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Chandra Kumar Chakravorti And Anr. Petitioners, v. Prosunn A Kumar Chakravorti And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 10, 1921
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Case Summary: Appeal Against Dismissal of Application for Revocation of Probate

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerned a decree of dismissal made by the District Judge of Chittagong on an application for revocation of probate of a Will under section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act.

The testator, Tarini Oharan Chukerbutty, executed a will on 5 December 1909 and died on 7 December 1909. The respondents, Prasanna Kumar Ohukerbutty and Satis Chundra Chukerbutty, applied for probate on 13 January 1910. The testator’s nephew, Chandra Kumar Chukerbutty, entered a caveat on 1 March 1910. Probate was initially granted on 11 April 1910.

An appeal to this Court resulted in the setting aside of the primary Court’s order on 18 March 1913 and a remand for retrial in the presence of both parties. A subsequent order for probate was made on 6 August 1914. An appeal against that order was dismissed on the merits on 2 July 1915.

During most of the period between the first grant of probate (11 April 1910) and the final grant (6 August 1914), the estate was under an administrator pendente lite. Fees levied on the probate were paid on 27 September 1915 (the probate is treated, for present purposes, as operative from that date); the administration bond was filed on 20 February 1916.

On 6 November 1918 the appellants (who had opposed the grant of probate) applied to revoke the probate under section 50. Their application was based on two grounds: (1) the grant had become useless and inoperative through circumstances; and (2) the executors had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory and accounts as required, or had exhibited an inventory and accounts untrue in material respects. The District Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the petitioners had failed to establish their contentions. The present appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the grant of probate had become useless and inoperative through circumstances, such that revocation under section 50 was justified.
  2. Whether the executors had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or had exhibited an inventory or accounts which were untrue in material respects, thereby justifying revocation under section 50.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that the grant had become useless and inoperative because the executors had completed their work and, on the terms of the Will, the estate had vested in the universal legatee, removing any need for the continuance of the executors in office.
  • The appellants further alleged that the executors had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory and accounts under Chapter VII of the Probate Act, and that the inventory and accounts that were exhibited were untrue in material respects.
  • In support of the first contention they relied on the decisions in Taran Singh Hazari v. Ramratan Tewari and Sankarnath Mooherji v. Biddutlata Debi (as authority for the proposition that an executor’s duties last only so long as necessary to carry out the terms of the Will and cease once the property has become that of the residuary legatee).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond the procedural history and the District Judge's factual findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Taran Singh Hazari v. Ramratan Tewari That an executor's duties are to administer the deceased's estate only so far and so long as necessary to enable him to carry out the terms of the Will; once property has become that of the residuary legatee the executor has no authority to manage it on behalf of the deceased's estate. The court observed that this principle did not apply to the present case because some duties remained to be performed by the executors; therefore the appellants' submission that the grant had become inoperative could not be sustained on that basis.
Sankarnath Mooherji v. Biddutlata Debi Same general principle as above concerning the duration of an executor’s duties (executor administers only so far and so long as necessary to carry out the Will). The court held the case inapplicable for the same reason: duties under the Will remained outstanding, so the grant was not inoperative.
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, Ltd. v. Frederick York Smith (Lord Macnaghten) That so long as the person entitled to the estate has not taken it out of the possession of the executors, the executors are entitled to continue in occupation of the estate. The court relied on this observation to support the conclusion that the executors were entitled to remain in possession until the beneficially entitled person took the estate out of their possession; this weighed against finding the grant inoperative.
Mohesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Biswa Nath Bhuttacharjee That the statute contemplates the submission of a single inventory and a single account (the account to be exhibited within one year from the grant, or within such further time as the Court may appoint); extensions of time do not enlarge the scope of the required account. The court used this authority to correct the lower court's apparent assumption that periodic accounts were required, and to explain the correct statutory expectations under section 98(1). It also supported the requirement that objections to accounts/inventory be specified precisely.
Sarat Sundari v. Uma Prosad Supports the construction that the statute requires one inventory and one account (consistent with the Mohesh Chandra decision). The court cited this case in conjunction with Mohesh Chandra to establish that periodic accounts are not mandated and to frame the proper scope and timing of the inventory/account obligations under section 98(1).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court dealt separately with the two grounds advanced for revocation.

