection between the abandonment of allegations against the receiver and the failure to re-present the appeal, suggesting the non-representation was not bona fide. The Court also found the 1st respondent's affidavit explanations vague and unpersuasive.
- Limitation analysis: The Court considered whether delay required excuse under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It held that under High Court rules an appeal returned for re-presentation may, on proper grounds, be re-admitted. Given the representative character of the suit and the petitioners' position as constructive parties, the Court concluded there was no strict bar of limitation for the purposes of applications made by worshippers in respect of a pending appeal. Even if the present filing were treated as a fresh appeal, the Court found sufficient grounds under Section 5 to excuse delay because of the circumstances suggesting fraud/improper motive by the original appellants.
- Merits and necessity to protect institutional interests: The Court observed that the Subordinate Judge had held certain valuable properties to be private and that the appeal could not be said to be hopeless. Applying the principle from Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai, the Court emphasized its power to protect the interests of the temple and to prevent prejudice to the institution resulting from purported compromises or withdrawals by parties on record.
- Relief and costs: On these bases the Court concluded there were grounds to excuse the delay (either as re-presentation of a pending appeal or as an extension under Section 5) and to admit the appeal filed by the petitioners. The Court ordered costs to be paid by the respondents for the applications and at the enquiry and fixed a vakil's fee of Rs. 100.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petitions allowed. The Court admitted the appeal filed by the petitioners (whether treated as re-presentation of the originally timely appeal or, alternatively, excusing delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act).
Implications (direct consequences as stated in the opinion):
- The appeal will be received and adjudicated by the High Court, allowing the merits of the dispute over the allegedly private properties to be considered.
- The Court treated the appeal as pending for the purpose of worshippers' applications and/or excused delay under Section 5, preventing the immediate loss of valuable properties to the temple without adjudication.
- The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the applications in the High Court and at the enquiry, and a vakil's fee of Rs. 100 was fixed.
- No new legal precedent was asserted as being created by this opinion; the Court applied existing principles (including the case Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai and provisions of Section 92 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) to the facts before it.
K. V. S. — Petitions allowed.
This appeal arises out of the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Salem in connection with a temple. The suit was filed with the sanction of the Collector for a scheme and for recovery of the properties of the temple and for the removal of the present Dharmakartha in possession and management. The question was raised by the 1st defendant in the suit that the temple was not a public temple, but was a private temple. On this question a Bench of the High Court differed and when the matter was taken in Letters Patent Appeal, it was ultimately held that the temple was a public temple. This judgment of the High Court was confirmed by the Privy Council. The suit was then remanded for disposal to the lower Court. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree framing a scheme and as regards certain properties which the defendant claimed to be his private properties he found in his favour, and held that the properties did not belong to the temple. It is against that decree, that an appeal was presented by the original plaintiffs on the 24th April, 1926 and it was returned for re-presentation on the 23rd July, 1926. It was never re-presented.
Meanwhile, the defendant applied for possession of the properties which the Subordinate Judge found not to be properties of the temple. It is alleged that although the plaintiffs admitted that they had preferred an appeal against that portion of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, no objection was taken to the application when it came on for hearing, and when the present applicants found this out, suspicions were aroused and they found that the appeal was not re-presented. They now apply for leave to appeal against that decree and for an order excusing the delay. Allegations are made in the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners, that the plaintiffs who filed this suit have been won over and have been paid a large sum of money and so they failed to re-present the appeal. For the respondent it is contended that there was no such misconduct on his part and also that the present petitioners are not worshippers within the meaning of Sect. 92 of the Code and therefore not competent to prefer an appeal against the decree. Affidavits and counfer-affidavits have been filed. We think that this is not a matter which we can decide on affidavits, and that it will be more satisfactory that the matter should be decided on evidence. We direct the Subordinate Judge to take evidence as to whether the petitioners or any and which of them are worshippers of the temple. The finding will be submitted within one month. The other questions raised will be decided after the receipt of the finding. The time for objections is 10 days. These petitions will stand over till the evidence is received.
[In pursuance of the above order the Subordinate Judge of Salem submitted the following finding]
FINDING.
