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C. Prasanna Venkatachella Reddiar v. Collector Of Trichinopoly
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Collector of Trichinopoly (plaintiff) instituted a suit under Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code concerning charitable trust property. The first defendant (now deceased) was alleged to be the trustee and manager of the charities; the second defendant was alleged to be a transferee from the first defendant of part of the trust lands.
The plaint sought against the first defendant removal from trusteeship, accounts, appointment of a new trustee and vesting of trust property. Prayer (b) sought a declaration that the sale to the second defendant of lands belonging to the charity was invalid — this was the only relief sought against the second defendant.
The lower Court granted all reliefs sought against both defendants. Both defendants appealed. The first defendant's appeal has abated and been dismissed because she is deceased and her legal representatives were not brought on the record. The present appeal is by the second defendant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the second defendant's appeal abates because a co-respondent (the first defendant) is deceased and her legal representatives were not brought on the record as required by Order XXII.
- On the merits, whether the Collector's claim for a declaration that the sale to the second defendant was invalid is barred by limitation (i.e., whether the claim is time-barred and, if so, from what date time begins to run).
- Ancillary question: if the Collector can sue under Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code for the declaration sought against a transferee, when does the right to sue accrue for limitation purposes (in relation to Article 120 of the Limitation Act)?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (Collector) Arguments
- The second defendant's appeal must abate because one of the respondents to the appeal (the first defendant) is deceased and her legal representatives have not been brought on the record as required by Order XXII (para 5).
Second Defendant (Appellant)'s Arguments
- The second defendant contended he was not a necessary party to the suit and his name should be struck off the record.
- Alternatively, the second defendant argued that any cause of action against him was barred by limitation and that the suit should therefore be dismissed as against him. He claimed entitlement to this relief in his sole right (para 8).
Government Pleader's / Other Contentions Mentioned
- A test suggested (attributed to the Government Pleader) for deciding whether a right survives: whether the appellant can succeed and the decree can be reversed without bringing the legal representative of the deceased party on the record. The opinion applies that test here and finds it satisfied (para 8).
- It was argued on behalf of the Collector (by the Government Pleader) that time did not begin to run from the date of the sale (26 January 1899) but only from the time when the Collector was informed of the facts entitling him to take action under Section 92 — i.e., time begins when the public officer becomes aware (para 12).
- Another argument referenced: that the lower Court's decree entitled the second defendant to sue the first defendant for damages for breach of covenant of title, which was said to make the first defendant interested in the second defendant's appeal; the Court regarded this argument as not requiring detailed refutation (para 8).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gopal v. Ramachandra (1902) I.L.R., 26 Bom., 597 | When applying the sections of the Civil Procedure Code now replaced by Order XXII to appeals, "the right to sue" should be construed as "the right to prosecute by law, to obtain relief by means of legal procedure" (interpretation to give meaning when applied to appeals) (para 7). | The Court relied on this construction to hold that the mere death of one respondent (without bringing representatives) does not automatically make the appeal abate if the right survives to the appellant (para 7–8). |
| Paramen Chetty v. Sundararaja Naick (1902) I.L.R., 26 Mad., 499 | This case followed the principle in Gopal v. Ramachandra (para 7). | Used to support the proposition from Gopal that the "right to sue" should be construed for appeals in a manner that prevents mechanical abatement where the appellant's right survives (para 7). |
| Srinivasachari v. Gnanaprakasa Mudaliar (1906) I.L.R., 30 Mad., 67 | Authority cited for the proposition that the question on which adjudication is sought by an appellant will not affect the deceased party in some cases (para 8). | The Court referred to it to show that the adjudication sought by the second defendant did not affect the deceased first defendant and so the appeal does not abate (para 8). |
| Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore (1899) I.L.R., 27 Calc., 493 | Test for ascertaining whether a particular defendant was a necessary party: (1) whether there was a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved; and (2) whether his presence was necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate and settle all questions involved (para 15). | Spencer, J. invoked this test (reading "appeal" for "suit") to conclude the appellant could obtain relief in the appeal without making the first defendant's representatives parties (para 15). |
