Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sriman Madabhushi Gopalacharyulu v. Emmani Subbanna And Ors.

Madras High Court
Dec 16, 1919
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerns the correct amount of the kattubadi payable to the plaintiff Zemindar by the defendants who are agraharamdars. The central procedural history is as follows:

  • O.S. No. 56 of 1901: Two agraharamdars sued the Receiver of the Nidadavole Estate and the Zemindar in the Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Rajahmundry, seeking a declaration that the kattubadi was only 580; the other agraharamdars were joined as defendants.
  • The Additional Subordinate Judge (Munsif) gave a decree in favour of those plaintiffs in O.S. No. 56 of 1901.
  • A.S. No. 451 of 1905: The District Judge (Kistna) reversed the Munsif's decree on 1-12-1910, deciding the fuller amount claimed by the Receiver was payable.
  • S.A. No. 838 of 1911: The plaintiffs appealed in second appeal to this Court, which confirmed the District Judge's decision on 7-8-1913.
  • One of the agraharamdars in the original suit, Prativadi Bhayamkaram Rukminiamma (the 6th defendant), died in March 1908 before the District Judge's decision and before the final disposal in this Court. Her legal representatives were not brought on record in the District Court appeal nor in the second appeal before this Court.
  • The present dispute (the current suit) raises whether the decree in the earlier proceedings is res judicata against the present 10th defendant (Sriman Madhabhushi Gopalacharyulu), who claims through the deceased Rukminiamma.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the earlier decision (District Judge's decree in A.S. No. 451 of 1905, confirmed in Second Appeal No. 838 of 1911) is res judicata as against the present 10th defendant in respect of the amount of the kattubadi.
  2. Whether Explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) applies to bind a person who was impleaded as a defendant in an earlier suit but whose legal representatives were not brought on record after the defendant's death — i.e., whether the litigation was "conducted bona fide" so as to bind all persons interested.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' / Respondents' Argument

  • The plaintiffs argued that the matter of the amount of kattubadi is res judicata against the 10th defendant by virtue of Explanation VI of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deems persons litigating bona fide for themselves and others to bind all persons interested in the right.

10th Defendant / Appellant's Argument (as represented in the opinion)

