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Gudimetla Ramireddi v. Gudimetla Satyam And Others S
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff) originally purchased an interest in a parcel of land and brought suit seeking a declaration of title and an injunction or, alternatively, possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title. A physical altercation occurred during the dispute and the plaintiff was alleged to have caused grievous hurt to a defendant, leading to a criminal prosecution. To terminate the criminal proceedings the parties compromised and the plaintiff executed a settlement deed conveying his rights in the property to the defendants.
A subsequent dispute arose with the plaintiff alleging the conveyance executed in the course of the criminal proceeding was invalid. Because of threats of renewed violence the police and the Magistrate intervened under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code; two days after filing the civil suit the parties gave undertakings to the Magistrate not to enter the disputed property without court orders.
The civil suit continued for years. Early on a Receiver was appointed who allowed the plaintiff to harvest crops on terms. In later years the court auctioned the right to harvest the crops annually; the plaintiff was the successful bidder each time and executed security bonds (not exhibited in these proceedings) by which he undertook to pay his bid when ordered and provided property as security. The trial court ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiff recognising his title and possession. On appeal the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was bound by the conveyance made during the criminal proceeding and therefore not entitled to the property; it found no need to decide possession.
After the appellate decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit, the defendants applied in execution for costs and interest, for realization of profits (during the period of the suit) by enforcing the security bonds, and for mesne profits covering the interval between the trial court's decree and the appellate court's decree. The District Munsif permitted execution for costs and interest but rejected enforcement of the security bonds and the mesne-profits claim for the interval between decrees. The lower Appellate Court disagreed with that latter part, holding the security bonds could be enforced in execution or by separate suit according to their terms, and that the defendants were entitled to mesne profits by analogy to restitution under Section 144 CPC, though the order would have to be passed under Section 151 CPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies from the District Munsif's order insofar as it rejected the application to enforce security bonds and to award mesne profits, given that the application was framed under Section 144 CPC but the Subordinate Judge indicated an order under Section 151 CPC should have been made.
- Whether an order dealing with restitution or reliefs analogous to restitution, though made under the inherent powers (Section 151) or otherwise, falls within the ambit of Section 47 CPC and is therefore appealable.
- On the merits, whether the defendants were in such a position of possession at the institution of the suit or thereafter that the court could order restitution (or an analogous remedy) and require the plaintiff to surrender profits realized during the suit and after the trial court's decree reversed on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The appellant's main contention was that no appeal lay from the District Munsif's order in so far as it related to matters not strictly falling under Section 144 CPC; although the application was framed as under Section 144, the Subordinate Judge treated it as under Section 151 CPC, and Section 151 is not an appealable provision.
- It was argued for the appellant that the defendants had not been shown to be in possession at the time the suit was instituted, pointing to a prior finding (by one Court) that the plaintiff was in possession, which had not been expressly reversed, and therefore restitution or analogous relief should not be available to the defendants.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants sought execution for costs and interest, enforcement of the security bonds to realize profits accrued during the period of the suit, and mesne profits for the interval between the trial court's decree and the appellate court's decree.