First ground — grant rendered useless or inoperative

The appellants argued that the executors had completed their duties and that the estate had vested in the universal legatee, so the grant was inoperative. The court examined the Will and relevant authorities cited by the appellants (Taran Singh Hazari and Sankarnath Mooherji) but found them inapplicable because some executor duties remained outstanding. The court further relied on the observation attributed to Lord Macnaghten in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation v. Frederick York Smith that executors are entitled to remain in occupation until the person beneficially entitled takes the estate out of their possession. The court also noted that the appellants were not the persons who would be beneficially entitled to the estate if the executors were removed; consequently the court did not need to and would not decide, in the absence of proper parties, whether the estate could be taken out of the executors' hands by the beneficially entitled person(s). Because duties under the Will still required performance, the court concluded the grant had not become inoperative through circumstances.

Second ground — omission to exhibit inventory/accounts or exhibition of untrue inventory/accounts

The court observed that the District Judge had likely misunderstood the fifth clause of the explanation to section 50 by assuming executors must submit periodic accounts. The court clarified, relying on Mohesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Biswa Nath Bhuttacharjee and Sarat Sundari v. Uma Prosad, that the statute contemplates the submission of one inventory and one account: section 98(1) requires an inventory within six months of grant (or further time as the Court may appoint) and an account within one year (or further time as the Court may appoint). An extension of time does not alter the content or scope of the single account required.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court treated the probate as having been granted on 27 September 1915. The accounts actually exhibited on 7 July 1917 covered the period 14 April 1915 to 13 April 1916; the account for the period after 13 April 1916 was not filed, apparently because of an erroneous assumption that annual accounts were required. The court noted that the accounts that were submitted are on record, and appellants could invite the Court to revoke probate on the ground that those accounts were untrue in material respects. However, to succeed on that ground appellants were required to specify in their petition the particular items they challenged and the precise respects in which they were alleged to be untrue; vague allegations would not suffice.

The court further observed that accounts relating to the period when the first grant dated 11 April 1910 operated could not now be relied upon under clause (5) of the explanation to section 50, because that earlier grant was cancelled when the appeal to this Court succeeded on 18 March 1913. Consequently any incorrectness in accounts for that earlier period could not serve as a basis for revocation of the later grant.

On the record, the appellants had not identified specific items or particularized their objections so as to show the accounts were untrue in material respects; therefore there was no foundation for revocation on this ground.

Inventory — omission or untruth

The court treated the contention that the executors wilfully omitted to exhibit an inventory as unsubstantial because, although delayed, the inventory had in fact been exhibited and accepted by the Court below. The principal contention left was that the inventory was untrue in material respects. The court emphasized that the inventory was lengthy with numerous entries and that appellants were required to specify the items challenged and the precise errors alleged. The appellants had failed to do so in their application for revocation. Although the District Judge permitted them to lead evidence and rejected the objection, the appellate Court reviewed the inventory and relevant evidence and saw no reason to disagree with the District Judge's conclusion. Thus the objection failed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Consequences and specific directions given by the Court:

  • The appeal was dismissed; the petitioners failed to establish either that the grant had become inoperative through circumstances or that the inventory/accounts were untrue in material respects or wilfully omitted.
  • There was a cross-objection by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 against the District Judge's order for costs. The Court set aside the District Judge's order for costs and directed that the petitioners in the Court below (i.e., the appellants before this Court) will pay the costs of the other side.
  • The hearing fee in the District Court was assessed at Rs. 80 (the maximum allowed by the Rules and Orders of the High Court). The hearing fee in this Court was assessed at Rs. 700.

No broader precedent was announced beyond the application and clarification of the cited authorities; the decision effected the direct outcome between the parties rather than creating a new legal principle.

