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His Holiness Sinha Sri Vythilinga Pandarasannadhi Avergal v. T. Sadasiva Aiyar

Madras High Court

Aug 8, 1928

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Multiple suits were filed by various plaintiffs against the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Madras Act I of 1925 was invalid, that the defendants (the Board) were not a legally constituted Board and were not entitled to exercise powers conferred by that Act, and an injunction restraining the Board from exercising powers under the Act, together with other reliefs. In some suits plaintiffs alternatively pleaded that, even if the 1925 Act were valid, it did not apply to the particular institutions in those plaints. The grounds alleging invalidity of Madras Act I of 1925 were set out in the plaints.

After institution of the suits, Madras Act II of 1927 was enacted. Section 6 of Act II of 1927 repealed the 1925 Act and Section 7 validated certain acts done under the 1925 Act. The parties by consent treated key questions (including the validity of Section 7 and related jurisdictional questions) as preliminary issues for determination.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Section 7 of Madras Act II of 1927 (which validates acts done under Madras Act I of 1925) is ultra vires the local legislature because Madras Act I of 1925 was allegedly invalid for non-compliance with provisions of the Government of India Act.
Whether Section 84 of Act II of 1927 gives the Religious Endowment Board jurisdiction to decide questions of the public or private nature of a temple where that nature is disputed, or where there is no temple within the statutory definition.
Whether, even if Section 7 is valid, the Religious Endowment Board is properly constituted given an alleged absence of a fresh notification required by Section 10 of the Act.
Ancillary procedural questions arising from the framing of preliminary issues and the proceeding of subsequent issues in the several suits (consideration of interlocutory applications, adjournment requests, and additional issues).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

The 1925 Act was invalid because it did not comply with provisions of the Government of India Act (specifically, non-compliance with conditions required by the Imperial Act that constituted the subordinate legislature).
Section 7 of Act II of 1927 is ultra vires because a subordinate legislature cannot validate or give retrospective effect to acts done under an invalid subordinate enactment; doing so would be indirectly what the law prohibits to be done directly.
Even if Section 7 were valid, Section 84 of Act II of 1927 does not confer jurisdiction on the Board where the public nature of the temple is disputed or where there is no temple fitting the statutory definition in Section 9(12) (i.e., where no temple in actual existence as a place of public worship exists when the Act commenced).
The Board is not properly constituted because no notification has been issued by the Government as required by Section 10 of the Act.
An argument was advanced (referenced in court) that only the Imperial Parliament could validate acts done under an invalid subordinate enactment (a submission supported by reference to a passage in Keith's Responsible Government in the Dominions).

Defendants' / Other Parties' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendants' or other parties' distinct legal arguments in adversarial form beyond the procedural positions and the parties' consent to treat questions as preliminary. The court records and addresses the plaintiffs' substantive contentions and proceeds to analyse authorities and statutory provisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Empress v. Burah (Privy Council)	That a subordinate (Indian) legislature created by an Act of Imperial Parliament has plenary legislative powers within the limits of its competence; when acting within those limits it is not an agent or delegate of Imperial Parliament.	The court relied on this observation to underline that the Madras Legislature, in matters within its competence (including legislation regarding religious endowments), is supreme and thus competent to enact Act II of 1927. This supported the conclusion that local legislature could validly pass Section 7.
Trustees of the Ottawa Soman Catholic Separate Schools v. The Quebec Bank (Privy Council)	That a provincial legislature may, by subsequent valid legislation within its competence, validate expenditures or acts done under a former statute later declared ultra vires, provided the validating statute does not contravene reserved constitutional protections (illustrated by reference to s. 93(1) of the British North America Act in that case).	The court treated this authority as analogous: a later valid enactment of a competent local legislature can validate acts done under an invalid provincial enactment. The court used it to support the proposition that Section 7 was within the competence of the Madras Legislature and thus validly validated acts done under the 1925 Act.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (Privy Council)	That duties or acts imposed/levied under an erroneous or invalid presumption may subsequently be validated by later legislation of the competent legislature, establishing that acts done without authority can be validated by subsequent legislation within the legislature's powers.	The court relied on this case to reinforce the principle that acts done without authority (and hence invalid at the time) can be validated by later valid legislation when the subject-matter falls within the competence of the legislature; this supported validation under Section 7.
Muthiah Chetti v. Periannan Chetti	Referred to by the Board in classifying a particular temple as a public temple on the basis of similar circumstances.	The court noted that the Board had relied on this decision in a letter stating that a temple was a public temple because it was similarly situated; the court treated that letter as indicative of a decision or determination potentially subject to the Board's further enquiry under Section 84.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that Madras Act I of 1925 was invalid for non-compliance with provisions of the Government of India Act, and then addressed whether a subsequent valid enactment (Madras Act II of 1927) could validate acts done or Boards constituted under the invalid prior Act.

