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Jadunandan Koer v. Ramjiban Lal

Calcutta High Court
Aug 10, 1909
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council had been granted and the final order for admission made, but the transcript of record had not yet been transmitted to England. Four respondents in the appeal—Harolal Chowdhury, Joygobindo Chowdhury, Newalal Chowdhury and Manilal Chowdhury—died (Harolal on 8 January 1908, Newalal on 18 January 1908, Joygobindo on 23 January 1908, and Manilal in December 1908).

The appellants did not immediately take steps in this Court to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondents on the record. While proceedings were pending before the District Judge (who had been ordered by this Court to enquire into the sufficiency of the security bond tendered by the appellants), the appellants were informed of the deaths on 9 August 1908 and substituted legal representatives for the purpose of that enquiry on 15 August 1908.

Subsequently, the respondents applied for an order declaring that the appeal had abated under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of 1908. The appellants applied for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents. The respondents objected that the proper application was to set aside the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 and raised limitation arguments under the Limitation Act; both sides also contended that, because the appeal had been finally admitted, this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court had jurisdiction to deal with applications for substitution of legal representatives or for declaration of abatement after the appeal had been finally admitted but before the transcript of record had been transmitted to England.
  2. Whether the appeal had abated under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of 1908 as contended by the respondents.
  3. Whether substitution of the legal representatives of deceased respondents could be refused on grounds of limitation—specifically, whether substitution ought to have been sought within six months under Article 177 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked to extend time for an application under Clause 3 of Rule 9 of Order 22.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents applied for an order declaring that the appeal had abated under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of 1908.
  • They argued that the correct procedure was to apply to set aside the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9, not an application for substitution.
  • They contended that any application for substitution should have been made within six months from the death of the respective respondents under Article 177 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act.
  • They further argued that the appellants had not shown sufficient cause for an extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which they said applies to an application to set aside an abatement under Clause 3 of Rule 9 of Order 22.
  • They also contended that, because the appeal had been finally admitted, this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain either application.

