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Hartej Bahadur Singh And Hari Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Ors.

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 23, 1964
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Hartej Bahadur Singh (landlord / appellant) owned agricultural land in village Kahngarh, District Sangrur (erstwhile Pepsu). Consolidation proceedings began in 1954 and repartition was effected in 1958. Sucha Singh (respondent) claimed to have been a tenant in possession of part of the appellant's land until rabi 1958. On 13 October 1958 Sucha Singh filed an application under section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, alleging that he had been dispossessed by Hartej Bahadur Singh after consolidation authorities "carved out a new tak and gave it to" Hartej Bahadur Singh, and sought restoration of possession.

The Collector, after making Hartej Bahadur Singh a party, dismissed Sucha Singh's application by order dated 17 December 1962, finding that Sucha Singh had failed to prove wrongful dispossession and observing that the applicant had admitted in his application that possession of the land had been delivered to Hartej Bahadur Singh by the consolidation authorities.

Sucha Singh appealed to the Commissioner, who allowed the appeal and directed the Collector to determine which khasra numbers Sucha Singh had been in possession of before consolidation and to put him in possession of the land allotted in lieu of those khasra numbers. The landlord (Hartej Bahadur Singh) sought revision to the Financial Commissioner, who rejected the revision and directed the Collector to ascertain which khasra were cultivated by Sucha Singh before consolidation and to restore possession of corresponding substituted land. The landlord filed a writ petition (No. 1910 of 1963) against the orders of the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner; the learned Single Judge dismissed that writ. The present appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenges the Single Judge's dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. In what circumstances is the Collector invested with jurisdiction under section 43 of the Tenancy Act to eject a person in wrongful or unauthorized possession and put another (a tenant) into possession after a summary enquiry?
  2. Whether mistakes (if any) committed by consolidation authorities in failing to recognize or put a tenant into possession can be corrected by the Collector under section 43 of the Tenancy Act, or whether the appropriate remedy lies exclusively under the Consolidation Act's procedure of objections/appeals/revision.
  3. Whether a tenant's relinquishment of possession by compromise before the Panchayat is ineffective as a matter of law such that the landlord's subsequent possession becomes "unauthorized" for the purposes of section 43.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Hartej Bahadur Singh — Landlord)

  • The consolidation authorities correctly delivered possession of the disputed land to the appellant after repartition, and the appellant was therefore lawfully in possession.
  • Sucha Singh had, by a mutual compromise (allegedly before 1954), surrendered possession of the disputed land; the appellant relied on this compromise as a defence to the claim of wrongful dispossession.
  • The Collector's dismissal of the tenant's application should be sustained because consolidation records showed delivery of possession to the landlord.

Respondent (Sucha Singh — Tenant)

  • Sucha Singh asserted he had been in possession of the land as a tenant until rabi 1958 and was wrongfully dispossessed by Hartej Bahadur Singh during Kharif 1958.
  • He applied under section 43 of the Tenancy Act for restoration of possession, arguing that he was a tenant entitled to be put into possession of the new holding allotted in lieu of his pre-consolidation khasra.
  • Reliance was placed on revenue records (jamabandi) suggesting Sucha Singh had been a cultivating tenant before consolidation and that he had not been ejected by any lawful process.
  • It was argued (by respondent's counsel) that the tenant could either pursue remedies under the Consolidation Act or approach the Collector under section 43 — i.e., that recourse to the Collector was an available alternative remedy to correct any failure by consolidation authorities to recognize the tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined (a) the text and purpose of section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (power of Collector to eject a person in wrongful or unauthorized possession after summary enquiry), and (b) the statutory scheme of consolidation and repartition under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (in particular sections 23, 25 and 6 and relevant rules).

The court set out the consolidation framework: after consolidation and repartition, holdings are allotted in lieu of previous holdings; the Consolidation Officer may allow owners and tenants to enter into possession or, if necessary, put them into physical possession; and the rights of land-owners and tenants in the new allotted land are to be the same as their pre-consolidation rights. Encumbrances must be transferred to allotted holdings, and the Consolidation Act provides specific procedures (objections, appeals, and revision to State Government) to correct mistakes in consolidation proceedings.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court distinguished two scenarios:

  • If the consolidation authorities had actually delivered possession after repartition to the tenant over the new land allotted in lieu of his old holding, and the tenant was subsequently dispossessed, then section 43 of the Tenancy Act would be directly applicable to evict the wrongful possessor and restore the tenant.
  • But in the present case the tenant's own application admitted that possession of the land in dispute was delivered by the consolidation authorities to Hartej Bahadur Singh (the landlord), and the Collector, after assessing evidence, accepted that Hartej had been put into possession by the consolidation authorities. Those findings were not specifically reversed by the Commissioner or Financial Commissioner.