Step-by-step reasoning as set out in the opinion:

The court accepted the legal proposition (supported by Empress v. Burah) that a subordinate legislature constituted by Imperial Act has plenary powers within matters of its competence; therefore if an enactment of the local legislature is within its competence, it is valid.
The court observed that legislation regarding religious endowments falls within the competence of the Madras Legislature and that Act II of 1927 had been validly passed; the sole objection was to Section 7.
The central legal question was framed: can the local legislature validate acts done under a former enactment that was invalid because it did not comply with certain requirements of the Government of India Act?
The court analysed comparative authorities (Trustees of the Ottawa Soman Catholic Separate Schools v. The Quebec Bank and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving) where subsequent provincial or local enactments validated acts previously done under invalid provincial statutes or under erroneous assumptions. The court found these authorities analogous and persuasive.
The court rejected the argument that only Imperial Parliament could validate acts done under an invalid subordinate enactment; the court found no source in the cited authorities that restricted such validating power exclusively to Imperial Parliament, provided the validating enactment deals with matters within the subordinate legislature's competence.
The court concluded that Section 7, which validates acts done under the 1925 Act and permits continuation of proceedings where not inconsistent with the new Act, was within the competence of the Madras Legislature and therefore valid.
Addressing the contention about the Board's constitution (alleged lack of notification under Section 10), the court applied Section 24 of the General Clauses Act to hold that if Section 7 is valid, the prior notification (already issued) would be valid and a fresh notification was not necessary; Section 10 merely permits the Government to issue a fresh notification after cancelling the old one.
On Section 84's scope, the court analysed statutory definitions (Sections 2, 3, 4, 9, and 84) and concluded that Section 84 generally gives the Board power to decide disputes as to whether a math or temple is one to which the Act applies, subject to a trustee's right to apply to the court to modify or set aside such decision within one year. The court held Section 84 does not carve out classes of disputes that the Board cannot decide merely because the Board is a party to the dispute.
The court pointed out a limitation: where there was no temple in existence as a place of public worship when the Act came into force, Section 84 could not reasonably be read to empower the Board to call trustees to account, direct reconstruction of a non-existent temple, or apply the doctrine of cy pres to devote income—these matters ordinarily belong to civil courts.
Applying that limitation to the facts of C.S. No. 424 of 1926 (where only ruins remained and the temple had ceased to exist for several years), the court held the Board had no jurisdiction to interfere; the plaintiff in that suit was entitled to relief.
The court then disposed of other suits on the preliminary issues: it declared Section 7 valid, held the Board properly constituted and empowered to act under the Act in general, and addressed procedural matters (adjournments, additional issues) as raised in specific suits.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's core rulings include:

Section 7 of Madras Act II of 1927 was validly enacted and is not ultra vires; it is within the competence of the Madras Legislature to validate acts done under Madras Act I of 1925.
The Religious Endowment Board, as constituted, has power and jurisdiction to act under the Act where appropriate, including the power under Section 84 to determine disputes about whether a math or temple is one to which the Act applies (subject to the statutory right of trustees to approach the Court under Section 84(2)).
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act applies so that a previously issued notification constituting the Board remains valid once Section 7 is upheld; a fresh notification under Section 10 is not mandatory in those circumstances.
Where a temple did not exist as a place of public worship when the Act commenced (for example, where only ruins remain), the Board does not have power under Section 84 to order reconstruction, to apply the doctrine of cy pres, or to otherwise deal with endowment income in place of civil courts; such matters ordinarily fall to civil courts.

