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Manubothula Rama Rao v. Manubothula Venkayamma

Madras High Court
Feb 5, 1931
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Connected Second Appeals)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are connected second appeals arising from litigation between a Hindu wife (plaintiff / respondent in the appeals) and her husband (defendant / appellant in S.A. No. 1432 of 1927). The principal, earlier suit was brought by the wife for future maintenance and arrears of maintenance. The trial Court dismissed that suit, but the lower appellate Court awarded arrears at Rs. 10 per month and future maintenance at Rs. 12 per month while the defendant remained in railway service and thereafter Rs. 10 per month.

Two second appeals are before the Court:

  1. Second Appeal No. 1432 of 1927 — challenging the maintenance decree (appellant husband).
  2. Second Appeal No. 1281 of 1929 — arising from a subsequent suit by the same wife in the Gudivada jurisdiction to have the amount of the earlier decree charged on husband's property there (question of competence under procedural rules).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. In S.A. No. 1432 of 1927: Whether the plaintiff (wife) had established a right to maintenance under Hindu law so as to justify the decree awarded by the lower appellate Court (and whether the time-limitation on the higher rate of maintenance should be retained).
  2. In S.A. No. 1281 of 1929: Whether a fresh suit in Gudivada to charge the husband's property there with the amount of the earlier decree (obtained in the Ellore jurisdiction) is competent, or whether Order 2, Rule 2 (and related rules) preclude such a separate suit after the plaintiff has chosen to sue in the Ellore Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (S.A. No. 1432 of 1927 — Husband)

  • Main contention: There should not have been any decree for maintenance because the respondent (wife) has not established her right to maintenance according to Hindu law.
  • Defensive pleadings: Husband denied allegations of cruelty, abandonment and infidelity; asserted the wife was to blame and that he was willing to take her back.

Respondent / Plaintiff's Position (S.A. No. 1432 of 1927)

  • Pleadings and evidence showed prolonged separation (about eight years), allegations that the husband deserted and neglected her (including failing to inquire or assist during serious illness and refusing to receive her in 1920).
  • Respondent sought maintenance arrears and future maintenance; respondent asked removal of the time limitation tied to the defendant's railway service so that the higher monthly rate would not cease on retirement.

Appellant / Defendant's Position (S.A. No. 1281 of 1929 — Husband / Respondent to that suit)

  • Defence to the Gudivada suit: The suit was incompetent by reason of Order 2, Rule 2 (i.e., the plaintiff had omitted a relief in the earlier suit and could not thereafter sue for it).

Appellant's Arguments (S.A. No. 1281 of 1929 — Wife seeking charge on Gudivada property)

  • Contended the decisions below were wrong and relied on Rangamma v. Vehalayya as a direct authority supporting her position, arguing that the different jurisdictions (Ellore for the first suit and Gudivada for the property she sought to charge) made the precedent inapplicable.
  • Advanced an alternative argument that the plaintiff might have asked for the charge on Gudivada property in the Ellore proceedings and could seek that relief in the second appeal or by other means (an argument the Court treated as contradictory and unsupported by applicable authority).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rangamma v. Vehalayya [1888] 11 Mad. 127 Authority on the scope of Order 2, Rule 2 and the obligation to include all reliefs arising from the same cause of action in one suit. The Court described this as a direct authority that would be binding if the properties sought to be made liable were within the same jurisdiction as the original suit; the Court nevertheless applied the underlying principle to hold that Order 2, Rule 2 prevents successive suits for reliefs arising from the same cause of action even when the separate reliefs would individually be cognizable in different jurisdictions.
Sitabai v. Laxmibai (1916) 40 Bom. 337 Authority cited as directly contrary to an argument advanced by the appellant that relief could be sought in a subsequent suit or by appellate intervention. The Court treated Sitabai v. Laxmibai as authority contrary to the appellant's argument and relied on it to reject the contention that the earlier Ellore suit entitled the plaintiff later to obtain a charge on Gudivada property by another suit or by seeking that relief in the present second appeal.
Sundara Bai Sahiba v. Tirumal, Rao Sahib [1910] 33 Mad. 131 An observation (described by this Court as merely obiter) concerning whether a maintenance suit charging ancestral property without specifying a portion of the property is a "suit for land" under the Letters Patent. The Court noted that the cited observation was obiter and arose under a different statutory/interpretive context (Clause 12, Letters Patent), and therefore it did not support the appellant's argument under the Civil Procedure provisions (Section 16 language). The Court declined to treat that observation as controlling.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two appeals sequentially and applied procedural rules and factual findings as follows.