The court considered the tenant's argument that jamabandi or other records showed prior cultivation by Sucha Singh and that any mistake by the consolidation authorities in not recognizing him as a tenant could be corrected either by the Consolidation Act remedies or by the Collector under section 43. The court held that mistakes committed by consolidation authorities are to be corrected by the procedures provided under the Consolidation Act (objections, appeals, revision) and that the Collector, under section 43 of the Tenancy Act, does not have jurisdiction to set right or undo acts performed by the consolidation authorities merely because a mistake may have been committed.

The court also addressed the Commissioner's view that a tenant's compromise before the Panchayat relinquishing tenancy would be inoperative and against the law. The court rejected that absolute view: while section 7 of the Tenancy Act prescribes grounds for termination of tenancy, a voluntary relinquishment of tenancy by a tenant (if validly made) would not automatically render the landlord's possession "unauthorized." The respondent's counsel conceded that the Commissioner's categorical position on this point could not be sustained.

Concluding its analysis, the court found that, on the evidence, possession had been delivered to the landlord by the consolidation authorities and thus his possession was not unauthorized. Accordingly, the Collector had no jurisdiction under section 43 to interfere with an act lawfully done under the Consolidation Act even if a mistake had occurred. The court therefore accepted the landlord's appeal against the orders that had directed restoration to the tenant.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside; the rule is made absolute; the impugned orders of the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner are quashed; and the order of the Collector (dismissing the tenant's application under section 43) will stand.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Hartej Bahadur Singh's possession (as recorded after consolidation) is upheld and Sucha Singh is not restored to possession by the Collector under section 43 on the facts of this case.
  • The decision clarifies that the Collector's power under section 43 of the Tenancy Act is not a tool to correct mistakes made by consolidation authorities in the exercise of their statutory jurisdiction; mistakes in consolidation proceedings should be remedied under the Consolidation Act's prescribed objection/appeal/revision procedures.
  • The tenant (Sucha Singh) remains free to pursue any remedies available under the Consolidation Act or other statutory processes — the court expressly noted this option — but no relief is granted under section 43 on these facts.
  • The opinion does not announce or rely upon new judicial precedent beyond its application of the relevant statutory scheme; it confines its holding to the statutory interpretation and application to the facts before the court.
  • Costs: There will be no order as to costs.
Show all summary ...

S.S. Dulat and Harbans Singh, JJ.

1. This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition (No. 1910 of 1963) filed by Hartej Bahadur Singh.

2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: Hartej Bahadur Singh appellant owned a considerable area of agricultural land in village Kahngarh, District Sangrur in the erstwhile Pepsu territory. Consolidation proceedings were taken in hand in the village in 1954 and repartition finally effected in 1958. Sucha Singh respondent, who apparently claimed to be a tenant in possession of a portion of the land belonging to the appellant, on 13th of October, 1958, filed an application under section 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act), stating that he had been in possession of the land as a tenant till rabi 1958, and thereafter "the consolidation authorities carved out a new tak and gave it to respondent (Hartej Bahadur Singh) and that the petitioner (Sucha Singh) had not been given possession over any area of land". He further went on to state that during Kharif 1958, Hartej Bahadur Singh had taken forcible possession of the land which was with him. He, consequently, asked for restoration of the possession of the land of which he was the tenant. The Collector, after Hartej Bahadur Singh had been made a party to the proceedings before him, by his order dated 17th of December, 1962, dismissed the application saying that Sucha Singh had miserably failed to prove that he had been wrongfully dispossessed by Hartej Bahadur Singh. The position taken by the appellant before the learned Collector was that the consolidation authorities had correctly delivered the possession of the land in dispute to the appellant and that Sucha Singh had, by a mutual compromise, had surrendered possession of the land in dispute prior to l954. ' After giving the facts and the contentions raised by the parties, the learned Collector observed as follows:

A perusal of the application made by the applicant reveals that in para No. 2 the applicant has admitted that the possession of the land in dispute was delivered by the consolidation authorities to the respondent (Hartej Bahadur Singh) and not to the applicant. From this very admission in the application, the applicant's case of forcible dispossession is shattered.

