Gulam Mohideen Quarishi Sahib (), v. Ahamadulla Begum Sahiba (2Nd Petitioner), .

Oldfield, J.:— The petitioner asks us to revoke the sanction granted by the District Court, South Arcot, for his prosecution for an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Sanction was originally refused by the District Munsif and was afterwards granted by the District Court. During the pendency of the proceedings in the District Court the original applicant for the sanction died and the application was continued by his widow, as his legal representative; and she is here to support the District Court's order.

The only question, which it is necessary for us to decide, is whether a legal representative is in such circumstances entitled to continue an application originally made by her predecessor in interest. The general rule is that any person whatever can institute a complaint of an offence other than certain offences clearly specified in the Code, such as defamation. An offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code is not one of those excepted offences. There would therefore be no objection to an application for sanction by the legal representative of a person directly affected, instead of that person himself; and that was the basis of the order of the District. Judge. That, however, takes no account of another principle of equally general application, that criminal proceedings instituted by a private complainant abate on such person's death. It is not necessary to give authority in support of that principle. We may, however, point out that, when an exception is intended as in the case of proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, such exception is specified clearly. We have not been shown that an application for sanction differs from other, Criminal Proceedings. It is suggested that an application for sanction is merely preliminary to the making ??? a substantive complaint and that is true; but, at the same time, we must regard it as part of a Criminal Proceeding, since there is no justification for holding that it is not an essential stage in one.

In these circumstances we cannot agree with the lower Court that it was entitled to grant the sanction to the legal representative on a petition presented by that representative's predecessor. We must, therefore, revoke the sanction-granted. We add only that it is no doubt open to the legal representative herself to apply for sanction if so advised; and we express no opinion as to the prospects of such application.

N.R