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T.S.P.L.P Chidambaram Chettiar v. Murugesam Pillai (Minor) And Others S

Madras High Court
Apr 28, 1939
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Factual and Procedural Background

The decree involved was obtained by the appellant's father in O.S. No. 157 of 1924 before the Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly, with the decree dated 29 June 1925. The appellant is the adopted son of that decree-holder. The appellant presented an execution petition (E.P. No. 216 of 1936) on 27 June 1936. The learned Subordinate Judge held the petition barred by limitation under Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, the judge treating earlier orders on previous execution petitions as not amounting to a "final order" for the purposes of Article 182(5).

Procedural history of execution petitions (as described in the opinion):

  • First execution petition: filed 3 November 1927, praying for arrest; dismissed 7 January 1928 (judgment-debtor not found for arrest).
  • Second execution petition: presented 3 November 1930; returned on 4 November 1930 requesting explanation as to entitlement to attach a sum in deposit; after extensions, re-presented 24 November 1930; returned on 26 November 1930 with endorsement that permission of Court was required to proceed against properties in the hands of a Receiver; two weeks' time allowed but requisition not complied with.
  • Third execution petition: filed 3 March 1931, with the second petition filed along with it and a remark that the earlier petition had been returned; on 5 March 1931 the lower Court again required permission to proceed against the Receiver and allowed two weeks' time; re-presented 6 April 1931 with applications but returned 7 April 1931 requiring amplification of property description; extensions were sought but the requisitions were not complied with and the petition did not come back to Court until 30 June 1934.
  • Fourth execution petition: filed 30 June 1934 (brought forward with earlier returned petitions); returned 3 July 1934 with multiple requisitions (affidavit regarding legal representatives of decree-holder, consent of prior vakil, guardian petition for minor legal representatives of judgment-debtor, production of Revenue extracts); time was endorsed (till 9 August 1934) but the petitioner took back the petition and no further steps were taken until 27 June 1936.
  • When E.P. No. 216 of 1936 was presented on 27 June 1936, the petitioner produced the second, third and fourth petitions which bore an endorsement: "As a fresh petition is filed herewith, this petition may be dismissed."

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the meaning of the words "final order" in Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act in relation to execution petitions?
  2. Whether execution petitions that are returned for amendment or further information — and not re-presented within the time allowed — can be treated as having produced a "final order" so as to stop or restart the period of limitation under Article 182(5).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (decree-holder) contended that E.P. No. 216 of 1936 was within time because each execution petition (second, third, fourth) had been presented within three years of the date when the immediately preceding petition was returned — i.e., he treated the last order in point of time as the "final order" for the purposes of Article 182(5).
  • He relied upon single-judge decisions, notably Mottaya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan (1936) M.W.N. 547, and a decision reported as C.R.P. No. 682 of 1933 (cited at the same page) for the proposition that “final” should be understood as merely the last order in point of time.

