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Habibar Rahaman v. Saidannessa Bibi

Calcutta High Court
Dec 20, 1922
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order made by the District Judge on 6 June 1922 authorising two mutwallis of a Mahomedan wakf to grant a lease of wakf property. The appellant, a different mutwalli, filed an objection to the application but did not appear to support it, and the District Judge made the impugned order ex parte in favour of the respondents. The respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the competency of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge's order authorising the mutwallis to grant a lease is a "decree" and thereby appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the order is one of the categories expressly made appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure or appealable under any other statutory provision.
  3. Whether the appeal is competent in view of the nature of the underlying proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The order is not a decree and therefore is not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The order is not among those expressly made appealable by the Code of Civil Procedure nor appealable under any other statute.

Appellant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's legal arguments beyond the procedural fact that the appellant objected but did not appear to support the objection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
<strong>Shama Churn Roy v. Abdul Kabeer</strong>(1) That mutwallis may be authorised to execute leases of this description by the District Judge, who is competent to discharge the functions of a Khazi under Mahomedan law. Cited to establish the District Judge's competence to authorise mutwallis to grant leases.
In re Halimal Khatun(2) That mutwallis may be authorised to execute such leases by the District Judge acting in the capacity described above. Relied on to support the proposition regarding the District Judge's authority over wakf leases.
<strong>Atimannessa Bibi v. Abdu Soban</strong>(3) Same principle that mutwallis may be authorised by the District Judge to execute leases. Used with the other authorities to show the settled position on the District Judge's role.
<strong>Fakrunnessa Begum v. District Judge</strong> of 24 Pergunnahs(4) The proceeding is not a suit but is a proceeding governed by section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Applied to characterise the proceedings as non-suit proceedings governed by s.141 CPC, affecting appealability.
Damodara Menon v. Kittappa Menon(5) The regulation of proceedings by the Code of Civil Procedure does not by itself render the orders passed therein appealable. Relied upon to support the conclusion that CPC regulation of proceedings does not convert the order into an appealable decree.
Parasurama Ayyar v. Seshier(6) Same principle that CPC regulation does not make every order passed under it appealable. Used alongside Damodara Menon to hold that the order remained non-appealable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the respondents' preliminary objection that the impugned order is not a decree and thus not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. It observed authorities establishing (a) that District Judges may authorise mutwallis to grant leases and (b) that the relevant proceeding is not a suit but a proceeding governed by section 141 CPC (Fakrunnessa Begum). The court then relied on precedents (Damodara Menon and Parasurama Ayyar) holding that the mere application of the Code of Civil Procedure to regulate proceedings does not make orders passed therein appealable. Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the order is not a decree and is not otherwise appealable, and therefore the preliminary objection to the competency of the appeal succeeds.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Consequences stated by the court:

  • The preliminary objection is sustained and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • The hearing fee is assessed at one gold mohur, to be given to each set of respondents except opposite party No. 4 (whose client is not entitled to any costs in this appeal).
  • The costs will not be paid out of the estate.
Show all summary ...

Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order made by the District Judge in favour of two mutwallis of a Mahomedan wakf authorising them to grant a lease of the wakf property. The appellant, another mutwalli, preferred an objection to the application but did not appear to support it, with the result that the order in favour of the respondents was made ex parte on the 6th June, 1922.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondents to the competency of the appeal.

3. It has been argued that the order is not a decree and consequently not appealable as such under the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been urged that the order is not one of those expressly made appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure nor is it made appealable under any other law. We are of opinion that this contention is well-founded. It is well-settled in this Court: Shama Churn Roy v. Abdul Kabeer(1); In re Halimal Khatun(2); Atimannessa Bibi v. Abdu Soban(3), that mutwallis may be authorised to execute leases of this description, by the District Judge, who, for this purpose, is competent to discharge the functions of a Khazi under the Mahomedan law. The nature of the proceedings was considered in Fakrunnessa Begum v. District Judge of 24 Pergunnahs(4), where it was pointed out that the proceeding is not a suit but merely a proceeding governed by section 141 of the CPC. The fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the proceedings does not make; the order which may be passed therein appealable: Damodara Menon v. Kittappa Menon(5) and Parasurama Ayyar v. Seshier(6). If, then, the proceeding is not a suit, the decision therein does not fall within the scope of a decree. It is an order—an order which is not expressly made appealable by any provision in the Code of Civil Procedure or by any other statutory provision. We accordingly hold that the order is not appealable and the preliminary objection must prevail.

4. The appeal is dismissed with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at one gold mohur which must be given to each set of respondents except the opposite party No. 4 for whom Babu Probode Kumar Das appears. His client is not entitled to any costs in this appeal. The costs will not be paid out of the estate.

5. Appeal dismissed.