| Subbayya v. Krishna (1891) I.L.R., 14 Mad., 186; Huseni Begam v. The Collector of Moradabad (1897) I.L.R., 20 All., 46; Girdhari Lal v. Ram Lal (1899) I.L.R., 21 All., 200; Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Deo Baishnav (1897) I.L.R., 24 Calc., 418 | Authorities holding that Section 539 (corresponding to Section 92 of the later Code) empowered the Court to remove trustees — i.e., within the competence of the Court (para 16). | These cases were cited to demonstrate reported decisions supporting the view that the Court had power under the earlier provision to remove trustees; used in the Court's overview of prior divergence (para 16). |
| Narasimha v. Ayyan (1889) I.L.R., 12 Mad., 157; Rangasami Naikan v. Varadappa Naikan (1891) I.L.R., 17 Mad., 462; Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789; Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy (1905) 2 C.L.J., 431 | Authorities holding that Section 539 (corresponding to Section 92) was without competence in specified contexts (para 16). | These cases were cited to show conflicting authority on the scope of the section and to contextualize the legal landscape before legislative change (para 16). |
| Ghazaffer Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain (1905) I.L.R., 28 All., 112; Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Deo Baishnav (1897) I.L.R., 24 Calc., 418 | Authorities holding that alienees could be impleaded for the purpose of determining what properties are affected by the trust and could be made parties for recovering improperly alienated properties (para 16). | Cited in the debate whether alienees or trespassers on trust property can be joined as parties to a suit under Section 92; used to show support for joinder of alienees in particular situations (para 16). |
| Augustine v. Medlycott (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 241; Strinivasa Ayyangar v. Strinivasa Swami (1893) I.L.R., 16 Mad., 31; Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna (1900) I.L.R., 24 Bom. 170; Arunachella Chetti v. Muthu Chettiar (1880) 23 M.L.J., 347; Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789; Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy (1905) 2 C.L.J., 431 | Authorities holding that the relevant section was not applicable to suits against strangers to the trust (para 16). | Cited to show the opposing line of decisions denying applicability of the section to strangers, demonstrating judicial divergence on the scope of the section (para 16). |
| Ottappurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Oherechi Pallikkal Uppathummma (1909) I.L.B., 33 Mad., 81 | Held that the right to sue for a declaration that an alienation is invalid falls under Article 120 of the Limitation Act and accrues at the completion of the document, not when the plaintiff obtains knowledge of the alienation (para 18). | The Court applied this principle to hold that the right to sue accrued on the date of the sale (26 January 1899) and therefore Article 120's six-year period began then; the plaint dated 7 October 1909 was therefore time-barred (para 18). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in two main stages: (A) whether the appeal abates because a respondent is deceased and (B) the merits limited to the question of limitation.
A. Abatement of Appeal
- The Court held that the appeal does not abate merely because one of the respondents (the first defendant) is dead and her legal representatives were not brought on the record (para 6–8).
- The Court accepted and applied the construction in Gopal v. Ramachandra that, for purposes of appeals and the provisions now replaced by Order XXII, the phrase "the right to sue" must be read as "the right to prosecute by law, to obtain relief by means of legal procedure." This interpretive treatment prevents mechanical abatement where the appellant's right survives (para 7).
- The Court applied a practical test (presented by the Government Pleader and applied by the Court): whether the appellant can succeed and the decree be reversed without bringing the legal representative of the deceased party on the record. The Court found that test satisfied here (para 8).
- It emphasized that the relief sought by the second defendant on appeal (striking off his name as not a necessary party; limitation defence) was solely against the plaintiff and could be asserted in his own right; the death of the first defendant did not affect that right (para 8).
- The Court rejected (without detailed refutation) an argument that the first defendant had an interest in the appeal because she might have a right to sue the second defendant for damages under the lower Court's decree (para 8).
B. Merits — Limitation
- The Court limited its consideration on the merits to the question of limitation and expressed the view that the claim, if any, against the second defendant was barred by limitation (para 9).
- The Court assumed (without deciding) that the Collector could seek the declaration against a transferee from the trustee under Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code (para 10).
- The Court analyzed the effect of the Limitation Act and the Trusts Act: (i) if a transferee is an assignee for valuable consideration and acted in good faith without notice, Section 64 of the Trusts Act gives him immediate title (para 11); (ii) if the transferee paid no consideration he is not an assignee for valuable consideration under Section 10 of the Limitation Act and the beneficiary's right to follow is not barred; (iii) where the transferee is an assignee for valuable consideration but did not act in good faith, he acquires good title after the period necessary for extinguishing the beneficiary's right under Section 28 of the Limitation Act (para 11).
