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Shiv Mohan Lal v. State Of U.P And Others

Allahabad High Court
Sep 29, 1992
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Full Bench Reference)

Factual and Procedural Background

A Division Bench of the Court referred two questions to a Full Bench concerning the legal character of agreements executed by persons authorised to run fair price shops under the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990 (the "Order"), promulgated under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Government of U.P. issued a letter dated 3-7-1990 from its Secretary to District Magistrates laying down procedures for selection of agents and directing that contracts be executed in a prescribed proforma. The petitioners are authorised agents who had entered into contracts with District Magistrates pursuant to that letter. After cancellation, suspension or stoppage of supply under those contracts, the petitioners filed writ petitions seeking appropriate reliefs. The Full Bench was constituted to decide (1) whether such agreements are statutory agreements; and (2) whether the earlier decision in Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P (which held that termination/suspension of such agreements does not attract Article 14 or principles of natural justice and is not maintainable under Article 226) requires reconsideration in view of later authorities such as Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P and Shyam Das Company v. State of U.P.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agreements under which the petitioners were authorised to work as agents for the sale of scheduled commodities are statutory agreements in view of the fact that the agreements are executed in pursuance of the statutory order notified by the State Government under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, i.e., U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990?
  2. Whether the decision in Gopal Das Sahu v. The State of U.P., which held that even after the coming into force of the statutory Order, 1990, termination or suspension of the agreement will not give rise to a cause of action to challenge the Order under Article 226 (as neither Article 14 nor principles of natural justice are attracted), requires reconsideration in view of the Supreme Court decision in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. and the Division Bench decision in Shyam Das Company v. State of U.P.?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners (through their learned counsel) argued that the Government letter dated 3-7-1990 was issued in exercise of the statutory power under Clause 4 of the Order and therefore should be treated as "law". Consequently, contracts executed in pursuance of that letter and in the prescribed proforma were statutory contracts.
  • The petitioners further argued that, relying on the decision in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., actions of the State touching contractual matters are open to challenge under Article 14 and that a writ under Article 226 to remedy breach of such contractual obligations is maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras Directions issued under statutory power are not necessarily "law"; the source of power does not alter the character of what is done in exercise of that power. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Government letter dated 3-7-1990 was an administrative direction and not "law"; hence contracts executed pursuant to it were not statutory contracts.
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar Where a contract entered into with the State is non-statutory, rights of the parties are governed by the contract and not by constitutional provisions; writ under Article 226 is not maintainable to enforce such contracts. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that non-statutory contracts cannot be enforced by writ under Article 226 and that constitutional provisions (e.g., Article 14) do not govern relations after a non-statutory contract is concluded.
Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority Affirms that once the State enters into ordinary contract, relations are governed by the contract and not by constitutional provisions unless a statute confers special power. Cited as reinforcing the principle from Radhakrishna Agarwal that non-statutory contracts are to be governed by contract law, limiting Article 226 reliefs.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. Distinction between public law and private law; courts will normally examine State action only where public law character is involved; contractual/private actions are ordinarily not subjected to Article 14 review. The Court relied on this Constitution Bench authority to reiterate that actions in the contractual/private law field are generally not subject to Article 14/judicial review, and to support refusal to entertain writs aimed at enforcing non-statutory contracts.
Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh If a contract does not contain statutory terms, after conclusion the relationship is governed by contract and not by constitutional provisions; Article 226 cannot be used to remedy breach of non-statutory contracts. Used to reinforce the established line of authority that non-statutory contracts do not give rise to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to enforce the contract.
