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Sankaramahalingam Chetty v. Muthulakshmi
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (Muthulakshmi) sued her brother and his sons for recovery of certain immovable property, claiming title under deeds of sale and gift executed by her father. At trial, two principal factual issues arose: (a) whether the deeds of sale and gift were real transactions or sham; and (b) whether the defendants had acquired title by adverse possession for more than the statutory period.
The suit was decreed in the plaintiff's favour in the lower Courts. Those Courts held that the defendants were precluded from raising the two defences (that the deeds were sham and that they had title by adverse possession) by reason of a prior judgment rendered in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 before the District Munsif of Koilpatti. Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 had been brought by the assignee of a mortgage to enforce a sale under a bond executed by Muthulakshmi (who was defendant 1 in that suit and is the plaintiff in the present suit). That prior suit was dismissed on the ground that the mortgage was a sham and devoid of consideration.
The present defendants were defendants 2 to 4 in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 and had raised similar contentions in that suit. In the prior proceeding Muthulakshmi contended that those defendants were unnecessary parties; the District Munsif considered them unnecessary (citing Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra) and proposed to strike them off the record, but ultimately allowed them to remain at their insistence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the findings in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 — namely (i) that the deeds of gift and sale to Muthulakshmi were real and genuine, and (ii) that the defendants had not acquired title by adverse possession — operate as res judicata to bar the defendants from raising those issues in the present suit.
- Whether, independently of res judicata by record, the defendants are estopped by their conduct (inviting decision on those points in the prior suit) from controverting those matters in subsequent litigation — including the applicability of principles under Section 115 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether a co-defendant's adjudication against him in a prior suit binds other co-defendants inter se where the adjudication between co-defendants was unnecessary to grant the plaintiff's relief.
- Whether the lower Courts erred in treating unnecessary findings in the prior suit as having the effect of res judicata between co-defendants.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The lower Courts were wrong to treat the two findings in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 (that the deeds were genuine and that the defendants had not acquired title by adverse possession) as res judicata. The prior suit was dismissible on the singular finding that the mortgage was a sham; thus those other findings were not necessary to the decision and could not operate as res judicata.
- Even though the mortgagee appealed and the appellate Court decided the questions against the defendants, the result of the prior suit could not have been otherwise because the mortgage finding was sufficient to dispose of the mortgagee's claim.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent's vakil did not strongly defend the res judicata point but contended that the defendants, having invited decision on these points by remaining parties in the prior suit, are estopped by conduct from denying those decisions in later litigation — invoking principles akin to Section 115 of the Evidence Act.
- Reliance was placed on authorities such as Collier v. Walters and Aghore Nath Mukerjee v. Kamini Debi to support the contention that previous decrees can operate as binding adjudications analogous to judgments in rem in some circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra | Authority relied upon by the District Munsif to support the view that certain defendants were unnecessary parties. | The District Munsif cited this authority in holding that defendants claiming adverse title to both mortgagor and mortgagee were unnecessary; the present Court records that the District Munsif was rightly of opinion that they were unnecessary. |
| Modukuri Vankataraju v. Masina Ramanamma | Cited by the District Munsif (as quoted) on a point of law. | The Court held that this decision had no bearing on the facts of the present case and that it was an error to suppose the prior suit could have been dismissed on the basis of the two issues in question. |
| Vasudeva Mallaya v. Thathadi Naranappaya | Principle that there can be no res judicata as between co-defendants where it is not necessary to decide their conflicting interests to give the plaintiff relief. | The Court followed this decision in concluding that res judicata did not apply between co-defendants on issues unnecessary to the plaintiff's relief. |