Referring to the witnesses produced by the applicant, who belonged to a different village and on whom the Collector was not inclined to place much reliance, he further stated that these witnesses had also mentioned that Hartej Bahadur Singh started cultivating the land after the consolidation proceedings. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that this evidence taken with the averments made in para No. 2 of the application, showed that "Hartej Bahadur Singh was put in possession by the consolidation authorities". Sucha Singh went up in appeal to the Commissioner, who accepted the appeal and directed that the Collector should go into the question as to what Khasra numbers Sucha Singh was in possession before consolidation and put him in possession of the land which had been given in lieu of the same. In coming to this decision, the learned Commissioner did not set aside the findings of the learned Collector that Hartej Bahadur Singh was, in fact, given possession of the land in dispute by the consolidation authorities or that Sucha. Singh had not been forcibly dispossessed by Hartej Bahadur Singh. All that he found was that from the revenue records it appeared that Sucha Singh had been in cultivating possession of the khasra numbers in dispute prior to 1958 and that he had not been ejected out of this holding through any process of law. While dealing with the plea of the landlord that there had been a compromise before the Panchayat whereby Sucha Singh gave up his tenancy of his own accord, he felt that this would not help the landlord because it had not been proved whether the compromise related to this parcel of the land which is now in dispute and that "even if this compromise be admitted, it is not in accordance with the law and unless the transfer is in accordance with the law, it is invalid. Such a compromise, therefore, cannot be relied upon in these proceedings." The landlord went up in revision to the Financial Commissioner who rejected it saying that, according to the landlord, Sucha Singh was not in possession of the land before 1958 while this statement was refuted by Sucha Singh. He then went on to say that ignoring the stray entries, the Collector should carefully find out which of the khasra were cultivated by Sucha Singh before consolidation and possession should be restored to him of only such land as had been substituted for those khasra numbers. It was against these orders of the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner that the writ was filed by the landlord.

3. The learned Single Judge very rightly held that even if the consolidation authorities decided the dispute with regard to the right-holder being a tenant or not, the conclusion so arrived at cannot be a final adjudication on the question of the relationship between the parties. He then discussed the provisions of the tenancy act above referred to, and holding that under sections 7 and 7-A, the tenancy can be terminated on the grounds mentioned therein and that section 43 gives overall power to the Collector to evict a person who is in wrongful or unauthorized possession and put the tenant into possession if he is so entitled, dismissed the writ application. The landlord has come up in appeal.

4. Section 43 of the Tenancy Act is in the following words:

43 (1) Any person who is in wrongful or unauthorized possession of any land-

(a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act, or-

(b) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the provisions of this Act, may, after summary enquiry, be ejected by the Collector, who may also impose on such person a penalty not exceeding five hundred rupees *

* * *

So far as a tenant is concerned, Section 7 of the Tenancy Act provides that the tenancy cannot be terminated except for the reasons given therein. The question for determination, however, in the present case is. In what circumstances is the Collector invested with the jurisdiction given by section 43 to evict a person and put some other person in possession after summary enquiry ?

5. The facts alleged and proved in the present case have first to be taken into account. The consolidation authorities, after consolidation proceedings, have to repartition the land and allot certain areas to each of the land-owner in lieu of the land which he owned before the consolidation and which had been put in the hotchpotch. Out of the total land put into the hotchpotch by all the land-owners, certain areas have to be set apart for common purposes etc and the remaining area has to be rateably distributed amongst the land owners. The right to possession of the new holdings so carved out is dealt with in sub-section (1) of section 23 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, according to which if the owners and tenants affected by repartition agree to enter into possession of the holdings allotted to them, the Consolidation Officer may allow them to enter into such possession forthwith or from such date as may be specified by him. Under sub section (2), the Consolidation Officer shall, if necessary, put them in physical possession of the holdings to which they are so entitled. Section 25 provides that a land-owner or a tenant shall have the same right in the land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme of consolidation as he had in his original holding or tenancy, as the case may be. Section -6 preserves the encumbrances and provides as follows:

If the holding of a land-owner or the tenancy of a tenant brought under the scheme of consolidation is burdened with any lease, mortgage or other encumbrance; such lease, mortgage or other encumbrance shall be transferred and attached to the holding or tenancy allotted under the scheme or to such part of it as the Consolidation Officer * * * * may have determined in preparing the scheme; * *

Rules made under the Consolidation Act, inter alia, provide for the determination of the encumbrances during the consolidation proceedings.