Direct Implications / Effect on Parties:

For C.S. No. 424 of 1926: The plaintiff obtained a decree declaring that the Act does not apply to the Kottamalai properties; the Board has no jurisdiction to interfere in that matter. An injunction was ordered restraining the Board from exercising powers in relation to that temple or interfering with the plaintiff's management and enjoyment of the properties. The Board was ordered to pay one-half of the plaintiffs' costs in that suit.
For the other suits (listed in the opinion: Nos. 390, 409, 384, 248, 383, 372, 168, 169, 170 and 338 of 1926, 64 of 1927, 573, and 624 of 1925): those suits were dismissed with costs.
C.S. No. 574 was dismissed with costs (plaintiff did not press other issues). Some matters were adjourned (e.g., No. 125 of 1926 adjourned for 6 weeks; C.S. No. 208 of 1927 and O.P. No. 65 of 1927 adjourned one month for a pending application for commission).
The opinion did not announce a new general constitutional precedent limiting subordinate legislatures; rather, it applied existing principles to hold that a competent local legislature may validate acts done under a prior invalid subordinate enactment by subsequent valid legislation on matters within its competence.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the content and formulations appearing in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

These are suits filed by the respective plaintiffs against the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, for a declaration that Madras Act I of 1925 is not valid and that the defendants have no right to act as a legally constituted Board and not entitled to exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the Board of Commissioners under the said Act, for an injunction restraining them from exercising all or any of the powers under the Act against the plaintiffs and for other reliefs.

In some suits there is an alternative prayer that even if the Act is valid, it does not apply to the institutions referred to in those plaints.

The grounds on which Madras Act I of 1925 is said to be invalid are set out in the plaints.

After the institution of these suits, Madras Act II of 1927 was passed; this Act by Sect. 6 repealed the Hindu Religious Endowment Act I of 1925 and by Sect. 7 validated certain acts done under that Act.

Sect. 7 runs as follows:—

“(i) All action taken and all things done including the constitution of the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments the notifications issued and orders made under and in pursuance of the said Act shall be deemed to have been validly taken, done, issued or made.

(ii) All proceedings taken under the said Act may be continued under this Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

(iii) Any remedy by way of application, suit or appeal which is provided by this Act shall be available in respect of proceedings under the said Act pending at the time of the commencement of this Act as if the proceedings in respect of which the remedy is sought had been instituted under this Act.”

It is contended for the plaintiffs that Sect. 7 of Madras Act II of 1927 is ultra vires as Madras Act I of 1925 was invalid as it did not comply with the provisions of the Government of India Act.

Another contention which arises in suit No. 424 of 1926 is that Sect. 84 of Act II of 1927 does not give the Religious Endowment Board jurisdiction where the public nature of the temple is disputed or where there is no temple within the definition of the word ‘temple’ in Sect. 9 (12).

It is also contended that even if Sect. 7 is valid, the Religious Endowment Board is not properly constituted as there has been no notification issued by the Government as required by Sect. 10.

By consent of parties these questions were treated as preliminary issues.

It is argued by Mr. Rangachari for the plaintiffs that Madras Act I of 1925 is not a valid Act as it was not passed in accordance with the provisions of the Governmet of India Act of 1919 and that it was not competent for the local legislature to validate the act or acts done under that Act by any subsequent enactment as it would virtually be doing indirectly what the law prohibits to be done directly. For the purpose of this argument I shall assume that Madras Act I of 1925 was invalid and it is therefore not necessary for me to discuss the various reasons given in the plaints and the question is where an Act of a subordinate legislature is invalid owing to the non-conpliance of certain conditions required by an Act of Parliament which constitutes the subordinate legislature whether the passing of a fresh enactment which complies with the requirements of the Imperial Act and which is validly passed and which validates acts done or Boards appointed under the provisions of the Act would be ultra vires of the legislature and invalid.

There can be little doubt that a subordinate legislature constituted by an Imperial Act of Parliament is, so far as matters within its competence are concerned, supreme. I need only refer to the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Empress v. Burah:

“The Indian legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and can, of course do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within these limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament but has and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself.”

So far as legislation regarding Religious Endowments is concerned, it clearly falls within the powers of the Madras legislature and it is not disputed that Madras Act II of 1927 has been validly passed. Sect. 7 is the only section to which objection is taken.

The only question is whether the legislature can validate acts done under a former enactment which owing to its not complying with certain requirements of the Government of India Act are invalid.

It is not disputed that if the Religious Endowments Board was constituted without any legislative authority by the Local Government and was for that reason incompetent to exercise its functions any subsequent legislation can validate the constitution of the Board as from the date of its constitution by the Government. It is also clear that the subjects dealt with by Act II of 1927 are subjects which the local legislature is competent to deal with. I do not think the mere fact that there was a prior ineffectual attempt to legislate would take away from the legislature the power to pass a subsequent enactment relating to the same subject-matter and to validate acts done or bodies constituted under the prior enactment.