| Jadav Chandra Sarkar v. Kailash Chandra Singh | Same general principle as Vasudeva Mallaya regarding res judicata between co-defendants; also discussed requirements for res judicata. | The Court followed this authority to support the conclusion that unnecessary adjudication between co-defendants does not bind them as res judicata. |
| Collier v. Walters | Used by respondent to support estoppel/approbate-and-reprobate principle and to show a party could be bound by a previous decree. | The Court analyzed and distinguished Collier v. Walters on the facts: the English case involved a decree embodying a declaration against the impleaded defendant and that defendant had the right of appeal; those distinguishing features meant Collier did not control the present case. |
| Aghore Nath Mukerjee v. Kamini Debi | Authority relied on to argue that a previous decree may be analogous to a judgment in rem and bind all parties. | The Court noted that Aghore Nath Mukerjee proceeded on that ground, but did not accept that it governed the present facts; the Court ultimately rejected the respondent's estoppel argument. |
| Kristo Gopal Shaha v. Kasheenanth Shaha | Instances where a person first set himself up as a necessary party and later claimed he had been unnecessarily impleaded. | The Court observed that such cases involved different factual circumstances (a party switching positions within the same suit) and did not establish estoppel here. |
| Bhaju Chowdhury v. Chuni Lal Marwari | Similar instances of a party changing position regarding necessity of being on record. | Cited as illustrating different factual matrix; the Court treated these authorities as not decisively aiding the respondent. |
| Achanta Venkatasuryanarayana v. Yellapragadu Shiva Sankara Narayana | One of several recent cases discussing the bar of res judicata as between co-defendants. | Referred to by Seshagiri Aiyar, J. as part of the doctrinal background; used to identify requisites for res judicata inter se co-defendants. |
| Fakiranand Lallubhai v. Naginchand Kalidas | Another recent case discussing res judicata between co-defendants. | Referred to for the same doctrinal context; the judgment contributes to formulation of requisite elements for res judicata inter se. |
| Venkayya v. Narasamma | Authority cited for the first requisite: there should be active controversy inter se between parties on the same side. | Quoted by Seshagiri Aiyar, J. to support the proposition that active controversy between co-defendants is a prerequisite to binding them inter se. |
| Tanjore Ramchandra Rau v. Vellayanadan Ponnusami | Also cited in relation to the first requisite of active controversy among co-defendants. | Referred to as supporting authority for the need for active controversy between co-defendants. |
| Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev | Authority cited for the second requisite: adjudication inter se must be necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff. | Quoted by the Court (per West, J.) to show that if the relief to the plaintiff does not require a decision between co-defendants, such co-defendants will not be bound inter se. |
| Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury | Authority supporting the necessity requirement for adjudication inter se between co-defendants to bind them. | Used by the Court (per Wigram, V.C.) to illustrate when adjudication inter se is required to give plaintiff relief. |
| Kevan v. Crawford | Also cited in support of the necessity principle for binding co-defendants. | Referred to (per Jessel, M.R.) as part of the doctrinal foundation for the second requisite. |
| Secy. of State v. Swaminatha Koundan | Establishes that although a finding may be unnecessary, if it is embodied in the decree it can be res judicata. | The Court invoked this authority to distinguish the present case from Collier: where an unnecessary finding is embodied in the decree it may bind, but that was not so here. |
| Lallah Bholanath v. Beechoo Koonwar | Authority noted as being strongly against the respondent's position. | The Court observed that this decision did not assist the respondent and was cited as contrary to his contention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in two complementary strands: (1) legal analysis of res judicata principles as between co-defendants when a prior suit contained findings unnecessary to the plaintiff's relief; and (2) whether an estoppel (by conduct) nonetheless prevents the defendants from challenging those issues in subsequent litigation.
On res judicata: The Court concluded that the lower Courts erred in treating the two findings in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 (that the deeds were genuine and that the defendants had not acquired title by adverse possession) as res judicata. The pivotal observation is that the prior suit was dismissible by the single finding that the mortgage was a sham; therefore the findings regarding title inter se co-defendants were unnecessary to the adjudication of the mortgagee's suit. Following earlier authorities (notably Vasudeva Mallaya v. Thathadi Naranappaya and Jadav Chandra Sarkar v. Kailash Chandra Singh), the Court held that where the determination of rights between co-defendants is not necessary to give the plaintiff the relief sought, an adjudication between co-defendants will not operate as res judicata inter se.