- Having concluded limitation could be pleaded, the Court agreed that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied to a suit for declaration that an alienation is invalid and that the right to sue accrues on completion of the document effecting the alienation — relying on Ottappurakkal Thazhate Soopi (para 12, 18).
- Applying that rule, the sale under Exhibit B occurred on 26 January 1899; the plaint was dated 7 October 1909. Article 120 allows six years from the date the right to sue accrues. The Court therefore held the suit was brought more than six years after the right to sue accrued and was time-barred (para 12, 18).
- On the Collector's submission that time should run from the date he was informed of facts under Section 92, the Court declined to accept that construction of "when the right to sue accrues" as inconsistent with the plain language of the Article (para 12).
- Consequently, the Court concluded the plaintiff's suit against the second defendant was barred by limitation and that the appeal should be allowed in respect of the second defendant (para 12–13).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal by the second defendant is allowed and the suit is dismissed against the second defendant on the ground of limitation (para 13). The Court also held that the appeal does not abate by reason of the death of the first defendant whose representatives were not brought on the record (paras 6–9).
Consequences and directions given by the Court:
- The costs of both parties to the appeal in both courts are to be payable out of the trust funds (para 13).
- The appellant (second defendant) will recover his whole costs first; the first respondent (deceased's estate / representatives) will recover costs only out of the balance (para 13).
- It was noted that some costs incurred in the lower Court had been recovered by the Collector from the appellant; these must be refunded to the appellant and the Court, invoking Section 82 of the Civil Procedure Code, specified four months from the date of the judgment for this refund to be made (para 13).
Broader implications: The opinion rests on existing authorities and statutes to resolve abatement and limitation issues in the facts before the Court. The Court applied established principles (as reflected in cited precedents) to conclude the appeal did not abate and that the Collector's claim against the transferee was time-barred. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond these applications to the facts.
1. The Collector of Trichinopoly is the plaintiff. The suit is instituted under Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The first defendant; (now deceased) was the alleged trustee and manager of the charities referred to in the plaint. The second defendant was alleged to be a transferee from the first defendant of a portion of the lands appertaining to the charitable trust.
3. The prayers against the first defendant were for removal of the first defendant from the trusteeship and for accounts. There was a prayer (b) "to declare the sale to the second defendant of the lands belonging to the charity to be invalid." This is the only relief claimed against the second defendant. There were other prayers for the appointment of a new trustee and for vesting the trust property in the trustee as appointed. The plaintiff obtained all the reliefs asked against both the defendants in the lower Court.
4. There were appeals against this decree by each of the defendants. But the firsts defendant is now dead and her representatives not having bean brought on the record, her appeal has abated, and has been dismissed by us. The present appeal is by the second defendant.
5. It was contended before us on behalf of the plaintiff that the second defendant's appeal must also abate, inasmuch as the first defendant who was originally a respondent to this appeal is now dead and her legal representatives have not been brought on the record as required by Order XXII.
6. In my opinion the appeal does not abate.
7. The mere fact that one of the respondents is dead and that his representative is not brought on the record will not make the appeal abate if the right survives to the appellant. In Gopal v. Ramachandra (1902) I.L.R., 26 Bom., 597 at pp. 602, 603 and 607, it was succinctly stated that when the sections of the Civil Procedure Code which are now replaced by Order XXII have to be applied to appeals, the words "the right to sue" must be construed as meaning "the right to prosecute by law, to obtain relief by means of legal procedure." This is not expressly stated in Order XXII, Rule 11, which may be styled the interpretation clause of the order. But several rules in the order become meaningless in their application to appeals unless these words are added; and the addition of these words would follow from giving to the expression "a right to sue" a meaning cognate to that which the rule expressly gives to the word "suit." Gopal v. Ramachandra (1902) I.L.R., 26 Bom., 597 was followed in Paramen Chetty v. Sundararaja Naick (1902) I.L R., 26 Mad., 499.