S.C. Shekharan v. T.N. Government Distributor appointed under a contract for sale of levy sugar has no legal right to trade in levy sugar; the right is purely contractual. Cited to support the conclusion that dealer/agent rights under such arrangements are contractual (non-statutory) and not enforceable via Article 226.
Shitla Prasad v. Saidullah (Full Bench) Held that writ petitions under Article 226 cannot be filed to remedy breach of contracts entered into by dealers with District Magistrates for sale of levy sugar; remedy is in civil courts. Relied on as local precedent holding similar contracts non-statutory and directing civil remedies for breach.
Raj Kumar Ashok Kumar v. Additional Distt. Magistrate Reiterated principle that contracts with the State of a non-statutory nature are governed by contract law and not remediable by Article 226 writs. Cited as one of the Division Bench decisions of this Court that reiterate the non-statutory character of such contracts and the limited scope for writ relief.
Ram Avadh v. State of U.P. Affirmation of principle that non-statutory contracts cannot be enforced via writ under Article 226. Used as supporting precedent by this Court to show consistent application of the contract-v.-constitutional distinction.
Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P. (Division Bench) Held that neither Article 14 nor principles of natural justice are attracted when agreements to sell Government food grains through fair price shops are terminated; relationship is contractual/non-statutory; Article 226 writ is not maintainable to compel supply. The Full Bench concluded that this Division Bench decision "lays down correct law and does not require any reconsideration" and applied it as binding in the present context.
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (Supreme Court) Executive orders de hors contract and actions with a public element can be challenged under Article 14; the presence of contractual rights does not necessarily exclude judicial review where public law element exists. The Court distinguished this authority on its facts: Shrilekha dealt with an order de hors contract with a public element (District Government Counsel appointments) and is not applicable to cases that are ordinary breaches of non-statutory contracts. The Court therefore refused to extend Shrilekha to the present contractual context.
Ambica Quarry Patel v. State of Gujarat Emphasises that the ratio of a decision must be understood in the factual background of that case. Cited to support the proposition that the holdings in Kumari Shrilekha must be read in light of its facts and cannot be generalized to the present non-statutory contractual disputes.
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Permitted challenge to actions/orders that were foreign to contract (order de hors contract) and reviewed policy decisions where public law element was present. Cited as an example of cases where actions outside contractual terms were subject to public law challenge; used to draw the line between contract-bound actions and de hors contract actions.
Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation Case concerned an order de hors contract; Supreme Court allowed challenge and directed consideration of whether an arrangement amounted to a contract. Relied on to illustrate instances where orders outside contractual scope are reviewable in public law despite contractual surroundings.
Shyam Gas Company v. State (this Court) High Court had found a contractual clause unconscionable and unconstitutional and had held that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before cancellation; distinction between statutory and non-statutory contract unclear in that judgment. The Full Bench observed that this Court's decision’s applicability to non-statutory contracts is unclear and noted that parts of the decision were not approved by the Supreme Court in subsequent proceedings.
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Shyam Gas Company (Supreme Court, SLP) Supreme Court did not approve certain findings of the High Court regarding clause constitutionality and set aside certain orders; upheld termination of an agency in part. The Full Bench cited this to show that the Shyam Gas Company decision of this Court was effectively overruled/clarified by the Supreme Court, limiting its precedential value for the present matter.
Ujagar Prints v. Union of India Two-Judge Benches cannot disregard binding precedents of three-Judge or Constitution Benches; if disagreement exists, reference to larger Bench is required. Relied upon to argue that Kumari Shrilekha (two-Judge Bench) cannot be used to overturn earlier three-Judge / Constitution Bench authorities (e.g., Radhakrishna Agarwal, LIC v. Escorts) without reference to a larger Bench.
Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. (referenced in Radhakrishna Agarwal extract) Referenced for the proposition that discrimination at the threshold (in entry to the field of contracting with the State) is reviewable, but once in the field of ordinary contract, relations are governed by contract. Quoted within Radhakrishna Agarwal's formulation and relied upon to delineate the stages at which constitutional protections apply versus when ordinary contract law governs.
D.F.O. v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. (referenced) Referenced among cases supporting the proposition that non-statutory concluded contracts are not enforceable by writ under Article 226. Relied upon as part of an established line of authority supporting the non-interference rule in non-statutory contractual breaches.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical stages corresponding to the referred questions.

