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Saraswatamma v. Paddayya

Madras High Court
Oct 11, 1922
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit before the Court was for partition. The parties comprised the plaintiff (father) and his sons: the first defendant (Lakshminarayana) and the deceased husband of the second defendant (Sitaramayya). The second defendant contended that a partition had been effected during the lifetime of her husband and that Exhibit V recorded the terms of that partition: of 12 acres the two sons each received about five acres and odd, while the plaintiff (the father) was allotted one acre and 50 cents for maintenance. The plaintiff disputed this arrangement and claimed a moiety (one-half) of the property, with an alternative prayer for one-third if the Court found that a partition had taken place in the lifetime of the deceased husband.

Procedurally, the Temporary Subordinate Judge admitted Exhibit V in evidence and held there was a completed partition, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The District Judge disagreed: he refused to admit Exhibit V on the ground that it was unregistered and held that any partition was effected only between the two brothers, not including the plaintiff; he reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree and remanded the suit for disposal of other issues. The material question on appeal is whether there was a division in status between the plaintiff, the first defendant and the second defendant's husband, and whether Exhibit V can be admitted in evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a division in status (a severance of joint family status) between the plaintiff, the first defendant and the deceased husband of the second defendant during the latter's lifetime.
  2. Whether Exhibit V — a deed of partition executed only by the first defendant and the deceased husband and not registered — is admissible in evidence to prove a division in status, notwithstanding provisions of the Registration Act (section 49(c) read with section 17).
  3. If Exhibit V is admissible, for what purpose may it be used (i.e., to prove the transaction itself or only as evidence of declaration/conduct indicating a change of status)?
  4. Procedural relief appropriate on remand: whether an additional issue should be framed to decide the question of division of status and to permit further evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Second Defendant / Appellant (represented by Mr. Anantakrishna Ayyar)

  • Contended that although a finding of fact by the lower court might be binding on some points, it was open to argue that there was a division in status among family members.
  • Argued that Exhibit V effected a division of right/status and that it should have been admitted in evidence to show such severance.

Respondent (represented by Mr. Narayanamurti)

  • Relied on the decisions in Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan and Pothi Naicken v. Naganna Naicker (both Letters Patent Appeals) where it was held that a document merely effecting a division of status required registration and, if unregistered, was inadmissible in evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan (Privy Council) Rejected the contention that a deed of partition was ineffectual to convert undivided property into divided property until followed by an actual partition by metes and bounds; indicated that a deed can operate to effect separation in interest/right without immediate metes and bounds division. Used to support the proposition that an actual division by metes and bounds is not necessary to effect severance of rights; a deed may operate to separate interests even if it does not produce a de facto division.
Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan (Letters Patent Appeal) Held that a document merely effecting a division of status required registration and if not registered was inadmissible in evidence. Cited by respondent as authority that unregistered documents effecting division of status are inadmissible; Court considered this decision but treated its authority as weakened by later views and conflicting decisions.
Pothi Naicken v. Naganna Naicker (Letters Patent Appeal) Held similarly that a document effecting a division of status required registration and was inadmissible if unregistered. Cited by respondent; Court noted the decision and the conflict of opinion in the Bench decisions, and did not accept it as conclusively barring admission of an unregistered document for collateral purposes.
Natesa Iyer v. Subramania Iyer Observed (in relation to the above decisions) that it was unnecessary to consider how far those decisions were reconcilable with the Privy Council's pronouncement in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj; indicated documents could be looked into to ascertain intention. Relied upon to weaken the authority of the Letters Patent Appeals and to support the view that unregistered documents may be examined to determine executants' intentions.
Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal Held that a document effecting merely a division in status did not require registration. Adopted as support for the proposition that an unregistered instrument can be admissible to prove intention or division in status; Spencer, J. and the present Court expressed agreement with this view.
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (Privy Council) Held that severance of status can occur without agreement; the intention to separate may be evidenced by explicit declaration or by conduct; to have effect intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed. Authoritatively relied on to establish that separation of status may arise from unilateral intention evidenced by declaration or conduct and that courts must assess whether the conduct/declaration was unequivocal.
Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain Affirmed the principle that what amounts to separation depends on facts; a definite and unambiguous indication of intention to separate may amount to separation. Referred to as consistent authority for the proposition that the question of separation is fact-specific and depends on unequivocal expression of intention.
Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal (Privy Council) Held that while recitals in certain petitions could not be used as evidence of a gift, the petitions could be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thereafter held by the donee. Used to support the proposition that documents referring to immovable property may nonetheless be admissible for collateral or explanatory purposes (e.g., explaining possession or intention), even if they cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of the transaction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed two linked questions: (1) whether there was a division in status among the family members; and (2) whether Exhibit V, though unregistered and executed only by two of the coparceners, could be admitted in evidence to prove such division.

