Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Kovuru Kalappa Devara v. Kumar Krishna Mitter (Died) And Another

Madras High Court
Aug 7, 1944
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the endorsee of a document, Exhibit A, and the assignee of all rights under the original cause of action arising from dealings in mica between the appellant's assignor and the respondent in 1930. The respondent had purchased mica from the appellant's predecessor and regularly paid by cheque, but stopped payment on one cheque. In 1933, Exhibit A was executed, wherein the respondent undertook to pay Rs. 12,600 after two years with interest "after deductions as would be agreed upon." The appellant, having been assigned this cause of action in 1938, filed suit which was dismissed by the learned District Judge. The appellant now appeals that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit can lie on the terms of Exhibit A, given the uncertainty of the phrase "after deductions as would be agreed upon" under Section 29 of the Contract Act.
  2. Whether the appellant can rely on the original cause of action from 1930 despite limitation issues, considering the acknowledgment of indebtedness in 1933 under the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 29 of the Contract Act does not apply because the Court can interpret the phrase "after deductions as would be agreed upon" by examining registered notices and other evidence to give it an intelligible meaning.
  • The appellant contends that if no agreement on deductions was made before suit, the full amount of Rs. 12,600 would be claimable.
  • Regarding limitation, it was argued that the acknowledgment in 1933 deferred payment for two years, and thus no suit could have been filed on the original cause of action before 1935.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The phrase "after deductions as would be agreed upon" is too vague and uncertain to form the basis of a suit under Section 29 of the Contract Act.
  • Any suit based on the original cause of action from 1930 is barred by limitation despite the acknowledgment in 1933.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Spencer v. Hemmerde Illustrates that an express promise to pay at a future date supersedes an implied promise to pay immediately, affecting when an action can be brought. The court noted the English principle but emphasized that limitation is governed by the Indian Limitation Act, which restricts the extension of limitation periods to the extent permitted by statute.
Section 29 of the Contract Act Contracts with uncertain terms are void and not enforceable. The court held the phrase "after deductions as would be agreed upon" was too vague and uncertain to constitute an enforceable contract term, supporting dismissal of the suit based on Exhibit A.
Section 19 of the Limitation Act An acknowledgment of liability restarts the limitation period from the date of acknowledgment. The court applied this provision to hold that the acknowledgment in 1933 only extended limitation for three years from that date, making the 1938 suit barred by limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the terms of Exhibit A and found that the phrase "after deductions as would be agreed upon" was inherently uncertain and vague, falling within the scope of Section 29 of the Contract Act which renders such agreements void. The court rejected the appellant's argument that extrinsic evidence could clarify the meaning, emphasizing that the contract's meaning must be clear on its face. Two conflicting interpretations of the phrase were noted, but neither resolved the uncertainty.

Next, the court considered whether the appellant could rely on the original cause of action from 1930. It acknowledged the English rule from Spencer v. Hemmerde regarding deferred payment promises but clarified that Indian limitation law governs the matter. Under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment in 1933 restarts the limitation period for three years from that date. Since the suit was filed in 1938, it was barred by limitation.

Thus, both grounds—the uncertainty of the contract terms and the limitation bar—justified dismissal of the suit.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL and upheld the dismissal of the suit with costs.

The decision directly affects the appellant by denying recovery under Exhibit A and the original cause of action due to contractual uncertainty and limitation bar. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles under the Contract Act and Limitation Act.

Show all summary ...

(Delivered by King, J.)

The appellant here is the endorsee of a document, Ex. A, and at the same time the assignee of all rights under the original cause of action under that document. It is common ground that the appellant's assignor and the respondent had dealings in mica in 1930. The respondent purchased mica from the appellant's predecessor and was in the habit of selling this mica in England and sending cheques to the appellant's predecessor to pay for it. Of one of these cheques he stopped payment. Subsequently in 1933 Ex. A. was executed in which the respondent undertook to pay to the appellant's predecessor after two years the sum of Rs. 12,600 with a certain interest “after deductions as would be agreed upon.” It was the claim based upon this document with its original cause of action that was assigned to the appellant in 1938. The learned District Judge has dismissed the suit and the appellant now appeals.

Two main difficulties stand in the way of the appellant and are the reasons why the suit was dismissed. The first is that no suit will lie on the terms of Ex. A itself because they embody an agreement which in the words of S. 29 of the Contract Act is one, the meaning of which is not certain or capable of being made certain. The second reason is that if the appellant falls back upon the original cause of action in 1930 although he can rely upon Ex. A as an acknowledgment of indebtedness given by the respondent's predecessor in 1933 that will afford him only a further three years in which to file his suit, and the suit being filed in 1938 is barred by limitation.

It is contended on the first question that S. 29 of the Contract Act does not apply and that it will be possible for the Court after scrutinising the various registered notices and other evidence in the case to give some intelligible meaning to the expression “after deductions as would be agreed upon.” It seems to us however that the Court is not called upon to decide between conflicting claims put in by both sides as to the meaning of a document. S. 29 contemplates that meaning shall be clear on the face of it. The very first illustration given in the section is of an agreement by A to sell to B a hundred tons of oil. That agreement is held in the illustration to be void for uncertainty, though it might be argued that it was open both to A and B to go into the witness box and give evidence from which it would not be beyond the power of the Court to arrive at the actual truth regarding an agreement which has been so vaguely expressed. It has been clear from the arguments before us that there are two very obviously different views in regard to the interpretation of the final few words of Ex. A. It has been claimed by Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar on behalf of his client that the real meaning of the phrase is that if in fact there had been no agreement regarding a reduction at any time before suit, and if the money had become payable the full amount of Rs. 12,600 could be claimed. There is also another and, in our opinion, more plausible interpretation that Rs. 12,600 was intended to be the maximum beyond which in no circumstances could the appellant's predecessor claim, and that some deduction was contemplated by both parties as being certain. However, the parties have expressed this matter in a language with which they were not very familiar in so vague a fashion that in our opinion there can be no doubt that the learned Judge was right in holding that the suit based upon the terms of this document must fall by reason of S. 29 of the Contract Act.

The next question is whether the plaintiff can sue upon the original cause of action, and this is a question merely of limitation. It is argued that because in the acknowledgment which the respondent's predecessor gave in 1933 there is also a clear promise to pay and that payment is deferred until a further period of two years, therefore no suit could have been filed even upon the original cause of action by the appellant's predecessor between 1933 and 1935. In support of this contention we were referred to the judgment of Lord Wrenbury in Spencer v. Hemmerde (1),

“Thus if he writes. ‘I acknowledge the debt and will pay it you six months hence’ the implied promise which would be a promise to pay forthwith is superseded by the express promise to ‘pay six months hence’ and an action cannot be brought until the six months have expired.”

Whatever may be the case in England, the question of limitation has been codified in this country in the Limitation Act and it seems to us that an acknowledgment can be used to extend the period of limitation only to the extent which the Limitation Act itself permits. The language of S. 19 of the Act is clear that where there is an acknowledgment of liability the result which follows is that the fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. There can be no doubt we think that the learned District Judge is right also in holding that any suit based upon the original cause of action in 1930 is barred by limitation.

In the result this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

N.R.R