- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sukhdeo v. Basdeo
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit by plaintiffs (the sons and descendants of Basdeo) against defendants (the descendants of Sukhdeo), concerning alleged joint family immovable properties (including zamindari, tenancy holdings and house property). The plaintiffs alleged that Basdeo and Sukhdeo and their descendants continued as members of a joint Hindu family, that Sukhdeo acted as the family manager, that the properties listed in the plaint were joint family properties, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a moiety (one half) share and to accounts of profits and assets misappropriated by Sukhdeo.
The defendants contended that separation occurred about ten years before suit, that Basdeo and Sukhdeo had thereafter acquired properties separately, denied that Sukhdeo was the manager, alleged Basdeo had acted as manager after Shankar Tewari's death until partition between branches, repudiated the misappropriation charge, and argued that claims for partition or declaration of rights in certain fixed-rate and occupancy (tenancy) holdings were not cognizable by the civil court.
The trial court found that the family remained joint until the suit and that proved properties were joint family properties; it held the plaintiffs were not entitled to rendition of accounts against Sukhdeo. The plaintiffs abandoned their claim for partition of fixed-rate and occupancy holdings at trial but sought a declaration that those holdings were joint family property and that their share was one half. The trial court declared the plaintiffs' one-half share in the immovable properties (including the holdings), directed partition of movables, and dismissed the rendition of accounts claim.
On appeal the defendants challenged only the civil court's jurisdiction to grant a declaration of plaintiffs' rights in the fixed-rate and occupancy (tenancy) holdings, relying on sections 121 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and on three decisions of this Court. The plaintiffs cross-objected to the refusal to order rendition of accounts by Sukhdeo.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to grant a decree declaring the plaintiffs' rights in fixed-rate and occupancy (tenancy) holdings in view of sections 121 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 (i.e., whether such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of revenue courts).
- Whether a civil court may entertain a suit that includes a claim for declaration of tenancy rights where the same cause of action also gives rise to other reliefs that only a civil court can grant (for example, declaration of rights in zamindari property and partition of movables), and if so whether the civil court can also grant the declaration as to the tenancy holdings.
- Whether the trial court was correct in refusing the plaintiffs' claim for rendition of accounts against Sukhdeo in the absence of proof of misappropriation or fraudulent conversion by the manager.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- There was a separation between plaintiffs and defendants approximately ten years before the suit, so the properties were not joint family properties at suit's institution.
- After separation, Basdeo and Sukhdeo acquired properties separately; the plaintiffs' allegation that all properties in the plaint were joint family properties was untrue.
- Sukhdeo was not the family manager; Basdeo continued as manager after Shankar Tewari's death until partition between branches.
- They repudiated the charge of misappropriation against Sukhdeo and argued that even if he were manager, he would not be legally liable to render accounts.
- The court below had no jurisdiction to grant a declaration of plaintiffs' rights in fixed-rate and occupancy holdings; jurisdiction over such tenancy rights was exclusively vested in revenue courts under sections 121 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. They relied upon this statute and three decisions of this Court to support that contention.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs alleged and proved that they and the defendants formed a joint Hindu family and that the listed properties were joint family properties.
- They claimed a moiety (one half) share in the immovable properties and sought partition of movables, debts, and the like; they also alleged misappropriation by Sukhdeo and sought rendition of accounts (the trial court later found they failed to prove misappropriation).
- At trial they abandoned their claim for partition of fixed-rate and occupancy holdings but maintained a claim for declaration that those holdings were joint family property and that their share was one half.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sahdeo v. Budhai (Full Bench decision) | Held that a person who claims to be a tenant must be deemed to be "claiming to hold through the landholder" within the meaning of section 121 of the Agra Tenancy Act; supports the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts over suits for declaration of tenancy rights. | The court relied on this decision to confirm that a pure suit by a plaintiff for declaration of tenant-rights is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue courts; however, the court distinguished that principle when the same cause of action also entitles the plaintiff to other civil reliefs. |
| Bunni Pandey v. Brahmdeo Pandey | Applied as a decision of this Court endorsing the view that jurisdiction of civil courts is ousted with respect to suits for declaration of tenancy rights under the Agra Tenancy Act. | Used by the court as one of the authorities establishing that the legislature vested jurisdiction over tenancy-declaration suits in revenue courts; affirmed that prior to the Act such suits were cognizable by civil courts but that the Act ousts that jurisdiction for pure tenancy suits. |
| Bhagwan Sahai v. Ram Chander | Cited as another decision of this Court supporting the view that the Agra Tenancy Act ousted civil court jurisdiction over suits for declaration of tenancy rights. | Relied upon to show consistency of the Court's earlier rulings that suits by a claimant of tenancy-rights fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, subject to the distinction drawn by the present Court when the cause of action yields additional civil reliefs. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first identified the statutory scheme: section 121 of the Agra Tenancy Act permits a tenant to sue for declaration of his right as tenant, and section 230 (together with the fourth schedule) bars all courts other than revenue courts from taking cognizance of suits of that nature. The court recognized that these provisions are mandatory and that a pure suit for declaration of tenant-rights is exclusively within revenue court jurisdiction.
