Budhiraju Seethayamma (Deceased) And Others v. Vullipalem Alias Putrevu Jagannadha Rao And Others S

(Delivered by Venkataramana Rao, J.)

The question for determination in this appeal is whether a vested remainder which was vested in one Lakshminarayana Rao was conveyed by his wife Bhramaramba (7th defendant) under a sale deed Ex. C in favour of the first defendant. The learned Subordinate Judge answered it in the negative and against this decision of the Subordinate Judge the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. One Kanchamma was the last owner of the suit property. She made a will in 1899 in and by which she bequeathed all the properties she was possessed of, including the suit property, to the said Lakshminarayana Rao who was her brother's son and to one Lakshmi Narasamma, her widowed daughter. By her will she directed Lakshminarayana Rao to divide the moveable and immoveable property which she was possessed of into two shares and to enjoy one half share, the other half share to be enjoyed during her life-time by Lakshmi Narasamma. The said Kanchamma further directed that after the death of Lakshmi Narasamma, Lakshminarayana Rao should take possession of the property in which Lakshmi Narasamma had a life interest. As we construe this will, the entire property was given over to Lakshminarayana Rao subject to the life-interest in favour of Lakshmi Narasamma the widowed daughter of the testatrix. It is immaterial whether his interest in the half share which was being enjoyed by Lakshmi Narasamma during her life-time is considered as a vested remainder or not. There can be no doubt that Lakshminarayana Rao possessed a vested interest in the said share which was capable of being alienated by him or by anybody purporting to act under his power. In 1908 Lakshminarayana Rao became heavily involved and in order to discharge his debts he executed a power of attorney in favour of his wife Bhramaramba. It is dated 14th August 1908. By it Lakshminarayana Rao authorised his wife to sell his moveable and immoveable property. The question is, is the vested interest which Lakshminarayana Rao possessed in the half share of the property which was being enjoyed by Lakshmi Narasamma during her life-time also included in the expression ‘immoveable property’ which Bhramaramba was authorised to convey? The learned Subordinate Judge seems to be of the opinion that she was not authorised to convey the vested remainder on the ground that it would not be ‘immoveable property’ within the meaning of the expression as used in the power of attorney. It seems to us, the view of the Subordinate Judge is totally unsound. A vested remainder is property and it is immoveable property being an interest in land. There can be no doubt therefore that Bhramaramba was authorised to sell all that interest which Lakshminarayana Rao possessed in the suit property on the date of the power of attorney. Acting under this power on 28th October 1908, she sold the suit property to the first defendant for valuable consideration. The question is, as we have said, whether the vested interest which Lakshminarayana Rao possessed in the half share which Lakshmi Narasamma enjoyed during her life-time passed under the sale deed. If we come to the conclusion that it passed, the plaintiff has no locus standi to maintain the suit and his suit is liable to be dismissed. What was conveyed under the sale deed was three vrittes of land enclosed within particular boundaries. The suit land was sold with all rights. On a proper construction of the sale deed it seems to us that Bhramaramba purported to convey the entire interest in the land as if it belonged to her husband. In fact on the date of the sale deed she could only convey the property minus Lakshmi Narasamma's life interest in it. It was contended in the lower Court successfully and the contention was repeated before us that there was no specific conveyance of the vested remainder possessed by Lakshminarayana Rao as such and therefore it did not pass. We think the learned Judge has misread the deed and the contention is fallacious. When a certain property is conveyed, it must be taken strongly against the grantor and in favour of the grantee and all the interest which the grantor possessed in the property sold should be deemed to have passed. Therefore when in this case certain specific lands were described as being conveyed, without specifying the extent of the interest possessed by Lakshminarayana Rao, it must be taken that all the interest which Lakshminarayana Rao possessed and which the seventh defendant was authorised to convey and which she could convey under the power of attorney executed by her husband in her favour would pass under the deed Ex. C. Prima facie therefore all that interest which Lakshminarayana Rao possessed including the vested interest in the half share in the enjoyment of Lakshmi Narasamma passed under the said deed.

A point was urged by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that Bhramaramba purported to deliver possession of the land which she was conveying, that she could not obviously have delivered possession of the half share to which Lakshmi Narasamma was entitled and that this shows that what was sold was only the half share of Lakshminarayana Rao. But the sale deed makes it clear that she purported to convey not only the entirety of the interest possessed by Lakshminarayana Rao but also to deliver possession of the entirety of the interest. Whether she was right in law in doing so is not the question. What was her intention in conveying the property? There is no doubt that she intended to convey all the interest which her husband possessed on the date of the sale deed. In this view the plaintiff has no locus standi to maintain the suit. The appeal is therefore allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout against the first respondent. The plaintiff will pay the necessary Court-fee on the plaint to the Government.

Letters Patent Appeal No. 5 of 1938 is dismissed but without costs.

Decree accordingly.

N.R.R