On the question of division in status, the Court held that the District Judge erred by failing to consider whether there was a change of status (severance) as distinct from an actual division by metes and bounds. The Court emphasized the legal principle — drawn from Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan and Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj — that severance of rights does not necessarily require a formal metes-and-bounds partition or agreement of all coparceners. Severance may arise from declarations or conduct evidencing an unequivocal intention to divide, and such intention may be unilateral if communicated appropriately.

Concerning admissibility of Exhibit V (an unregistered document), the Court examined the scope of section 49(c) of the Registration Act (which makes documents required by section 17 to be registered inadmissible as evidence of any transaction affecting such property). The Court drew a distinction between:

  • Receiving a document as evidence of the transaction it purports to effect (which section 49 prohibits if the document required registration is unregistered); and
  • Receiving a document in evidence as a piece of evidence of declarations or conduct (i.e., collateral evidence) relevant to questions such as intention or change of status.

The Court reasoned that a document which merely contains a declaration or affords evidence of conduct is not being tendered as evidence of the transaction (i.e., as effecting transfer of immoveable property), but as evidence bearing on whether an intention to separate existed. Thus section 49 does not bar admission of such a document for that collateral purpose.

The Court addressed the opposing authorities (Ayyakutti Mankondan and Pothi Naicken) which held that documents effecting only a division in status required registration; it found those rulings to be weakened by Natesa Iyer and by decisions and views (including Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal and the Privy Council decisions cited) supporting the alternative view. The Court accepted the view — expressed by Sankaran Nayar and Spencer, J. in earlier cases and adopted in this judgment — that an unregistered document may be looked into to ascertain the intention of the executants and may be admissible to prove a declaration or conduct indicative of division in status.

Applying these principles to Exhibit V, the Court found the document contained clear declarations and evidence of conduct from which the executants' intention to divide was deducible: it is described as a “list of shares of division,” divides lands and house, divides debts and movables, and contains explicit recitals such as “Both of us have agreed to the said shares and effect settlement without any dispute whatever.” Although not executed by all co-parceners (so it did not by itself effect an immediate legal change of status as between all members), Exhibit V was nevertheless admissible to prove the executants' declaration and conduct and to support an inference of intention to remain divided.

Because the existence of communication of that intention to the plaintiff was not definitively established in the record before the Court, the appropriate remedy was procedural: to direct the trial court to frame an additional issue specifically on the question of division in status and to allow the parties to adduce evidence on that issue.

Spencer, J. concurred and reiterated that unregistered documents may be used as evidence of intention to become divided in status. He emphasized that section 49 must be read in light of section 17 of the Registration Act and section 91 of the Evidence Act, and that instruments of partition as defined in section 2(15) of the Stamp Act, where the property exceeds Rs. 100, are required to be registered and cannot be used as evidence of the transaction; but such instruments may be used for the collateral purpose of proving division of status.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that Exhibit V, though unregistered and executed only by two coparceners, is admissible in evidence for the collateral purpose of proving the executants' declarations and conduct indicative of a division in status (i.e., an intention to remain divided). The Court found that the District Judge was wrong to ignore the question of division in status. The District Judge's order remanding the suit for disposal on other issues was upheld, but the trial court was directed to frame an additional issue in these terms: "Whether there was a division in status between the members of the joint family during the life-time of second defendant's husband" and to try that issue with opportunity for the parties to adduce evidence.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The remand to the Court of First Instance by the District Judge remains in force; on remand the Subordinate Judge must frame and try the additional issue directed by this Court.
  • Exhibit V may be admitted for the collateral purpose of proving declarations or conduct amounting to a division in status, but it cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of the transaction (i.e., it cannot be admitted to prove the substantive partition transaction if registration was required by statute).
  • All costs hitherto incurred were ordered to be costs in the cause.