S.A. No. 1432 of 1927 (maintenance appeal)

  1. Factual assessment: The Court accepted the lower appellate Court's findings that the parties were married about 21 years, lived together harmoniously for 13 years and had been separated for about eight years; that the separation was marked by estrangement and inability to live together; and that the husband had neglected and deserted the wife (including failing to attend her during serious illness and refusing to receive her in 1920).
  2. Legal consequence: On those facts, the Court concluded the husband had deserted his wife and neglected his duty to maintain her; therefore the plaintiff was "clearly entitled to a decree."
  3. On the quantum and limitation: The lower appellate Court had ordered Rs. 12 per month during railway service and Rs. 10 thereafter. The respondent asked removal of that limitation. Considering the husband's salary (well over Rs. 120), likely savings and future entitlement to provident fund, the Court considered Rs. 12 per month not excessive and concluded it was appropriate to remove the time limit tied to railway employment — thereby making Rs. 12 per month payable indefinitely rather than reducing it on retirement.
  4. Correction of decree: The Court detected a clerical/ drafting error in the lower appellate decree concerning costs: the institution fees (specified as Rs, 179-13 0 in the text) were omitted from the recital of costs payable to the plaintiff. The Court ordered the decree amended to include those institution fees to be paid by the defendant.

S.A. No. 1281 of 1929 (competence of suit to charge Gudivada property)

  1. Preliminary posture: The wife sued in Gudivada to have the amount of the earlier Ellore decree made a charge on the husband's property in Gudivada. The defence was that the suit was incompetent under Order 2, Rule 2 because the plaintiff had omitted that relief in the original suit and could not sue separately for it afterwards.
  2. Statutory text examined: The Court quoted and relied on Order 2, Rule 2 clauses (1) and (3) — clause (1) requiring that "Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action" (subject to relinquishment to bring suit within jurisdiction), and clause (3) preventing a plaintiff who omits a relief (except with leave) from later suing for that omitted relief.
  3. Analytical principle: The Court reasoned that these rules operate even where different reliefs arising from the same cause of action would, if brought separately, be cognizable in different jurisdictions. The Court illustrated the point by reference to (a) a mortgage plus personal covenant (where the mortgage suit must be where the property is situated), and (b) a promissory note with co-debtors in different jurisdictions (where a plaintiff cannot split claims into separate suits against different debtors to evade the rule).
  4. Interaction with other rules: The Court noted Order 34, Rule 14 and Section 20(b) as relevant background (e.g., rules about jurisdiction/leave), and Sections 16–18 as limiting where immovable property suits must be brought; the Court concluded that if the plaintiff wanted a charge on the husband's property in Gudivada she was obliged to sue in the Gudivada Court originally rather than first suing in Ellore and later bringing a separate suit.
  5. Dealing with authorities and counter-arguments: The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on the Sundara Bai observation as merely obiter and arising in a different context (Clause 12, Letters Patent). The Court also held that Sitabai v. Laxmibai was directly contrary to the appellant's second line of argument and therefore unsupported.
  6. Conclusion: On these grounds the Court held the lower Courts were correct in finding the Gudivada suit incompetent under Order 2, Rule 2 and dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The Court reached final decisions on both connected appeals. The core rulings and their immediate consequences are:

  • Second Appeal No. 1432 of 1927: Dismissed with costs to the respondent (plaintiff). The Court affirmed entitlement to maintenance, modified the lower appellate decree by removing the limitation that reduced maintenance on the defendant's retirement, and directed that the plaintiff receive Rs. 12 per month from the date of the plaint. The Court also ordered correction of the decree to add institution fees of Rs, 179-13 0 to the plaintiff's costs recoverable from the defendant.
  • Second Appeal No. 1281 of 1929: Dismissed with costs. The Court upheld the finding that the Gudivada suit to charge the husband's property was incompetent under Order 2, Rule 2 because the relief was omitted in the original suit in Ellore and could not be pursued subsequently in a separate suit.

