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Valluru Appalasuri v. Sasapu Kannamma Nayuralu

Madras High Court
Feb 5, 1925
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit originated from one of two Hindu widows (the plaintiff) seeking partition of her deceased husband's property and possession of a share. The 1st defendant was the co-widow who executed a sale (Ex. IV) of part of the property to the 2nd defendant and another sale (Ex. VI) to the 3rd defendant; the 2nd defendant had married the daughter of a deceased co-wife, and the 4th defendant was the undivided brother of the 3rd defendant. The District Munsif initially decreed the suit for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge remanded the case for fresh trial. On remand, the District Munsif again decreed for the plaintiff. Meanwhile the 1st defendant died. The plaintiff obtained permission to amend the plaint to claim possession of the entire estate because of the 1st defendant's death; the amendment was allowed and the Subordinate Judge granted the plaintiff possession of the entire property. Defendants 2 to 4 appealed to the High Court (this Second Appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale deed Ex. IV executed by the 1st defendant (co-widow) is binding on the plaintiff (the other co-widow) and on the plaintiff's half share.
  2. Whether Ex. IV is at least binding on the 1st defendant's own half share (i.e., whether the 2nd defendant can be protected in respect of the purchase from the 1st defendant).
  3. Whether the amount of Rs. 516, said to have been used to discharge a decree-debt of the husband, entitles the 2nd defendant to any relief (e.g., subrogation or contribution) against the plaintiff's share.
  4. Whether the amendment of the plaint (to claim the whole property after the 1st defendant's death) should have been allowed.
  5. What the proper decree should be in respect of properties alienated to defendants 2–4 and in respect of possession and mesne profits.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (defendants 2–4) relied upon Kalliyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139 (as argued by the appellant's vakil) to contend that Ex. IV ought to be upheld against the plaintiff — i.e., that the alienation by one widow could bind the other in certain circumstances.
  • The appellant contended that Ex. IV at least should bind the 1st defendant's own half-share so that the purchasers (including the 2nd defendant) should be protected in their possession.
  • The appellant (2nd defendant) claimed entitlement to Rs. 516 said to have been utilised to discharge a decree-debt of the husband, seeking relief by way of subrogation or contribution.
  • The appellant argued that the amendment of the plaint (to claim the whole estate after the 1st defendant's death) ought not to have been permitted, relying on Lakshmi Ammal v. Alamelu Ammal (1923) 45 MLJ 811.