In Trustees of the Ottawa Soman Catholic Separate Schools v. The Quebec Bank, the legislature of Ontario purported to authorise the appointment of commissioners to take over the management of certain Roman Catholic Schools. Commissioners were appointed and they carried out their duties and for the purposes of the schools drew and expended money standing to the credit of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Schools. Then the Statute 5, Geo. 5, C. 45 under which they acted was declared by the Privy Council to be invalid. Thereupon the legislature of Ontario passed 7 Geo. 5, C. 60 declaring that the expenditure incurred by the Commissioners under the invalid legislation must be deemed to have been made for and at the request of the trustees for the Roman Catholic Schools. The question was raised as to the validity of 7 Geo. 5, C. 60 and it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the Act was not invalid. Lord Dunedin observed as follows:—

“The claim against the Quebec Bank would be obviously good at common law. The Bank was the debtor of the appellants, and it would be no defence to say that they had paid the money to a commission whose authority was based on an Act of the Provincial Legislature which had been declared to be ultra vires. The real defence to the action lies in the later statute quoted above. It is equally clear that this statute by its terms provides a complete defence. The only real question is therefore whether that statute also is ultra vires. It can only so be held if it contravenes the exception to Sect. 93, Sub-Sect. 1 of the British North America Act, or in other words, if it prejudicially affects a right or privilege of the appellants. For indubitably in other respects it is a measure dealing with civil rights and as such within the domain of the provincial legislature.”

After pointing out that the Act does not offend against Sect. 93, Sub-Sect. 1, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the Statute 7, Geo. 5, C. 60 was not ultra vires.

In the present case it cannot be said that Act II of 1927 offends against any of the provisions of the Government of India Act or legislates on matters not within the competence of the local legislature. It is difficult to see why the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council would not apply equally to the facts of the present case.

Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited v. Irving is also a case in point. In that case certain duties on sugar were levied under an erroneous impression that the fact that the Minister had moved a resolution for the levy of such duties was a valid ground for the imposition. An Act was subsequently passed which authorised the levy of the duty as from the date on which they were begun to be levied. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the Act was within the competence of the local legislature and validated the previous levy. Their Lordships observed:

“Between October 8, 1909, and July 26, 1902, the respondent demanded from the appellants in respect of 6,700 tons of sugar produced in Queensland, sums amounting in the aggregate to £ 20, 110 as duty imposed on manufactured sugar, in accordance with the resolution. The appellants disputed their liability and deposited the amount in accordance with statutory provisions for that purpose. It is unnecessary now to discuss whether the payment of the duty could have been enforced before the passing of the Excise Tariff, 1902, and it is not now disputed that the appellants are liable for the duty if the Act imposing the duty as from October 8, 1901 was within the powers of the Parliament.”

This case is clear authority for the view that acts done without authority and which therefore would be invalid can be validated by subsequent legislation if the legislation is within the ambit of the powers of the legislature.

This is not a case where an enactment which is invalid in law as not complying with certain provisions of the Government of India Act has been declared to be valid. On the contrary that enactment is expressly repealed and all that Sect. 7 does is to validate acts done under that enactment. As I pointed out before the legislation was on matters within the competence of the Madras Legislature and if no previous Act had been passed and the Board constituted without legislative sanction was invalid for want of legislative sanction, there was nothing to prevent the legislature from passing an Act validating the constitution of the Board as from the date when it came into existence. All that Sect. 7 does is to validate certain acts done and this I think is within the competence of the legislature. To hold otherwise would mean that where a previous legislation has been infructuous owing to the non-compliance with certain requirements Imposed by the Government of India Act the legislature would have no power by a subsequent enactment to validate acts done bona fide under the previous enactment or even to legislate on the same matter. No authority has been cited by Mr. Rangachari for this broad proposition. He has referred to Brooms Legal Maxims, page 375. It is no doubt a general maxim that you cannot do indirectly what the law prohibits to be done directly. But I do not see how by enacting Sect. 7 of Act II of 1927 there has been any evasion of the law or any indirect getting over the provisions of the Government of India Act.