I have been directed to submit a finding as to “whether the petitioners or any and which of them are worshippers of the temple.”
******
The 15th witness for the respondents is the karnam of Kalipatti village. According to him, these petitioners have no interest in this temple. I have already shown that they are not like the numerous worshippers that resort to it. The 16th and 17th witnesses for the respondents are only servants of the 1st respondent. Their evidence can hardly be termed as disinterested. Regarding the 3rd petitioner, his special interest is apparent enough. He along with other villagers is entitled to a katalai in this temple.
For these reasons, I find that the petitioners are worshippers of this temple within the meaning of Sect. 92 of the Code.”
[These petitions and S. R. No. 17519 of 1926 came on for final hearing after the return of the finding of the lower Court.]
ORDER*
These applications arise out of an appeal preferred against the final decree of the Subordinate Judge of Salem in O. S. No. 4 of 1916. The suit was by three worshippers who had obtained the necessary sanction of the Collector under Sect. 92, Civil Procedure Code, for a scheme and other reliefs relating to the Sri Kandaswami, also-known as Subramania Swami temple. One of the defences of the defendants who were the pujaries of the temple was that the temple was not a public temple, but a private one. The Subordinate Judge upheld the contention and dismissed the suit. On appeal there was difference of opinion between two learned Judges and the matter went up to a Full Bench of this Court and was decided in L. P. A. No. 10 of 1917 that the temple was a public temple and the suit was remanded for the purpose of framing a scheme and determining the properties of the temple. Against this judgment of the High Court an appeal was preferred to their Lordships of the Privy Council and their Lordships of the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the High Court with the result that the suit went back to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge, on the 30th November, 1925 passed a decree. A scheme was framed but as regards the valuable properties which are alleged to belong to the temple of the value of nearly two lakhs yielding an income of Rs. 6,000 a year, he held they were private properties of the 1st defendant. This judgment was pronounced on the 30th November, 1925 and against that judgment an appeal was preferred by two of the worshippers on 22nd April, 1926 to the High Court. The appeal which was presented within time was returned for re-presentation on the 23rd July 1926, because some formal defects had to be corrected. Between 30th November, 1925 and 23rd July 1926 there were proceedings which were going on against the 1st defendant who was appointed as interim receiver. The affidavits show that so far as the 1st defendant is concerned, his conduct was adversely commented upon by the High Court in certain proceedings before the High Court and, so far as we can see from the remarks of the learned Judges of the High Court, the 1st defendant's conduct was not honest in several matters. The proceedings about his receivership which were pending before the Subordinate Judge came on on the 30th July, 1926 and, although till then we find hot contests between the persons who presented the appeal to the High Court and the receiver who was the 1st defendant in the suit, all on a sudden the petition against the receiver was not pressed, so that allegations which would have been usually enquired into against this receiver, the 1st defendant were suddenly abandoned. We find that the appeal, which was returned for re-presentation on 23rd July, 1926 about 7 days before this petition, was not pressed and was not re-presented subsequently and it is easy from these facts to assume that the non-representation had an intimate connection with the withdrawal of the allegations against the receiver on 30th July 1926. As we said before, this action was a representative action and the suit being filed on by the three plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and of the general body of worshippers, the appeal was also an appeal which was presented for the benefit of the temple and the general body of worshippers. Had the appeal been prosecuted, it would have bound the whole general body. When some of the worshippers found that their allegations against the receiver were suddenly withdrawn on 30th July, 1926, they suspected that there was something wrong and they admittedly came to Madras to see what became of the appeal that was presented and was returned for re-presentation on 23rd July, 1926 and they found that the appeal was not re-presented. They then went to the Sub-Court and applied for a copy of the judgment and decree on 4th August 1926, and got the copies on 9th August. On 11th August they presented an appeal with an affidavit stating the facts which led to the present course being adopted. They allege that the non-re-presentation was due to an improper motive and they say that they are informed that Rs. 10,000 was paid to the three appellants in the case and the matter was withdrawn and allowed to drop. They allege that it will be a great loss to the temple if the appeal is not properly disposed of. When the matter came on before us one preliminary objection taken was that the petitioners before us were not worshippers of the temple and, as this would go to the root of the application, we directed the Subordinate Judge to take evidence and return a finding as to whether they were worshippers or not. The Subordinate Judge has gone into the evidence adduced before him and submitted a finding that the present petitioners are worshippers and an objection has been filed but we see no reason to hold that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that these petitioners were worshippers of the temple. There is thus clearly a locus standi to apply.
