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A.M. Narayana Sah v. A. Sankar Sah
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a suit for partition of joint family properties and delivery of the plaintiff's share. The family descended from four brothers: Munusami Sah, Sankar Sah (the 1st defendant), Chinnasami Sah and Ponnusami Sah. Munusami Sah's descendants included three sons and a daughter; one son Sudarsan Sah earlier obtained a share in O. S. No. 63 of 1910 and separated from the family. The plaintiff (appellant) and others are members of the remainder of the family; various other family members are recorded in a genealogical tree in the record.
Procedurally, the case reached this court as an appeal raising two questions (one of fact and one of law). The factual question was whether a contract with the Madras Corporation was a family (joint) business or the separate business of the 1st defendant; the trial judge held it to be a joint family business and the Full Bench agreed. The legal question concerned whether a share already taken by a branch at a prior partial partition (when Sudarsan Sah separated) must be taken into account in a subsequent complete partition. The court considered prior authorities, arguments from both sides and referred a question to a Full Bench; the Full Bench (opinions of the Chief Justice, Wallace J., and Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.) answered the reference in the affirmative.
Legal Issues Presented
- Factual issue: Whether the contract with the Madras Corporation was a joint family business or a separate business of the 1st defendant.
- Legal issue: When one or more members of a joint Hindu family have previously taken a share by partial partition while other members remain joint, must that earlier partition be taken into account in determining the shares due to various branches at a subsequent partition (i.e., is the rule in Manjanatha v. Narayana still good law), or should the subsequent partition be made rebus sic stantibus ignoring the earlier partition?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant relied upon the strict classical proposition (quoted from Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan) that, while a Hindu family remains undivided, no individual member or branch can be said to have a definite share in the joint property.
- It was argued that the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana proceeds on a wrong principle by predicating a vested share for a member/branch before an actual partition, and that the contrary view is taken in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam (Bombay).
- It was urged that the Smriti Chandrika (invoked in Manjanatha) is not authoritative in the Madras Presidency and that, where it conflicts, the Mayukha (or other texts) may point the other way.
- The appellant argued that the reasoning that equality of funeral oblations (religious efficacy) supports equal shares is now obsolete and that using such religious tests to compute partition shares is no longer sound law.
- Practical objections were raised that taking a previous partition into account would create inequities and be impracticable to execute (survivorships, increases of family, valuation problems, possible negative debits etc.).
Respondent's / Supporting Arguments
- The respondent (and supporting judges) relied on the equitable considerations and on the longstanding Full Bench decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana which held that a prior partial partition should be brought into account at a subsequent partition (i.e., the branch which took a share earlier should be debited in the final reckoning).
- It was pointed out that modern developments (recognition of alienations, rights of alienees, attachment for personal debts, insolvency and the operation of survivorships) have rendered the strict classical theory of the undivided family less 'watertight' and have created circumstances in which members effectively possess an ascertainable fractional interest at a given point in time.
- It was argued that stare decisis and long practice in the Madras Presidency (nearly fifty years of application of Manjanatha) counsel strongly against upsetting that decision and the titles and arrangements that have flowed from it.