The Court further emphasized two requisites (addressed at length by Seshagiri Aiyar, J.): (a) there must be active controversy between the parties on the same side (i.e., active contest between co-defendants); and (b) adjudication inter se between the co-defendants must be necessary to enable the Court to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff. The Court found these requisites lacking on the facts: the adjudication on title between co-defendants was unnecessary to dispose of the mortgagee's claim, and there was no demonstration that an adjudication inter se was required to grant the plaintiff relief in the prior suit.
On the point of whether the prior finding should nevertheless bind the defendants by reason of estoppel or approbation and reprobation, the Court rejected that contention. It held that principles akin to Section 115 of the Evidence Act do not apply to produce an estoppel by conduct in these circumstances, because there was no evidence that the plaintiff was induced to alter her position by reason of the defendants' continuing on the record in the prior suit. The mere fact that the plaintiff adduces evidence in the former case does not necessarily show prejudice or that her position was changed by the defendants' conduct.
The Court engaged in a comparative analysis of Collier v. Walters (whose observations were relied on by the respondent) and distinguished it on two grounds: (1) the impleaded defendant in Collier had a right of appeal which the present defendants did not have; and (2) the English decree contained a declaration embodied in the decree which made the finding res judicata — whereas in the present case the unnecessary findings were not embodied in the decree in a manner that would bind the defendants. The Court cited Secy. of State v. Swaminatha Koundan for the proposition that an unnecessary finding may be res judicata when embodied in the decree, but found that factual distinction absent here.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J. reiterated the doctrinal requisites derived from several authorities and concluded that the first two requisites (active controversy inter se and necessity of adjudication to give plaintiff relief) were not satisfied. He declined to give a definitive opinion on whether an express adjudication (as a third element) is required in all cases, but noted it was unnecessary to decide that point for the present case.
On the issue of adverse possession, the Court observed that the fact the claim was not barred as between the defendants on the date of the 1910 suit did not conclusively determine adverse possession as on the date of the present suit; accordingly the question of adverse possession ought to be tried freshly in the remanded trial.
As a result of the foregoing analysis, the Court held that the earlier adjudication did not operate as res judicata nor did estoppel by conduct apply; accordingly, the findings in the prior suit could not preclude the defendants from contesting title and adverse possession in the present suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court reversed the decisions of the lower Courts on the specific issue concerning res judicata (issue 5) and estoppel. The Court concluded that the prior adjudication in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 does not operate as res judicata between the co-defendants on the questions of title and adverse possession, and that no estoppel by conduct arises from the facts of this case.
DISPOSITION: The case was remanded to the Court of first instance for disposal on the merits after trial. Costs up to date were ordered to abide and to be provided for in the final decree.
Implications: The direct consequence for the parties is that the prior findings will not preclude re-litigation of the issues of the genuineness of the deeds and adverse possession in the remanded trial. The opinion does not elaborate broader doctrinal innovations beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; its practical effect is to require the first-instance Court to try the substantive issues on their merits rather than rely on the prior suit as res judicata.
Spencer, J.:— The plaintiff sued her brother and brother's sons in this suit for the recovery of certain immovable property, to which she claimed title under deeds of sale and gift from her father. Questions were raised at the trial whether these deeds represented real or sham transactions and whether the defendants had a good title by adverse possession for over the statutory period. The suit has been decreed in the plaintiff's favour both the lower Courts holding that the defendants are debarred from raising these defences by the decision in a prior suit, Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Koilpatti, which makes these matters res judicata. Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 was a suit brought by the assignee of a mortgage to enforce a sale of the suit properties upon a bond executed by Muthulakshmi, who was defendant 1 in that suit and is the plaintiff in this suit. That suit was dismissed on the finding that the mortgage was a sham transaction devoid of consideration. The defendants in this suit were defendants 2 to 4 in that suit and they raised similar contentions when Original Suit No. 232 was tried. Muthulakshmi then contended that they were unnecessary parties to that suit. The District Munsif, M.E Ry. M.A Krishna Rao, who tried that suit, was rightly of opinion that they were unnecessary, as they claimed under a title adverse to both the mortgagor and mortgagee: vide Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra(1), and he proposed to strike their names off the record. Nevertheless as they insisted on continuing on the record, he weakly allowed them to remain.