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants applied for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents and asserted that they had taken steps to substitute the representatives promptly once they learned of the deaths.
  • They maintained that they had no knowledge of the deaths of three respondents until the matter was reported during the enquiry into security and that they quickly caused legal representatives to be substituted before the District Judge for the purposes of that enquiry (15 August 1908).
  • The appellants also argued—apparently—that because the appeal had been finally admitted, this Court lacked jurisdiction to act (an argument shared, inconsistently, by both parties and addressed by the Court as a preliminary issue).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bishnu Dutt Chobey v. Lilabati Misrani (P.C. App. 41 of 1997, unreported) Example of this Court directing stay of execution of decree after final admission but before transmission. Used to show settled practice that this Court exercises jurisdiction while transcript not yet transmitted.
Mir Sarbarjan v. Fakiruddin (P.C. App. 2 of 1907, unreported) Example of this Court directing stay of execution. Illustrated the Court's practice of exercising jurisdiction before transmission of record.
Kali Prosad v. Girdharilal (P.C. App. 33 of 1907, unreported) Example of this Court directing substitution of legal representatives of deceased parties. Supported the proposition that substitution orders have been made by this Court before transmission.
Girdharilal v. Meghlal (P.C. App. 6 of 1907, unreported) Another example of substitution being directed. Reinforced the view that substitution is within this Court's competence pre-transmission.
Jiabarham v. Jiban Ram (P.C. App. 1 of 1907, unreported) Example of this Court directing addition of parties to the appeal. Used to demonstrate the Court's practice of managing parties before transmission.
Amritalal v. Jotindra Nath (P.C. App. 12 of 1907, unreported) Example where appeal withdrawal was allowed. Supported the broader point that this Court acts on various interlocutory matters pre-transmission.
Tripati v. Jibankishore (P.C. App. 24 of 1907, unreported) Example of appeal withdrawal being allowed. Illustrated earlier practice of this Court's intervention on appeals.
Deo Narain v. Nursing Singh (P.C. Apps. 45, 43 and 61 of 1906, unreported) Examples of allowing appeals to be withdrawn. Supported the proposition that this Court dealt with interlocutory matters before transmission.
Gangadhar Seal v. Sreemutty Radhamoney Dossee (6 M.I.A. 209; 9 Moore's P.C. 44) Held that the Judicial Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain any application in an appeal until the petition of appeal was lodged after arrival and registration of the transcript in the Council Office. Presented as a contrasting Judicial Committee decision; the Court recognized this but explained the settled Indian practice of acting before transmission.
Harasunderi v. Krishna Nath (1842) Fulton 10 Support for the view about jurisdictional limits of the Judicial Committee in certain stages. Referenced as supporting the same view as Gangadhar Seal in historical decisions.
Gobardhan v. Mani Bibi (5 B.L.R. 76) Supportive historical authority on related procedural jurisdiction points. Used to illustrate historical positions aligned with the Judicial Committee's restrictive view.
Thakoor Kapil Nauth Sahai v. Government (1 C. 142) Another historical authority cited on the jurisdictional issue. Referenced in support of earlier restrictive views about Judicial Committee jurisdiction.
Haidar Ali v. Tasadduk Rasul (16 I.A. 209; 16 C. 184) Authority for procedure when the transcript has been transmitted—applications are forwarded to the Judicial Committee for final disposal. Used to explain the contrasting procedure when the record has already been sent to England.
Ram Chandra v. Rani Keshabati (P.C. App. 22 of 1905, unreported) Example where an application was made for appointment of guardian ad litem and addition of new parties after transmission procedure was followed. Illustrated the practice of referring applications to the Judicial Committee after transmission.
Gopal Prosad v. Raja Raghu Nath (P.C. App. 14 of 1905, unreported) Example of application for substitution of parties and compromise of matters in dispute. Supported the procedural description of post-transmission practice.
Peary Mohan v. Narendra (P.C. App. 38 of 1905, unreported) Example of application for amendment of the transcript record. Further illustrated forwarding practice to the Judicial Committee when transcript transmitted.
Abhiram v. Shama Charan (P.C. App. 23 of 1906, unreported) Example of application for substitution of legal representatives after transmission procedure. Used to show practice of referring substitution matters to the Judicial Committee when transcript transmitted.
Richards Spooner v. Juddow (4 M.I.A. 353; 6 Moore's P.C. 257) Historical example where the Courts in India appear to have substituted legal representatives on the record. Demonstrated that earlier practice in India sometimes involved direct substitution by Indian Courts.
Babu Kasi Persad Narain v. Musammat Kawalbasi Kooer (5 M.I.A. 146) Another historical example of substitution by Indian Courts. Supported the point that earlier Indian practice included substitution on the record.
Raja Sutti Charan Ghosal v. Sri Mudden Kishore Indoo (5 M.I.A. 107) Example where applications for substitution and revival appear to have been presented to the Judicial Committee. Contrasted with cases where Indian Courts substituted representatives directly, showing variation in historical practice.
Gooroo Churn Sein v. Radanath Sein (7 M.I.A. 1) Another example of presentation of substitution/revival applications to the Judicial Committee. Used to show that some matters were taken directly to the Judicial Committee historically.
Troup v. East India Company (7 M.I.A. 104) Historical authority illustrating presentation to the Judicial Committee. Part of the Court's discussion of non-uniform earlier practice.
Gobind Chunder Sein v. Valentine Ryan (9 M.I.A. 140) Historical example of applications presented to the Judicial Committee. Shown as illustrating earlier divergent practice.
Gour Mohun Chakerbati v. Tarn Sunderi Debi (17 C. 639) Authority showing that after transmission, the Judicial Committee (not the High Court) disposes of applications concerning withdrawal and revival; the Judicial Committee subsequently granted leave to a petitioner to carry on the appeal. Demonstrated that once transcript is transmitted, the proper forum for some matters is the Judicial Committee; used to justify that while transmission had not occurred in the present case, the Court could act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered a preliminary jurisdictional objection first. The respondents had contended that after final admission of the appeal the Court's powers were limited by Order 45 Rule 13 and thus the current applications were outside its competence. The Court rejected that contention as inconsistent with the established practice of the Court in India.