  • Counsel (Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar) drew a distinction that when a party was represented at one stage of the earlier proceedings but later ceased to be represented because of a failure to bring his legal representatives on record, such cases should be exceptions to application of Explanation VI. In other words, non-representation at a later stage (after death and failure to bring on legal representatives) should prevent the earlier decision from operating as res judicata against the absent party.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandavelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457 Full Bench decision explaining that when a co-sharer sues for his own share impleading other co-sharers as supplemental defendants but not claiming relief for them, the decision is not res judicata against those co-sharers. The Court relied on this Full Bench authority to distinguish cases where a plaintiff sues only for his own share (so as not to bind others) from cases where plaintiffs litigate bona fide on behalf of themselves and others. The decision was used to examine whether the earlier plaintiffs had litigated on behalf of others.
Rangamma v. Narasimha Charyula (1915/1916) 31 M.L.J. 26 Held that Explanation VI (language of explanation) can bind persons not parties where one agraharamdar sued on behalf of himself and other agraharamdars who were impleaded as defendants and remained ex parte. The Court treated Rangamma as the principal governing decision and followed it: it supported applying Explanation VI to bind the 10th defendant where earlier litigation showed plaintiffs litigating bona fide on behalf of others.
Varanakot Narayanan Nambudri v. Varanakot Narayanan Nambudri (1880) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 328 Held that a decree against the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad binds other members of the tarwad because the karnavan represents them. Used to illustrate instances where representative status (karnavan) rendered a decree binding on non-parties; aided reasoning that recognized representative litigation may bind others.
Thanakoti v. Muniappa (1885) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 496 Held that where the plaintiff did not seek relief for others (other ryots), the explanation did not debar other ryots not parties from bringing similar suits; the case contains observations about reading Explanation with Section 30. Cited to show limits of the explanation where a plaintiff did not litigate on behalf of others; used to contrast different fact situations and to underline that the explanation must be read with rules on joinder/representation.
Mahadevan v. Keshavan (1887) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 191 Four out of five trustees suing to recover trust property sufficiently represented the trust; the absent trustee was bound. Referred to as an example where partial representation bound others (trust context) though the Court observed it did not decisively help either side in the present dispute.
Chandu v. Kunhamad (1891) I.L.R. 14 Mad. 324 Initially held that a subsequent suit by a plaintiff claiming under one of the defendants was barred under the explanation, but later overruled by the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali. Referred to as an example of earlier inconsistent decisions that were overruled; used to explain the evolution of law on the scope of the explanation.
Latchanna v. Saravayya (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 164 Held similarly to Chandu v. Kunhamad (that decision could bar subsequent suits), later overruled by Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali. Placed in the discussion to show earlier rulings which the Full Bench corrected; used to justify reliance on Full Bench authority.
Surendra Nath Pal Chowdhury v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhury (1886) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 352 Authoritative Full Bench support referenced in relation to the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali. Used to show prior Bench authority followed by the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali; part of tracing precedential history.
Ram Narain v. Bisheshar Prasad (1888) I.L.R. 10 All. 411 Edge C.J.'s cautionary observation that Explanation should be applied carefully and not beyond its wording. Cited for the proposition that courts should be cautious in applying the broad language of the explanation; used by the Court to frame its approach (not to apply it where substantial departures from joinder rules occur).
Markt Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd. (1910) 2 K.B. 1021 Under Order XVI Rule 9 of the Supreme Court, where a plaintiff properly sues to represent others, those represented are bound. Used to explain the principle in English practice about representative suits and that persons properly represented by a plaintiff are bound; helped comparison with Indian provisions.
Cockburn v. Thomson (1809) 16 Ves. 321; 94 E.R. 1171 Described as explaining the practice of the Court of Chancery on representative suits (as explained by Lord Eldon). Referred to as a historical foundation for representative-suit principles adopted in later rules (Order XVI Rule 9).
Vasudevan v. Sankaran (1897) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 129 Held that the karnavan is a recognised representative whose participation binds other members of the tarwad. Used to support the view that recognised representatives (like a karnavan) can bind others, as a contrast to the present fact pattern of private right claimed in common.
Ellaiya v. Collector of Salem (1866) 3 M.S.C.R. 59 Authority referred to in support of the proposition that agraharamdars are jointly and severally liable for the jodi payable on their agraharam. Relied upon (with other cases) to support the statement that agraharamdars have a common interest in limiting the demand because each may be made to pay the whole jodi.
Ramayya v. Subbarayudu (1889) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 25 One of the prior decisions followed for the proposition of joint and several liability of agraharamdars for jodi. Used as supporting precedent for the factual-legal premise that agraharamdars share a common private interest.
Sobhanadri Apparao v. Gopalakrishnamma (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 84 Another prior decision cited on joint and several liability of agraharamdars. Used along with other cases to underpin the Court's assessment of common interest among agraharamdars.
Baiju Lal Parbatia v. Bulak Lal Puthak (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 385 Cited in the context of discussion about construing the explanation with Section 30 and related rules. Referred to among authorities addressing the scope of the explanation and its interplay with rules on representation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several discrete steps, as reflected in the opinions:

  1. Identification of the narrow factual question: whether the decree in the earlier proceedings (District Judge's judgment in A.S. No. 451 of 1905, confirmed in Second Appeal No. 838 of 1911) is res judicata as to the amount of the kattubadi vis-à-vis the present 10th defendant, who claims through a deceased defendant (Rukminiamma) who was impleaded in the earlier suit.
  2. Examination of representation and record status: the Court notes that Rukminiamma was impleaded as a defendant and later died (March 1908). Her legal representatives were not brought on record either in the District Court appeal or in the second appeal to this Court. The District Judge had found res judicata against the present 10th defendant on the (mistaken) ground that he had been impleaded as representative of the deceased in the second appeal; the Court identifies that as an error of identity (different individuals with similar names).
  3. Textual and statutory focus on Explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908): The Court frames the dispute around whether the earlier litigation was "conducted bona fide" within the meaning of the Explanation so as to bind all persons interested in the private right (kattubadi).
  4. Review of the statutory history and related rules: The opinion traces the lineage of the explanation through earlier Codes and rules (Section 30 of the Code of 1877; Order 16 Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court; Order 1 Rule 8 of the present procedural rules) and contrasts the English practice (where no court permission was required for representative plaintiffs) with Indian law (where Section 30 required leave). The Court emphasizes that Section 11 and the Explanation must be read together with joinder and representative rules.
  5. Survey and analysis of precedents: The Court extensively reviews prior decisions (both Full Bench and single-judge authorities) that have applied or limited the Explanation. It distinguishes cases where plaintiffs sued only for their own share (and thus did not litigate on behalf of others) from cases where plaintiffs expressly litigated on behalf of others and obtained relief that affected those others. The Court highlights Rangamma v. Narasimha Charyulu (31 M.L.J. 26) as the principal authority directly governing the present issue and as supporting application of the Explanation where a plaintiff litigated bona fide for himself and others and the others remained ex parte.
  6. Assessment of "bona fide" litigation in the present facts: The Court concludes that, on the strict construction of the Explanation, the earlier plaintiffs did litigate bona fide for themselves and the other agraharamdars by impleading them as defendants and seeking relief that would bind the class. The Court notes that the failure to bring the deceased defendant's legal representatives on record was due to default by the other side in the District Court and that the omission did not amount to such a want of bona fides as to exclude the Explanation's operation.
  7. Treatment of arguments for exception where a party ceases to be represented: The opinion considers the contention that a party who was represented at one stage but later not represented (e.g., after death and failure to bring representatives on record) should be excepted from the Explanation. The Court declines to construe Explanation VI narrowly to create such an exception unless the statutory words themselves required it; it finds no basis for reading such limiting words into the Explanation.
  8. Conclusion drawn: Both the primary opinion and the concurring analysis (Spencer, J.) conclude that the earlier litigation was conducted bona fide and that the Explanation applies to bind the 10th defendant; accordingly the earlier decision operates as res judicata against him.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the earlier decision (the District Judge's judgment in A.S. No. 451 of 1905, confirmed in Second Appeal No. 838 of 1911) is res judicata against the 10th defendant in respect of the correct amount of the kattubadi. The Court ordered dismissal of the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the 10th defendant (Sriman Madhabhushi Gopalacharyulu), who claims through the deceased 6th defendant (Prativadi Bhayamkaram Rukminiamma), is bound by the prior determination of the amount of kattubadi under Explanation VI to Section 11 CPC because the earlier litigation was held to have been conducted bona fide for the benefit of those similarly interested.
  • The Court applied and followed existing precedents (notably Rangamma v. Narasimha Charyulu and the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandavelu Pillai) in reaching its conclusion. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel principle beyond applying the Explanation to the present facts; the result is the dismissal of the appeal with costs.
Show all summary ...

1. The subject of this suit is the amount of the kattubadi payable to the plaintiff Zemindar by the defendants who are agraharamdars, and the question argued before us is whether this is res judicata against the 10th defendant by reason of the decree in second appeal No. 838 of 1911 confirming the decree in A.S. No. 451 of 1905 which decided the question against the agraharamdars reversing the decree of the Subordinate Judge in their favour.

2. In O.S. No. 56 of 1901 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge's Court of Rajahmundry two of the agraharamdars sued the Receiver of the Nidadavole Estate and the Zemindar for a declaration that the kattubadi was only 580 joining the other agraharamdars as defendants.

3. The Additional Subordinate Judge of Godavari gave the plaintiffs a decree in O.S. No. 56 of 1901 which was reversed on 1st December 1910 by the District Judge of Kistna in A.S. No. 451 of 1905. Prativadi Bhayamkaram Rukminiamma, one of the agraharamdars through whom the present appellant (the 10 defendant.) claims, was impleaded as the sixth defendant in the former suit and as the fourth respondent in the appeal to the District Court. She died in Match 1908 nearly three years before the disposal of the appeal, and the appellant, who was the Receiver of the Nidadavole Estate, failed to bring on her legal representatives, nor were they made parties in the second appeal to this Court preferred by the plaintiffs in S.A. No. 838 of 1911. The District Judge has found the amount of the kattubadi in the present case to be res judicata against the 10th defendant Sriman Madhabhushi Gopalacharyulu, on the ground that he was impleaded in the second appeal as the representative of the deceased Rukminiamma, but this appears to be an error as Prativadi Bhayamkaram Gopalacharyulu who was impleaded as the fourth respondent in the second appeal was the 9th defendant in the Original Suit and a different person from the present 10th defendant.