2. Now it is argued that the lower Courts were wrong in treating the two findings in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910, viz., (1) that the deeds of gift and sale to Muthulakshmi from her father were real and genuine; and (2) that these defendants had not acquired any title by adverse possession, as res judicata seeing that the finding as to the enforceability of the mortgage bond was sufficient to justify the dismissal of the mortgagee's suit, and that although the mortgagee could and did appeal and the appellate Court also decided these questions against the defendants, the result of the suit could not have been otherwise even if the findings on these two issues had been the other way. I think that this contention is right and that the judgments of the lower Courts cannot be supported on this ground.
3. The decision in Modukuri Vankataraju v. Masina Ramanamma(2) quoted by the District Munsif has no bearing on the facts of this case and it was an error to suppose that Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 could have been dismissed on the decision of the two issues upon which the contentions of defendants 2 to 4 failed. Following Vasudeva Mallaya v. Thathadi Naranappaya(3) and Jadav Chandra Sarhar v. Kailash Chandra Singh(4), I am of opinion that there can be no res judicata as between co-defendants in cases where it is not necessary to decide upon their conflicting interests in order to give the plaintiff the relief appropriate to his suit.
4. The respondent's vakil has not seriously attempted to support the findings as to res judicata, but he argues that the defendants, having in the prior suit invited a decision upon these points, are estopped, not by record, but by conduct from turning round and saying in subsequent litigation between the same parties that decision was wrong. If the principles of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, are sought to be applied to the circumstances of the case, there is no reason for suggesting that the plaintiff was led to alter the position, that she had taken up all along, in consequence of these defendants persisting in being made parties to the mortgagee's suit. From the mere fact that the plaintiff was left to adduce evidence in the former case to substantiate her position it does not necessarily follow that she was prejudiced or induced to change her position by the defendant's inconsistent conduct. The decisions in Collier v. Walters(5) and Aghore Nath Mukerjee v. Kamini Debi(6) turned upon the construction of wills, and the decrees in the previous suits were of the nature of judgments in rem binding all persons who were parties to them. The Master of the Rolls pointed out in Collier v. Walters that William Collier, Junior, the plaintiff in the subsequent suit, had made no attempt to impeach the correctness of the former decree and, therefore, he must be bound by it. In Kristo Gopal Shaha v. Kasheenanth Shaha(7) and in Bhaju Chowdhury v. Chuni Lal Marwari(8) the same person at one time set himself up as a necessary party to a suit and afterwards turned round and declared that he had nothing to do with it and had been unnecessarily impleaded. Such is not the case here. The defendants simply maintained that they are not bound by the decision in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910. Whether they were necessary parties to that suit is a question of law and there can be no estoppel on a point of law.
5. I am, therefore, of opinion that no case of estoppel arises from the facts of the present case. The decisions of the lower Courts on issue 5 are reversed and the suit will be remanded to the Court of first instance for disposal on the merits after trial. Costs up to date to abide and to be provided for in the final decree.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.:— I agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother. But as the point for decision is one of some importance, I propose to say a few words. It was conceded that the District Munsif was wrong in saying that the decree of the Court in Original Suit No. 232 of 1910 could have been based on either of the findings arrived at in that suit. The finding on the mortgage was fatal to the suit. The other finding which related to title as between the contesting defendants could not have non-suited the plaintiff. Such a finding was unnecessary and though asked for by the added defendants should not have been given in the suit.