The Court reviewed prior decisions and practice to determine whether it could deal with interlocutory applications before transmission of the transcript to England. It acknowledged that the Judicial Committee had in Gangadhar Seal held that the Judicial Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain certain applications until the petition of appeal was lodged after arrival and registration of the transcript in the Council Office. However, the Court treated that decision and related authorities as distinguishable in practice from the settled practice in India: Indian Courts had routinely exercised jurisdiction over appeals after final admission but before transmission, making orders such as stays of execution, substitution of parties, addition of parties and allowing withdrawal of appeals. The Court concluded that because the transcript had not yet been transmitted to England in the present case, it was competent for this Court to entertain the applications before it.

Turning to the merits, the Court examined the circumstances surrounding substitution. It found that the appellants had no knowledge of the deaths of three respondents until the point when the District Judge enquired into the sufficiency of security and that they promptly obtained substitution of legal representatives for the purpose of that enquiry on 15 August 1908. The Court noted that the District Judge, having been directed only to report upon security, did not have seisin of the appeal and thus lacked jurisdiction to order substitution; nonetheless, the parties substituted did not object and allowed themselves to be treated as parties.

To remove potential technical objections arising from the irregular substitution before the District Judge, the Court held that an order of substitution should now be made by this Court itself.

As to Manilal Chowdhury (who died in December 1908), the Court observed the record did not show when the appellants learnt of his death, but noted that after respondents applied on 13 July 1909 for a declaration of abatement, the appellants applied on 26 July 1909 to bring on the record the heirs of the deceased respondents.

The Court addressed the respondents' contention that under Order 22 Rule 4 the appeal had abated and that an application under Rule 9 (to set aside abatement) must have been made within the time fixed by the Limitation Act. The Court rejected this contention for two reasons explicitly given in the opinion:

  • Order 22 of the Code of 1908 does not apply to appeals to His Majesty in Council; the Judicial Committee's procedure for appeals to the Council is not limited by the provisions of the Code, so the limitation argument based on the Code did not arise.
  • Even if Order 22 were applicable, Manilal's death in December 1908 would not have caused abatement until June 1909 (i.e., the Court reasoned an abatement would not have occurred immediately), and an application to set aside abatement would have been in time if made within 60 days from the date of abatement. Thus, on any view, there was no substantial objection to substitution.

Having resolved jurisdiction and the substantive limitation and procedure objections against the respondents, the Court exercised its discretion to direct that the legal representatives of all the deceased respondents be brought on the record and that notices issue on them. The Court qualified this directive by stating it was subject to the Rules of the Judicial Committee and any orders or directions their Lordships might give at the hearing of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court directed that the legal representatives of all the deceased respondents be brought on the record and that notices issue on them.

Explicit statement of holding: LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL DECEASED RESPONDENTS TO BE SUBSTITUTED AND NOTICES TO ISSUE.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The legal representatives of Harolal Chowdhury, Joygobindo Chowdhury, Newalal Chowdhury and Manilal Chowdhury are to be formally placed on the appeal record and served with notice.
  • The Court rejected the respondents' submission that the appeal had abated under Order 22 Rule 4 and rejected the contention that substitution was barred by limitation in the circumstances described.
  • The order is subject to the Rules of the Judicial Committee and to any orders or directions that the Judicial Committee (their Lordships) may give when the appeal is ultimately heard in England.
  • No assertion is made in the opinion that a new legal precedent was laid down; the Court relied on existing practice and authorities to justify exercising jurisdiction pre-transmission and to direct substitution.