Lower Court / Respondent Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The learned Subordinate Judge held that orders passed on the second, third and fourth execution petitions were not "final orders" within Article 182(5), and therefore the last "final order" was the dismissal of the first petition on 7 January 1928; hence the 1936 petition was out of time.
  • The opinion does not contain a detailed adversarial brief by the respondent's counsel beyond the Subordinate Judge's conclusion and the factual endorsements set out on the petitions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mottaya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan (1936) M.W.N. 547 Single-judge authority suggesting 'final' could mean the last order in point of time. The appellant relied on this decision; the Court distinguished it and declined to follow that single-judge view in preference to Division Bench authorities.
C.R.P. No. 682 of 1933 (reported same page as Mottaya Padayachi) Earlier decision (by Stodart, J.) which construed 'final order' as the 'last order'. Stodart, J. (concurring in this opinion) expressly recanted his earlier view, stating that such directions to remedy defects are not final orders; he now considers that earlier decision wrong.
Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore (1936) 71 M.L.J. 336 Division Bench authority holding that 'final' cannot be taken merely as meaning last in point of time. The Court accepted and followed the view expressed by the Division Bench in Kesavuloo, treating 'final' as involving the notion of putting an end to something rather than merely being the last in time.
Muthu Rama Reddi v. Motilal Daga (I.L.R. 1938 Mad. 326) Division Bench authority (subsequent to single-judge decisions) supporting that 'final' is not merely the last order in point of time. The Court referenced this Division Bench decision as supporting the same view as Kesavuloo and treated these Division Bench views as correct.
Municipal Council, Tanjore v. Sundaresan (1939) 1 M.L.J. 87 Decision of the present opinion's author (sitting singly) on related limitation questions (treatment of returned petitions). The author reiterated and applied the view expressed in that earlier decision: a returned execution petition which the decree-holder does not pursue should be treated as if it had never been presented.
Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei (1914) 27 M.L.J. 1; L.R. 41 I.A. 104; I.L.R. 36 All 284 (P.C.) Privy Council authority concerning the meaning of "final decree or order" (in the context of what constitutes finality for limitation purposes); held that dismissal for want of prosecution did not constitute a final order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. The Court relied on the Privy Council's reasoning as a test: an order is "final" only if it judicially deals with the matter and puts an end to it; orders dismissing for want of prosecution merely recognise non-compliance and are not final orders for limitation purposes.
Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) 27 M.L.J. 17 ; I.L.R. 36 All. 350 (P.C.) Privy Council authority on the meaning of "final" in limitation provisions (similar principle as Batuk Nath). The decision was cited as directly in point; the Court applied the same test drawn from these Privy Council authorities.
Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Guchait (1926) I.L.R. 53 Cal. 664 Case cited by appellant; it was decided before the 1927 amendment to the Limitation Act. The Court held this authority was not applicable because it predated the 1927 amendment and so did not govern the present situation under the amended Article 182.
Muhammad Abu Bakkar Maracair v. Ramakrishna Chettiar (1932) 64 M.L.J. 401 Authority stating that so long as a Court does not dismiss a petition, it must be deemed to be still pending. The Court considered this principle inapplicable to defective execution petitions where a period of limitation is prescribed: allowing that view would enable decree-holders to extend limitation by presenting defective petitions and not re-presenting them.
Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 453 (Full Bench) Reference made to Mr. Justice Pandrang Row's adherence to his view notwithstanding Division Bench decisions; cited as context for discussion about possibly referring the issue to a Full Bench. The Court declined to refer the matter to a Full Bench, considering two Division Bench decisions already expressed a correct view and not seeing sufficient reason to depart from them.
A.K. Narasimha Aiyar v. Veerappa Chettiar A.A.A.O No. 138 of 1937 Referenced as part of the judicial background where single-judge views persisted despite Division Bench decisions. Cited in context; the Court did not consider these references sufficient to require Full Bench determination and preferred Division Bench authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on the interpretation of "final order" in Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act. The analytical steps and principles applied by the Court are set out below, following only the material present in the opinion:

  1. Interpretive principle: The Court adopted the view — drawn from Division Bench authority and Privy Council decisions — that the word "final" connotes an order that puts an end to something; it cannot be equated simply with the last order in point of time. The Court cited Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei and Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (Privy Council) as authoritative exposition that procedural dismissals for want of prosecution are not "final" in this sense.
  2. Application to returned execution petitions: Orders returning an execution petition for amendment or requiring the petitioner to obtain permission or provide further particulars do not put an end to the matter; they are orders requiring further action and do not themselves constitute a judicial determination that disposes of the petition. Therefore, such returned orders are not "final orders" under Article 182(5).
  3. Practical duty and consequences for decree-holders: If a decree-holder receives back his execution petition with requisitions, it is his duty to re-present it within the time allowed, seek extensions, show cause, or otherwise pursue the matter until a proper final order is obtained. If he takes no further steps, he should be treated as if he had never put in the petition at all — the returned petition does not operate to extend limitation.
  4. Policy consideration and the 1927 amendment: The Court observed that permitting a decree-holder to extend limitation merely by filing defective petitions and refraining from re-presentation would undermine the 1927 amendment to the Limitation Act. The earlier pre-1927 law allowed the mere presentation date to start limitation periods in ways that could be abused; under the amended regime, an application must be "made in accordance with law" and finally disposed of to trigger the limitation protection.
  5. Stodart, J.'s further analysis (concurring): He examined Order 21, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, describing three ways an execution application can be dealt with: (a) admitted and finally disposed of, (b) rejected forthwith, or (c) left in abeyance to permit remedying defects (the usual practice being to return the petition with directions). He concluded that the direction to remedy a defect is not an "order" in the sense required by Article 182(5); and, in any event, a defective application kept in abeyance is not an application "made in accordance with law" and thus falls outside Article 182(5).
  6. Conclusion of reasoning: Given the facts — returned petitions with requisitions not complied with and not judicially determined — the Court concluded that none of the orders on the second, third and fourth execution petitions constituted a "final order" for the purposes of Article 182(5). The last final order remained the dismissal of the first petition on 7 January 1928.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications (direct effect and stated consequences in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on the parties: The execution petition presented on 27 June 1936 (E.P. No. 216 of 1936) is barred by limitation because the court found that none of the subsequent returned execution petitions produced a "final order" under Article 182(5); therefore the decree-holder's appeal fails and the subordinate court's dismissal (on limitation grounds) is upheld.
  • Practical legal consequence: For the purposes of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, an order returning an execution petition for amendment or further particulars (i.e., allowing the petitioner time to remedy defects) is not a "final order" that can be relied on to extend or restart the three-year limitation period unless the petition is properly re-presented and an order finally disposing of it is made. A defective application kept in abeyance is not regarded as an application "made in accordance with law" for Article 182(5) purposes.
  • Precedential note: The Court aligned itself with Division Bench authorities (Kesavuloo; Muthu Rama Reddi) and Privy Council reasoning and expressly disapproved the contrary single-judge view earlier taken in C.R.P. No. 682 of 1933 by Stodart, J., who in this opinion accepts that his earlier decision was wrong. The opinion therefore endorses the position that "final" implies an order putting an end to the matter rather than merely being the last order chronologically.

Show all summary ...

1. The only point in this appeal is one of limitation. The appellant's father got a decree in O.S. No. 157 of 1924 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly on the 29th of June, 1925. The appellant is his adopted son. He presented his petition in execution (E.P. No. 216 of 1936) on the 27th of June, 1936, and the learned Subordinate Judge has held that it was barred by limitation on the ground that it was not presented within three years after the final order passed on a previous application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution - Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act.

2. The execution petition presented on the 27th of June, 1936, is the fifth of the execution petitions presented by this decree-holder. The first was filed on the 3rd of November, 1927, praying for arrest of the defendant; it was dismissed on the 7th of January, 1928, as the judgment-debtor was not found for arrest. The second execution petition was presented on the 3rd of November, 1930. This was returned on the 4th of November, 1930, with an endorsement requesting the petitioner to show how he was entitled to attach a sum of money in deposit in O.S. No. 6 of 1925. After two extensions of time had been given, learned Counsel for the petitioner re-presented this petition on the 24th November, 1930, with an explanation. The petition was. then returned on the 26th of November, 1930, with an endorsement that the permission of the Court must be obtained to proceed against the properties in the hands of the Receiver appointed by the Court. Two weeks' time was allowed for this. This endorsement was not complied with. The next application was filed on the 3rd of March, 1931 and the second E.P. was 'filed' along with it with the remark:

On 3rd November, 1930, petition was put in, but it was returned. It was not re-presented, it is filed herewith.

3. On this petition, on the 5th of March, the lower Court again required the petitioner to obtain the permission of the Court to proceed against the properties in the hands of the receiver appointed by the Court in O.S. No. 6 of 1925 and allowed two weeks' time for complying with this. After two extensions, this was re-presented on the 6th of April with an application for permission to proceed against the receiver. It was again returned by the lower Court on the 7th of April with a requisition that the description of property sought to be attached should be amplified and that the extent and Survey Numbers should be given. One week's time was allowed for this. On the 15th of April, the petitioner's pleader prayed for 15 days' time to obtain the necessary extracts from the Survey registers. On the 25th of June, 15 days' further time was prayed for and granted by the Subordinate Judge in his order dated the 30th of June, 1931. The requisition was however not complied with and this petition did not come back to the Court until the 30th of June, 1934, when the fourth E.P. was filed. In that, as in the third, the petitioner stated that he had put in previous execution petitions on the 3rd of November, 1930, and the 3rd of March, 1931, but they had been returned to him and therefore he said, they were presented along with the fourth. This was returned on the 3rd of July, 1934, with an endorsement requiring the petitioner firstly to file an affidavit with regard to the legal representatives of the decree-holder (this petition was presented by the present appellant the adopted son of the original decree-holder); secondly, to obtain the consent of the vakil who had appeared in the prior execution proceedings; thirdly, to put in a guardian petition for the minor legal representatives of the judgment-debtor; and fourthly, to produce the Revenue extracts which had already been called for on the previous two, execution petitions. The petitioner did not comply with these requisitions but appears to have applied for further time, for, on the 18th July, 1934, the lower Court has endorsed, "Time granted till 9th August, 1934." The petitioner having taken this petition back, nothing more was heard of ft until the 27th of June, 1936, when he presented E.P. No. 216 of 1936. He then produced the second, third and fourth petitions with an endorsement on each of them in these words:

As a fresh petition is filed herewith, this petition may be dismissed.

4. Now, the learned Subordinate Judge has held that none of the orders passed on the second, third and fourth execution petitions can be considered to be a "final" order within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act. The last final order on an execution petition is dated the 7th of January, 1928, and the execution petition presented on 27th of June, 1936, is long out of time.

5. Hence this appeal by the decree-holder. His contention is that his E.P. No. 216 of 1936 is not barred by limitation because it was presented within three years from the 30th of June, 1934, when the fourth E.P. was finally returned to him; the fourth E.P. was presented within three years of the 30th June, 1931, when the third E.P. was returned to him, and the third E.P. was presented within1 three years of the 26th of November, 1930, when the second E.P. was finally returned to him. The second E.P. was presented on the 3rd of November, 1930, within three years of the 7th of January, 1928, on which date the first E.P. had been dismissed.

6. The question is: what is the meaning of the words "final order" in Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act? Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that it means simply the last order in point of time. He relies on the decision of Mr. Justice Pandrang Row in Mottaya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan (1936) M.W.N. 547 and the decision of Mr. Justice Stodart in C.R.P. No. 682 of 1933 reported in the same page. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the appellant recognises that there are two decisions of Division Benches of this Court subsequent to these decisions of single judges in which it has been held that 'final' does toot mean merely last in point of time. These are the cases of Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore (1936) 71 M.L.J. 336. and Muthu Rama Reddi v. Motilal Daga I.L.R. 1938 Mad. 326. There is also a decision of my own sitting singly, reported in Municipal Council, Tanjore v. Sundaresan (1939) 1 M.L.J. 87. In the case of Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore (1936) 71 M.L.J. 336, Venkatasubba Rao and Cornish, JJ., have shown that 'final' in Article 182(5) cannot be taken as meaning merely last in point of time. Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao points out that the word 'final' occurs not only in Clause (5) of Article 182 but also in Clauses (2) and (6) and the meaning of the word 'final' in Clause (2) has been considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Batuk Nath vi Munni Dei (1914) 27 M.L.J. 1 : L.R. 41 I.A. 104 : I.L.R. 36 All 284 (P.C.) and Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) 27 M.L.J. 17 : I.L.R. 36 All. 350 (P.C.). The latter case, in my opinion, is very much in point. Article 182(2) provides that the three year period of limitation for execution of a decree shall run, when there has been an appeal, from:

The date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court....

7. In the first of the cases before the Privy Council, an appeal I was preferred to the Privy Council and it was dismissed for want of prosecution under Rule. 5 of the Order in Council of 1853. It was contended on behalf of the assignee-decree-holder that the date on which the appeal had been dismissed by the Privy Council was the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court, and that the decree could be executed within three years from that date. This contention was disallowed by their Lordships. They held that in such case, there was no final order of the Privy Council within the meaning of Article 179(2) as it was then, corresponding now to Article 182(2). In the latter case again it was contended that the date of the dismissal by the Privy Council was the date of the final order or decree. Lord Moulton observed that:

The order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit and could in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely recognised authoritatively that the appellant had not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him, and that therefore he was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all.