- The respondent also contended that the Smriti Chandrika (even if accepted) did not apply to a case where the rest of the family remained joint after the earlier partition, so its assistance was at best analogous and not decisive.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in this Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan | Lord Westbury's statement that "no individual member of an undivided family can predicate of the joint and undivided property that he has a definite share." | The Court quoted the principle and addressed its force; while acknowledging its logic, the Court explained why strict application is unsuitable given modern developments and equitable considerations affecting partial partitions. |
| Manjanatha v. Narayana | Rule that a share taken by a member/branch at a prior partial partition must be taken into account and debited when computing shares at a subsequent partition. | Central precedent. The Full Bench held that this decision remains good law in the Madras Presidency and applied it to conclude prior partial partitions must be accounted for; relied upon both as equitable in substance and under stare decisis. |
| Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam | Bombay High Court decision dissenting from Manjanatha: subsequent partition should be made rebus sic stantibus (ignore earlier partition) — relied on Mayukha authority in that Presidency. | The Court considered it as the principal counter-authority; it contrasted the Bombay approach with Madras and explained why Madras would not follow the Bombay divergence here. |
| Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti | Authorities supporting that an alienee may take the fractional share as at the date of alienation (i.e., a member may have a definite transferrable interest at a given time). | Used to show that practical developments in Madras law recognize a member's transferable fractional interest and so support the reasoning that branches may possess ascertainable interests for equitable accounting. |
| Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick | Privy Council cases on related points concerning alienation/representation; referenced as part of authorities known when Manjanatha was decided. | Mentioned to show the background of authorities which the Madras Court was aware of; used in discussion of how alienation/alienee rights affect the strictness of classical joint-family theory. |
| Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma | Authority in which Smriti Chandrika's force was doubted by a Bench of this Court. | Cited in the Court's assessment that the Smriti Chandrika's authority in the Madras Presidency has been doubted or departed from in later decisions. |
| Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya | Pull Bench held contention of proportionate shares (relying on Smriti Chandrika) could not be supported by Hindu Law texts or reported cases. | Used to support the view that Smriti Chandrika should not be taken as overriding authority in Madras; helped the Court to limit the Chandrika's relevance by analogy only. |
| Kristnayya v. Guravayya | Decision in which the authority of the Smriti Chandrika was declined by the Court (comments by Phillips, J.). | Referred to as further support for the proposition that Smriti Chandrika's applicability in Madras is doubtful and that reliance upon it is not decisive for the present question. |
| Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana | Case relied on in Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya. | Mentioned as a cited authority in earlier litigation treating the relevant textual issues; used as part of the background to the courts' treatment of Smriti Chandrika. |
| Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar | Decision regarding re-union that treats the re-united family's status as restored to joint family status. | Invoked to show that re-union restores joint-family status and therefore makes the Smriti Chandrika analogy (dealing with re-united brethren) of limited applicability to cases where the rest of the family remained joint. |
| Debt Parshad v. Thakur Dial | Full Bench warning that it is dangerous to draw analogy from rules applicable to devolution among re-united brethren. | Used to caution against over-reliance on Smriti Chandrika or re-union analogies when deciding the present kind of partial partition question. |
| Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayek Venkatesh Kothekar | One of the series of cases cited to show that religious efficacy as a test for heritage has been narrowed or criticized. | Mentioned in the Court's discussion that the old test of equality based on religious efficacy has lost force in modern decisions; reduces weight of religious-ritual arguments for equal partition. |
| Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Shav Persad Singh | Privy Council treatment acknowledging that alienations and similar practices are inconsistent with strict joint-family theory but justified by equity. | Quoted to support the proposition that modern practice (alienations, recognition of alienee rights) has modified the strict theory of the undivided family. |
| Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh | Privy Council authority on alienation: fractional share passes and alienee's entitlement to the fractional share at date of alienation. | Used by the Court to explain current Madras law that a fractional share at the time of alienation is what passes and that this development undermines the 'no vested share before partition' strict theory. |
| Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser | Privy Council authority on similar principles of alienation/attachment of coparcenary interests. | Referenced alongside other Privy Council cases to demonstrate doctrinal developments affecting coparcenary interests. |
| Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya | Full Bench: alienee's right is to the fractional share as at date of alienation; death of alienor does not defeat alienee's right. | Relied on to show that alienee's rights have been recognized fully in Madras and that such recognition supports a practical conception of vested fractional interests. |
| Sat Narain v. Behari Lal | Authority implying that on insolvency the coproparcener's share vests in the Official Assignee. | Used to illustrate that the law treats a coparcener's share as something that can vest and be dealt with, further eroding the strict 'mere claim to partition' theory. |
| Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Official Receiver of Tinnevelly | Discussion of the meaning of "charge" or "lien" when used of attaching decree-holders over coparcenary interests. | Quoted to explain the Court's understanding of how attachments and liens operate practically on coparcenary interests and affect the joint family. |
| Govinddoss Krishnadoss v. Gokuldoss Govardhandoss | Listed among cases on re-union and joint-family status (contextual authority). | Referred to in the Court's survey of authorities concerning re-union and the legal effect of re-union on joint-family status. |
| Manjaya v. Shanmuga Maharajah of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu and Balabhadra Patro v. Khetra Doss | Grouped citation in the text as cases relating to alienee rights and partition practice. | Referred to in the discussion of the practical law on alienation, alienee rights and partition (cited as part of background authorities). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in three principal phases: (A) factual determination; (B) survey of competing authorities and doctrines; and (C) application of equitable and practical considerations together with stare decisis to the legal question.