Judges: Mookerjee, J. (delivering the principal judgment); Buckland, J. agreed. Result: Appeal dismissed with costs; cross-objection partly allowed as to costs allocation and hearing fees assessed as above.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

Mookerjee, J.:—This appeal is directed against a decree of dismissal made by the District Judge of Chittagong on an application for revocation of probate of a Will. The testator, one Tarini Oharan Chukerbutty, made a testamentary disposition of his properties on the 5th December 1909 and died two days later. The Respondents Prasanna Kumar Ohukerbutty and Satis Chundra Chukerbuttv applied for probate of the Will on the 13th January 1910. Chandra Kumar Chukerbutty, the nephew of the testator, entered a caveat on the 1st March 1910. Probate was, however, granted on the 11th April 1910. Thereupon an appeal was preferred to this Court, with the result that the order of the primary Court was set aside on the 18th March 1913 and the case was remanded for retrial in the presence of both parties. On the 6th August 1914, an order for probate was again made. An appeal, preferred to this Court, was dismissed on the merits on the 2nd July 1915. During a considerable portion of the period which elapsed between the first grant of probate on the 11th April 1910 and the final grant on the 6th August 1914 the estate was in charge of an administrator pendente lite. The fees leviable on the probate were paid on the 27th September 1915 and it may be assumed, for our present purpose, that the probate became operative from that date, although the administration bond was not filed till the 20th February 1916. On the 6th November 1918, the Appellants who had unsuccessfully opposed the grant of probate commenced the present proceedings by an application for revocation under sec. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. The application was founded on two allegations, namely, first, that the grant had become useless and inoperative through circumstances, and, secondly, that the persons to whom the grant had been made had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit, an inventory and accounts in accordance with the provisions of Chap. VII of the Probate Act and had further exhibited under that chapter an inventory and accounts which were untrue in material respects. The District Judge has dismissed the application on the ground that the Petitioner has failed to establish the validity of his contentions. On the present appeal, the two points which were unsuccessfully urged before the District Judge have been reiterated with considerable zeal: we shall deal with them separately.

As regards the first point, namely, whether the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances, it has been contended that the Opposite Parties who took out probate have completed their work. The District Judge did not accept this contention and observed that although, after this lapse of time, they might be expected to have completed the administration, on the very showing of the Petitioners, the work had not been actually completed. This view has been controverted by the Appellant. Our attention has been drawn to the terms of the Will which, it has been argued, show that the estate has by this time vested in the universal legatee and that consequently there is no need for the continuance of the executors in their office. In support of this position reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the cases of Taran Singh Hazari v. Ramratan Tewari and Sankarnath Mooherji v. Biddutlata Debi . In the first of these cases it was pointed out that the duties of the executor are to administer the estate of the deceased, only so far and so long as to enable him to carry out the terms of the Will. Consequently after the property has ceased to be the estate of the deceased, and has become the property of the residuary legatee under the Will, the executor as such has no authority to manage the estate on his behalf. In the second case, it was pointed out that the duties of an executor are to administer the estate of the deceased, only so far and so long as to enable him to carry out the terms of the Will. These cases do not apply to the circumstances of the present litigation. It is clear that although some of the duties imposed on the executors have been performed, there are others which still require to be carried out. It is moreover clear, as pointed out by Lord Macnaghten in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, Ltd. v. Frederick York Smith , that so long as the person entitled to the estate has not taken it out of the possession of the executors, they are entitled to continue, in occupation of the estate. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that the Appellants have really no concern with this matter; for they are not the persons who would be beneficially entitled, to the estate, if the executors were removed from, possession. It is thus not necessary for us to determine in the absence of proper parties, whether the estate is liable to be taken out of the hands of the executors by the person or persons beneficially entitled-thereto. The fact remains that, under the terms of the Will, there are duties still to be performed by the executors consequently it cannot be maintained that the grant has become inoperative through circumstances, and the first ground urged in support of the application, for revocation cannot be sustained.