6. In this view prima facie the conclusion of the Court could not operate as res judicata. The principle underlying I the bar of res judicata as between the co-defendants has been the subject of discussion in three recent cases, Achanta Venkatasuryanarayana v. Yellapragadu Shiva Sankara Narayana(9), Fakiranand Lallubhai v. Naginchand Kalidas(10) and Jadav Chandra Sarkar v. Kailash Chandra Singh. The first requisite is that there should be active controversy as against each other between the parties arrayed on the same side: per Muthusami Aiyyar, J., in Venkayya v. Narasamma(11) and Tanjore Ramchandra Rau v. Vellayanadan Ponnusami(12). Secondly, the adjudication inter se between the co-defendants should be necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff. See per West, J., in Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev(13) and Wigram, V.C, in Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury(14) and Jessel, M.B, in Kevan v. Crawford(15). In the earlier case, the Vice-Chancellor says:
“But if the relief given to the plaintiff does not require or involve the decision of any case between co-defendants, the co-defendants will not be bound as between each other by any proceedings which may necessary only to the decree the plaintiff obtains.”
7. The third element mentioned in Jadav Chandra Sarkar v. Kailash Chandra Singh seems to imply that there should be an express adjudication and not one which may either be inferred or be deemed to have been granted or refused. Without further argument, I am not prepared to express a definite opinion on this last point. For the purposes of this case, it is enough to say that the first two requisites are wanting. Mr. Vonkatarama Ayyar relied on certain observations made by the Master of the Rolls in Collier v. Walters. I am prepared to concede that the observations at p. 267 go a great way to help the respondent; but when the facts of the case are closely examined, the decision will be found to leave the present case unaffected. Under a will, one William Collier claimed the estate as the tenant-in-tail. He and his mortgagee sued the trustee appointed under the will for a declaration that William Collier was the tenant-in-tail, that his rights were assigned to the mortgagee, and that the trustee should convey to the mortgagee the rights of the mortgagor. To this suit the son of William Collier was a party. His contention was that his father had only a life-interest in the property bequeathed, that the estate tail vested in him and not in his father, and that subsequently the claim for a declaration that the trustee should convey the legal estate to the mortgagee was unsustainable. The Master of the Rolls pointed out that the son was not bound to put forward these pleas and could have asked to be dismissed from the suit, keeping his right to contest the conclusion in the suit untouched; but he claimed an adjudication of his rights. In the result, it was found that the father was tenant-in-tail and not the son, and that the mortgagee was entitled to a recognition of his rights by the trustee. The decree in the suit distinctly stated that the claim of the mortgagee was only subject to the equity of redemption possessed by the son Collier.
8. The son preferred no appeal against this decree. In the subsequent suit, the son pleaded that the previous adjudication was not binding on him. Sir George Jessel held he was bound. The points of difference between that case and the present one are these: (a) The impleaded defendant in the English case had the right of challenging the decision in appeal, which he has not in this case; (b) The declaration against the son Collier was embodied in the decree of the Court, which has not been done in the present case it is well settled that although a finding may be unnecessary, if it is embodied in the decree it will be res judicata. Secy. of State v. Swaminatha Koundan(16). These two considerations distinguish Collier v. Walters from the case before us. I have referred to this case at some length, because I was somewhat impressed by the able argument of the learned vakil when the observations were quoted before us at the hearing. I do not agree with him that the principle that a man should not both approbate and reprobate is applicable to this case or to the English case I have referred to.
9. The other decisions do not take us very much further. In Kristo Gopal Shaha v. Kasheenauth Shaha the question did not arise in a subsequent suit. The point considered was whether a party who insists upon being put on the record and upon having his case dealt with can claim in the course of that suit or on appeal from that suit to be exonerated. The learned Judges expressly say that a question whether a decision against an unnecessary party will be res judicata did not arise in that case. On the other hand Lallah Bholanath v. Beechoo Koonwar(17) is strongly against the respondent. Aghore Nath Mukerjee v. Kamini Debi proceeded on the ground that the decision was analogous to a judgment in rem and bound all the parties. I therefore agree with my learned colleague in holding that the previous adjudication does not operate as res judicata on the question of title. On the question of adverse possession, too, the same observations apply. Moreover, the fact that the claim was not barred as between the defendants on the date of the suit of 1910 is not conclusive on the question of adverse possession at the date of the present suit. This issue should have been tried under any circumstance. I agree as to the order as to costs.
S.N/R.K
10. Case remanded.
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