(A) Factual determination: The Full Bench accepted the trial judge's factual finding that the contract with the Madras Corporation was carried on as a joint family business rather than a separate business of the 1st defendant. The Court relied on pleadings, account entries (e.g., credits in family account books) and admissions (including the 10th defendant's role in writing the accounts and the 8th defendant's admission) to uphold the trial court's conclusion.
(B) Survey of authorities and doctrinal tensions):
- The Court examined the classical proposition quoted from Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan that no individual or branch can be said to have a definite share while the family remains undivided. It acknowledged the logical force of that rule.
- It then surveyed modern developments: judicial recognition in Madras (and Bombay) of alienations by coparceners, the rights of alienees (fractional share passes as at date of alienation), attachment for personal debts, insolvency vesting shares in Official Assignees, and other practical interventions. Cases such as Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya, Deendyal Lal, and related Privy Council decisions were invoked to show that these developments operate to create a present, ascertainable interest in a coparcener at a given point in time.
- The Court reviewed the competing decisions: Manjanatha v. Narayana (Madras Full Bench, which held prior partial partitions should be accounted for) and Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam (Bombay decision declining to follow Manjanatha and preferring rebus sic stantibus distribution). The Court also examined the use and authority of the Smriti Chandrika and related textual authorities and noted that Madras decisions had doubted or limited its force in the Presidency.
- The Court acknowledged the strong practical objections against the method advocated by Manjanatha (survivorship complications, valuation difficulties, potential for anomalous debits), but it also observed that Manjanatha itself recognized survivorship issues and did not disregard them; moreover, complete avoidance of injustice is impossible whichever principle is adopted.
(C) Application and conclusion):
- The Chief Justice and the other members of the Bench concluded that equity and the realities of modern practice have eroded the strict 'water-tight' classical rule. Because courts have for a long period permitted transferability and attachment of coparcenary interests, a coparcener (and analogously a branch) can at a particular time be regarded as possessing an ascertainable fractional interest that equity can recognize and charge.
- Stare decisis played an important role: the Court emphasized the long-standing acceptance (nearly 50 years in Madras) and practical reliance on the Manjanatha rule in the Presidency; disturbing that rule would unsettle many titles and transactions carried out in reliance on it.
- Balancing these considerations, the Full Bench held that Manjanatha v. Narayana remains good law in the Madras Presidency, and that a prior partial partition must be taken into account when determining shares at a subsequent partition. The Bench accepted that practical difficulties exist but held they do not justify overruling the established rule in this jurisdiction; the Court also clarified that the accounting should operate by reference to share-fractions rather than absolute numbers of shares to avoid anomalies.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Answered in the affirmative. The Full Bench held that when there has been a partition of one or more members in a joint Hindu family while the other members remain united, that earlier partition is to be taken into account in determining the shares due to the various branches at a subsequent partition — i.e., the rule in Manjanatha v. Narayana is still good law in the Madras Presidency and must be applied.
Implications:
- Direct effect in this dispute: The Court applied the principle of Manjanatha to the facts of the case. Anantakrishna Aiyar J. illustrated the arithmetic application: the plaintiff's branch (being one of four branches) was entitled to one-fourth of the family properties; after Sudarsan Sah had earlier taken a third of that one-fourth, the remaining representatives of that branch (the plaintiff and the 10th Defendant) were entitled to the remaining two-thirds of the one-fourth, i.e., two‑twelfths of the family properties, and the plaintiff's share was therefore one‑twelfth. (This arithmetical application appears in the judgment as the concrete disposition of shares.)
- No novel rule displacing prior authority was created: instead the Court reaffirmed and applied existing Madras precedent (Manjanatha v. Narayana) and emphasized stare decisis. The decision preserves the established Madras approach to accounting for prior partial partitions rather than adopting the Bombay approach of ignoring prior partitions.
- Practical guidance: the Court stressed that accountings should operate by reference to share‑fractions (not raw counts of shares) to avoid anomalies; it also acknowledged practical difficulties (valuation, survivorship, births/deaths between partitions) but treated them as manageable and not decisive against the established rule.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material and statements present in the provided opinion; no extra-textual facts or inferences beyond the opinion's content have been introduced.