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the provided opinion text. No facts, arguments, or authorities beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. In this case leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council has been granted and the final order for admission made, but the transcript of the record has not yet been transmitted to England. It now appears that Harolal Chowdhury, Joygobindo Chowdhury, Newalal Chowdhury and Manilal Chowdhury some of the respondents in the appeal, have died. Harolal is alleged to have died on the 8th January, 1908. Joygobindo on the 23rd January, 1908, Newalal on the 18th January 1908, and Manilal in December 1908. No steps in this Court have been taken up, till recently, by the appellants to bring the legal representatives of these respondents on the record. But while proceedings were pending before the District Judge who under the orders of this Court, enquired into the sufficiency of the security bond tendered by the appellants, the matter was brought to the notice of the appellants on the 9th August. 1908, and they got the legal representatives substituted for the purpose of the enquiry before the District Judge on the 15th August 1908. The respondents have now applied to this Court for an order declaring that the appeal has abated under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of 1908. The appellants on the other hand have in answer made an application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents. To the grant of this application, objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that the proper application to make is one to set aside the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9, that any application for substitution ought to have been made within six months from the death of the respective respondents under Article 177 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act and that sufficient cause has not been shown for extension of the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is made applicable to an application to set aside an abatement under Clause 3 of Rule 9 of Order 22. It has further been argued, somewhat inconsistently by both sides, that as the appeal has been finally admitted, this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with either application. This latter point must obviously be considered first.

2. It has been argued in support of the preliminary objection that after an appeal has been finally admitted, the powers of this Court are defined by Order 45 Rule 13, and that as the matter now before this Court is not covered by that rule, it is incompetent to this Court to make an order of any description. There can be no question that this contention is opposed to what has been the settled practice of this Court as recognised by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. After an appeal has been finally admitted, before the transcript of the record is transmitted to England, this Court has always exercised jurisdiction over the appeal. It is sufficient to refer to the cases of Bishnu Dutt Chobey v. Lilabati Misrani P.C. App. 41 of 1997 unreported and Mir Sarbarjan v. Fakiruddin P.C. App. 2 of 1907 unreported, where this Court directed stay of execution of decree; Kali Prosad v. Girdharilal P.C. App. 33 of 1907 unreported and Girdharilal v. Meghlal P.C. App. 6 of 1907 unreported, where this Court directed substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased parties to the appeal; Jiabarham v. Jiban Ram P.C. App. 1 of 1907 unreported, where this Court directed the addition of parties to the appeal, and Amritalal v. Jotindra Nath P.C. App. 12 of 1907 unreported, Tripati v. Jibankishore P.C. App. 24 of 1907 unreported and Deo Narain v. Nursing Singh P.C. App. 45; 43 and 61 of 1906 unreported, where this Court allowed appeals to be withdrawn. This practice is supported by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Gangadhar Seal V. Sreemutty Radhamoney Dossee 6 M.I.A. 209; 9 Moore's P.C.44, in which it was held that the Judicial Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain any application in an appeal until the petition of appeal was lodged after the arrival and registration of the transcript in the Council Office. The same view is supported by the cases of Harasunderi v. Krishna Nath (1842) Fulton 10; Gobardhan v. Mani Bibi 5 B.L.R. 76 and Thakoor Kapil Nauth Sahai v. Government 1 C. 142. On the other hand, if the transcript record has been transmitted, the application has to be presented to this Court, which is then forwarded with a report to the Judicial Committee for final disposal. It is sufficient to refer in this connection to the case of Haidar Ali v. Tasadduk Rasul 16 I.A. 209; 16 C. 184. The procedure indicated in this case was followed in the case of Ram Chandra v. Rani Keshabati P.C. App. 22 of 1905 unreported, where application was made for appointment of a guardian ad litem of an infant respondent and for the purpose of addition of new parties as respondents; Gopal Prosad v. Raja Raghu Nath P.C. App. 14 of 1905 unreported where application was made for substitution of parties and for compromise of the matters in dispute in the appeal; Peary Mohan v. Narendra P.C. App. 38 of 1905 unreported, where application was made for amendment of the transcript record; and Abhiram v. Shama Charan P.C. App. 23 of 1906 unreported, where application was made for substitution of the legal representatives of one of the deceased parties. It may be pointed out that the earlier practice of the Judicial Committee in these and analogous matters was not quite uniform. Thus in the cases of Richards Spooner v. Juddow 4 M.I.A. 353; 6 Moore's P.C. 257 and Babu Kasi Persad Narain v. Musammat Kawalbasi Kooer 5 M.I.A. 146 the Courts in India appear to have actually substituted the legal representatives on the record in place of the party who had died, while in the cases of Raja Sutti Charan Ghosal v. Sri Mudden Kishore Indoo 5 M.I.A. 107; Gooroo Churn Sein v. Radanath Sein 7 M.I.A. 1; Troup v. East India Company 7 M.I.A.104 and Gobind Chunder Sein v. Valentine Ryan 9 M.I.A. 140 the applications for substitution and revival appear to have been presented to the Judicial Committee direct and entertained by them. The practice, however, must now be taken to be well-settled, namely, that as proper evidence must be given of the representative character of the persons by or against whom the reviver is sought, the title ought to be established upon petition to the Indian Court, which thereupon makes any enquiries which it may deem necessary and orders the petition to be transmitted to England for such order as the Judicial Committee may think fit to make. Reference may in this connection be made to the case of Gour Mohun Chakerbati v. Tarn Sunderi Debi 17 C. 639 where after the transmission of an appeal to England, the appellant obtained leave in the High Court to withdraw it. Thereupon an infant, a party to the suit whose rights were involved, applied to the High Court for leave to prosecute the appeal. This was refused on the ground that it was for they Lordships of the Judicial Committee and not for the High Court to dispose of the matter. On behalf of the infant an application was subsequently presented to the Judicial Committee, and leave was granted to the petitioner to carry on the appeal. We must take it, therefore, that as in the present case, the record has not yet been transmitted to England, it is competent to this Court to deal with the applications which have been presented.