It is also argued that as the previous Act was invalid it is only the Imperial Parliament that could validate Acts done under it and reference was made to Keith's Responsible Government in the Dominions Vol. III, p. 1,325. I do not see anything in the passage referred to in Keith's book which states that it is only the Imperial Parliament that can validate acts done in pursuance of an enactment of a subordinate legislature which is invalid. The fact that the Imperial Parliament passed Acts to validate certain enactments of Colonial Legislatures which were invalid cannot prevent the validation of acts done in pursuance of invalid Acts passed by the subordinate legislature assuming that the acts which it validates are Acts which could be legislated upon by it.

I am of opinion that Sect. 7 of the Madras Act II of 1927 was validly enacted by the local legislature.

As regards the argument that there is no valid Board constituted owing to want of notification under Sect. 10, I think that Sect. 24 of the General Clauses Act applies to the present case. If Sect. 7 is valid, a fresh notification is not necessary as the notification already issued would be valid. The mere fact that Sect. 10 states that the Local Government may by notification direct the constitution of a Board does not make it obligatory on the Government to do so where there is a prior valid notification. All that Sect. 10 does is to enable Government to issue a fresh notification after cancelling the old one.

The next question is as regards Sect. 84. Sect. 84 runs as follows:

“(1) If any dispute arises as to whether a math or temple is one to which this Act applies or as to whether a temple, is an excepted temple, such dispute shall be decided by the Board.

(2) A trustee affected by a decision under Sub-Sect. (1) may within one year apply to the Court to modify or set aside such decision but subject to the result of such application, the order of the Board shall be final.”

I am of opinion that it is within the competence of the Board to determine whether a math or temple is a public institution where the trustee or Matathipathi alleges that it is a private endowment or temple not falling within the Act.

Sect. 2 of the Act is general. It says that the Act extends to the whole of the Presidency of Madras except the Presidency Town and applies, save as hereinafter provided, to all Hindu public religious endowments.

Sect. 3, Cl. (a) gives the Local Government power after consulting the Board, to exempt any such endowment from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act, or vary, alter or cancel such exemption:

Sect. 4 enacts that nothing in this Act shall apply to any math or temple whose average annual gross income including income from endowments connected therewith for a period of five years immediately preceding the commencement of this Act was less than Rs. 500 in the case of maths and Rs. 250 in the case of temples. But even in such cases the Local Government has power to issue a notification declaring that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall apply to such math or temple.

Sect. 9, Cl. (7) defines math as an institution for the promotion of the Hindu Religion presided over by a person whose duty is to engage himself in spiritual service or who exercises or claims to exercise spiritual headship over a body of disciples and succession to whose office devolves in accordance with the directions of the founder of the institution or is regulated by usage; and includes places of religious worship other than a temple or places of religious instruction which are appurtenant to such institution.

Temple is defined as meaning a place by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of, or used as of right by the Hindu community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship.

Sect. 2 being general and applying to all Hindu public religious endowments except such as are excluded by the provisions of the Act it seems to me to be clear that where a question arises between a Matathipathi or Dharmakartha on one side and the Board on the other as to whether the Religious Endowment Board has jurisdiction, Sect. 84 gives the Board power to determine that question subject to the right of the trustee under Cl. 2 to apply to the Court to modify or set aside the decision of the Board.

It is contended by Mr. Rangachari that before the Board can assume jurisdiction the institution or temple must be one which does not fall within the exceptions stated above and that where that question itself is in dispute, the Board would have no authority to act under the Act and must file a suit as otherwise the Board would really be adjudicating on a matter in which it is a party.

Sect. 84 is general and says that if any dispute arises as to whether a math or temple is one to which the Act applies or as to whether a temple is an excepted temple, it is the Board that shall settle the dispute.

Sect. 84 does not make any exception as to the class of disputes that give the Board competence to decide matters in issue.

Where however there is no temple in existence as a place of public worship when the Act came into force, it is difficult to see how Sect. 84 can give any power to call upon the trustees to account for the endowed properties or direct them to rebuild the temple or to apply the income in a particular manner.

Sect. 9, Cl. 12 clearly contemplates a temple in actual existence as a place of public worship. There is nothing in the Act or in Sect. 84 which says that the trustees shall have jurisdiction to decide the way in which the income of particular endowments attached to temples which before the Act came into force ceased to exist as places of public worship is to be applied. That is a function which ordinarily belongs to Civil Courts.