Pakenham Walsh, J. — This is a suit by the plaintiff for partition of joint family properties and for delivery of his share. One Munusami Sah, Sankar Sah (1st defendant), Chinnasami Sah and Ponnusami Sah were four brothers. The 1st defendant is one of the above four who is alive. Munusami Sah had three sons and a daughter. One son Sudarsan Sah filed O. S. No. 63 of 1910, got a share and separated himself from the family; the second son Chender Sah is the 10th defendant and plaintiff is the third son. Various other members of the family are set out in the genealogical tree and it is unnecessary to particularise them further here. The plaintiff is the appellant.
There are only two questions in the appeal; one of fact and one of law. The one of fact is, whether the contract with the Madras Corporation was a separate business of the 1st defendant or a joint family business. The learned Judge has found on the question of fact that it is a joint family business and I have no hesitation in agreeing with him. The family was one which traded by taking contracts, but the plaintiff alleges that this contract with the Madras Corporation was solely carried on by the 1st defendant. Paragraph 9 of the plaint states that the 1st and 8th defendants have been carrying on a family trade in gold lace, lametta and other goods and have also been carrying on the family contracts on behalf of the joint family with the Government, for the supply of badges and for stitching uniforms to the Army, Police, etc. Under such circumstances there is no reason to suppose that the contract with the Corporation would also not have been a joint family business. The chief argument urged against this is that in the written statement filed by the present 1st defendant in the partition suit he puts himself down as a debtor to the family in a sum of Rs. 9,000 (item No. 214). This admittedly represents the value of materials which had been handed over to the family by one Chokkalinga Naicker who was indebted to the family and had undertaken the contract with the Corporation. At the time of this partition suit, the contract with the Madras Corporation had not been taken up by the plaintiff's family and the plaintiff in that suit was therefore not concerned with it. The 1st defendant has explained why under the circumstances he showed himself as a debtor for this amount to the family. In the Thundukanakku with a Chetti for sums borrowed on account of this contract, there is a credit for Rs. 1,359-3-9 in respect of lametta which obviously refers to joint family business in that commodity. Moreover, the 10th defendant who supports the plaintiff's case that the contract business was not joint family business admits that he was writing the accounts for it. He stated first that he only began to do so in 1915 but had to admit that he had written them ever since the contract was entered into in 1910 and he could only give the lame explanation that he wrote them as he was asked to. The other adult members of the family were in fact writing these accounts though plaintiff professes that he kept entirely aloof. The 8th Defendant admits that the contract was a joint family one and I have no hesitation in agreeing with the finding of the Court of First Instance in this matter.
The second question, which is one of law, is much more difficult and turns on the point whether the share taken by the Plaintiff's branch of the family when his brother Sudarsana became divided is to be taken into account or not in making the present partition. The learned Judge following the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana, has held that the share must be taken into account and he has accordingly granted the plaintiff only instead of ⅛. We have been asked to make a reference to a Full Bench as to whether this decision is still good law. The grounds urged against its correctness may be summarised as follows:—
(1) That it proceeds on a wrong principle of law in holding that the share of any member or branch of an undivided Hindu family can be predicated before an actual partition is made and that a view opposite to Manjanatha v. Narayana, has been taken in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam(2).
(2) That the Smriti Chandrika which is invoked by the learned Judges in Manjanatha v. Narayana, in support of their view has since been held to be not an authority and that failing this the Mayukha which holds in an opposite sense is good law in this Presidency unless it is opposed to the Mitakshara.
(3) That the argument relied on that those who have capacity to confer spiritual benefits on the common ancestor ought to take equal shares, is no longer sound in law.
(4) That even as regards equality, it cannot be secured by taking a previous division into account, that such a course may actually work inequality and that it is impracticable in execution. We are asked to hold that the correct law is that adopted in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam in which Manjanatha v. Narayana was considered and dissented from.
Turning to the first argument, the principle that the share of any member cannot be predicated until the partition is actually effected was laid down by the Privy Council as long ago as Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan(3). Lord Westbury says:
“According to the true notion of an undivided family in Hindu, Law no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, the particular member, had a certain definite share.”