First, on whether the contracts are statutory, the Court examined the text of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990 (particularly Clauses 2(c), 2(e), Clause 3 and Clause 4). It observed that the Order itself does not prescribe the procedure for selecting agents, nor the terms or form of the contract; Clause 4 leaves selection and mode of operation to the Collector, subject to State Government direction. The Government letter dated 3-7-1990, which prescribes selection procedures and a contract proforma, was held to be a communication addressed to Collectors (administrative officials) and not an instrument of "law".

The Court applied the principle from Raman and Raman Ltd. that the mere source of power (i.e., statutory source) does not convert every direction issued under that power into "law"; the character of the direction determines whether it is law or administrative instruction. The Court relied on several further indicia: the letter was addressed only to officials (not published as a law), it could be secret or changed without formal legislative amendment, and the Executive could have amended the Order or issued a fresh order under Section 3 if it desired the contents of the letter to have statutory force. From these considerations the Court concluded the letter was administrative and the resulting agreements executed pursuant to it were not statutory contracts.

Second, on whether the line of authorities holding such contracts non-statutory and non-justiciable under Article 226 requires reconsideration in light of Kumari Shrilekha, the Court surveyed Supreme Court and other authorities. It reiterated the well-established principle (from Radhakrishna Agarwal, Premji Bhai Parmar, LIC v. Escorts, Bareilly D.A., and others) that once the State enters the field of ordinary contract, relations are governed by contract and not by constitutional provisions; hence breaches of non-statutory contracts are ordinarily not remediable by writ under Article 226.

The Court considered Kumari Shrilekha and explained that Shrilekha concerned an executive order de hors contract (the termination of appointments of District Government Counsel), where a public element existed and the order was not an exercise of contractual rights. Therefore, Shrilekha's holding that such de hors contract executive orders may be challenged under Article 14 must be understood in the factual background of that case and cannot be generalized to ordinary breaches of non-statutory contracts. The Court emphasized the need to read precedents with regard to their facts (citing Ambica Quarry Patel and Radhakrishna Agarwal's admonition) and observed that applying Shrilekha to ordinary contractual breaches would conflict with prior three-judge and Constitution Bench decisions. It also relied on Ujagar Prints to stress that a two-judge bench cannot disregard earlier larger-bench precedents.

The Court noted that certain decisions of this Court (e.g., Shyam Gas Company) were either unclear on the statutory/non-statutory distinction or were later reviewed by the Supreme Court (Bharat Petroleum v. Shyam Gas Company), thereby limiting their applicability as precedent for treating dealer contracts as conferring public-law rights.

Finally, the Court observed that even though Article 226 is not generally available to enforce non-statutory contracts, petitioners are not remedy-less: the Government letter itself provides appeal mechanisms against certain orders, and the civil courts remain available to seek contractual remedies including specific performance.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • Agreements under which the petitioners were authorised to work as agents for the sale of scheduled commodities are non-statutory agreements.
  • The decision of this Court in Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P. lays down correct law and does not require reconsideration.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Petitioners' contracts being non-statutory means that remedies for cancellation, suspension or stoppage of supply are matters of contract law and are not ordinarily enforceable by writ under Article 226. The Court cannot, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, compel the State to perform or remedy a breach of such non-statutory contracts.
  • Available remedies: The Government letter (dated 3-7-1990) itself provides for appeals against certain administrative orders; additionally, the authorised agents retain the ordinary civil remedies (e.g., civil suit for specific performance or other contractual relief) before appropriate Civil Courts.
  • Precedential consequence: The Full Bench affirmed existing case law (as cited) and did not announce a novel or contrary proposition. The Court expressly held that the earlier Division Bench decision in Gopal Das Sahu remains good law for the matters before it.

The Court directed that the papers of the writ petitions be placed before the Bench concerned for their disposal in accordance with these answers.

Show all summary ...

R.A Sharma, J.:— A Division Bench of this Court has referred the following questions to the Full Bench for its decision:

“1. Whether the agreements under which the petitioners have been authorised to work as agents for the sale of scheduled commodities are statutory agreements in view of the facts that the agreements are executed in view of the statutory order notified by the State Government under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, i.e, U.P Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990?

2. Whether the decision given in the case of Gopal Das Sahu v. The State of U.P,1 holding that even after the coming into force of the statutory Order, 1990, the termination or suspension of the agreement will not give a cause of action to the petitioner to challenge the said Order by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as neither Article 14 of the Constitution nor the principles of natural justice are attracted, requires reconsideration in view of the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P,2 and the Division Bench of this court in the case of Shyam Das Company v. State of U.P.3

2. This Full Bench has accordingly been constituted for deciding the aforesaid questions. In exercise of powers under Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (here-in-after referred to as the Act) read with notifications of the Government of India, the Government of U.P has promulgated an order known as U.P Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990 (here-in-after ref erred to as the Order). Clause 2(c) of the Order defines ‘agent’ “as a person authorised to run a fair price shop.” According to sub-clause (e) of Clause 2 ‘fair price shop’ “means a shop set up under these orders of the State Government for distribution of scheduled commodities.” ‘Scheduled Commodity’ has been defined by sub-clause (on) as follows: “Scheduled Commodity” means a commodity specifid in the schedule appended to this order, products thereof and includes such other commodities which the State Government directs to be sold through a fair price shop.” The commodities, which have been specified in the schedule are wheat, rice, pulse, sugar, edible oil, kerosene oil, soft coak and controlled cloth. Clauses 3 and 4, which provides for setting up and running of fair price shop are reproduced below:

“3. With a view to effecting fair distribution of Scheduled Commodities the State Government may issue directions to set up such number of fair price shops in an area as it deems fit.