The court then posed the narrower question whether the civil court is barred from entertaining a suit where the cause of action entitles the plaintiff to not only a declaration of tenancy rights but also to other reliefs that only a civil court can grant (for example, declarations regarding zamindari property and partition of movables). The court noted the general principle (section 9, Civil Procedure Code) that civil courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred.
The court reasoned that section 121 contemplates a suit that is "a suit for declaration of right to a holding pure and simple" and that the Tenancy Act nowhere expressly ousts civil court jurisdiction over suits in which the cause of action also gives rise to other civil reliefs. The court found no implication in the Act that a plaintiff must split a single cause of action into two suits—one in the revenue court and one in the civil court—where the same set of facts gives rise to reliefs cognizable by different forums.
Practical considerations underpinned the court's analysis: requiring plaintiffs to split causes of action would lead to duplicative evidence, waste of public time, unnecessary expense, and risk of contradictory decisions. In the absence of a statutory provision compelling such a result, the court would not attribute that intention to the legislature.
The court therefore concluded that a suit based on a cause of action that requires reliefs obtainable only from a civil court is cognizable by the civil court notwithstanding that one prayer is for a declaration of tenancy-rights. The court added a limiting principle: a plaintiff who, merely to oust revenue jurisdiction, prays for other reliefs and is not entitled to them will fail if the only relief he deserves is one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court.
Applying these principles to the present case, the court found that the plaintiffs proved they were coparceners of a joint family with rights as to zamindari properties and tenancy holdings and sought partition of movables and cash. Because adequate relief with respect to the zamindari property and partition could not be granted by the revenue court, the civil court properly entertained the suit and could decree the declaration as to tenancy holdings in exercise of jurisdiction over the entire cause of action.
Regarding the cross-objection on rendition of accounts, the court applied settled law: absent proof of misappropriation, fraudulent or improper conversion by the manager, a coparcener seeking partition cannot claim an account of past dealings; entitlement is limited to an account of the joint family property as it exists on the date partition is demanded. As the plaintiffs did not produce reliable evidence of misappropriation by Sukhdeo, the trial court was right to dismiss the claim for rendition of accounts.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court dismissed the defendants' appeal and the plaintiffs' cross-objection with costs. The appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed with costs.
Implications and direct effects:
- The civil court was correct to entertain the suit because the cause of action entitled the plaintiffs to civil reliefs (declaration of rights in zamindari property and partition of movables) that could not be granted by revenue courts; consequently the civil court could also grant a declaration as to the tenancy (fixed-rate and occupancy) holdings in the same suit.
- Pure suits for declaration of tenancy rights remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts under sections 121 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, as affirmed by prior decisions of this Court; the decision distinguishes those pure suits from mixed-cause suits where civil reliefs are also sought.
- The trial court's refusal to order rendition of accounts was upheld because there was no reliable evidence of misappropriation or fraudulent conversion by the manager; a coparcener seeking partition is not entitled to an account of past dealings absent such proof and is entitled only to an account of the joint family property as it exists on the date partition is demanded.
- No finding in this opinion purports to create a broader statutory amendment; the court framed a jurisdictional principle limiting the exclusive revenue jurisdiction to pure tenancy-declaration suits and permitting civil courts to hear mixed-cause suits where necessary to provide complete relief.
Thom and Iqbal Ahmad, JJ.:— This is a defendants' appeal and arises out of a suit for (1) partition of the plaintiffs' moiety share in the property given at the foot of the plaint, (2) a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to a moiety share respecting the property not capable of partition by the civil court, and (3) rendition of accounts of the profits of the joint family property and business and a decree for a moiety share in the same.