Implications: The decisions operate to (a) provide the plaintiff (wife) a permanent monthly maintenance of Rs. 12 (from date of plaint) and an amendment in the decree to include institution fees as costs, and (b) preclude her from separately suing in another jurisdiction to obtain a charge on property which she did not seek in the original suit. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal precedent beyond applying existing procedural rules and cited authorities to the facts; its effect is to resolve the parties' rights in the specific matters before the Court.

Show all summary ...

1. These are connected second appeals. The main suit out of which the litigation arose was brought by a Hindu wife against her husband, the appellant in S.A. No. 1432 of 1927, for future maintenance and arrears of maintenance. The first Court dismissed the suit, but the appellate Court awarded the plaintiff arrears of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10 a month and future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 12 a month so long as the defendant remained in his present service in the railway and thereafter at Rs. 10 a month.

Second Appeal No. 1432 of 1927.

2. In this appeal the appellant's main point is that there should not have been any decree for maintenance because the respondent (plaintiff) has not established her right to maintenance according to Hindu law. The facts established are that the appellant married the respondent some 21 years before the suit, of which for the first 13 years they lived in harmony together and for the remaining period of eight years the parties lived separately. The wife accuses the husband of cruelty, abandonment, and domestic infidelity. The husband denies these charges and says that the wife has only herself to blame and that he is willing to take her back. As usual both these charges and explanations were found by the lower appellate Court ' to be somewhat exaggerated, But the truth as found by the lower appellate Court is that the relations between the spouses have bean so estranged for the last eight years that they have found it impossible live together and have more or less reconciled themselves to that fact. During the period the husband has not maintained his wife. The wife was, it seems seriously ill, for two years at Ellore but the husband who was then employed at Hyderabad made no inquiries and paid no thought to the wife's condition. After she became a little better, she and her maternal uncle went to Hyderabad in 1920 and asked the appellant to take her into the house. He refused and sent them a way. Sometime later the husband came to the neighbourhood of the wife's residence on some business but never cared to go to the wife or to make any inquiries of her. He now excuses himself upon the ground of rain and badness of the road which are excuses merely. On the evidence I have not the slightest doubt that the appellate Court came to the correct conclusion that the husband has deserted his wife and neglected his duty to maintain her. In these circumstances the plaintiff was clearly entitled to a decree.

3. The decree actually awarded Rupees 12 a month after suit so long as the defendant is in railway service and Rs. 10 after he retires. The respondent asks that the limitation may be removed. I think it right not merely in the circumstances of the husband but also to prevent further estrangement between the parties that this limit should be removed and I consider that a sum of Rs. 12 a month is by no means excessive having regard to the fact that the husband's salary is well over Rupees 120 and that he is supposed to have saved something and will on retirement become entitled to his provident fund money. I therefore modify the decree of the lower appellate Court by removing the limit for the payment of Rupees 12 to the period of the defendant's employment.

4. The result is that there will be a decree for Rs. 12 a month from the date of plaint. The words in the decree of the lower Court until he retires from the railway employment and thereafter at Rs. 10 a month will be deleted accordingly.

5. The only other matter arising in this appeal is that a small error has crept into the decree of the lower Court which makes it discrepant with the judgment. The lower Court awarded the plaintiff her full costs in the first Court and the lower appellate Court which of course includes the institution fees and then gave the Government a charge upon the whole of the decree obtained by the plaintiff for court-fees payable to Government by the plaintiff who brought the suit in forma pauperis. But in the decree of the lower appellate Court the institution fees are not included in mentioning the costs due to the plaintiff. That decree will therefore be amended by adding institution fees, namely, Rs, 179-13 0 to the plaintiff's costs in the first Court and in the lower appellate Court payable by the defendant.

6. The second appeal (1432 of 1927) substantially fails and is dismissed with costs of respondent (plaintiff).

Second Appeal No. 1281 of 1929.

7. This second appeal arises from a suit brought by the same wife as in the other second appeal against her husband in the Gudivada Munsif's Court for having the amount of the decree awarded to her in the first suit in the Elloro District Munsif's Court made a charge upon certain property of the husband in the Gudivada jurisdiction. This was occasioned by the fact that in the first suit the plaintiff did not ask that any amount decreed to her might be made a charge upon the husband's property and I am told that this was because the husband had no property in the Ellore jurisdiction. However that may be the second suit, the subject of this second appeal, was met by the defence that the suit was incompetent by reason of Order 2, Rule 2. That defence has been upheld by both the Courts below.

