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Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bengal v. M. Shaw Wallace & Co. Assessees
Summary of Opinion — Rankin, C.J. (with Pearson, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal, for a certificate that the case is fit to be taken on appeal to His Majesty in Council under Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act (noted as involving the same considerations as Cl. (c), Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code). The dispute concerns a very large sum of money and whether income-tax is claimable on that sum.
The judgment below was pronounced on 13 January 1931. The Commissioner filed the application for the certificate in the court office on 31 March 1931, together with a notice of motion calling upon the assessees to appear on 20 April 1931. The court customarily hears such applications on Mondays and the Easter vacation began on 3 April 1931. A copy of the Court's judgment, which by the Income-tax Act must be sent to the Commissioner under the seal of the Court, was received by the Commissioner on 26 January 1931.
The central procedural question brought forward was whether the application for the certificate was filed in time under the Limitation Act or whether an extension under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was required.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the application for a certificate to appeal under Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act was filed within the period of limitation or was out of time.
- Whether the applicable Limitation Act provision is Article 179 rather than Article 181 for computing the period, and consequently whether the date of the judgment is the date from which time must be counted.
- Whether, under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, the Commissioner is entitled to have the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment included in the computation of time for filing the application.
- Whether an extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is necessary or appropriate in the circumstances (including the attempt to obtain special leave to serve short notice before the Easter vacation).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court (Rankin, C.J.) began by observing that the question is significant because of the large sum at stake and the importance of whether income-tax is claimable. Prima facie the case falls within the class of cases contemplated by Cl. (c), Section 109 CPC and Cl. (2), Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act.
The Chamber turned to the contention that the application was out of time. The relevant chronology is: judgment pronounced 13 January 1931; copy of the judgment, required by the Income-tax Act to be sent under the court seal, was received by the Commissioner on 26 January 1931; application filed 31 March 1931 with notice of motion for 20 April 1931. The Court noted its ordinary practice of dealing with such applications on Mondays and explained that, because the Easter vacation began 3 April, four clear days' notice (calculated from 31 March) would have taken the notice into the vacation; the first convenient Monday after the vacation was 20 April.
On the Limitation Act analysis, Rankin, C.J. held that Article 179 governs rather than Article 181, and therefore the date of the judgment is the date from which the limitation period must be counted. The judge relied on Section 12 of the Limitation Act to conclude that a party is entitled to include the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment in the computation. Because the Commissioner could not have received a copy earlier than 26 January 1931, the application filed 31 March was within the permitted time when the period to obtain the copy is allowed.
The opinion records that on 31 March the applicant's advocate had applied for special leave to serve short notice so that the matter might come on before the Easter vacation; the Court considered that not convenient. Paragraph 17 of the Commissioner's petition set out the relevant facts, and Rankin, C.J. stated he would have extended time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act if that had been necessary. Concluding the analysis, the judge held that a certificate must issue as asked for. Justice Pearson agreed with Rankin, C.J.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Application allowed; a certificate is to issue for appeal to His Majesty in Council under Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act.
Implications: The direct effect is that the Commissioner is granted the certificate enabling an appeal to His Majesty in Council on the important question of whether income-tax is claimable on the money at issue. The Court found the application to be within time when the time to obtain a sealed copy of the judgment (received 26 January 1931) is included under Section 12 of the Limitation Act; alternatively, the Court would have extended time under Section 5 had that been necessary. The opinion does not set out or announce any novel legal precedent beyond the decision to allow the certificate in the circumstances.
Bench: Rankin, C.J. (delivering judgment); Pearson, J. (concurring). Application allowed.
Rankin, C.J:— This is an application by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal, for a certificate that the case is a fit one to be taken on appeal to His Majesty in Council under Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act, which involves the same considerations as are involved in Cl. (c), Section 109 of the CPC. The sum of money at stake upon which the tax is claimed is very large and I am satisfied that the question as to whether income-tax is claimable on this money is a very important question both from the point of view of the assessees and from the point of view of the treasury. Prima facie I should have no difficulty in saying that this case is exactly of the type which is contemplated by Cl. (c), Section 109 of the CPC and which comes under Cl. (2), Section 66(a) of the Income-tax Act. It is said however that in this case the application for a certificate has been brought out of time.
2. The facts are that the judgment was pronounced on 13th January 1931 and that the application for this certificate was filed in the office of the Court on 31st March 1931. This was filed together with a notice of motion served on the same day calling upon the assessees to appear before this Court on 20th April.
3. It ought to be explained that this Court usually takes applications of this character on Mondays and that, in the ordinary way, these applications are dealt with as listed motions, the papers being filed in the office first. The Easter vacation began in this Court on 3rd April and at the time, namely, the 31st March 1931 four clear days' notice requisite for a notice of motion would have taken the applicant into the vacation. The Court reopened on Tuesday the 14th April and, in the ordinary way, 20th April being a Monday would be the first day on which it was convenient for this Court to deal with this motion. For this reason, the notice of motion was given for that day.
4. Under the Income-tax Act, a copy of this Court's judgment has to be sent to the Commissioner under the seal of the Court. This was sent to the Commissioner in due course and was received by him on 26th January 1931. If the period between 13th January and even 21st January be deducted under Section 12 of the Lim. Act, then the applicant is in time and he does not require us to make any order in his favour under Section 5 of the Lim. Act.
5. It appears to me, when one comes to look at the article in the Limitation Act applicable, that the case must be governed by Article 179 rather than by Article 181 and I think therefore that the date of the judgment in a case of this sort must be the date from which the time has to be counted. I also think that, under S. 12, a party in a case such as this is entitled to the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment. Nothing the Commissioner could have done would have given him a copy of the judgment sooner than he got it, namely, on 26th January 1921. I am not of opinion therefore that the application is out of time.
6. It appears that, on 31st March, the applicant by his advocate applied to this Court asking for special leave to serve short notice of motion be that the matter might come on before the Easter vacation. It appeared to the Court that would not have been a convenient course and para. 17 of the petition which has been filed on the part of the Commissioner sets out the facts. I am quite prepared, were it necessary, upon the strength of that paragraph to extend the time under Section 5 of the Lim. Act. In my judgment, a certificate must issue as asked for.
Pearson, J.:— I agree.
B.V/R.K
7. Application allowed.
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