4. We must take it then that no legal representative of Rukminiamma, through whom the 10th defendant claims, was brought on after her death either by the contesting defendant in his appeal to the District Court, or by the plaintiffs in their Second Appeal to this Court. It has none the less been argued before us that the suit is res judicata as against the 10(h defendant by virtue of Explanation VI of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act V of 1908 which says that "where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a private right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating." It is clear from the judgment of the District Judge in the previous suit, which was confirmed in Second Appeal, that the plaintiffs in the previous suit were litigating on behalf of themselves and the other agraharamdars whom they joined as defendants because they were unwilling to sue as plaintiffs, as regards the amount of kattubadi, and that they obtained a decree in the Munsif's Court which was reversed by the District Judge on the ground that the full amount of kattubadi claimed by the. contesting defendant, the Receiver of the Estate, was payable; and the position therefore is that Rukminiamma, the 6th defendant and her heirs were not represented in the appeal when the District Judge set aside the decree which the plaintiffs had obtained on her behalf as well as well as their own, or in the second appeal preferred by the plaintiffs in which that decision was affirmed. If there had been no appeal to the District Court from the decree of the Subordinate Judge the issue as to the kattubadi would apparently have been res judicata in her favour by virtue of the explanation although she had been impleaded only as defendant and she remained ex parte because the relief had been claimed on her behalf, Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandavelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28. Mad. 457 and equally of course it would have been res judicata against her if her representative had been properly impleaded in the appeals. The question whether the explanation is applicable although Rukminiamma was not represented either in the appeal or in the second appeal is of considerable difficulty. The explanation was first enacted as Explanation V of Section 13 of the Code of 1877 in which Section 30(now Order 1 Rule 8) was first enacted. Section 30 was again taken with an important modification from Order XVI. Rule 9 of the new Rules of the Supreme Court which embodied the practice of the Court of Chancery in representative suits as explained by Lord Eldon in Cockburn v. Thomson (1809) 16. Ves. 321 : 94 E.R. 1171 Order 16 Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court under the Judicature Act provides that "where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more or such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court or a Judge to defend in such cause or matter, on behalf or for the benefit, of all persons so interested" and, where a plaintiff properly so sues, the persons whom he represents are bound Markt Co., Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd. (1910) 2 K.B. 1021. The rule was reproduced in Section 30 of the Code of 1877 with this important modification that the permission of the Court is required to enable the plaintiff to sue in such a case, where as under Order 16 Rule 9 no such permission is required in the case of plaintiffs. It therefore follows that in India the legislature considered that a plaintiff ought not to be allowed to represent the other parties interested in the case mentioned in the section without the leave of the Court. Section 11 and the explanation were enacted at the same time and must be read together and it has sometimes been stated that the explanation is applicable only to cases where the consent of the Court to the institution of the suit had been given under Section 30. Thanakoti v. Muniappa (1885) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 496 Baiju Lal Parbatia v. Bulak Lal Puthak (1897) I.L.R. 24. Cal. 385 Srinivasachariar v. Raghavachariar (1897) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 28, 32. The explanation no doubt applies to such cases, but it is not in terms confined to them. It may be that, if a suit to which Section 30 is applicable were brought without the consent of the Court the plaintiff could not be considered to be litigating bona fide on behalf of the other persons interested, that is, not only honestly but with due care and attention, or in other cases in which he failed to implgad parties who ought to have been joined, but it is in terms wide enough to include accidental slips where no real prejudice has been caused, and we should not in my opinion be justified in refusing to apply it to such cases. This is the view taken in Rangamma v. Narasimha Charyula 31. M.L.J. 26 but before coming to that decision it is desirable to refer to the other decisions of this Court which have been cited. In Varanakot Narayanan Nambudri v. Varanakot Narayanan Nambudri (1880) I.L.R. 22Mad. 328 it was merely held that a decree against the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad, was binding on the other members of the tarwad, even though no order under Section 30 had been obtained. This proceeded on the ground that the karnavan sufficiently represented the other members of the tarwad without any order under Section 30, and even where the section was in terms inapplicable as where the members of the tarwad are not numerous. Similarly a widow sufficiently represents her husband's estate, and the nearest reveVsioner, it is now settled, sufficiently represents other reversioners in contesting an adoption which would exclude them all. This case does not seem to me to help us as the other matters of the tarwad were properly represented throughout the litigation by the karnavan. In Thanakoti v. Muniappa (1885) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 496 a ryot had sued for damages to his crops caused by the defendants' diversion of certain water which the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to along with the other ryots of the village. The suit was dismissed on the ground that they had not the right claimed, but the explanation was held not to debar other ryots not parties to the former suit. from bringing similar suits. This decision proceeded on the ground that the explanation was inapplicable as the plaintiff in the first suit had not sought any relief for the other ryots which is in accordance with the subsequent ruling of the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandavelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457 but the judgment also contains the following observations as to the effect of the explanation, " Now, unless the other plaintiffs were aware of the suit of plaintiff No. 3 and authorised him to make the claim for them (of which there is neither allegation nor evidence) Plaintiff No. 3 would have had no authority to claim on their behalf so as to bind them from afterwards bringing their own suit. One party having a right in common with others is not at liberty or authorized to sue in his own name to establish the right of others except by their authority. Explanation 5 must be read with the provisions of section 30 and the principles to be found in that section. If that section had been followed which it was not, then the other plaintiffs would be bound." These observations may be read as meaning that in such a case the other ryots could not have been bound unless they were impleaded in the former suit on an order obtained under Section 30. That in my opinion might properly be so, because a plaintiff who sued on their behalf without impleading them could not be considered to be litigating on their behalf bona fide i.e., with due care and attention and the explanation should not be read as setting at naught the ordinary rules as to the joinder of parties. Be that as it may, it is a very different case from the present one. In Mahadevan v. Keshavan (1887) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 191 it was held that where four out of the five trustees sued to recover trust property the trust which was the real plaintiff was sufficiently represented and bound by the decision, and that the fifth trustee was not entitled to sue again on its behalf. The decision was so understood by the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandaivelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457 and does not I think really help either side. In Chandu v. Kunhamad (1891) I.L.R. 14 Mad. 324 certain members of a Mahomedan family sued to recover their share in certain land joining the other members of the family as defendants and it was held that a subsequent suit by a plaintiff claiming under one of these defendants for the recovery of that defendant's share was barred under the explanation, but this decision was afterwards overruled by the Full Bench in Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandavelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457 following the Full Bench in Surendra Nath Pal Chowdhury v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhury (1886) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 352 on the ground that the plaintiff had not been suing in the first suit on behalf of the other members of the family impleaded as defendants but merely claiming his own share. Latchanna v. Saravayya (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 164 was to the same effect and was also overruled by the Full Bench in Somasundra Mudali v. Kulandaivelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457. It was held by the Full Bench in that case, overruling the decisions just cited that, where a co-sharer sues for his own share impleading the othar co-sharers as supplemental defendants but not claiming any relief for them the decision is not res judicata against them although they were parties to the suit.