8. The relief that the second defendant claims in appeal is first that as he was not a necessary party to the suit, his name should be struck off from the record, and secondly that if there was any cause of action against him it was barred by limitation, that in either case the suit should be dismissed as against him. If the second defendant is entitled to claim this relief, he is entitled to do so IN his sole right. The only person against whom this relief is claimed is the plaintiff. On the death of the first defendant, the second defendant's right to claim this was not affected. A test for deciding whether the right survives was suggested by the Government Pleader, viz., whether the appellant can succeed, and the decree can be reversed, without bringing the legal representative of the deceased party on the record. This test is satisfied in the present appeal, The question on which adjudication is sought by the second defendant as appellant before us will not affect the deceased party. See Srinivasachari v. Gnanaprakasa Mudaliar (1906) I.L.R., 30 Mad., 67, 63 and 69. An ingenious argument was put forward on this point that the lower Court's decree entitled the second defendant to sue the first defendant for damages for breach of covenant for title...if there was any such covenant that the first defendant was consequently interested in the appeal of the second defendant. The argument does not seem to require any detailed refutation. I hold, therefore, that the appeal does not abate.
9. On the merits several questions of law were argued before us. It is necessary to deal only with the question of limitation. I am of opinion that the claim, if any, against the second defendant was barred.
10. I express no opinion on the point whether the plaintiff had any cause of action against the second defendant; but will assume that in the circumstances of this case, though the suit was brought by the Collector under Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code such a declaration as is here sought by prayer (b) can be asked and obtained against a parson who claims to be a transferee from the trustee.
11. It was suggested in the first instance that the Collector's right to obtain this relief (assuming its exists) is not barred as Section 10 of the Limitation Act prevents the right to follow the trust property in the second defendant's hands from being barred by any length of time. The second defendant has been found to be an assignee for valuable consideration, and that finding has not been attacked before us. But it was argued that it has not been found that the second defendant is a transferee in good faith, and that the mere fact of his being a transferee for consideration will not make the plea of limitation available to him, unless he is also a transferee in good faith. This contention cannot be upheld. Trust property in the hands of a transferee in good faith for consideration without the notice of the trust cannot be followed by the beneficiary at all: see Trusts Act, Section 64. The right to follow arises only where the transferee has not acted in good faith: (1) If such a transferee has paid no consideration ho is not an assignee for valuable consideration within the terms of the Limitation Act, Section 10, and in his case a suit for the purpose of following trust property is not barred by any length of time. But (2) where the transferee is an assignee for valuable consideration, (a) if he has acted in good faith without having notice of the trust he acquires immediate title to the property under Section 64 of the Trusts Act, or (6) if he has not acted in good faith, but has paid valuable consideration he acquires good title after the lapse of the period necessary for extinguishing (under Section 28 of the Limitation Act) the right of the beneficiary to follow the trust property in his hands. This is in accordance with principle. When there is valuable consideration for the transfer, the original trust property is replaced by the consideration. There is no such institution when there is no consideration, no question is raised here as to the adequacy of the consideration.
12. If limitation can be pleaded then the article applicable to the suit is Article 120. This was conceded. It was argued, however, by the learned Government Pleader that time did not begin to run from the date of the execution of the sale of the 26th of January 1899 which is alleged to have been made in breach of trust, and a declaration of the invalidity of which is sought in prayer (b) of the plaint, but that it began to run only from the time when the Collector was informed of the facts entitling him to take action under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was strenuously pressed upon us that a public officer has no duty east upon him to go round and examine public trusts and that suits which he is entitled to institute must; be allowed to be barred though he may have no knowledge of his right to sue. The article must, however, be construed as it is, and I find myself unable to see how the meaning suggested by learned Government Pleader can be read into the words "when the right to sue accrues." The article must be construed as it is notwithstanding that Article 134 prescribes a period of twelve years from the date of the purchase from the trustee when possession is sought for. If the Collector can sue under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for a declaration against an alleged transferee in breach of trust (on which point I express no opinion), then the suit must, it seems to me, be brought within six years or the sale. Time began to run therefore on 26th January 1899, and the suit was brought more than six years thereafter. It was, in my opinion, barred by limitation,
13. The appeal will be allowed and the suit dismissed against the second defendant. The costs of both parties to the appeal in both Courts will be payable out of the trust funds, but the appellant will recover his whole costs first and the first respondent will recover his costs only out of the balance. We are informed that some costs incurred in the lower Court have been recovered by the Collector from the appellant. These will have to be refunded to the appellant and under Section 82 of the Civil Procedure Code we specify four months from this date for this being done.