- The lower Appellate Court's position (adopted by respondents) was that enforcement of the security bonds was permissible either in execution proceedings or by separate suit according to the bonds' terms and in favour of the proper person, and that mesne profits could be awarded by analogy to restitution under Section 144 CPC though the order would be made under Section 151 CPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raman Nambyar v. Pulasseri Thekkee (1934) M.W.N. 412; 150 Ind. Cas. 98; A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 484 | The right of appeal is determined by what the Court purported to do (i.e., the provision under which the Court purported to act), not by what it should have done; if the Court purports to act under a provision that carries a right of appeal, that right exists even if the Court should have acted under another non-appealable provision. | The Subordinate Judge relied on this case to support the existence of a right of appeal where the lower court purported to act under a provision carrying appeal rights. |
| Akshia Pillai v. Gavin darajulu Chettiar, 47 M.L.J. 549; 84 Ind. Cas. 975; A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 778 | Supports reasoning that Section 47 CPC covers cases of restitution and related appeals (i.e., appeals may lie where orders relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree). | Cited as supporting authority for treating restitution-like orders as falling within Section 47 and thus being appealable. |
| Govinda Padayachi v. Velu Murugayya Chettiar, 64 M.L.J. 586; 143 Ind. Cas. 454; A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 399 | Similar support for the proposition that Section 47 CPC covers restitution-like orders and provides the procedure/forum making such orders appealable. | Relied upon to reinforce the conclusion that orders for restitution or analogous reliefs fall under Section 47 and are appealable. |
| Somasundaram v. Ghokkalingam, 40 M. 780; 38 Ind. Cas. 806; A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 185 | Affirms that Section 47 CPC covers cases of restitution. | Cited to conclude that appeals lie from orders declining restitution or analogous reliefs because such orders are within Section 47's scope. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two principal steps: first, whether the order of the District Munsif (declining enforcement of security bonds and mesne-profits relief) was appealable; and second, whether the Appellate Court's order allowing enforcement and mesne profits was correct on the merits.
On appealability, the court accepted the Subordinate Judge's reliance on Raman Nambyar to the limited extent that the right of appeal may be determined by what a court purports to do. However, rather than resolving fine distinctions about whether a court may purport to act under an appealable provision to avoid non-appeability of another provision, the court grounded its conclusion primarily on Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court explained that although inherent powers (such as those in Section 151) are not per se appealable, when an order is passed on an application by one party against another relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree it falls within Section 47 and is therefore appealable. Section 47, the court emphasised, governs the procedure and forum for decisions affecting execution/discharge/satisfaction of decrees — the substantive power invoked may derive from Section 144, Section 151, or other provisions, but Section 47 makes such orders subject to appeal.
Applying this reasoning, the court concluded that an order declining restitution or reliefs analogous to restitution (even if characterized under Section 151) is appealable to the Subordinate Judge because it falls within Section 47's scope. The court cited prior decisions (Akshia Pillai, Govinda Padayachi, Somasundaram) to support the conclusion that Section 47 covers cases of restitution.
Turning to the merits, the court examined possession facts. It found that shortly before suit both parties were threatening violence and neither party's possession was effectively established; the police and magistrate intervened and, after undertakings, the property remained in custodia legis until the Court allowed the plaintiff limited cultivation rights. Given the Appellate Court's finding that the defendants held title, and in the absence of clear contrary indications when there was no effective possession by either party, the court applied the presumption that possession follows title. Accordingly, the defendants were at least in a position with respect to possession at the time of suit filing sufficient to justify the court ordering restoration of the pre-suit position — including surrender of property and profits the plaintiff obtained by virtue of court-ordered cultivation and by subsequent possession effected solely by operation of the trial court decree (which was later found bad).
The court also observed that the plaintiff had accepted the court's direction concerning disposal of money realized from cultivation and had executed bonds promising payment; having put himself under the court's direction, the plaintiff could not later contend the Court lacked power to order payment or disposal of those funds. For the period after the first court's decree (which gave the plaintiff possession via the court's action), the court held it was entitled to make just and proper orders for disposal of profits that accrued to the plaintiff as a result of that decree once the decree was held bad on appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal and the revision petition are dismissed.
Consequences and implications explicitly stated in the opinion:
- The court upheld the lower Appellate Court's order allowing enforcement of the security bonds (either in execution or by separate suit according to their terms) and awarding mesne profits by analogy to restitution; the lower Appellate Court's decision was held to be correct.
- The District Munsif's order declining restitution or analogous relief was held to be appealable to the Subordinate Judge under Section 47 CPC, regardless of characterization under Section 151.
- The appeal and revision petition are dismissed with costs (one set), and leave to appeal to a higher court is granted.