Plaintiff's / Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff challenged Ex. IV as not binding on her half-share because one co-widow cannot alienate the share of another co-widow without consent, particularly where the widows are hostile to each other.
  • The plaintiff's position, as accepted by the Courts below, was that any right of contribution or subrogation against the plaintiff's half-share could operate only during the lifetime of the 1st defendant and not after her death so as to affect the plaintiff's right by survivorship.
  • The plaintiff supported allowance of the amendment to the plaint so that events occurring after the filing of the suit (including the 1st defendant's death) could be taken into account to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give effective relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kalliyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139 Relied upon by appellant to support validity of sale by one co-widow; appears inconsistent with some earlier authorities but was decided on facts where one widow acted as manager/agent of the other. The Court distinguished the case on its facts (manager/agent relationship) and held it did not support binding the plaintiff here; Ex. IV was held not binding on plaintiff's half-share.
Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Sri Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1 (PC) Principle that mortgage/alienation by one widow does not bind the joint estate to affect surviving widow or reversioners; one widow cannot bind the joint estate by mortgage for necessity. Quoted and applied to support the proposition that alienations by one co-widow cannot bind reversioners or the surviving widow except to limited extents; used to deny binding effect of Ex. IV on plaintiff's share.
Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya (1902) ILR 26 M 334 Held that one of two co-widows cannot alienate the share of the other even for purposes beneficial to the estate without consent. Relied on by the Court to support holding that Ex. IV is not binding on the plaintiff's half-share (particularly where widows are hostile).
Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268 Discusses joint title of widows, possible agreements for separate enjoyment, and limitations on absolute surrender that would defeat survivorship. Quoted at length: Court treated earlier dicta with caution and distinguished aspects inconsistent with later authority; used to trace development of law about partitions between widows.
Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (1868) 3 MHCR 424 Held that a decree for division of joint estate does not affect survivorship of the surviving widow; one widow cannot by mortgage bind the joint estate. Used to support the proposition that alienations by one widow do not bind the surviving widow or reversioners.
Gajapathi Nilamani v. Gajapathi Radhamani (1877) ILR 1 M 290 (PC) Approves that arrangements for separate possession for convenience are acceptable but do not confer power to alienate so as to defeat survivorship or reversioners' rights. Cited as authority that partition for enjoyment does not create separate alienable estates affecting survivorship or reversionary rights.
Kaihaperumal / Kathaperumal v. Venkabai (1880) ILR 2 M 194 States that two widows take a joint undivided estate and partition for separate enjoyment cannot convert it into estates in severalty. Adopted to emphasize that the widow's estate remains joint and indivisible in the strict sense.
Ariyaputri v. Alamelu (1888) ILR 11 M 304 Partition between widows is for distributive enjoyment and does not create separate property; income during life may be enjoyed separately. Used to reinforce the distinction between partition for enjoyment and creation of separate alienable estates.
Kailash Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Kashi Chandra Chuckerbutty (1897) ILR 24 C 339 Case about daughters under Dayabhaga but analogous to widows: alienations cannot bind reversioners unless conditions met. Cited as analogous authority to show uniformity of principle across related contexts; court noted it supports limitations on alienation.
Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101 Held one of two widows can alienate estate that came to her for life and can enter into deeds precluding her from recovering during her life to the extent of the alienation, provided it does not extend beyond her life-interest. Applied to explain that alienation is limited to the alienor's life-interest and cannot prejudice survivorship or reversioners beyond that; used to refuse broader effect claimed by appellants.
Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) ILR 23 M 504 : 10 MLJ 253 One of two daughters (analogue) cannot alter right of survivorship; may alienate her interest but cannot convert character of estate for reversioners. Used to illustrate two kinds of partition and to support limitation on alienation affecting reversioners.
Chengappa v. Buradagunta (1920) ILR 43 M 855 : 39 MLJ 567 Disapproved dictum that division by co-widows could let in reversioner's right on death of one; reversioner's interest does not begin until all widows die unless surrender by all. Relied on to reject Rindamma dictum and to support that reversioners' rights arise only after all widows die (except by surrender).
Ammani Ammal v. Periaswami Udayan (1923) 45 MLJ 1 Affirmed that reversioners' interest does not arise until after death of the surviving widow; clarified limits of alienation and partition. Used in concert with Chengappa to establish current correct law on survivorship, partitions and effect of alienations.
Durga Dal v. Gita (1911) ILR 33 A 443 Contains obiter(s) about alienation and survivorship; the Court noted its dictum was not followed in later decisions. Mentioned as containing contrary obiter which the Court did not follow in favour of the decided line of authorities.
A.S. No. 166 of 1922 (unreported) Unreported High Court judgment invoked by appellants to support binding effect of alienation for necessity. The Court expressly disagreed with that decision and declined to follow its reasoning as applied to reversioners not parties to the alienation.
Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj (1923) ILR 45 A 339 (FB) Referenced in context of limits on relief and as comparative authority. Referred to when discussing the A.S. No. 166 of 1922 decision, as part of a cluster of authorities not justifying expansive effect on reversioners.
Basappa v. Fakirappa (1921) ILR 46 B 292 Referenced similarly in the discussion of A.S. No. 166 of 1922. Noted but not treated as supporting the appellants' broader contention as to reversioners.
Lakshmi Ammal v. Alamelu Ammal (1923) 45 MLJ 811 Cited by appellant to oppose amendment of plaint; court observed that if decision is only about discretion at a stage it is acceptable, but not if it laid a principle that events after filing cannot be noticed. The Court declined to accept a rigid rule disallowing post-filing events to be taken into account; allowed amendment here in exercise of discretion to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Ram Ratart Sahu v. Mohunt Sahu (1907) 6 CLJ 74; Rai Charan v. Biswa Nath (1914) 20 CLJ 107; Doraiswami Pillai v. Chinnia Goundan (1917) 34 MLJ 258; Pendekkallu Thimmayya v. Pendekkallu Siddappa (1923) 75 IC 112 : AIR 1925 M 63 Authorities cited for the proposition that events occurring after filing suit (including those adding to plaintiff's title) may be taken notice of and amendment allowed in appropriate circumstances. Collected as supporting precedent for allowing the amendment to the plaint; used to justify taking post-filing events into account in partition suits to avoid multiplicity.
Rustomji v. Sheth Purshotamdas (1901) ILR 25 B 606 Illustrative authority (Jenkins, C.J.) warning against excessive technicality in partition suits where events during pendency change shares. Quoted to show practical reasons for allowing amendments (e.g., death of a co-sharer) and to avoid multiplicity of suits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying precedent and analyzing the nature of the estate held by co-widows under Hindu law. Its reasoning can be synthesized in the following steps:

  1. On Ex. IV's effect against the plaintiff: The Court recognized precedents (Sri Gajapathi Radhamani, Vadali Mamidigadu and others) establishing that one of two co-widows cannot, without the other's consent, alienate the other's share even for the estate's benefit, particularly where the widows are hostile. It examined Kalliyanasundaram Pillai and concluded that that case was distinguishable on its facts (where senior widow acted as manager/agent) and hence did not support validation of Ex. IV against the plaintiff here. Consequently Ex. IV was held not binding on the plaintiff's half-share.
  2. On whether Ex. IV binds the 1st defendant's own half-share: The Court surveyed a range of authorities and articulated the current law: the estate of co-widows is a joint estate and cannot, in strictness, be converted into separate estates; partitions permissible are limited and intended for consumptive enjoyment. The Court identified two kinds of partition (i) lasting only during joint lives; and (ii) binding until the death of all. The effect of an alienation depends on the kind of partition: if partition is of the second kind the alienee may continue to enjoy the property even after the alienor's death; if of the first kind the alienation ceases on death and survivorship may operate. Having applied these principles (and relying on Ramakkal, Kanni Ammal and Ammani Ammal among others), the Court rejected appellants' contention that Ex. IV should be upheld to bind the plaintiff's share and also disallowed the broader contention that the 2nd defendant acquired an absolute right that prejudiced survivorship or reversioners.
  3. On the Rs. 516 utilised to discharge a decree-debt: The Court observed factual difficulty that the documents show the payment was made by the 1st defendant (not the 2nd defendant). Even assuming construction in favour of the 2nd defendant, there was no mortgage or charge created by the decree; hence, no basis for subrogation. Any right to contribution or subrogation against the plaintiff's half-share would, the Court held, operate only during the lifetime of the 1st defendant and not after her death so as to defeat the plaintiff's right of survivorship. Therefore the 2nd defendant was not entitled to the claimed relief by way of subrogation; Sections 69 and 70 of the Contract Act were inapplicable (the 2nd defendant had not paid on behalf of the plaintiff or been interested in the payment).
  4. On the amendment of the plaint: The Court rejected a rigid rule that events arising after filing cannot be relied on. It reviewed authorities allowing courts to take post-filing events into account (including partition suits where a co-sharer dies during pendency). The Court held that amendment should generally be allowed to avoid multiplicity and unnecessary technicality unless there is a change of jurisdiction, undue delay, or need for a fresh enquiry on other facts. Applying this principle, the amendment to enable the plaintiff to claim the whole property after the 1st defendant's death was properly allowed.
  5. On the decree and relief: The Court found that while the plaintiff is entitled to possession of all properties, the decree in subordinate courts had wrongly been made against defendants 2–4 in respect of properties other than those alienated to them. Therefore those parts of the decree should not have been made against defendants 2–4; the High Court adjusted relief accordingly (see Holding below). Costs were apportioned (parties to bear their own costs in the Second Appeal).