3. Now, so far as the merits of the applications are concerned, it is fairly clear that the appellants had no knowledge of the death of three of the respondents till the matter was reported to them in the course of the investigation of the sufficiency of the security. They at once took steps to have the legal representatives brought on the record before the District Judge, apparently for the purpose of the enquiry before him. This was, perhaps, not quite regular, because the District Judge who had been directed to report upon the security, had not seisin of the appeal and had no jurisdiction to make the order for substitution. The parties substituted, however, did not take exception to the course which was adopted, and did not urge that the application for substitution must be presented to this Court and orders thereupon passed here. In substance, therefore, the legal representatives of three of the respondents have been brought on the record and they have allowed themselves to be treated as if they have been made parties by a valid order of a competent Court. It is desirable, however, that to avoid all objections of a technical character, an order for substitution should now be made by this Court. So far as Manilal Chowdhury is concerned, he is stated to have died in December, 1908. There is nothing to indicate when the fact of his death came to the knowledge of the appellants; but it is clear that as soon as the respondents presented their application on the 13th July, 1909, for an order that the appeal has abated, the appellants presented their application on the 26th July to bring on the record the heirs of the deceased respondents. It is contended under these circumstances by the learned Vakil for the respondent that under Order 22 Rule 4 the appeal must be taken to have abated and that application must be made under Rule 9 of that Order to set aside the abatement within the time allowed by Article 171. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. In the first place, Order 22 has no application to appeals to His Majesty in Council. It cannot be disputed that the Judicial Committee, in respect of procedure with regard to appeals presented to His Majesty in Council, are not limited by the provisions of the Code. In this view, no question of limitation would arise. In the second place, if Manilal died in December 1908, the appeal even if it had been an appeal pending in this Court would not abate till June 1909, and an application to set aside that abatement would be in time if made within 60 days from the date of abatement. In any view, therefore, it is clear that there is no substantial objection to the substitution of the parties on the record. We, therefore, direct that the legal representatives of all the deceased respondents be brought on the record and notices do issue on them. This order is made subject to the Rules of the Judicial Committee and any orders and directions that may be given by their Lordships in this matter at the hearing of the appeal.