- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Akkaraju Narayana Rao v. Akkaraju Seshamma
1. The true question is as to whether the appeal is out of time. The appellant under O. 44 presented an application for leave to prosecute his appeal in forma pauperis or companies by a memorandum of appeal as required by the order. The appellation for leave was two months out of time and was filed on the last day allowed for filing the appeal. Eight days later the Court returned the application and the memorandum on the ground that the application was out of time and gave two days' time to explain the delay. Two days later the appellant again presented the memorandum of appeal with the full court-fee and applied under S. 149 that the delay should be excused. In the case of plaints insufficiently stamped O. 7, R. 11 (S. 54 of the old Code), the Court is bound to give a few days to pay the correct fee. Delay could be excused if the insufficiency was caused by a mistake as to the amount of the requisite stamps. But under S. 149 it is now left to the discretion of the Court.
2. In Balkaran Rai v. Gobina Nath Tiwaij(1) the opinion was expressed that these provisions of S. 5 as regards a plaint were not made applicable to a memorandum of appeal by virtue of S. 582. To meat this decision, a new S. 588-A was inserted which allowed the admission of insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal presented within the proper period of limitation, provided the insufficiency of the stamps was caused by a mistake on the part of the appellant as to the amount of the requisite stamps.
3. This enactment appears to us to recognize the correctness of the I Allahabad ruling that S. 54 did not apply to memoranda of appeals as, if it did, there would have been no and of the new section. Then we come to the present Code which, for S. 582-A, substituted a new S. 149 not confined to memoranda of appeal but giving the Court a discretion in all cases to allow the payment of the fee at any time. This, in our opinion is the section which governs the present case, and with respect we are not satisfied as to the correctness of the ruling in Achut Ramchandra Pal v. Nagappa Balb Balgaya(2) that under the present Code O. 7, R. 11, is rendered applicable to memoranda of appeal by S. 148 so as to make it incumbent upon us to admit memoranda out of time where the conditions of the rule are complied with. In the present case we are not prepared to differ from the exercise of the single Judge's discretion in admitting the appeal.
Appeal No. 227 of 1910.
4. Akkaraju Ramadoss had two sons, Sitarammayya and Janakiramayya. The plaintiff is the grandson of Sitaramayya. The defendant is the widow of Janakiramayya, who died in 1907. This suit is for the recovery of his property on the ground that the plaintiff and the deceased were members of an undivided Hindu family and that by survivorship the plaintiff has become entitled to it. The case for the defendant is that the properties were the self-acquisition of Janakiramayya.
5. The Subordinate Judge upheld the defendant's plea and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal.
6. The plaintiff bases his claim on two grounds: (a) that Ramadoss, the common ancestor of himself and Janakiramayya, acquired large property with the aid of which the latter purchased the properties in suit; and (b) that his grandfather, Sitaramayya, and Janakiramayya had thrown their earnings into a common stock and that the properties sued for represent the savings and accumulations from the joint acquisition. We have heard Mr. Prakasam at considerable length and we are not satisfied that either of these allegations has been made out in this case. Ramadoss was apparently a man of methodical habits. He kept accounts and although, owing to lapse of time, all of them are not available, Ex. E which relates to the period immediately preceding his death shows that he left only Rs. 84 odd at the time of his death. This sum has been proved to have been spent for his funeral expenses. We see no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that it has not been established that there was any nucleus of the property of Ramadoss in the hands of Janakiramayya. It has not been shown that any inams were in the possession of Ramadoss and that they descended to his sons. Ex. N has not been proved. The property mentioned in Ex. D has not been shown to be ancestral property. There is no evidence that the inam mentioned in Ex. C ever was in the possession of Ramadoss.
7. As regards the theory of joint acquisition, prima facie, the facts that the two brothers were lending their savings in their individual names, transacted separate business and kept separate accounts are against it. There is no reliable evidence that Sitaramayya remitted his earnings to his father or brother. On the death of Sitaramayya the properties left by him and the debts which he had advanced were all colleated by one Gopalakrishnayya on behalf of the widow. No portion of these was mixed up with the earnings of Janakiramayya. On the other hand we have full and exhaustive accounts kept by Janakiramayya (Ex. 3 series) after the death of his father in 1870, which show with what small beginnings he began life and how they were augmented month after month. The totals in Ex. 3 series approximate to the properties now claimed in the suit. These accounts prove beyond doubt that the properties in dispute were the self acquisition of Janakiramayya.
8. Mr. Prakasam laid stress on the fact that Ramadoss applied for a succession certificate to the estate of his son Sitaramayya. There is nothing to show that the certificate was granted or that any money were collected by him; non constant that any money, if collected, reached Janakiramayya and was mixed up by him with his own money. Subsequent to the death of Sitaramayya and Ramadoss, Janakiramayya brought up his brother's son and grandsons, educated them and got them married. They were apparently living with their mother in Janakiramayya's house. From these facts Mr. Prakasam argues that they constituted members of a joint Hindu family with the deceased and that the burden was upon the defendant to prove that the properties were not ancestral. We are unable to uphold this contention. As the Subordinate Judge has pointed out, Janakiramayya appears to have done just as much for the descendants of his brother who have never made any claim to share in his property. Further, all these relations, including the plaintiff and his father, appear to have been treated by Janakiramayya rather as dependants than as cosharers. A joint family presupposes the possession of common property. Under the Hindu Law mere living together of the members of the family will not make them joint owners of properties acquired by each individual member. There must have been a nucleus of ancestral property which was utilized for the purpose of making the subsequent acquisition, or the members must have thrown their 1 joint earnings into the hotchpot with the intention of giving up their individual rights in them. Chamier, J., examines all the previous rulings upon the subject in Ram Krishna Das v. Tanda Mal(3) and says that “there is no presumption that property found in the possession of any one member is joint family property unless it is shown that the family as such possessed at least some property.” In another place the learned Judge says that it is only when there is “ancestral property by means of which other property may have been acquired, then it is for the party alleging self-acquisition to prove that it was acquired without any aid from the family estate.” We entirely agree with these propositions. In Dhurm Das Pandey v. Mt. Shama Soondri Debiah(4) Lord Campbell states distinctly at p. 240: “It was allowed that this was a family who lived in commensality, eating together and possessing joint property.” The Judicial Committee laid down that under these circumstances the mere fact that purchases were made in the names of individual members of the family was not evidence of separate ownership. Vedavalli v. Narayana(5) proceeds on the same principle.
9. We have found that there was no nu-clues of ancestral property proceeding from Ramadoss and that his two sons did not throw their earnings into a common stock. On these findings the decisions quoted by Mr. Prakasam have no application. We agree with the Subordinate Judge in his conclusion and dismiss the appeal with costs.
S.N/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.
Alert