4. (1) A fair price shop shall be run through such person and in such manner as the Collector, subject to the direction of the State Government, may decide.

(2) A person appointed to run a fair price shop under sub-clause (1) shall operate it as the agent of the State Government.”

3. According to Clause 4 of the Order a fair price shop is required to be run through such person and in such manner as the Collector subject to the direction of the State Government, may decide and the person, who is authorised to run the fair price shop, shall operate it as the agent of the State Government. By a letter dated 3-7-1990 written by its Secretary, the Government has issued instructions to all the District Magistrates of the State laying down procedure for selection of agents for rural areas and by clause 6 thereof the District Magistrates have been directed to get contracts executed in the prescribed proforma by the agents for running fair price shops. By Clause 11 of the said letter, provision has been made for appeal against the order of appointment, suspension, cancellation or non-renewal of the contracts. In Clause 12, it has mentioned that the letter has been issued under Clause 4 of the order. The copies of this letter have been sent for information and necessary action in accordance therewith to all the Additional District Magistrates, Civil Supply Officers, Commissioner, Food and Civil Supply, Divisional Commissioners and Regional Food Controllers. It has been stated by the learned counsel that similar instructions have been issued by the Government for establishment of fair price shops in urban area.

4. Petitioners are the authorised agents of the Government of U.P for running the fair price shops sale of scheduled commodities and in connection therewith they have entered into contracts with the District Magistrates. Their contracts having been cancelled, susperded or supply of scheduled commodities having been stopped by the State, they have filed these writ petitions for appropriate relief.

5. A contract entered into a Government with another person in exercise of power conferred by Statute or Rules framed thereunder is a statutory contract. Such a contract is different from the ordinary contract, which is made by the Government or authority in exercise of their executive/administrative power.

6. The first question, which has been referred is as to whether the contracts, which the petitioners have made with the District Magistrates in the proforma prescribed by the Government's letter dated 3-7-1990, are statutory contracts. The order neither lays down the procedure for selecting an agent nor does it provide for execution of the contract and the terms thereof. Perusal of Clause 6 of the Order makes it clear that the agent is to run the fair price shop in such manner as the Collector, subject to the direction of the State Government, may decide. How the agent will be selected and what will be the criteria for selecting him has not been laid down by the Order. The Order also does not provide for the manner in which the fair price shop shall be run. All this has been left to the Collector to decide subject to the direction of the State Government. As mentioned hereinbefore, the Government has issued instructions vide letter dated 3-7-1990 laying down the procedure of selection of an agent and the manner for running the fair price shop and in that connection requirement for execution of contract between the Collector and the authorised agent has also been laid down.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that since the letter dated 3-7-1990 has been issued in exercise of power conferred by Clause 4 of the Order, it is liable to be treated as “law” and the contract executed in pursuance thereof is a statutory contract. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. Merely because directions have been issued under statutory power, they cannot be treated as “law”. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras,4 wherein it was laid down as follows:

“Nor is there any basis for argument that as the directions are issued under a statutory power, they are “law”. The source of the powers does not alter the character of the things done in exercise of that power. Whether it is a law or an administrative direction depends upon the character or nature of the orders or the directions authorised to be issued in exercise of the power conferred.”

8. The letter dated 3-7-1990 is in the form of a letter from the Secretary, Government of U.P, addressed to all the District Magistrates of the State, who have been required to take necessary action in pursuance thereof. It contains the instructions and directions issued by the Government regarding the selection of the authorised agent and the manner for running the fair price shop. This letter is addressed to the Collectors and not to any other person. Statutory Orders/laws are normally not issued in the form of letters addressed to the officials of the State only.