No statement is made in this summary about any precedent beyond those specifically cited in the opinion. This summary strictly reflects the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Venkatasubba Rao, J.:— The Temporary Subordinate Judge held that Exhibit V was admissible in evidence and the District Judge disagreed with him and refused to admit it, on the ground that it was unregistered. The material question to be decided in this appeal is, whether there was a division between the plaintiff, the first defendant and the second defendant's husband and whether the document above referred to can be admitted in evidence. The facts necessary for the decision of this question may be very briefly stated.

The first defendant and the deceased husband of the second defendant were brothers, being the sons of the plaintiff. The suit is for partition. The second defendant contends that a partition was effected during the lifetime of her husband and that Exhibit V embodies the terms thereof, that under it, of the 12 acres of land which the family possessed, each son obtained about 5 acres and odd, and the plaintiff, the father, was allotted for his maintenance one acre and 50 cents. It may be stated that the plaintiff ignoring this arrangement claims in the suit a moiety of the property; but there is an alternative prayer in the plaint to the effect that he may be allotted one-third of the property in the event of the Court holding that there was a partition in the lifetime of the second defendant's husband. The Subordinate Judge, holding that there was a completed partition, dismissed the plaintiff's suit, and the District Judge, having decided that the partition was effected only between the two brothers and that the plaintiff was not a party to it and was not bound thereby and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share, reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and remanded the suit for disposal on the other issues framed in the case.

It must be stated, at the outset that Exhibit V, the deed of partition relied on by the second defendant, was executed only by the first defendant and the deceased husband of the second defendant and that it was not registered.

The question whether the plaintiff was a consenting party to the division is a question of fact, and Mr. Anantakrishna Ayyar on behalf of the second defendant (appellant) argued that, though this finding of fact is binding upon him, it is open to him to contend that there was a division in status between the members of the family and that the District Judge acted erroneously in refusing to admit Exhibit V for the purpose of showing that there was such severance.

The Subordinate Judge observes as follows in regard to Exhibit V:

“The plaintiff and the first defendant objected to its admissibility on the ground that it required registration. I overruled the objections, because the second defendant was tendering the document to prove the status of the family but not the title of any particular sharer to any particular item.”

The District Judge, while holding that there was no actual division, fails to consider the question whether there was a division of status. In this, I think, he was clearly wrong. It has been held that, to effect a severance of rights, an actual division by metes and bounds is not necessary. A deed which is ineffectual to effect a de facto actual division of the subject matter may operate to effect a separation in interest and in right. In Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan, their Lordships of the Privy Council had to consider the effect of a deed of partition executed by all the members of an undivided Hindu family which spoke of a division having been agreed upon to be thereafter made, and the contention that the deed was ineffectual to convert the undivided property into divided property until it had been followed up by an actual partition by metes and bounds, was rejected by their Lordships. Mr. Anantakrishna Ayyar on behalf of the second appellant, argued that Exhibit V effected in any event a division of right and that the document was admissible in evidence to prove such a division. The question then arises, is a document which operates to convert a change in the status of the family and effects a division of right, when it is unregistered, admissible in evidence? Mr. Narayanamurti on behalf of the respondent strongly relied on Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan, and Pothi Naicken v. Naganna Naicker. Both were Letters Patent Appeals and three learned Judges decided each of them, and the judgments are entitled to great weight. It was held in both the cases that a document merely effecting a division of status required registration, and if it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence. But the authority of these rulings is considerably weakened by the fact that in Natesa Iyer v. Subramania Iyer, Ayling and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ. (it will be noticed that the latter took part in both the Letters Patent Appeals) observed at page 309 as follows:—

“In this view it is unnecessary to consider how far the decisions of this Court in Pothi Naicken v. Naganna Naicker, and Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan, are reconcilable with the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj.”

In Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal, Sankaran Nayar, J., held that a document effecting merely a division in status did not require registration and in Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan, Spencer, J., adopted the same view and referred with approval to Subrahmania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal). Sadasiva Ayyar, J., took a different view and the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges led to the Letters Patent Appeal. In Pothi Naicken v. Naganna Naicker, Sankaran Nayar and Oldfield, JJ., differed, the former adhering to the view already expressed by him, and this difference of opinion led to the other Letters Patent Appeal. Speaking for myself, with great respect, I am inclined to agree with Sankaran Nayar, J., and Spencer, J., for, in the words of Sankaran Nayar, J., the alteration in the nature of the estate is an incident attached by Hindu Law to the divided status of the members of a Hindu family. A document merely creating a separation in status does not itself create any interest in immoveable property. Such an interest is created not by virtue of the instrument but by the operation of the rules of the Hindu Law. Were it necessary to decide this question, we might refer it to the decision of a Full Bench, but it seems to me that for the determination of this case, the question as presented to us in the argument does not arise.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that an agreement between all the coparceners is not essential to the disruption of the joint status; and that separation so far as the separating member is concerned, is a matter of individual volition. A very clear exposition of this principle is contained in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj. Their Lordships observe:

“Some of the Courts in India have supposed Lord Westbury's expressions in Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan to imply that the severance of status can take place only by agreement. Their Lordships have no doubt that this is a mistaken view.”

Then it is pointed out that the intention to separate may be evidenced in different ways, either by explicit declaration or by conduct, and if it is an inference derivable therefrom, it will be for the Court to determine whether the conduct or declaration was unequivocal and explicit. To the same effect was the law laid down in Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain).

“What may amount to a separation,” their Lordships say, “or what conduct on the part of some of the members may lead to disruption of the joint undivided family and convert a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common must depend on the facts of each case. A definite and unambiguous indication by one member of an intention to separate himself and to enjoy his share in severalty may amount to separation. But to have that effect, the intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed.”

These and similar observations make it perfectly clear that an inference of intention may be derived either from declaration or from conduct. For effecting a division in status in addition to conduct or declarations, the intention must be unequivocally and clearly expressed to the other members of the family. For ascertaining whether a deed amounts to such conduct or contains evidence of it, or contains declarations of intention, I fail to see why it should not be looked at, although it may refer to immoveable property, and is not registered. Coupled with declaration or conduct, there must be a communication of intention to the other members, then alone a division in status would result. A document, therefore, which merely contains a declaration or affords evidence of conduct, does not of itself create a division in status, and I find no difficulty in holding that Exhibit V, which, as I already pointed out, is not an agreement between all the members of the family, and does not therefore as such, operate to create a division in status, is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the declaration or the conduct of the executants.

It was argued in Natesa Iyer v. Subramania Ayer, already referred to, that an unregistered document was inadmissible to evidence a unilateral declaration and the argument was rejected, the learned Judges observing,

“We are not able to hold therefore that the documents cannot be looked into to ascertain the intention of the executants.”

Section 49(c) of the Registration Act enacts

“No document required by section 17 to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property.”

The document containing a declaration or which affords evidence of conduct is not tendered as evidence of a transaction but only in evidence, in other words, the section makes inadmissible a document which records a transaction affecting immoveable property. It does not mean that no single piece of evidence affecting immoveable property can be admitted, if the evidence is contained in a writing which is not registered. For instance, if the question to be decided is whether a gift of a property is real or benami and if a letter written by the donor to the donee is sought to be put in evidence, it cannot be ruled out on the ground that it affects immoveable property. What is prohibited by the section is receiving a document as evidence of a transaction, not merely receiving it in evidence, that is, as a piece of evidence having a bearing on the question to be ultimately decided.