- No broader new legal principle beyond the application of Section 47 to restitution-like orders was announced; the decision affirms that orders relating to execution/discharge/satisfaction of decrees fall under Section 47 and are appealable, and applies existing precedents cited in the opinion.
1. These matters arise out of a suit brought by the present appellant for a declaration of his title to a certain land and an injunction or in the alternative for possession. The plaintiff originally acquired an interest in the land by a purchase. The defendant disputed that title. There was some sort of a fight in the course of which the plaintiff is alleged to have caused grievous hurt to one of the defendants. A criminal prosecution of the plaintiff resulted and it is common ground that there was a compromise of the disputes between the parties in order to put an end to the criminal prosecution and as a result of that compromise the plaintiff executed a settlement deed conveying his rights in the property to the defendants. This was followed up by another dispute, the plaintiff alleging that the conveyance executed by him in the course of criminal proceeding's was invalid. It would appear that there was a danger of a fresh resort to violence and that. The Police intervened and the Magistrate issued notice, to both parties under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Thereupon the plaintiff filed the suit referred to above and two days after the filing of the suit, in pursuance, of an order prohibiting the parties, from entering upon the property in dispute, both the plaintiff and the defendants gave an undertaking to the Magistrate that they would not eater upon the property without orders of Court.
2. The suit dragged on for years. During the first year a Receiver was appointed who permitted the plaintiff to harvest the crops on terms. In the subsequent years the right to harvest the crops was auctioned by the Court and in each year the plaintiff was the successful bidder, and he executed a series of security bonds which have not been exhibited in these proceedings, but they were looked into by both the lower Courts, and I am informed that by their terms the plaintiff undertook to pay the amount of his bid whenever ordered to do so that the Court and gave his property as security for so doing. Fife suit terminated in a decree of the trial Court recognizing the title of the plaintiff and also finding that he was in possession. The matter was taken up in appeal and the Appellate Court found that the plaintiff was bound by his conveyance of title, to the: defendants and was, therefore, not entitled to the property, and in the circumstances found that no decision as to possession was necessary. After this decree dismissing the plaintiffs suit, the defendants filed an execution application in which they prayed for costs and interest, for realization of the profits during the period of the suit by the enforcement of the security bonds and for mesne profits by way of restitution during the period between the decree of the trial Court and the Appellate Court's decree. The learned District Munsif permitted execution to proceed for costs and interest, but rejected he application so far as it related to the enforcement of the security bonds and the claim for mesne profits the interval between the two decrees. The lower Appellate Court, disagreeing with the latter part of the decision of the District Munsif, held; that the security bonds could be enforced execution proceedings or by a separate suit according to their terms and according to the person in whose favour they were made out, and also held that the defendants were entitled to mesne profits on the analogy if restitution under Section 144, Civil Procedure code, with respect to the subsequent period, though the order would have to be passed under Section 151. Civil Procedure Code, as the: defendants were not, strictly speaking, ejected from the property by the operation of the decree which had been reversed.
3. The plaintiff has filed both an appeal had a revision petition with the same grounds to cover any possible objection that a second appeal, does not lie. The main contention urged before me is that no appeal lay from the order of the District Munsif in so far as it relates to matters which do not fall strictly under Section 144, though the application was framed as coming under that section. The argument is that Section 151, under which the learned Subordinate Judge finds that the order should have been passed, is not an appealable section and that the order of the lower Court rejecting the application for the enforcement of the security bonds and subsequent mesne profit must be regarded not as an order under Section 144 but as an order under Section 151 and therefore it must be treated as one against which no appeal lay. The learned Subordinate Judge met this contention by a reference to the case in Raman Nambyar v. Pulasseri Thekkee (1934) M.W.N. 412 : 150 Ind. Cas. 98 : A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 484 : 57 M. 777 : 67 M.L.J. 43 : 39 L.W. 738 : 6 R.M. 692 wherein it was held that the right of appeal is determined not, by what the Court should have done, but, by what it purported to do, and that if the Court purported to act under a provision of law which carries a right of appeal against the order, that right of appeal will exist even though the order should have been under another provision against which there is no appeal.