9. Terms of Clause 4 and the manner of issuing the directions also lead to the same conclusion that the letter in question is not “law”. As the Collector, under Clause 4, exercises the powers of selecting a person and laying down the manner for running the fair price shop subject to the direction of the State Government, the object is to bring the Collector within the administrative control of the Government. Further these directions are not required to be published and they can even take the form of secret communication to the officials. Such directions cannot be treated to be “law” because law has to be published before any action can be taken under it. That apart, the Act gives legislative power to the Government under Section 3. The Government, if it wanted that the letter in question be treated as “law”, it could have exercised its legislative power by amending the order or could have issued a fresh order under Section 3 by incorporating therein all that, which is contained in the letter. But it has not been done and instead only a letter has been sent to the Collectors. It is also not disputed that the letter is not part of the Order and it can be changed by the Government from time to time without any information to any one. Such a letter cannot be treated to be “law” and the contracts executed in pursuance thereof by the agents with the Collector cannot be said to be statutory contracts. We accordingly hold that the contracts made by the petitioners with the Collectors are not statutory contracts.

10. As regards the second question, it may be stated that Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that where the contract, which has been entered into between the State and the person aggrieved, is non-statutory, the rights of the parties thereto are governed by the terms of the contract and not by constitutional provisions and no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court for enforcing such a contract. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar,5 paragraph 12 of which being relevant is quoted below:

“The Patna High Court had, very rightly, divided the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up into three types. These were stated as follows:

(i) Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State he has acted to his prejudice and predicament, but the agreement is short of a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution:

(ii) Where a contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State; and

(iii) Where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and the petitioner complains about breach of such contrast by the State”

11. Regarding the third category where the contract made by a person with the State is non-statutory, it was laid down that no writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, will be maintainable to remedy the breach of such a contract. It was further held in that case that after the State has entered into a contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the terms and conditions of the contract. In this connection Paragraph 10 of the judgment is reproduced below:

“It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd.'s case (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State Act purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract.”

12. It was also laid down therein that the limitations imposed by the Rules of Natural Justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by terms of an agreement.”

13. The decision in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) has been approved and followed by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority,6 relevant extract from which is reproduced below:

“But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents purporting to act with in this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them and are bound by the terms of the contract only, unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract” See Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar,7

14. Same position was reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Excorts Ltd.,8, relevant extract from which has been reproduced below:

“While we do not for a moment doubt that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reason and that, in appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 14 of the Constitution, we do not construe Article 14 as a charter for judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions. For example, if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the court will keep away from it. The court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligation or obligations arising out of the Court, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a share-holder, and dons and robes of a share-holder, with all the rights available to such a share-holder. There is no reason why the State share-holder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder.”

15. In this case the argument that the State when it purchased shares of a company cannot act like an ordinary share-holder and its action must be supported by reasons, was rejected by holding that when the Government purchases a share it dons the robes of a share-holder with ail the rights available to such a share-holder and it should not be expected to state its reasons when seeks to change the management. Again in the case of Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh,9 the Supreme Court reiterated the same principles by holding as follows:

“In the case before us, the contract between the respondents and the B.D.A does not contain any statutory terms and/or conditions. When the factual position is so, the High Court placing reliance on the decisions in Ramana Dayaram Shetty's case . 1979 3 SCC 489 has erronously held:

“It has not been disputed that the contesting opposite party is included within the term ‘other authority’ mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, the contesting opposite parties cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily with the principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Where an authority appears acting unreasonably this Court is not powerless and a writ of mandamus can be issued for performing its duty free from arbitrariness or unreasonableness. This finding in our view, is not correct in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case because in Ramana Dayaram Shetty's case (supra) there was no concluded contract as in this case. Even conceding that the BDA has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in ‘other authority’ for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the authority of its agents after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity. Thereafter the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on part of the authority (i.e BDA in this case) in the said contractual field. There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple, Radhakrishha Agarwal v. State of Bihar,11 Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority,12 and D.F.O v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. . 1981 3 SCR 662 In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncements of this Court in the series of cases dealing with the scope of interference of a High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in cases of non-statutory concluded contracts like the one in hand, we are constrained to hold that the High Court in the present case has gone wrong in its finding that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appellants herein in increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly instalments and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for.”

16. It thus stands established by the Supreme Court that in the matter of non-statutory contracts rights and……obligations of the parties arising thereunder are governed by the terms and conditions of the contract and constitutional provisions like Article 14 cannot be extended and in such cases the question of violation of Article 14 or other provisions of the Constitution by the State or its officials does not arise. Any action taken or any order passed under such a contract by the State or its official however wrong or arbitrary it may be cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not open to this court to enforce such a contract or to remedy the breach thereof by the State in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.