Spencer, J.
14. I agree that the appellant can obtain the relief that he seeks in this appeal without making the legal representatives of the second respondent parties.
15. In Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore (1899) I.L.R., 27 Calc., 493 at p. 497, the test employed for ascertaining whether a particular defendant was necessary party to the suit was to see (1) whether there was a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the suit, (2) whether his presence was necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The questions involved in an appeal do not necessarily include all the questions involved in the suit to which it is related; if we read "appeal" wherever the word "suit" occurs in the above passage and consider what are the reliefs asked for by the appellant in the present appeal it will appear that he can obtain all that he wants without the presence of the first defendant or her legal representatives.
16. There has been considerable divergence of opinion in the reported decisions of Courts in India as to the scope of Section 539 (corresponding to Section 92 of the Code of 1908) before the present Code became law. Now the question as to the powers of a Court proceeding under Section 539 to remove trustee held to be within the competence of the Court by Subbayya v. Krishna (1891) I.L.R., 14 Mad., 186, Huseni Begam v. The Collector of Moradabad (1897) I.L.R., 20 All., 46, Girdhari Lal v. Ram Lal (1899) I.L.R., 21 All., 200, Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Deo Baishnav (1897) I.L.R., 24 Calc., 418, and held to be without the competence of the Court by Narasimha v. Ayyan (1889) I.L.R., 12 Mad., 157, Rangasami Naikan v. Varadappa Naikan (1891) I.L.R., 17 Mad., 462, Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789, Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy (1905) 2 C.L.J., 431, has been settled by the legislature introducing clause (a) in section 92(1), Its is still a debatable question whether alienees or trespassers on trust property can be joined as parties to a suit under this section. It was held in Ghazaffer Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain (1905) I.L.R., 28 All., 112, that alienees could be impleaded for the purpose of determining what properties are affected, by the trust and in Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Deo Baishnav (1897) I.L.R., 24 Calc., 418, that they could be made parties for the purpose of recovering from them properties improperly alienated but in Augustine v. Medlycott (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 241, Strinivasa Ayyangar v. Strinivasa Swami (1893) I.L.R., 16Mad., 31, Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna (1900) I.L.R., 24 Bom. 170, Huseni Begam v. The Collector of Moradabad (1897) I.L.R., 20 All., 46, Arunachella Chetti v. Muthu Chettiar (1880) 23 M.L.J., 347, Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry (1906) I.L.R., 33 Calc., 789, Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy (1905) 2 C.L.J., 431, it was decided that the section was not applicable to suits against strangers to the trust. Now assuming without accepting that the Government Pleader is correct in his contention that the object of the section as shown by the addition of Clause 2 is to protect trusts against multifarious suits, that; the words of the section are very wide, that the reliefs (a) to (g) are illustrative and do not limit the grant under (h) of each further or other relief as the nature of the case may require; the plaintiff's suit must still fail as against the second defendant unless he can show that is in time.
17. The relief asked against the second defendant is a declaration that the sale of the trust properties to him is invalid. This case can hardly ho treated as a suit for recovery of possession of trust properties for which Article 134 would be appropriate.
18. It was held in Ottappurakkal Thazhate Soopi v. Oherechi Pallikkal Uppathummma (1909) I.L.B.,33 Mad., 81, that the right to sue for a declaration that one alienation of property is invalid falls under Article 120 of the Limitation Act and accrues at the completion of the document, not when the plaintiff obtains knowledge of the alienation. The second defendant purchased under Exhibit B on 26th January 1899 and the plaint is dated 7th October 1909. Article 120 allows six years from the date of the right to sue accruing. The Sub-Judge finds that the Collector became aware of the alienation when he received the report of the Revenue Inspector, Exhibit H, dated 19th February 1905; but it appears that he was aware of some trust properties having been misappropriated and alienated when he passed the proceedings, Exhibit I, dated 9th June 1899. I therefore consider that the relief sought against the appellant is in any case time-barred, and I agree in dismissing the suit against him with costs to be paid as directed in my learned brother's judgment.
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