Pariti Narayana Murti, In Re

The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Vizagapatam of offences punishable under Ss. 467, 471, 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment under each count, the sentences to run concurrently.

The chief question in this appeal—as in the trial—is whether a confessional statement made by the accused on oath before the Assistant Registrar is admissible evidence against him. It is argued on a point of law that no statement made on oath can be a voluntary statement that would be admissible under S. 24 of the Evidence Act. The learned Advocate for the appellant relies on Emperor v. Dawood Kazi(1), the decision of a single Judge. The question there was whether a statement made on oath by an accused person examined by a Coroner was admissible against him in the Sessions trial. The learned Judge held that it was not. His judgment is concerned primarily with the questions whether the statement of the accused was protected by virtue of S. 132 of the Evidence Act and whether the Coroner did not act in contravention of S. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code in recording a statement on oath from the accused or, rather, having recorded a statement on oath in ignorance of the fact that the person giving the statement would be an accused, he acted illegally in putting that statement before the Coroner's jury. He decided both these questions in favour of the accused; and then, in the last sentence or two of his judgment, he says,

“The statement before the Coroner in this case cannot be admitted as a confession as it is a statement on oath. A confession must be voluntary; and a person who is summoned to give evidence and who is put on oath and who answers questions or makes a statement under the compulsion of his oath cannot be said to have made a voluntary statement.”

It may be said that this learned Judge, during the course of his judgment, expressed his disagreement with the decisions of two Full Benches of his own Court. S. 24 of the Evidence Act says nothing about voluntary statements. It makes irrelevant a confession if it appears to the Court that confession was “caused by any inducement, threat, or promise……proceeding from a person in authority……sufficient……to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would………avoid any evil of a temporal nature………” So that the statement with which we are concerned can only be inadmissible on the ground that it was caused by a threat. It does not seem to me reasonable to argue that the administering of an oath is tantamount to a threat to the person under oath that if he does not speak the truth, he will be punished for it. If that were the case, there would be no reason for the enactment of the proviso of S. 132 of the Evidence Act; for if no evidence on oath by a witness could amount to a voluntary confession, it never could be used against him. On at least two occasions a somewhat similar question has been considered by this Court. A Full Bench of five Judges held in The Queen v. Gopal Doss, that a statement given on oath in an affidavit filed in a civil suit could be used against a person making the statement. That case was followed in Pedabba Reddi v. Varada Reddi(2), in which a statement given by a person examined as a witness was subsequently used against him on a charge of defamation.

A statement made on oath may be said in certain cases to be made as the result of the holding out of a threat; but that is always a question of fact. It is contended that in this case there was such an inducement; and the learned Counsel for the appellant relies on a statement made by P.W 7 a retired District Medical Officer and the Chairman of the Cooperative Bank, six of whose cheques the accused is said to have forged. It appears from the cross-examination that he replied in the affirmative to this question put by the counsel for the accused:

“As soon as P.W 3 and yourself went to the Bank on 23rd April 1941, did you not ask the accused whether he realized the consequences of the fraud that he had committed?”

Such a question was not however put to P.W 3, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies who conducted the inquiries and questioned the accused. Both P.W 3 and P.W 7 say in examination in chief that when they entered the premises of the Bank, P.W 3 first checked the cash balance with reference to the cash book and found it to be correct. P.W 3 then asked the accused about the forged cheques and showed those cheques to him; whereupon the accused admitted that he had forged those cheques and drawn money on them. It seems to me that if it is true that such a question was put to the accused, it must have been put to him after he had been shown these cheques and the accused had answered that he had forged them. It seems most unlikely that P.Ws 3 and 7 walked straight into the Bank and without asking the accused any preliminary questions, said to him, “Do you realise the consequences of the fraud you have committed?”

I have no doubt that the accused was properly convicted. The sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment is a light punishment for such serious offences.

The appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

N.R.R