Mayne on Hindu Law, page 346, paragraph 270, is also quoted. He says:
“It is common to say that in an undivided family each member transmits to his issue his own share in the joint property, and that such issue takes per capita inter se, but per stirpes as regards the issue of other members. But it must always be remembered that this is only a statement of what would be their rights on a partition. Until a partition all their rights consist merely in a common enjoyment of the common property, to which is further added the right of male issue to forbid alienations, made by their direct ancestors”
It is urged on the other side that though it may not be quite correct to talk about any branch or member having a vested interest in a joint family, nevertheless in this Presidency a member has in a certain sense a definite share at any moment which he can alienate and that his power to alienate extends to the share to which he would be entitled if division took place at the time of alienation and the alienee's right will not be diminished by subsequent births in the coparcenary. Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti. It is also urged that advances made to a coparcener for private purposes and not for the benefit of the family considered as a whole can be adjusted at partition. [Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick]. It is further contended for the respondent that one branch cannot take more than its share by effecting a separate partition amongst its members while the rest of the family remains united and it was endeavoured to deduce this equality of the sons from the text in Yajnavalkya 120 and Vignanesvara's commentary thereon. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the Respondents has furnished a translation of the text and of the commentary. Speaking for myself, I do not see any reason to prefer it to that given in Setlur. The latter translates Pitruthas () “according to father.” It appears to me to be preferable to “through the fathers.” It is also the translation in Mandlik. In the commentary it is no doubt true that the words Pithrudwaraneva () are very emphatic and I take it that they literally mean “verily through the door formed by the father.” The words Naswaroopapekshaya () which Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar translates “not by reason of their own personal being” are if I may say so respectfully better rendered by Colebrooke “not with respect to themselves” though it is difficult to give an exact English equivalent of Swaroopa (). I may note that in a case before my learned brother Devadoss, J., and myself the very same text and the same commentary have been quoted to show quite the opposite thing, namely, that the sons really represent the grandfather's estate and that the only way the father comes in is as a mere measure or quotient. For the purposes of the present case, it appears to me to be immaterial which view we adopt, i.e, whether we stress the importance of the Father or reduce him to a mere mathematical quotient, because the text does not throw any light on whether the father's share is to be deemed to remain the same at the second partition as it was before the partition which is the point in question here. There is no doubt that the view of the Privy Council in Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick, must have been well known to their Lordships at the time they decided Manjanatha v. Narayana.
The second argument is about the Smriti Chandrika. It is urged firstly that some later decisions go to show that it is no longer of force in the Madras Presidency and secondly it is pointed out that even if it is an authority it has no application to the present case. As regards the first point, we are referred to Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma, Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya(4) and Kristnayya v. Guravayya(5). Although Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma does not show that the Smriti Chandrika was referred to, it will be seen from Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya that its authority was urged in defence of the view which the Court ultimately declined to accept. Curiously enough, in that case, the learned Counsel who supported the view, which was opposed to the Smriti Chandrika, is reported as quoting Manjanatha v. Narayana, to show that the Smriti Chandrika ought not to be accepted whore it differs from the Mitakshara; whereas in Manjanatha v. Narayana, it is actually invoked in aid of the Court's decision. Their Lordships decided the case Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya following an unreported decision in A. S. No. 170 of 1901 by three Judges Subramanya Aiyar, Benson and Bhashyam Ayangar. The judgment in Kristrayya v. Venkatramayya does not mention the Smriti Chandrika at all and the learned Judges merely say “We do not think that this contention” (i.e, that the son of a re-united brother would not have the status of a re-united member with his uncle) can be supported by any text of the Hindu Law or by any reported case. In that case, Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana(6) was relied on. But the most important case cited by the plaintiff to show that the Smriti Chandrika is not an authority in this Presidency is Kristnayya v. Guravayya. Phillips, J., remarks:
“In Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya a Pull Bench of this Court held that this contention of proportionate shares could not be supported by any text of the Hindu Law and was opposed to the fundamental conception of the status of an undivided Hindu family or of a re-united Hindu family. Whether this passage in Smriti Chandrika was quoted before the learned Judges in that case does not appear from the report; but it was quoted in a later case reported in Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma, in which a Bench of this Court declined to accept the authority of the Smriti Chandrika: and followed a previous Full Bench ruling.”