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Second Appeal fails on the merits and the judgment below is largely affirmed with the following qualifications:

  • EX. IV is not binding on the plaintiff's half-share. The Court held that one co-widow cannot bind the other's share by alienation without consent, especially where the widows are hostile, and distinguished authorities relied upon by the appellants.
  • Ex. IV does not entitle the 2nd defendant to subrogation or contribution against the plaintiff's half-share for the Rs. 516. There was no mortgage/charge and any contribution/right against the plaintiff's share would have been limited to the lifetime of the 1st defendant and cannot affect survivorship.
  • The amendment to the plaint was properly allowed. Events occurring after filing (including death of a co-widow) may be taken into account; amendment was appropriate to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
  • The decree should not have been passed against defendants 2, 3 and 4 in respect of properties other than those alienated to them. The plaintiff is entitled to be put in possession of all the properties, but liability of defendants 2–4 is limited to the properties actually alienated to them; therefore the subordinate decree must be read down accordingly.
  • Costs: For this reason the parties were ordered to bear their own costs in the Second Appeal.

Implications: The decision reaffirms and synthesises principles concerning co-widows' joint estate under Hindu law: partitions are limited in character; alienations by one co-widow have only constrained effect (largely limited to the alienor's life-interest or the particular kind of partition); reversioners' rights generally arise only after death of all widows unless all join in a surrender; and courts should allow amendments to pleadings to take account of intervening events in partition suits to avoid multiplicity. The Court expressly declined to follow an unreported contrary decision (A.S. No. 166 of 1922) insofar as it purported to bind non-parties (reversioners).

Direct practical effect on the parties: The plaintiff's entitlement to possession was upheld, mesne profits were awarded in respect of the 1st defendant's half-share only from the death of the 1st defendant, the appellant's claims for Rs. 516 and wider binding effect of Ex. IV were rejected, and the decree will be corrected so that defendants 2–4 are not held liable for properties not alienated to them. No new broad precedent that alters the established line of authority was laid down; rather, the Court clarified and reconciled existing authorities on partitions and alienations among co-widows.

Show all summary ...

1. This Second Appeal arises out of a suit by one of two Hindu widows for partition of her husband's property and possession of a share. The 1st defendant is the co-widow and she sold a part of the property under Ex. IV to the 2nd defendant who married the daughter of a deceased co-wife of plaintiff and 1st defendant, and another part to the 3rd defendant under Ex. VI. The 4th defendant is the undivided brother of the 3rd defendant. The 1st and 2nd defendants lived in the same house. The District Munsif decreed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge remanded the suit for fresh trial. On remand, the District Munsif again passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. In the interval the 1st defendant died. There was again an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff prayed for an amendment of the plaint and prayed for possession of the entire estate as the result of the 1st defendant's death. The amendment was allowed. The Subordinate Judge granted a decree to the plaintiff for possession of the entire property. The defendants 2 to 4 appeal.

2. The portion of the case relating to the alienations in favour of defendants 3 and 4 has not been seriously pressed and the other portion relating to the 2nd defendant has been fully argued.

3. The Subordinate Judge found that out of the Rs. 600 for which Ex. IV was executed, Rs. 516 was utilised to discharge a decree obtained by D. W. 6 against the husband (Ex. V). If the sale was effected by both the widows, it would have been for purposes beneficial to the estate and therefore binding on the daughter and other reversioners. The appellant's vakil contended, relying on Kalliyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139. that the sale ought to be upheld against the plaintiff. In Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Sri Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1 (PC) and Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya (1902) ILR 26 M 334 it was held that one of two co-widows cannot alienate the share of the other even for purposes beneficial to the estate without the consent of the other. The decision in Kattiyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139. decided by Benson and Bashyam Aiyangar, JJ. the same Judges who decided Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya (1902) ILR 26 M 334. is apparently inconsistent with this, but, on a careful examination of the judgment, it seems to me that the Judges were of opinion on its facts, that the senior widow was recognised as manager or agent of the other. Such an inference can be made only in a case where there is no known hostility between the widows and is not possible when the widows are hostile to each other as in this case. We therefore agree with the Courts below in holding that Ex. IV is not binding on the plaintiff's half share.