8. In my opinion, this is the test to be applied in cases like the present. If an execution petition is returned to the decree-holder, for some amendment, it is his duty to re-present it within the time allowed, or to get an extension of the time allowed, or to show cause why he should not comply with the requisition, Or to pursue the matter in some way until he gets what can be properly described as a final order upon it. If having received back his execution petition he takes no further action upon it, then he should be treated in my opinion as if he had never put in his petition at all. This is what I said in my judgment in Municipal Council, Tanjore v. Sundaresan (1939) M.W.N. 426. It is not, in my opinion, permissible for a decree-holder to extend the period of limitation by simply failing to re-present an execution petition returned for rectification. The proper way to deal with such a petition as that is to treat it as not having come into existence at all. In the present case, the first execution petition, as I have already said, was dismissed on the 7th of January, 1928; the second execution petition was filed on the 3rd of November, 1930, and was last returned to the petitioner on the 26th of November, 1930, requiring him to get the Court's permission to proceed against the properties in the hands of the receiver and giving him two weeks' time to do so. Now he did not bring this back until the 3rd of March, 1931, and when he brought it back, he did not comply with the requisitions; he did not pray for excusing the delay in complying with the requisitions; he did not ask that anything whatever should be done with the second execution petition; he merely filed it with the third execution petition presented on the 3rd of March, 1931. Now, on the 3rd of March, 193,1, execution was barred because that was already more than three years after the 7th January, 1928, when the first execution petition had been dismissed. As I have already said, the third execution petition was dealt with in the same way as the second and therefore no judicial determination of it has been made but it is quite conceivable that if the third execution petition had been re-presented in proper time, it would have been dismissed as barred by limitation. Certainly it would have been necessary to dismiss the second execution petition as barred by limitation when it was re-presented on the 3rd March, 1931, unless the petitioner had been able to persuade the Court to excuse the delay in re-presentation. If the delay were not excused, then this petition would have had to be treated as if it had been presented for the first time on the 3rd March, 1931, and that was beyond the period of limitation. Learned Counsel has suggested that we should refer this matter to a Full Bench because Mr. Justice Pandrang Row, in spite of the decision of a Bench of this Court in Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore (1936) 71 M.L.J. 336, in 1936, still adhered in 1937 to his former opinion - vide Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 453 (F.B.) and again in A.K. Narasimha Aiyar v. Veerappa Chettiar A.A.A.O. No. 138 of 1937. I regret I do not consider that this is a sufficient reason for referring this matter to a Full Bench. As I have already said there are two Benches which have already expressed the view that 'final' in Article 182(5) cannot be interpreted as being merely the last in point of time. With respect, I think those decisions are correct. 'Final' is a word which has many meanings but all of them I think involve the notion of putting an 'end' to something. It is not possible to call an order a "final order" unless it puts an end to something or other. Now, in my opinion, it is impossible to say of any of these orders of return on the second, third and fourth execution petitions that they put an end to anything. They were expressly orders requiring the petitioner to do something more in order that the Court might proceed with his execution petition. They did not contemplate the end of that execution petition at all. Learned Counsel for the appellant wishes us to say that such orders as these ought to be construed as if they contained further clauses. He says that when an execution petition is returned for amendment within 15 days it ought to be read as if it contained a statement that in default of re-presentation within 15 days, it should stand dismissed. I am not able to accept this contention. Article 182(5) refers expressly to "the date of the final order". It is not possible for this purpose to bring in some fictitious date of an order which has not been passed. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied strongly upon the case of Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Guchait (1926) I.L.R. 53 Cal 664.was before the amendment of the Act in 1927 as the ruling shows. It is 1 therefore not applicable to this case. Learned Counsel has also referred to the decision of Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair in Muhammad Abu Bakkar Maracair v. Ramakrishna Chettiar (1932) 64 M.L.J. 401. What stated in that decision is that so long as the Court does not dismiss a petition, it must be deemed to be still pending. With respect I do not think that that principle can be applied, to execution petitions of this kind where there is a period of limitation prescribed. If that view is taken, it is possible, as I have pointed out elsewhere, for a decree-holder to extend the period of limitation at his will by presenting a defective execution petition, and on its return to him by refraining from representing it. This course could be taken before the amendment of Article 182 in 1927. In 1927 it was the date of an execution petition that gave the start for the period of limitation of three years. Any execution petition presented within three years of the date of the presentation of a former execution petition was in time. It was therefore possible to present an execution petition with no intention of proceeding with it, and to take no further steps upon it, for two years and 364 days and then to come in with another execution petition. Pandrang Row, J., in Mottaya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan (1936) M.W.N. 547 has expressed some views about the policy of the amending Act passed in 1927. With respect it is not quite self-evident to me that the policy underlying the amendment was to give the decree-holder more time. I would prefer to follow the views on this subject expressed by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao in Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore (1936) 71 M.L.J. 336. I do not think, therefore, that there is any sufficient reason for putting this matter before a Full Bench. I am quite satisfied that the execution petitions which were returned for amendment and which were not re-presented within the proper time cannot save limitation.

9. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is, therefore, in my opinion, correct, and this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Stodart, J.

10. I agree with my learned brother, I think that my decision in C.R.P. No. 682 of 1933 was wrong. In that decision I held that the expression 'final order' in Article 182(5) of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act must be construed as the 'last order' and that a direction of the Court that an application made to it in execution should be amended as if the amendment was never made the 'last order' on that application. On further consideration I think that such a direction is not final in the sense in which that word should be construed, namely, as putting an end to the application: and I would go further and hold that such a direction is not an order at all. It is simply an intimation to the applicant that his petition cannot be admitted and acted upon unless he supplies the Court with further particulars or observes some formality which he has omitted to observe. There are in my opinion only three ways of dealing With an application for the execution of a decree: and these are unambiguously defined in Order 21, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. If the application conforms to the requirements of rules 11 to 14 it must be admitted which means that it receives a serial number in the execution petition Register and comes on in the usual course in open Court for the orders of the Judge. In such a case there will be a final order which will effectively dispose of the matters raised in the application. Secondly, if the application does not comply with the requirements of rules 11 to 14 it may be forthwith rejected. Thirdly, and this is the ease now under consideration, if the application does not comply with the provisions of rules 11 to 14, the Judge, instead of rejecting it forthwith, may allow the defect to be remedied and if necessary may grant time to enable the applicant to do this. The practice universally followed by the Courts is to embody a direction to this effect on the application itself and to return it to the party. If within the time allowed, the application is not presented nothing more is heard of it. In my opinion the direction of the Court, stating that the application is defective, that the Court allows the defect to be remedied and that the Court grants time for that purpose - generally a certain number of days - is not an order at all, much less a final order. It sometimes happens that a decree-holder makes an application for the execution of a decree not with any idea of realising anything towards his decree, but in order to extend the time during which it is lawful for him to execute his decree. Such an application may be perfectly bona fide. He may know at the time that the judgment-debtor is not able to pay anything: or he may wish to give the judgment-debtor further time to pay, either at the request of the judgment-debtor himself or for a variety of other reasons. Nevertheless, in his own interests, it is necessary to present an application for the execution of the decree to the proper Court lest he should lose his remedy altogether. Since the amendment of the Limitation Act in 1927 (Act IX of 1927) the mere presentation of an execution application to the proper Court is not sufficient to extend the period of limitation. Surely enough time has now elapsed for decree-holders to realise that the law has been changed and that they must not only present an application but must see that it conforms to the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 of Order 21 and that it is admitted and finally disposed of by an order of the Court. It may occasionally happen that an application does conform to the requirements of rules 11 to 14 but is nevertheless not admitted but is held in abeyance pending the furnishing of some further information which the Court requires but which should not properly be called for till a later stage is reached. In that case the attention of the Court may be drawn to the fact that the application is one which should be under the provisions of Rule 17 admitted and disposed of in the ordinary course. Lastly I would like to say that in my opinion Article 182(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Limitation Act does not seem to provide for the case where an order is passed by the Court on a defective application. The relevant words are:

The date of the final order, passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court.

11. But an application which does not conform to the requirements of Order 21, Rules 11 to 14 and which for that reason has to be kept in abeyance - if the Judge so wishes - to permit the defect to be remedied, is not in my opinion an application made in accordance with law. Even therefore if the direction allowing time for the remedy of the defect is regarded as an 'order' of the Court, it would in my view not be an order passed on an application made in accordance with law. If the application on the other hand were not defective it would necessarily be admitted and a final order would be passed on it in due course. When it is defective and no order can be passed on it except an order - if order it can be called - that the defect can be remedied in a certain time, it seems to me that it falls altogether outside the provisions of Article 182(5).

12. I agree that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.