The next question is whether, under the circumstances of this case, this application should be granted. We are inclined to hold on the facts of this appeal that, this appeal having been presented in time by two worshippers for themselves and other worshippers and having been returned for re-presentation, there is no question of excusing the delay under Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act. Under the rules of the High Court, if the re-presentation is not made within the time allowed, the Court can, on proper grounds shown, excuse that delay, and receive the appeal. The suit being a representative suit, we think that two or more worshippers who would be constructive parties to the appeal have a right to require the appeal which was properly presented to be re-presented and received by the Court and adjudicated on its merits. They are in the position of being parties and, if one of the parties receives the appeal memorandum back from the Court and does not present it, it is difficult to see how the other persons, parties to the suit, can be prejudiced by the action of one person. The fact that the present petitioners are not on record by name would not make any difference as they are constructive parties bound by any decision that may be passed in the appeal just as if they were parties named in the cause title of the appeal and it seems to us that they are entitled to see that proper adjudication is made in the appeal. In the present case we are not satisfied that the non-re-presentation was bona fide and we come to the conclusion that there has been some indirect motive for the appeal not having been re-presented. We think that the Court has in cases under Sect. 92, ample power to see that the interests of the institution are protected. Even in cases of compromise it has now been decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council that persons not actually on record have a right to apply to prevent the parties on record from compromising to the detriment of the institution. We would only refer to the case in Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai(1). In the present case till the High Court passed orders upon the appeal petition presented in time, we think that the appeal should be treated as pending for the purposes of any application the worshippers may make and in this view there is no question of limitation under the Limitation Act and we can treat the present application as an application in a pending appeal. As the original papers have been taken away and not brought back, the present petitioners had under the rules to present a copy of the judgment and decree and the grounds of objection and they, in order to prevent any further difficulty or troubles as to limitation, have again paid the stamp upon the appeal which they presented, but this would not make the present appeal a fresh appeal by third parties requiring excuse under Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act. Even assuming that this appeal should be treated as a fresh appeal presented on the date when the present petition was presented, we think that ample material exists under Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act to excuse delay. We have already set out the facts and we think that the appellants who presented the appeal on 22nd April, 1926 and took it back for representation on 23rd July, 1926, have fraudulently and with an improper motive not re-presented the appeal. We can find nothing bona fide in the whole transaction. If the appellants were honest, they could easily have come before us in this matter and brought in the original papers and explained to us why it was that it was not re-presented. The 1st respondent filed an affidavit saying that he consulted some vakil friends and that they advised there was not much chance of altering the scheme. The vakil who now appears is not the vakil who appeared then and we are not prepared to accept the vague statement that some vakil friends advised him, especially as we think the appeal is by no means a hopeless one. The statement that the object for which the suit was brought was established is not correct because valuable properties which were claimed for the temple by the plaintiffs were the subject-matter of the appeal. The affidavit is vague and we do not think that the 1st plaintiff's affidavit can be acted upon. We think the present petitioners have acted with due deligence and bona fides.
Under these circumstances we are of opinion that, whether the case be looked at from the point of view of re-presentation or fresh presentation of an appeal, there are grounds which entitle us to excuse the delay either in re-presentation or in presentation of the appeal and admit the appeal now filed by the petitioners. This will enable the whole matter to be gone into when the appeal is disposed of and prevent valuable properties being lost to the temple. A perusal of the Subordinate Judge's judgment shows that the appeal cannot be said to be a hopeless one and the worshippers are entitled to the benefit of the adjudication by the High Court. The respondents will pay the costs of these applications both here and at the enquiry. We fix Rs. 100 as vakil's fee.
K. V. S.Petitions allowed.
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