5. In these cases the Court had not to consider a case where the plaintiff in the second suit had not been impleaded in the first suit or properly represented in it by virtue of an order under Order 1. Rule 8 or otherwise.

6. The only decision of this Court governing the present question appears to be Rangamma v. Narasimha Gharyulu (1915) 31 M.L.J. 26 where it was held upon the language of the explanation that the decision in a suit, brought by one agraharamdar to recover the suit property for himself and the other agraharamdars, fourteen of whom were impleaded as defendants 3 to 16 and remained ex parte, was res judicata in a subsequent suit for the same reliefs brought by the fourth defendant so impleaded and another agraharamdar who for some reason had not been made a defendant in the previous suit. The learned Judges held that the plaintiff in the former suit had been litigating bona fide in respect of a private right claimed in common for himself and others, and that the second plaintiff, though not a party to the suit was bound by virtue of the explanation.

7. The language of the explanation may seem dangerously general, and Edge C.J., has observed in Ram Narain v. Bisheshar Prasad (l888) I.L.R. 10 A11. 411 that we should be careful in applying it, and that it should not be applied to any case which does not come within its very wording. I entirely agree, and should certainly hesitate to hold that any litigation had been bona fide within the meaning of he Explanation in which there had been a substantial departure from the accepted rules as to the joinder of parties as for instance by suing without the leave of the Court in a case properly falling under Order 1. Rule 8 or in suits as regards public rights without the authority prescribed in Sections 91 and 92. At the same time, 1 cannot say on the strictest construction that the plaintiff's litigation in the earlier suit in this case was otherwise than bona fide within the meaning of the section. He impleaded all the other agraharamdars as defendants including Rukminiamma through whom the present 10th defendant claims, and they remained ex parte. When she died after being impleaded as a respondent in the first defendant's appeal to the District Court and before the hearing of the appeal, the failure to bring on her legal representatives was due to the default of the other side. When the plaintiff appealed to this Court from the decree of the District Court the fact that he did not implead the representative of the deceased 6th defendant who had been ex parte in the first Court and whose legal representatives had not been brought on by the other side in the District Court cannot in my opinion be said to constitute such a want of bona fides as to render the explanation inapplicable. Onthis ground therefore I would support the Subordinate Judge's finding that the 10th defendant in this suit who claims through the 6th defendant in the previous suit is bound by res judicata and would dismiss the second appeal with costs.