17. With regard to the contract made by the authorised agent with the Collector for the sale of scheduled commodities through fair price shops there is a line of decisions of the Courts holding that these contracts are non-statutory and the rights of the parties thereto are governed by the terms and conditions of the contracts and not by constitutional provisions such as Article 14, and no writ can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution for compelling the authorities to remedy the breach of such a contract. In S.C Shekharan v. T.N Government,14 the Supreme Court held that a person who has been appointed as distributor by the Government under a contract for a sale of levy sugar under Levy Sugar (Supply Control) Order, 1972 has no legal right to trade in levy sugar, as right of such a person is purely contractual. A Full Bench of this Court in Shitla Prasad v. Saidullah.15 also repelled the similar contentions which have been raised before us in the instant case, holding that no writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to remedy the breach of contract entered into by a dealer with the Distt. Magistrate for sale of Levy Sugar. It was further laid down that if there has been breach of such a contract the only remedy is before the Civil Court, where the person aggrieved can secure specific performance of contract and can seek other necessary reliefs in connection therewith Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Ashok Kumar v. Additional Distt. Magistrate,16 and Ram Avadh v. State of U.P,17 have also reiterated the same principle while dismissing the writ petition of the dealers. The decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P,18 deals with the cancellation of contract executed by an agent with the Collector for sale of the scheduled commodity under the order. This Court held that neither Article 14 of the Constitution nor principle of natural justice are attracted when agreement to sell the Government Food grains through fair price shops is terminated. It was further laid down that relationship of the agents with the Government is contractual which is non-statutory in nature, and therefore, writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not maintainable to compel the Government to supply the quota of scheduled commodities to the petitioner therein. The decision of the Division Bench of this court in case of Gopal Das Sahu (supra) and other cases of this court mentioned hereinbefore lay down contract law.

18. The position would, however, be different in the case of Orders dehors contract. Orders, which are passed by the Government or its authorities in exercise of their executive/administrative power can always be challenged before this Court under Article 226 by a person, who is aggrieved thereby. Although any action taken or any order passed by the authorities under a non-statutory contract cannot be challenged under Article 226 even if such actions or the orders are illegal and arbitrary, but if the order of the Government/authorities is foreign to and/or is not under the contract, it can always be challenged before this Court under Article 226 on the ground of voilation of Constitutional provisions in this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P,19 wherein the executive order of the Government of U.P terminating the appointments of all the District Government Counsel in all the districts of the State of U.P was challenged. Supreme Court held that the office or post of District Government Counsel has a public element and is not purely contractual. On that basis it was observed that the validity of the impugned order can be decided on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that connection it was further laid down as follows:

“We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all sphere by requirement of Article 14, does not undergo such radical change after making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if requirements of Art. 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts which cannot exist”.

19. It was further observed that,

“Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Art. 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Art. 14.”

20. Relying on the above observations and some other similar observations in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that the Government action under non-statutory contract is open to be challeged on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition under Article 226 to remedy the breach of such contractual obligation committed by the State is maintainable. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) the order, which was under challenge was not passed in exercise of any contractual rights and was in fact foreign to it. It was an order de-hors contract. In that connection Supreme Court has observed that such an order can be challenged on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution and challenge cannot be thrown out “merely because some contactual rights accrue to the other party in addition.” The controversy before the Supreme Court in that case was not about enforcement of a non-statutory contract. The law laid down by the Supreme Court has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Ambica Quarry Patel v. State of Gujrat . 1987 1 SCC 213 wherein it was laid down as under:

“The aforesaid observations have been set in detail in order to understand the true ratio of the said decision in the background of the facts of that case. It is true that this Court held that if the permission had been granted before the coming into operation of the 1980 Act and the forest land has been broken up or cleared, Clause (ii) of Section 2 of 1980 Act would not apply in such a case. But that decision was rendered in the background of the facts of that case. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides, and not what logically followed from it.”

21. Similarly the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwat (supra) has declared that, “the proposition of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case”. The observations made by the Supreme Court and the law laid down by it in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case, and as such it cannot be applied to the case of non-statutory contract.