The properties in dispute in the suit were immovable properties including zamindari, tenancy holdings and house property. We are not concerned in the present appeal with the movable and other properties in dispute in the suit.
One Shankar Tewari died leaving two sons Sukhdeo and Basdeo. Basdeo and his sons were the plaintiffs in the suit and Sukhdeo and his descendants were the principal defendants. The plaintiffs' case was that Basdeo and Sukhdeo and their descendants continued to live as members of a joint Hindu family till the date of the suit and that Sukhdeo was the manager of the family. The plaintiffs alleged that all the properties detailed at the foot of the plaint were joint family properties and the share of the plaintiffs in the same was to the extent of one half. They charged Sukhdeo with misappropriation of the profits and assets of the joint family and maintained that he was liable to account, with respect to the family assets.
The defendants resisted the suit mainly on the allegation that separation between the plaintiffs and the defendants took place about 10 years before the date of the suit and that after separation Basdeo and Sukhdeo acquired properties separately and the allegation of the plaintiffs that all the properties mentioned in the plaint were joint family properties was untrue.
They denied the allegation of the plaintiff that Sukhdeo was the manager of the alleged joint family and maintained that after the death of Shankar Tewari, Basdeo plaintiff continued to be the manager of the family till the partition took place between the branches of Basdeo and Sukhdeo. They repudiated the charge of misappropriation levelled by the plaintiffs against Sukhdeo and contended the even if the family be found to be joint and Sukhdeo be held to be the manager, he is not legally liable to be called upon to render accounts. The defendants further contended that the plaintiffs' claim for partition of the fixed-rate holdings, occupancy holdings, etc., was not cognizable by the civil court, and most of the argument addressed in this appeal has centered, round this plea.
The trial court held that the family of the parties was joint till the date of the suit and all the properties out of the properties detailed in the plaint which were proved to be in existence were joint family properties. It further held that as the family was joint the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for rendition of accounts against Sukhdeo.
At the trial the plaintiffs abandoned their claim for partition of the fixed-rate and occupancy holdings and prayed only for declaration that those holdings were the property of the joint family and the plaintiffs' share in the same was to, the extent of one half, and the court below held that it had jurisdiction to grant that relief to the plaintiffs. In view of the findings noted above, the court below, while dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for rendition of accounts, passed a decree in the plaintiffs' favour declaring that the plaintiffs' share in the immovable properties including the holdings was to the extent of one half and directed partition of the movables, debts, etc.
In appeal before us no exception has been taken to the findings on the questions of fact recorded by the court below and the sole point raised on behalf of the defendants appellants is that the court below had no jurisdiction to grant a decree for the declaration of the plaintiffs' right in the fixed-rate and occupancy holdings. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on sections 121 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, and on the decisions of this Court in Sahdeo v. Budhai (1), Bunni Pandey v. Brahmdeo Pandey (2), and Bhagwan Sahai v. Ram Chander (3).
It is provided by section 121 that at any time during the continuance of a tenancy the tenant of a holding may sue the landholder, or any person claiming to hold through the landholder, whether as tenant or rent-free grantee or otherwise, for a declaration of his right as tenant, and by section 230 all courts other than revenue courts are precluded, except by way of appeal or revision, from taking cognizance of all suits and applications of the nature specified in the fourth schedule of the Act, “or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which adequate relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application”. The provisions of section 230 are mandatory and the jurisdiction of the civil court from taking cognizance of suits or applications specified in the fourth schedule of the Act or based on a cause of action in respect of which adequate relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application is absolutely barred. A suit for a declaration of plaintiff's right as tenant under section 121 of the Act is specified at serial No. 14 of group B of the fourth schedule of the Act. It is clear, therefore, that since the passing of the Agra Tenancy Act (Act III of 1926) such a suit cannot be entertained by the civil court. Prior to the passing of the present Tenancy Act suits between rival claimants to a tenancy were, according to the rulings of this Court, cognizable by the civil court; but the legislature has, by the clearest possible provisions in the present Act ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to such suits, and the revenue court and the revenue court alone is competent to entertain and try such suits. This is the view that has been taken in the three decisions of this Court noted above and it has been held in the Full Bench decision in Sahdeo v. Budhai that a person who claims to be a tenant must be deemed to be “claiming to hold through the landholder” within the meaning of section 121 of the Act, irrespective of the fact that he does not set up a case of a special grant or a special contract with the landholder as the basis of his claim. It must, therefore, be taken as settled law so far as this Court is concerned that a suit by a plaintiff for a declaration that he is either the sole tenant or joint tenant with the defendant of a holding is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue courts.