4. The next point that has been argued in the case is that Ex. IV is at least binding on the 1st defendant's half share. The appellants rely on the unreported judgment of this Court in A.S. No. 166 of 1922. The position of two co-widows or two daughters has been the subject of consideration in several decisions of the various High Courts and the Privy Council. In Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268. Bittleston, C.J and Ellis, J. observed: "Upon the death of the husband the widows became jointly entitled; they might agree to divide the estate and hold separately distinct shares of it during their joint lives. We are not prepared to say they might not enter into such an agreement as would bind each to an absolute surrender of all interest in the other's share, so as to let in the next heirs of the husband immediately upon the death of that other.... One obtained a decree against the other for a division.... It dealt only with the joint estate, and the joint estate ceased on the death of Krishnamma. Then the whole estate of the husband vested in the surviving widow ; and neither Krishnam-ma's claim for division nor the decree for division could touch that." In another case Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (1868) 3 MHCR 424 at 452. Scotland, C.J. and Ellis, J., observe : " Now, the right as contended for on behalf of the appellants, namely, to the absolute partition of the joint estate, giving to each widow a share in severalty, we are of opinion is not maintainable. In support of it reliance was placed on the language of the foregoing texts .... The division there spoken of must be understood to refer only to the distributive enjoyment of the benefits of the joint property; and no doubt, two or more widows might by an agreement inter se not prejudicial to the rights of the next heir in succession provide for such enjoyment by an apportionment of the property. A partition converting the joint estate into an estate in severalty whenever either of the widows choose to insist upon it, is quite incompatible with the right of survivorship to the whole property arising out of the joint estate for life and the surviving widow or widows being the nearest heir or heirs of the husband. On the other hand, it has been recently decided by this Court in the case of Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268. that a division obtained under a decree was ineffectual against the claims of the survivor of two widows to the divided moiety." They then consider the question whether the relief of separate possession of a portion of the inheritance may not be granted, when it appears to be the only proper and effectual mode of Securing the enjoyment of her distinct right to an equal share of the benefits of the estate. This case has been approved by the Privy Council in Gajapathi Nilamani v. Gajapathi Radhamani (1877) ILR 1 M 290 (PC). At p. 300 their Lordships say: " It was held there that there was no objection to a transaction which was merely an arrangement for separate possession and enjoyment, leaving the title to each share unaffected ; although the widows nevertheless remained coparceners with a right of survivorship with them, and there could he no alienation by one without the consent of the other ... Their Lordships, guarding themselves against being supposed to affirm by this order that either widow has power to dispose of the one-fourth of the estate allotted to her, or that they have any right to a partition in the proper sense of the term, are not disposed to vary. " In Kaihaperumal v. Venkabai (1880) ILR 2 M 194 it was observed : " But by Hindu Law two widows of one and the same husband take a joint interest in, one undivided estate, and it has been held that, although the widows may arrange for the enjoyment of the estate in separate portions, there can be no compulsory partition converting the joint estate into an estate in severalty. " In Ariyaputri v. Alamelu (1888) ILR 11 M 304. we have : "It is true that when there are more widows than one, they take together as a class. It is also true that partition is permitted between them not as in the case of male co-parceners for the purpose of converting a joint estate into two or more separate estates to be held in severalty, but for the limited purpose of securing to each widow a distributive enjoyment of the benefit of joint property. In this view partition between them certainly creates no separate property in the portions placed in their separate possession and no disposing power so as to defeat the right of survivorship vesting in the co-widow, but as between them, each widow is entitled to take the income of the portion placed in her possession during her life." In Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Sri Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1(PC). which arose out of the facts of Gajapathi Nilamani v. Gajapathi Radhamani (1877) ILR 1 M 290 (PC). their Lordships of the Privy Council observed at page 10 : "It may be assumed for the present judgment, without deciding the point, that there was a sufficient necessity for borrowing money to pay the Government revenue, or even for the payment of Nilamani's debt, but that necessity did not render a mortgage by one widow binding upon the joint estate which had descended from their deceased husband, so as to affect the interest of the surviving widow. " One may add " or that of the reversioners " though this was not necessary for the case see Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (1868) 3 MHCR 424 at 452. already quoted. It is well to remember that, in that case, part of the money borrowed by the alienating widow was applied for paying Government revenue, and still no decree even for this amount was given. The case in Kailash Chandra Chuckcr-butty v. Kashi Chandra Chuckerbutty (1897) ILR 24 C 339. is a case of daughters but, as observed in Ramakkal v. Ramaszvami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101 to be next referred to, the case is analogous to that of widows. Nor does the fact that the Calcutta case was under the Dayabhaga Law make any difference as observed in Ammani Animal v. Periaswami Udayan (1923) 45 MLJ 1 at 4 by Oldfield, J. It was there observed: "That being so, the estate that devolved on the daughters of Radhakrishna would not determine until after the death of Gaganeswari and until that event happens, the arrangement come to between the daughters, which was assented to by all the daughters, should in our opinion remain in operation. This would not in any way interfere with the rights of the reversionary heirs for the simple reason that those rights do not come into existence until after the death of Gaganeswari.... As we have already indicated, its effect was to make the properties allotted to each daughter remain her property capable of being alienated by her, and if not alienated, capable of passing on her death to the heirs of her separate property as distinguished from the property inherited by her from her father. " In Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101 it was held that one of two widows can alienate any estate which came to her as such for her life and can therefore enter into such a deed as will preclude her from recovering during her life property which she has alienated, to the full extent of such alienation, provided it does not extend beyond her life interest. In Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) ILR 23 M 504 : 10 MLJ 253 it was held that, while one of two daughters cannot by any alienation alter the character of the daughter's estate so far as concerns the right of survivorship or the rights of reversioners, she may alienate her interest in the property. The parties in that case were ably represented as two of the vakils for the appellant and two vakils for the respondent have since become Judges of this Court and a full report of the argument is available and is instructive. It shows that there may be two kinds of partition between two widows or other co-heiresses : (1) so as to last during their joint lives only and if one dies the other gets it by survivorship; and (2) so as to last until the death of all. If one dies first, the other does not get her share by survivorship and the share will continue to be enjoyed by the alienee, if alienated, or will go to the heirs of her stridhanam property, if unalienated. In either case the partition is an arrangement for their own convenience and cannot affect reversioners.