The learned Judge states that there is one case in which a single Judge of this Court (Sankaran Nair, J.,) held the contrary view, but that the balance of authority was in favour of the view that on re-union the members are remitted to their former status. The Smriti Chandrika lays down the opposite of this. The other Judge in that case, Krishnan, J., expressed no opinion about the Smriti Chandrika. At the time when Manjanatha v. Narayana was decided, there was some uncertainty whether when one member becomes divided the question whether the others separated or remained joint was purely one of fact. It is now settled law that it is simply a question of fact and no legal fiction of separation and re-union has to be invoked. The last decision on this point is Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar. In the present case, the very terms of the first division state that the rest of the family remained joint. Vide Ex, A (plaint in C. S. No. 63 of 1910, paragraph 4). The importance of this point lies in this that if the rest of the family remained joint, as they undoubtedly did, the Smriti Chandrika which refers only to partition after the family has become re-united and says that under these circumstances division may be unequal if the re-united partners had brought unequal shares to the common stock has no application and can be merely used as an analogy. In fact, Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar frankly admitted that he did not rely on the Smriti Chandrika to support his position and argued that even in Manjanatha v. Narayana it was only used by way of analogy. The danger of such an analogy has been pointed out in Debt Parshad v. Thakur Dial a Full Bench case. Their Lordships say:
“It is dangerous then to draw an analogy from the special rules which apply to the devolution of the shares of re-united brethren. Indeed, the circumstance that rules have been specially prescribed to regulate the devolution of the common property of re-united brethren affords ground for arguing that they were exceptions to the ordinary rules regulating the partition of the common property of an undivided family.”
Therefore, as regards the second argument it would appear (1) that the authority of the Smriti Chandrika in this Presidency has been doubted and departed from, (2) that even if it is accepted, it has no application to the case where the family remains joint after the partition and in the view of Allahabad it even tells the other way. The importance of this lies in the fact that one of the reasons why the Bombay High Court in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam felt itself entitled to dissent from the Madras decision was that the Madras High Court relied on the authority of the Smriti Chandrika which has no direct authority in Gujerat wherefrom the Bombay case came, and that the Mayukha was opposed to it. If the Smriti Chandrika has no authority in Madras or if the passage relied on does not apply to the case before us, and if it cannot he shown that the principle laid down in the Mayukha is opposed to the Mitakshara, then the argument that we should follow the principle of Mayukha receives great weight.
The third ground of argument is that one of the reasons of the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana namely that equality of funeral oblations implies equality in partition is now obsolete, as religious efficacy as a test for a heritage has been exploded by a series of cases of which Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayek Venkatesh Kothekar is the latest and that religious efficacy is now confined to cases of rival claims to succession between two bandhus of equal status, where it is said that the greater religious efficacy of one may be accounted as a ground of preference over the other. On the other side, it was pointed out that the son of the great grandson is not one of the coparcenary, because he cannot offer the funeral cake although from the point of consanguinity he is the direct descendant of the propositus.
Mayne, 9th edition, page 347, section 271.
Coming now to the fourth argument, that the alleged inequity of not taking into account the previous partition is not a fact, it was remarked in the Bombay case that if the family had increased in wealth since the partition it would be depriving that branch in which partition had taken place of their share in that increase to make the second partition with reference to the first and it was also observed that it would deprive them of the benefit which they would have got by survivorship from one or more of the stirpes in the interval between the partitions. Hayward, J., says:
“It seems to me, indeed, impracticable to frame any rule which would ensure absolute equality for all circumstances.”
On the other side, it is argued that according to the law in Bombay, sons and grandsons cannot claim partition against their fathers and uncles while the latter are alive and that this makes an important distinction when considering the argument of the Bombay High Court that the other members of the family can divide if they wish to and if they choose to remain united they take the risk of doing so. In other words, as was tersely stated by Muttuswami Aiyar, J., in Manjanatha v. Narayana.
“It is anomalous to hold that in a case where two brothers, each of whom may have several sons and grandsons, desire to separate, all the members should be forced to separate, the sons and grandsons from their father and grandfather.”
These are the arguments that have been adduced for and against the supposed equity of the doctrine laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana.