Then there is another aspect of the question to be considered. It is said that the document itself refers to immoveable property and we cannot therefore look at it for any purpose whatsoever. This argument appears to me wholly untenable in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, where their Lordships holding that the recitals in certain petitions could not be used as evidence of a gift, still held that the petitions could nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thenceforth held by the donee.

Now turning to Exhibit V it affords clear evidence of conduct from which an intention to divide on the part, of the executants is deducible and the declarations in it also lead to the same inference. Lakshminarayana, the first defendant, and Sitaramayya, the deceased husband of the second defendant, who are the executants, begin by describing the document as a “list of shares of division.” Lands are first divided, then the residential house. The debts are said to amount to Rs. 1,060-14-10. They are divided and the document contains the statement, “Both of us have agreed to the said shares and effect settlement without any dispute whatever.” The treasure box and cart are also divided and the document contains the further recital, “Out of the hayricks, the northern side of the hayrick has fallen to Lakshminarayana's share and the southern side to Sitaramayya's share.” All the co-parceners not being parties to this document, it did not effect an immediate division in status, but the document is the clearest possible indication of the intention of the executants to remain divided.

We have been referred to some evidence that this intention has been communicated to the plaintiff, but the question was not definitely before the minds of the parties and it seems to me that the proper order to make would be to direct an additional issue to be raised; “Whether there was a division in status between the members of the joint family during the life-time of second defendant's husband” and to allow the parties to adduce evidence in regard to this issue. It is scarcely necessary to add that to effect a division in status a document is not necessary and evidence may be given of acts of parties or declarations independent of any document. As the attention of the Subordinate Judge was not directly called to this question, there being no issue upon the point, and as the District Judge has altogether failed to consider it, I think the course suggested would be the proper course to follow. The order of the District Judge remanding the suit for disposal will stand, but the Court of the First Instance will be directed to frame an additional issue in the terms already mentioned and to try it.

Spencer, J.:— I agree with my learned brother both as to the admissibility of Exhibit V to prove division of status and as to the order proposed by him to be made for an additional issue to be framed.

I adhere to the opinion which I expressed in Ayyakutt-Mankondan v. Periasawmi Koundan, following what Sankaran Nayar, J., said in Subramania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal, that even an unregistered document can be used as evidence of an intention on the part of members of an undivided family to become divided in status. I am glad to find that my learned brother agrees with the opinion which I then gave and that there have been several later pronouncements of great weight which tend to show that my view was correct.

I have the highest respect for the opinion of Sadasiva Ayyar, J., but I think he stretched too widely the meaning of the verb “affect” in Section 49 of the Registration Act. All sorts of transactions may remotely affect immoveable property. Section 49 of the Registration Act has to be read in the light of section 17 of the same Act and section 91 of the Evidence Act. If this is done, the word “affect” will be seen to be only a compendious term for expressing the longer phrase of “purporting or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent to.” Thus applications for the mutation of names in the Government registers or agreements to become divided in status may be said to “affect” in an indirect sense immoveable property, but they do not of themselves purport to pass any right to immoveable property and so do not require to be registered. The decision of the Privy Council in Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal has made this clear as regards the former kind of documents. On the same principle I think that documents which are instruments of partition, as defined in section 2(15) of the Stamp Act, that is, instruments whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty, are required by section 17 of the Indian Registration Act to be registered when the property to be divided is immoveable property over Rs. 100, in value, and if they are not so registered they cannot by reason of section 49 be admitted as evidence of the transaction they purport to effect; but they may be used for the collateral purpose of proving division of status among the parties to the documents. When so used they do not “affect” immoveable property nor is the division of status a “transaction affecting immoveable property” in the sense intended by the Act to be given to the word “affect.” Documents that do not fall under the above description are not required to be registered at all and are admissible in evidence without registration. All costs hitherto incurred to be costs in the cause.

N.R