5. In Chengappa v. Buradagunta (1920) ILR 43 M 855 : 39 MLJ 567. and Ammani Ammal v. Periaswami Udayan (1923) 45 MLJ 1. (in which one of us, Venkatasubba, Rao, J., took a part) the remark in Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268. quoted by me that the arrangement may be such that, after partition by the co-widows, the death of one may let in the reversioner's right, was disapproved, i.e., the reversioner's interest does not begin until all the widows die (unless there is a surrender by all).

6. The decisions establish that (1) the estate of co-widows or other co-heiresses in Hindu Law is a joint estate but it is unlike other joint estates. It is indivisible see Kathaperumal v. Venkabai (1880) ILR 2 M 194.. Strictly it can never be divided so as to create separate estates such that each sharer is the owner of her share and at her death the reversioner's estate falls in. Such a division is impossible in law. (2) Such partition as is permissible is merely for the convenience of their enjoyment by the sharers ; and may be of two kinds : (i) so as to last during the lifetime of both the widows; and (ii) so as to bind them until the death of all of them. In the latter case if one of the widows dies before the other without alienating the property, it passes to the heirs of her private property and not to the other co-widow or their reversioners, the dictum to the contrary in Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268. not being good law Ammani Ammal v. Periyaswami Udayan (1923) 45 MLJ 1 and Chengappa v. Buradagunta (1920) ILR 43 M 855 : 39 MLJ 567. (3) By the very nature of the arrangement, there can be no survivorship if the partition is of the second kind. But if it is of the first kind, it cannot affect the right of survivorship of the other. (4) One of the co-widows can alienate her share which may be defined or undefined according as there is a partition or not. If the alienor dies before the co-widow, the alienation ceases to be operative if there is no partition, or, if the partition is of the first kind, the property goes to the co-widow by survivorship. But if the partition is of the second kind, the property continues to be enjoyed by the alienee Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101. Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) ILR 23 M 504 : 10 MLJ 253 and Ammani Ammal v. Penaswami Udayan (1923) 45 MLJ 1. until the other co-widow dies. The obiter dictum to the contrary in Durga Dal v. Gita (1911) ILR 33 A 443. has not been followed here. (5) Except for the limited purposes mentioned above, i.e., during the lifetime of the alienee in a partition of the first kind or during the lifetime of/all the co-widows in a partition of the second kind, there can be no alienation by a widow of her interest Gajapathi Nilamani v. Gajapathi Radhamani (1877) ILR 1 M 390 (PC) and Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Sri Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1 (PC) and whether there is necessity or not, an alienation by one co-widow cannot bind the reversioner Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (1868) 3 MHCR 424 at 452. Kailash Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Kashi Chandra Chuckerbutty (1897) ILR 24 C 339. Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) ILR 23 M 504 : 10 MLJ 253 and Durga Dat v. Gita (1911) ILR 33 A 443. (6) If an alienation for necessity is to bind the reversioners, all the co-widows must join in it.

7. It follows that I cannot agree with the decision in A.S. No. 166 of 1922. In that case the last male owner left a widow Gangalakshmi and two daughters Rattamma and Narasamma. Rattamma effected an alienation of the property along with her sons. The suit was brought by four plaintiffs-plaintiffs 1 to 3 being parties to the alienation, but the 4th plaintiff was not a party to it. Their Lordships found that there was necessity and held that the alienation was binding on the reversioners. So far as plaintiffs 1 to 3 were concerned, the decision might well have rested on the ground that they were parties to the alienation and could not question it. Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj (1923) ILR 45 A 339 (FB) and Basappa v. Fakirappa (1921) ILR 46 B 292. But as to the 4th plaintiff, we are constrained to differ from the judgment and to dissent from its reasoning. The decisions in Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1 (PC). Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101 and Durga Dat v. Gita (1911) ILR 33 A 443. were referred to and then it was observed : " The facts in this case are different from those in the cases quoted. Gangalakshmi gave away or surrendered her life-interest in some property in favour of Rattamma and it is stated that by another deed she surrendered her right to some other property in favour of Narasamma. After that both Narasamma and Rattamma began to deal with their properties as their own. " We are not able to see how the surrender of the mother in favour of her daughters and the conduct of the daughters can have any effect on the rights of the reversioners. It was conceded in the judgment that the alienation cannot affect the rights of Narasamma by survivorship; but it was observed that this has nothing to do with the reversioners who do not claim through Narasamma. Here again, I am compelled to dissent with all deference. When the surviving co-widow gets the property by survivorship after the death of the alienating widow, she represents the estate and the reversioner though he cannot be said to claim through her so as to be bound by her acts still claims through her in respect of matters where she represents the estate. But, apart from this, the cases cited by me also show that a single widow has no power of alienation except for her own convenience, i.e., so as to affect the other widows (except in the partition of the second kind) or the reversioners. It seems to me that the learned Judges who decided A.S. No. 166 of 1922 did not give due weight, while referring to Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) ILR 22 M 522 : 9 MLJ 101 to the qualification referred to at page 524, i.e., the words " provided it does not extend beyond her life interest" nor to the words " which will prejudice the right of survivorship of her co-widow or the rights of the reversioners after the death of the survivor of the widows " in Durga Dat v. Gita (1911) ILR 33 A 443. which was actually quoted by them. The cases in Gajapathi Nilamani v. Gajapathi Rahamani (1877) ILR 1 M 290 (PC). Jejoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (1868) 3 MHCR 424 at 452. Kailash Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Kashi Chandra Chuckerbutty (1897) ILR 24 C 339 and Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) ILR 23 M 504 : 10 MLJ 253. were not cited at all. All the authorities show that, strictly there is no separate estate of any kind in any one of the widows, a right of partition for the convenient enjoyment being all that is permitted. This contention of the appellants must therefore be disallowed.