4. It might of course be argued that while the Court has power to set right a wrong which has been done by the use of a wrong provision of law, if that provision of law itself contemplates an appeal, it need not necessarily have a right to direct the doing of a positive act under a non-appealable provision merely because the Court has refused to do that act, purporting to do sounder a provision which gives a right of appeal. But I do not think it is necessary to go into such subtleties. The matter seems to me to be covered by the provisions of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code. Granted that an order under the inherent powers of the Court is not per se appealable, if that order is in fact an order passed on an application made by one of the parties as against another party and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, it falls under Section 47 and for that reason it is appealable. Section 47 provides only for the procedure and the forum whereby a decision is to be reached. It does not give the powers by virtue of which the Court decides; these powers have to be sought in other provisions of the Code. They may be derived from Section 144; they may be derived from Section 151.
5. If an order for restitution made under Section 144 is appealable because it also falls under Section 47, similarly an order under Section 151 for something analogous to restitution made as between the parties would also fall under Section 47 and be subject to an appeal. A similar reasoning is found in decisions of this Court reported in Akshia Pillai v. Gavin darajulu Chettiar 47 M.L.J. 549 : 84 Ind. Cas. 975 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 778 : (1924) M.W.N. 842 and Govinda Padayachi v. Velu Murugayya Chettiar 64 M.L.J. 586 : 143 Ind. Cas. 454 : A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 399 : 37 L.W. 484 : Ind. Rul. (1933) Mad. 302 and it has been held in the case in Somasundaram v. Ghokkalingam 40 M. 780 : 38 Ind. Cas. 806 : A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 185 : 5 L.W. 267. That Section 47 Civil Procedure Code, covers all cases of restitution. I must, therefore, hold that an appeal lay to the Subordinate Judge from the order of the District Munsif declining to order restitution or to order reliefs analogous to restitution. The next question is whether on the merits the order of the Subordinate Judge is contrary to law. It is argued that the defendants have not beep shown, to be in possession at the time when the suit was instituted. There is a finding of one Court which has not been expressly reversed, that the plaintiff was in possession and that therefore no proceedings by way of restitution or by way of analogy to restitution can lie. Now the facts are, as I understand them, that shortly before the suit was filed both the parties were threatening to resort to violence to support their claim to possess on of this property.
6. In all probability the possession of neither party was effective, but each was prepared to use violence to resist entry by the other. Those circumstances brought about the interference of the Police and the magistracy. At any rate within two days after the filing of the suit both the parties agreed not to enter upon the suit properly and thereafter the property was certainly in custodia legis until it was given up to the plaintiff for specific purposes subject to the control of the Court. The defendants have been found to have title, and in the absence of any clear indication to the contrary, when there was apparently no effective possession by either party, one may apply the presumption that possession follows title and hold that the defendants were at least in such a position as regards possession on the filing of suit as to justify the Court, in the exercise of its duty to do justice and restore the parties to their position before the suit, in ordering the surrender to the defendants of the property which the plaintiff got during the defendants of the suit and the appeal entirely by the action of the Court in making a provision for the cultivation of the land pending suit.
7. The plaintiff put himself under the direction of the Court as to the disposal of the money realized by the cultivation of this land and handed over to him by the Court and he cannot now be heard to say that the Court cannot make orders for the disposal of the money which he undertook to pay. As to the period subsequent to the first Court's decree, here again the plaintiff got possession entirely by the action of the Court. Had the Court not passed this decree, the property would have been held by the Court with a prohibition of entry by either party pending the decision. In such circumstances it seems to me that the Court was entitled to make such orders as were just and proper for the disposal of the profits which accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the decree which has been found to be bad. In the result, therefore, I hold that the lower Appellate Court's order is correct and dismiss the appeal and the revision petition with costs one set. Leave to appeal is granted.
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