Spencer, J.

8. The question to be decided is whether the decision of the District Judge of Kistna in A.S. No. 451 of 1905 dated 1-12-1910 (Exhibit A in these proceedings) confirmed in Second Appeal by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 838 of 1911 on 7-8-1913 (Exhibit XVII) is res judicata against the 10th defendant, who is the appellant before us, on the point of Rs. 714-14 being the correct amount of kattubadi payable by the agraharamdars on the Gopavaram Agraharam. It appears that the 6th defendant in that suit, whose name was Prativadi Bhayamkaram Rukminiamma, was dead at the time when the High Court passed its remand order on 17-9-1909 and when the District Judge delivered his judgment on 1-12-1910, although her name was still kept on the record. The Subordinate Judge is of opinion that this defect is cured by the fact that the 10th defendant was one the record as Rukminiamma's legal representative when the High Court judgment finally disposing of the Second Appeal was passed on 7-8-1913.

9. The District Judge's judgment in A.S. No. 451 of 1905 shows the name of Prativadi Bhayamkaram Gopalacharyulu as the 6th respondent and the same individual's name appears as 4th respondent in the High Court's judgment.

10. The 10th defendant's name is Sriman Madhabhushi Gopalacharyulu, The Subordinate Judge therefore appears to be in error in his statement that this 10th defendant was added as the legal representative of Rukminiamma in the second appeal to the High Court.

11. A suit instituted for settling the amount of kattubadi due to the Receiver of the estate upon this agraharam was one in which all the agraharamdars were necessarily interested. In Second Appeal No. 359 and 1789 of 1918 it was recently held by Krishnan J. and myself that agraharamdars are jointly and severally liable for all the jodi payable on their agraharam. We followed prior decisions of this High Court in Ellaiya v. Collector of Salem (1866) 3 M.S.C.R. 59 Ramayya v. Subbarayudu (1889) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 25 and Sobhanadri Apparao v. Gopalakrishnamma (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad 84

12. Under Explanation VI to Section 11 of the C.P. Code when there is a final decision by a competent Court in respect of a private right claimed in common by parties to the suit and others and the litigation is conducted bona fide, all persons interested in that right are bound by the result of the litigation.

13. In Ran gamma v. Narasimha Charyulu (1916) 31. M.L.J. 26 it has been held by Sadasiva Aiyar and Moore JJ., that this explanation is not confined to suits brought under O.I.R. 8 by a few persons representing a numerous class after obtaining the Court's permission and after giving notice to others who may be interested. This decision followed the dictum in Varanakot Narayanan Nambudri v. Varanakot Naraynan Nambudri (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 328 under the Code of 1859. That was a case where a declaratory decree had been obtained against the karnavan of a tarwad. A decree to which a karnavan is a party binds the other members of the tarwad because he is their recognised representative in suits, as was well settled by a Bench of Four Judges in Vasudevan v. Sankaran (1897) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 129. But Rangamma v. Narasimhacharyulu (1916) 31 M.L.J. 26 and the case before us are instances of private rights claimed by some individuals in common with others rather than as representatives of a body of persons. Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandaivelu Pillai (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 457 was a Full Bench case under the Code of 1882. The words "claimed in common" occurring in explanation V to Section 13 of that Code and repeated in explanation VI of the present Code are explained therein as referring to rights to relief which would benefit such parties by being granted and give them such an interest as would enable them to join as co-plaintiffs under Section 26. (Now Order 1 Rule 1.)

14. There can be no doubt that agraharamdars have such a common interest, for as each agraharamdar can be made to pay the whole of the Jodi if others do not pay, all are equally interested in the demand being decreased to the lowest possible figure, or at least not being increased.

15. Judged by this standard, I feel clear that the decision in A.S. No. 451 of 1905 is binding on the parties to this suit including the 10th defendant, as that litigation was, so far as it appears conducted bona fide.

16. But Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar has sought to draw a distinction in a case where a party is represented at one stage of the suit and afterwards ceases to be represented owing to a failure to bring his legal representatives on record. If such cases are to be made exceptions to the general rule it would be necessary to import words in Explanation VI to Section 11 which are not there. "All persons interested in such right" must then be understood as meaning "all persons who are not already parties to the suit and are interested in such right."

17. I see no reason to put such a limited construction on the plain words of the explanation.

18. I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the lower Court's decision is right and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.