8. The third point argued by the appellant is that he is entitled to the amount of Rs. 516 which was utilised for discharging the husband's decree-debt. Apart from the difficulty that the documents (Exs. IV-(a) and V) show that the debt was discharged by the 1st defendant and not by the 2nd defendant and assuming it is open to us to construe them as if the payment to the creditor was made by the 2nd defendant, we do not think he is entitled to any relief. The decree was not a mortgage decree. If the debt discharged was a charged debt, the plaintiff may be entitled to the relief he claims by subrogation. But when there is no charge and seeing that any right by contribution against the plaintiff's half share can be operative during the lifetime of the 1st defendant and not after the death of the 1st defendant so as to affect plaintiff's right by survivorship, there can be no subrogation (vide Sheldon on Subrogation, page 4, Section 3). Section 69 of the Contract Act cannot help the 2nd defendant for he was not interested in the payment but his vendor, nor can Section 70, as he did not make the payment for or on behalf of the plaintiff. This contention must also be negatived. The plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits in respect of 1st defendant's half share only from the death of the 1st defendant. The decree requires no modification as no mesne profits have been awarded for the additional half share.

9. The fourth point argued by the appellant is that the amendment of the plaint so as to enable the plaintiff to claim the whole of the property including the 1st defendant's share ought not to be allowed. He relies on Lakshmi Ammal v. Alamelu Ammal (1923) 45 MLJ 811. If the decision is regarded merely as one on the question of discretion on the particular facts of the case and the stage at which the amendment was asked, we have nothing to say against it. But if it meant to lay down that a cause of action that arose after the filing of the suit ought never to be taken notice of, we are constrained to dissent from it. The events that happened even after the filing of the suit--including those that add to the title of the plaintiff-may be taken notice of has been established by several cases (vide Ram Ratart Sahu v. Mohunt Sahu (1907) 6 CLJ 74. Rai Charan v. Biswa Nath (1914) 20 CLJ 107. Sri Rajah Setrucharlu Ramachandra Raju v. Maharajah of Jeypore (1916) MWN 355. reversed by the Privy Council on another point, Subbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal (1917) 7 LW 403. Doraiswami Pillai v. Chinnia Goundan (1917) 34 MLJ 258 and Pendekkallu Thimmayya v. Pendekkallu Siddappa (1923) 75 IC 112 : AIR 1925 M 63. Specially in partition suits it will be very inconvenient if the general principle of confining the suit to the cause of action in the plaint is rigidly adhered to as can be seen from a simple case where A filed a suit against his two brothers for partition and seeks to recover a third share, and during the pendency one of the brothers dies, to say that the plaintiff cannot be awarded half instead of a third and that the decree should be limited to a one-third, he being compelled to file another suit for one-sixth is to be technical with a vengeance vide Jenkins, C. J., in Rustomji v. Sheth Purshotamdas (1901) ILR 25 B 606 at 613. No doubt the discretion ought not to be exercised when there is a change of jurisdiction, when there is a great delay in making the application and may not be exercised if a fresh enquiry on other facts is necessary. But when these features do not exist, in our opinion, the amendment ought, as a general rule, to he allowed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In all such cases, the only question of consequence is one of Court fees, a matter with which the parties are not concerned and the opposite party is not deprived of any defence which is obviously open to him (see also Pendekkallu Thimmayya v. Pendekkallu Siddappa (1923) 75 IC 112 : AIR 1925 M 63. This contention must be disallowed. The appeal fails on the merits. The defendants 2 to 4 say that they are not in possession of propertes other than those alienated to them and in respect of which a full decree is not passed against them.

10. In the Lower Court the decree in respect of all the properties was passed against all the defendants including defendants 2 to 4. The plaintiff is entitled to be put in possession of all the properties but the decree, in respect of the properties other than those alienated to defendants 2 to 4, should not have been passed against the defendants 2, 3 and 4. For this reason the parties will bear their own costs in Second Appeal.