22. In case it is held that the law laid by the Supremere Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) is applicable to non-statutory contract also, the decision will run counter to the law laid down by it in several of its earlier decisions, reference of which have been given above. The decision in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496 is a three Judges decision and the decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. . 1986 1 SCC 264 is a decision given by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, whereas the decision of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) is of two Judges only. It has been settled by the Supreme Court that Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court cannot disregard the decision of a Bench of three Judges or that of the Constitution Bench and if two Hon'ble Judges are inclined to disagree, the case should be referred to larger Bench. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Ujagar Prints v. Union of India . 1986 Supp SCC 652. The presumption is that had the Supreme Court intended to disagree with the law laid down in earlier cases regarding the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution and maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 in the matter of breach of non-statutory contract, the case would have been referred to a larger Bench. What was under challenge in the aforesaid case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi was an order de-hors contract. That was purely executive order passed by the Government not in exercise of any contractual rights. The relationship of the parties therein was not purely contractual and element of public law was fully involved, as is clear from perusal of the judgment itself Observation of the Supreme Court in that case cannot be applied to a case where breach is committed of non-statutory contract where rights of the parties thereto are purely contractual.

23. In the case of Dwarkadas Marfatia and sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay . 1989 3 SCC 293 action of the Board evicting a tenant was under challenge. Eviction of the tenant was not under any contract but in pursuance of the policy of the Board whereunder plot was to be allotted to a person holding major portion of the plot. The Supreme Court found this policy fair and reasonable. It was also a case of impugned order being foreign to outside contract. Similarly in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation . 1990 3 SCC 752 there was no question about breach of non-statutory contract involved. In that case relationship between the parties was not governed by any concluded contract. In fact the Supreme Court while allowing the petition of the appellant therein has directed the respondent corporation to consider the plea of the appellant to the effect that the existing arrangement between him and the Corporation amounts to a contract. It was also a case where the order de-hors contract was challenged.

24. As far as the case of Shyam Gas Company v. State . AIR 1991 Alld. 129. is concerned, it may be mentioned that the main grounds on which this Court allowed the writ petition were that Clause 28 of the contract between the Shyam Gas Co. and the Petroleum Co. was unconscionable and unconstitutional being violative of fair play. It was further observed that the petitioner was entitled to be given an opportunity of being heard before cancellation of his contract and granting the dealership to a third person. From the judgment of this case it is not clear as to whether the Court was dealing with a case of statutory or non-statutory contract. In fact distinction between the non-statutory and statutory contract and effect thereof on the rights of the parties thereto to maintain the writ petition does not appear to have been raised and decided. The law laid down by this court in the above case of Shyam Gas Company cannot be applied to a case where an action is taken or an order is passed by the Government under a non-statutory contract. It is however, not necessary to deal with this case any further as is Shyam Gas Company (Supra) has almost been over rules by the Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Shyam Gas Company . S.L.P No. 3456-59 of 1991. decided on July 9, 1991 inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not approve the finding of this court regarding Clause 28 of the contract being unconstitutional. The order of this court cancelling the agency created in favour of third person was also set aside. However, the order, so fas as it relates to termination of the agency of the respondent No. 1 was upheld without giving any reason. This is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the above case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation, which is reproduced hereinbelow:

“Heard learned counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the observations made by the High Court that Clause 29 of the Agency agreement is unconstitutional and would not be binding be kept open in the facts of the case, we accordingly leave that question open to be decided in an appropriate case.

Having heard counsel for the parties. We are also of the view that there was no justification for the High Court to vacate the agency created in favour of Uttar Pradesh State Food and Essential Commodity Corporation. The agreement with respondent No. 1 did not create an exclusive right of agency in its favour and even with the respondent's agency agreement subsisting, it was open to the petitioner to create further agencies subject to the terms of the agreement in favour of the respondent. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in setting aside that agreement.

25. We sustain the order in favour of respondent No. 1 to the effect that its agency shall not be terminated. The special leave petitions are accordingly disposed of.”

26. Even though the petitioners and other authorised agents cannot challenge the breach of their contract on the ground of violation of constitutional provisions before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but they are not remedyless. Government letter itself provides for appeal against some of the orders, which may be passed by the authorities. That apart, the authorised agents like the petitioners have remedy of civil suit before the appropriate Civil Court, which they can institute before filing of the appeal as well as after the appeal is decided. Our answers to the two questions referred to are as follows:

(1) Agreement under which the petitioners have been authorised to work as agents for the sale of scheduled commodities are non-statutory agreements.

(2) The decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P . 1991 17 ALR 406. lays down correct law and does not require any reconsideration.

27. Let the papers of these writ petitions be placed before the Bench concerned for deciding them.