As regards the second point we are inclined to the view that there was some confusion in the Court below and probably the true effect of the fifth clause of the explanation to sec. 50 was not fully realised. It appears to have been assumed by the District Judge that the executors are under a liability to submit accounts periodically, whereas it is clear from the decisions in Mohesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Biswa Nath Bhiittacharjee and Sarat Sundari v. Uma Prosad , that what the statute contemplates is the submission of one inventory and one account. Sec. 98, sub-sec. (1) provides in the first place that an executor or administrator shall, within six months from the grant of probate or letters of administration or within such further time as the Court may from time to time appoint, exhibit in the Court by which the same has been granted, an inventory containing a full and true estimate of all the property in possession and all the credits and also all the debts owing by any person or persons, to which the executor, or administrator is entitled in that character. It next provides that an executor or administrator shall in like manner, within one year from the date aforesaid or within such further time as the Court may from time to time appoint, exhibit an account of the estate showing the assets that have come to his hands and the manner in which they have been applied or disposed of. As was pointed out by Sir Francis Maclean, C.J, in the case of Mohesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Biswa Nath Bhuttacharjee , what is contemplated is that an account should be filed within one year from the grant showing the assets Which have come to the hands of the executor or administrator and the manner in which such assets have been applied or disposed of. If the executor or administrator is not able to exhibit such an account within one year from the grant, he may obtain an extension of time from the Court. But the fact that time has been extended does not enlarge the scope of the account. The account of the estate which is required to be exhibited, whether it is exhibited within, a year or thereafter, is the account contemplated by the second paragraph of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 98. In the present case, it is clear from the facts already stated that the probate may be taken to-have been granted on the 27th September 1915. The accounts, exhibited on the 7th July 1917, cover, we are told, the period from the 14th April 1915 to the 13th April 1916. The account subsequent to the 13th April 1916 was not filed, probably because it was erroneously assumed that the account to be exhibited was a periodical annual account and that the next account required to be exhibited by the executors was an account from the 14th April 1916 to the 13th April 1917. However that may be, the accounts submitted are in Court and it is open to the Appellants to invite the. Court to revoke the probate on the ground that the accounts mentioned were untrue in material respects. In order to enable the Court to deal with this matter effectively, it is essential that the Appellants should have in their petition of objection specifically stated what items in the accounts were untrue they should also have stated in what respects the item or items challenged were untrue: it is not enough to make vague allegations that the accounts are untrue. It is unfortunate that in the Court below, exception was not taken on this ground and the Petitioners were not called upon to furnish fuller and more specific details as to their objection to the accounts; which related principally to accounts for periods antecedent to the grant of probate. It appears that the executors were in possession after probate had been granted in the first instance on the 11th April 1910. No exception can be taken to those accounts now, for the purpose of an application under sec. 50, because the only relief which the Petitioners would obtain, if they could sustain such objections, would be the revocation of that grant. The grant however stood cancelled when the appeal to this Court was allowed on the 18th March 1913. Thus, whatever liability the executors might have incurred by their interference with the estate under the grant of the 11th April 1910, the incorrectness of the accounts for that period cannot be urged as a ground for relief under cl. (5) of the explanation to sec. 50. In so far as the relevant accounts are concerned, the Appellants have not been able to refer us to such specific objections as would entitle us to hold that the accounts were untrue in material respects. Consequently there is no foundation for the prayer that the probate should be revoked because the accounts exhibited are untrue in material respects.

Finally, we have to consider whether the grant is liable to be revoked for the reason that the executors have wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or that they have exhibited an inventory which is untrue in material respects. In so far as the omission to exhibit the inventory is concerned, there is no substance in the contention because although there was delay in the exhibition of the inventory, it has been in fact exhibited and accepted by the Court below. The only substantial point urged under this head is that the inventory is untrue in material respects. Here, again, the Petitioners did not, in their application for revocation, state specifically and precisely the grounds for the allegation that the inventory was untrue in material respects. The inventory was, a lengthy document and contained numerous entries. It was essential for the Appellants to specify the particular item or items challenged; they should have also indicated as precisely as possible the errors which vitiated the inventory. This they did not do. The District Judge, however, allowed them to go into evidence and came to the conclusion that the objection was not sustainable. This objection has been repeated before us and we have been taken through the inventory along with relevant portions of the evidence. It is sufficient to state that we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the District Judge. Consequently the last ground urged in support of the application for revocation fails.

The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.

There is a cross-objection on behalf of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 against the order for costs. In view of the nature of these proceedings we have come to the conclusion that the order for costs made by the District Judge should be set aside. The Petitioners in the Court below will pay the costs of the other side. The hearing fee in that Court will be assessed at Rs. 80 which is the maximum allowed by the Rules and Orders of the High Court. In so far as this Court is concerned, we assess the hearing fee at Rs. 700 (Seven hundred).

Buckland, J.:—I agree.

J.N.R
Appeal dismissed with costs.