So far as suit No. 424 of 1926 is concerned, it is not disputed that all that remains are the ruins of a temple which fell into ruins or was demolished several years ago. The report filed (Ex. A) as to which there is no dispute makes this clear. It is no doubt true that certain properties are described as Devaswam properties and probably their income was used by the members of the tarwad at least in part for the performance of worship in the temple. But I do not think the fact that there are some properties attached the income of which should be devoted to the temple would give the Board jurisdiction either to direct the restoration of the temple or to invoke the doctrine of cy pres for the purpose of dealing with the income.

So far as C. S. No. 424 of 1926 is concerned, there must be a decree in favour of the plaintiff declaring that the Act does not apply to the Kottamalai properties and that the Board has no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. An injunction will issue restraining the Board from exercising any of the powers conferred on the Board by the Act with reference to the temple or interfere with the plaintiffs' management and enjoyment of the properties. The Board will pay the plaintiffs one half costs of the suit.

As regards the other suits, I decide the preliminary issues against the plaintiffs. It will be declared that Sect. 7 of Act II of 1927 is not ultra vires but was within the competence of the legislature and that the Board is at present constituted has power and jurisdiction to act under the Act. As the suits have been posted for hearing to-day on the other issues I shall proceed to dispose of the other issues.

Mr. Rangachariar says he does not press the other issues in C. S. No. 574. It is dismissed with costs. In C.S Nos. 168 and 412 it is argued by plaintiffs' vakil that a right of suit still remains to plaintiffs even though the Board has held the temples to be public temples as that right is not taken away by the new Act, which only validates acts done under the old Act. I have held that the acts of the defendants under the old Act have been validated and that the Board has the power to decide under Sect. 84 corresponding to Sect. 80 of the old Act whether temple is public or private. Having regard to the frame of the present suits I do not see how an injunction can issue having regard to Sects. 7 and 84 of this Act. Assuming without deciding that a suit would lie for setting aside the Board's decision that the temple is a public temple, such a suit would only lie in the Court where the temple is situate. As regards C. S. No. 169 it is argued that the Board has not decided the question that the temple was public. It is stated that the Board by its letter dated 20th November 1925 stated that having regard to the decision in Muthiah Chetti v. Periannan Chetti the present temple is a public temple as it was similarly situated. If this order is not an order declaring the temple to be public after due enquiry then the matter must be deemed to be still pending and the Board can enquire into the matter under Sect. 84 and pass final orders. I do not see how I can grant the prayers in the plaint which are confined to declaring the Act to be invalid and for an injunction restraining the defendants from acting. In C. S. No. 64 of 1927 it is argued that no enquiry was held under Sect. 84 and the vakil wants an enquiry. The Board on the allegations of the plaintiff that 50 llams were interested in the temple held it was a public temple. I do not think I have any jurisdiction to go into the matter of the temple situated in Malabar being a public or private temple. The plaintiffs ought to have filed a suit in Court having the jurisdiction as regards the temple. As a temple belonging to several families may still be private if it originally belonged to one family which in course of time became divided into several branches. I think the Board will save expenses and litigation if they would rehear the matter and decide on the evidence plaintiff may adduce.

As regards 624 Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar wants an adjournment. I see no grounds to grant further time. The parties ought to have been ready. The case was on board several times and when I disposed of the preliminary issues on the 1st August I intimated my decision but the parties said they wanted time to consider. I said I would give judgment later on to enable them to be ready to go on with the other issues if they pressed them. I think the plaintiff had ample time. As regards No. 372 of 1926 plaintiff wants to raise an additional issue as to allegation in paragraph 10 as to a treaty with the Government. No summons has been taken out for an additional issue. I see no grounds to raise any additional issue at this stage. No application was made even when the case was taken up on the 1st August.

Suits Nos. 390, 409, 384, 248, 383, 372, 168, 169, 170 and 338 of 1926, 64 of 1927, 573, and 624 of 1925 will be dismissed with costs.

In No. 125 of 1926 the plaintiff is reported dead 2 months ago. This will be adjourned for 6 weeks. Plaintiff's vakil withdraws No. 295 of 1926, it is dismissed with costs. C. S. No. 208 of 1927 and O. P. No. 65 of 1927 on the file of the District Court of, Tanjore which is C. S. No. 89 of 1928 will be adjourned 1 month as application for commission is pending.

G. R.