6. From the above it is clear that if a person is a tenant under a landlord of a particular area of land, then the landlord will be allotted some other land in lieu of that but the possession shall have to be given to the tenant of the area corresponding to the area of which he was a tenant. The consolidation proceedings in no way affect the rights of the parties and in no way change their rights inter se. In the present case, if the facts alleged and proved were that after the consolidation proceedings, possession was, in fact, delivered to Sucha Singh as a. tenant over the new land which had been allotted on repartition to Hartej Bahadur Singh in lieu of the land which was with this tenant and that subsequently the tenant was dispossessed, the provisions of section 43 of the Tenancy Act would be directly applicable and this was not disputed. Here, however, that is not the case. In the application filed by the tenant, as already given, the main allegation was that the consolidation authorities had given a new tak to the landlord and that the tenant had not been given possession over any part of the land. As stated above, the Collector also came to the same conclusion after taking into consideration this allegation in the application and the evidence on the record. These findings have not been specifically reversed by the higher authorities.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent-tenant, however, urged that the jamabandi of the year 1954-55 showed that he was a tenant under the landlord of the area claimed by him and that he continued to be in possession and was dispossessed by the landlord. We adjourned the case in order to find out whether in the records of the consolidation authorities, Sucha Singh was actually mentioned as a tenant. In the jamabandi prepared after the repartition, Sucha Singh is not mentioned as a tenant in any portion of the land allotted to Hartej Bahadur Singh. This was not disputed. At best, it may mean that the consolidation authorities through some mistake or otherwise failed to treat Sucha Singh as a tenant and, consequently, refused to recognise him as such and give him possession over any portion of the new tak given to Hartej Bahadur Singh. The question is whether this mistake even if committed by the consolidation authorities can be set right by the Collector after summary enquiry under section 43 of the Tenancy Act. It was not disputed that if consolidation authorities make any mistake in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them, there is a provision for filing objections to the Consolidation Officer and for filing appeals from that order, to the Settlement Officer and then to the Assistant Director and ultimately a revision is provided to the State Government under section 42

of the Consolidation Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent tenant, however, was that it is optional for the tenant either to pursue his remedy under the Consolidation Act to get redress or to approach the Collector and ask him to summarily put him into possession. Under the Consolidation Act it is duty of the consolidation authorities to put the land-owners or tenants into possession. That is a jurisdiction vested in them. If they put any person into possession, he cannot be said to have been in wrongful or unauthorized possession of the land became it does not fall either under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 43 of the Tenancy Act because it is not effected by a transfer either by an act of parties or by operation of law, which is invalid under the provisions of the tenancy act and there is no question of the person not being entitled to the use and occupation of the same under the provisions of the Act. Mistake, if any, committed by the Consolidation Officer can be got corrected by proceedings under the Consolidation Act, and the Collector cannot, under the provisions of section 43 of the Tenancy Act, seek to correct the mistakes of, and undo the acts performed by the consolidation authorities.

8. It is necessary to refer to another matter dealt with by the learned Commissioner. According to him, even if a tenant has, by a compromise before the Panchayat, relinquished the possession in favour of the landlord, the same would be inoperative and against the provisions of the law. Section 7 of the Tenancy Act relates to the circumstances in which a tenancy can be terminated but that does not imply that if a tenant, of his own accord, relinquishes the tenancy and goes away handing over the possession to the landlord saying that he is no longer interested in the land, the possession of the landlord will become unauthorized or illegal. The learned counsel for the respondent conceded that this view of the learned Commissioner cannot be sustained.

9. From the evidence on the record it appears, therefore, that the possession was delivered to the landlord by the consolidation authorities and that being the case, he cannot be said to be in unauthorized possession. His possession is in accordance with the consolidation proceedings and the records prepared as a result thereof. The Collector under section 43 of the Tenancy Act, has no jurisdiction to interfere in anything done under the Consolidation At t even if some mistake has been made by the authorities during consolidation proceedings. The appeal, therefore, must be accepted, the order of the learned Single Judge set aside, the rule made absolute and the impugned orders quashed. The order of the Collector will stand. This will not, however, in any way prevent the tenant from pursuing any remedy that may be open to him. There will be no order as to costs.

section 43 of the Tenancy Act,