8. In second appeal the appellant (wife) urges that those decisions are wrong, The decision in Rangamma v. Vehalayya [1888] 11 Mad. 127 is a direct authority which would be binding in this case if the husband's properties sought to be made liable in the second suit were within the same jurisdiction as that in which the first suit was brought. It is argued that, as in this case the property sought to be made liable is in the Gudivada jurisdiction whereas the first suit brought for personal remedy was brought in the Ellore Court, that makes the decision inapplicable. I think there is no such distinction on principle. According to Order 2, Rule 2, Clause (1):

Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

9. Clause (3) is:

A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

10. There is in my opinion nothing in those rules which limits their operation to cases where of two reliefs open to a plaintiff on the same cause of action both are cognizable by the same Court. On the contrary they are operative even where these reliefs taken separately and alone would be cognizable in different jurisdictions. Several illustrations of this may be given. In the case of a mortgage with a personal covenant the jurisdiction within which the suit must be brought on the mortgage is where the property is situate. If a suit were to be brought on the personal covenant alone, it may have to be brought in a different jurisdiction; but that could not enable the plaintiff to first sua on the personal covenant and then sue on the mortgage. I do not lose sight, of course, of the provisions of Order 34, Rule 14, which makes it plain that, but for that rule, what I have said above about a mortgage would be right. Take again a case where there are two persons liable on a promissory note, each of whom is living in a different jurisdiction. A suit can be brought in either the one or the other but with leave under Section 20 (b). Can a plaintiff bring a suit in one jurisdiction against one debtor without impleading the other or asking for leave and then bring another suit against the other debtor in the other jurisdiction and justify himself on the ground that the prohibition of Order 2, Rule 2, only applies to cases where both reliefs are open in the same Court? Clearly not. Therefore it seems to me the argument that because the plaintiff could not have asked the Ellore Court to give her a decree charging the property in the Gudivada jurisdiction she is entitled to bring another suit in the Gudivada jurisdiction for that relief is not right. The answer to the argument is that if the plaintiff wished to make the husband's property in the Gudivada jurisdiction charged for her decree amount it was Obligatory upon her to sue in the Gudivada Court, and in that suit there is no doubt upon the rules and orders upon [the subject that she could have asked for a personal remedy against her husband, because the rules of jurisdiction based on personal residence laid down in Section 20 are subject to the limitations as to the place of suing where immovable properties are concerned as laid down by Sections 16 to 18. She having failed to do that, and having brought her suit in the Ellore Court, must be held to have relinquished that particular relief which might have been open to her of getting a charge on her husband's Gudivada property.

11. The appellant's learned advocate in the latter half of his address argues that in the suit brought in the Ellore Court the plaintiff might have asked for relief against the Gudivada property and on that footing asked me to give that relief in the second appeal which has already been disposed of. But that argument, while it is contradictory to the earlier portion of his own argument is not based upon any authority which is applicable and is directly contrary to the decision in Sitabai v. Laxmibai [1916) 40 Bom. 337. The only approach to support for that argument is found in an observation contained in Sundara Bai Sahiba v. Tirumal, Rao Sahib [1910] 33 Mad. 131. That was a suit brought on the original side of this Court against the defendant who was living outside the original jurisdiction of this Court for maintenance charging it upon property in Madras. The question arose whether such a suit was a suit for land within the meaning of Section 12, Letters Patent. It was held that it was, and in so holding their Lordships made an observation that

" where in a suit for maintenance the plaintiff only prays for a decree charging her maintenance on ancestral property without specifying any particular portion of that property, the suit may not be a suit for land as she does not claim any relief against any specified property."

12. Apart from the fact that this was an observation merely, it was made in a case which depended upon the meaning of the words "for land" in Clause 12, Letters Patent, and not upon the Coda of Civil Procedure where the words of Section 16 are:

for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property.

13. Having regard to the difference in language I am not able to say that the learned advocate's first argument on this point was not right or that the second argument is.

14. The result is that the decision of the lower Courts dismissing the suit as incompetent is right and the second appeal must be dismissed with costs.