The question however remains whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit which is based on a cause of action that entitles the plaintiff not only to a mere declaration of his right to certain tenancy holdings but also to other reliefs which cannot be granted by the revenue courts, and if the civil court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of such a suit, is that court competent, while granting to the plaintiff the other reliefs, to grant him a decree for the declaration of his right to the holdings?
It cannot be disputed that civil courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature unless their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred; vide section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is also clear that a suit is of a civil nature if the principal question in the suit relates to a civil right. The reason for the rule that civil courts are ordinarily to decide disputes concerning civil rights is not far to seek. The determination of disputed questions of right involves adjudication of complicated questions of fact and law and it is inexpedient to leave the, decision of such questions in the hands of courts presided over by officers who have had no legal training or practice.
Section 121 read with section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act no doubt bars the jurisdiction of the civil court as regards “suit by tenant for declaration of his right to a holding”, but the suit contemplated by section 121 is a suit for declaration of right to a holding pure and simple, and not a suit in which the cause of action on which the suit is based entitles the plaintiff, apart from a declaration of his right to tenancy holdings, to other reliefs as well. There is no provision in the Tenancy Act which expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to such suits. The only question that remains for consideration, therefore, is whether the jurisdiction of civil courts with respect to such suits is impliedly barred by that Act. In our judgment the answer to the question must be in the negative.
The scheme and the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act clearly indicate that the legislature intended to vest revenue courts alone with jurisdiction to decide all disputes concerning tenancy holdings, but there is nothing in the Act to imply that if some of the reliefs prayed for in a suit can only be granted by the civil court, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted by the mere fact that the relief for a declaration of right to a certain holding is coupled with the other reliefs. Nor is there anything in the Act to show that if the cause of action entitles the plaintiff, over and above a declaration of his right to a holding, to certain other reliefs, for instance, declaration of his right to zamindari property, the plaintiff must split his cause of action in two parts and sue for a declaration of his right to the holding in the revenue court, and claim redress with respect to the zamindari property from the civil court. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the words, “based on a cause of action in respect of which adequate relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application”, used in section 530 of the Act. That the legislature could not have contemplated the splitting of a cause of action, and the institution of two separate suits, one in the civil and one in the revenue court, by a plaintiff when the reliefs prayed for in the two suits are based on the identical set of facts, is demonstrated by the fact that such a course would be highly inconvenient and might lead to anomalous results. The institution of two such suits would involve both the plaintiff and the defendant in the unnecessary expenditure of adducing the same evidence in two different courts and would manifestly lead to waste of public time. Apart from this there would be the risk of contradictory decisions on the same set of facts being arrived at by the civil and the revenue courts. In the absence of a specific provision in the statute countenancing such a deplorable state of affairs a court is not justified in crediting the legislature with such an intention. We, therefore, hold that a suit which is based on a cause of action with respect to which adequate relief can only be granted by the civil court is cognizable by that court notwithstanding the fact that one of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff is for the declaration of his right to a tenancy holding. It is needless to observe that if a plaintiff simply with a view to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court prays for reliefs other than a relief for a declaration of his right to a holding, and it is found that he is not entitled to the other reliefs, his suit will fail on the ground that the only relief to which he was entitled could be granted to him by the revenue court.
In the suit before us the plaintiffs alleged and proved that they were members of a joint Hindu family with, the defendants and were as such entitled to a declaration of their right as to zamindari properties and tenancy holdings owned by the family, and for partition of the movables and cash belonging to the family. The cause of action on which the suit was based was therefore, one with respect to which adequate relief could not be granted by the revenue court and the suit was rightly entertained by the court below. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed.
A cross-objection has been filed by the plaintiff as regards the refusal by the court below to order Sukhdeo to render accounts of his dealings with the family property. It is settled law that in the absence of proof of misappropriation or fraudulent or improper conversion by the manager of a joint family a coparcener seeking partition is not entitled to call upon the manager to account for his past dealings with the family property. The coparcener is entitled only to an account of the joint family property as it exists on the date he demands partition. In the present case there was no reliable evidence to prove the charge of misappropriation or fraudulent conversion of the family property by Sukhdeo. The court below was, therefore, right in dismissing the claim for rendition of accounts. The cross-objection must, therefore, also fail.
The result is that we dismiss both the appeal and the cross-objection with costs.
Alert