The fourth argument which deals with the practicability of having regard to a previous partition is of considerable importance, though, of course, if the law clearly enjoins that such a partition must be taken into account, then in spite of all difficulties, the law must be carried out; but the difficulties are very considerable. In Manjanatha v. Narayana Muttuswami Aiyar distinctly states that he does not overlook the matter of survivorship, and is not to be understood as saying that the right of survivorship on the birth of new coparceners between the first and second partitions will in no case increase or decrease the shares to be allotted at the second partition. It is obvious that if the principle is to be applied even while the propositus is alive and capable of begetting more sons, it might happen that the share taken by one member or members of a branch at the first division would be greater than the share which that branch would be entitled to at the time of the second division; consequently its members at the second division would get nothing at all or might even be held to be indebted to the other branches. When the propositus be dead, it is clear that the share of each branch may be increased by survivorship. It is therefore absolutely impossible to start the calculation by predicating a fixed share to each stirpes or by stating that the share which the stirpes held at the time of the first partition is the same as it held at the second. We must therefore certainly begin at the other end by calculating the shares as if the family were being partitioned for the first time and then deduct from the branch the share which it has already drawn. This again leads to considerable difficulties. Suppose one member to have been very anxious to leave the coparcenary and to have had a partition effected taking only a small amount of what really was due to him. When we are calculating the amount to be taken by this branch at the second division, are we to take it that this member received his full share on the previous occasion or merely debit the branch with what he actually took? Again, if the share is not taken in money but in property, have we got to go back and calculate the value of the property at the time of the previous division or are we to take it at its present value? Even in the present case, we have had two contentions (assuming that the view of the learned Judge is correct) as to the method of division, one is that since at the former partition A. M. Sudarsan Sah who went away took , the present plaintiff's branch (Plaintiff and his brother) should take one quarter minus , i.e, th or each th. This is the method which has been adopted by the learned Judge of this Court and it is the method which was contended for but not allowed in the Bombay case. On the other hand, it is argued for the Plaintiff that we should consider that there are 11 shares left in the family after the departure of A. M. Sudarsan Sah of which Plaintiff would get one share or of the whole estate. It was argued that the result in Manjanatha v. Narayana was reached by this method, but Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the Respondents has shown that in the Madras case the result obtained can be reached by the other method. The principle of Stare decisis has of course been strongly urged upon us. But there do not appear to have been any reported cases since Manjanatha v. Narayana where this precise point arose. In A. S. No. 223 of 1917, the question was whether, when a father only had separated both from his own father and from his son and the son remained joint with his grandfather, the son was liable for a mortgage binding on the latter. In that case, Manjanatha v. Narayana, was only referred to on the question as to whether the withdrawal of some members of a branch affected the application of the principle of representation as between the different branches. Sir John Wallis, C. J., notices the decision in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam in the following words:
“The decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana, has been dissented from in Bombay in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam, on grounds to some extent peculiar to that Presidency. As at present advised, I see no sufficient reason for differing from it in this Presidency; but whatever the basis on which Manickam's share should be calculated on a fresh partition, I think the parties to Ex. 1 clearly manifested the intention that Manickam should remain united with his grandfather's branch.”
Spencer, J., says:
“The importance of the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana is, so far as this Presidency is concerned, not seriously affected by the doubt thrown upon the correctness of the rule laid down therein as to the shares to be taken in a partition between reunited coparceners, in the case of Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam seeing that the Madras decision purported to follow the doctrine of the Smriti Chandrika and the Vombay decision adopted the rule prescribed in the Vyavahara Mayukha which was of greater local authority.”
It is clear therefore that Manjanatha v. Narayana was only mentioned in this connection with reference to the question as to whether a member, whose share had been notionally calculated for purposes of effecting a previous division became separated by this previous notional partition or remained united, and the basis on which the shares should be calculated in the second division did not arise at all for determination.
Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam appears to have been a case of first impression in that Presidency and I cannot help thinking that the principle of Manjanatha v. Narayana cannot have been widely known or availed of in this Presidency, because considering the numerous difficulties in working out a second partition which takes account of the share taken away in a former partition, it would seem almost inevitable that some cases would have come up afterwards for decision on these difficult questions. But there appears to be no subsequent case on the point. This may perhaps indicate that in practice the principle laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana has not been followed and if so there may not be so much force in the argument of “stare decisis” in this case even though it is one of succession, as to justify a refusal to make a reference on the point. I would therefore propose that my Lord the Chief Justice be asked to refer the following question to a Full Bench:—
“When there has been a partition of one or more members in a joint Hindu family, the other members remaining united, is this partition to be taken into account in determining the share due to the various branches in a subsequent partition, as laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana or should subsequent partition be made rebus sic stantibus as at the time of such subsequent partition?
The Chief Justice.—I agree.
[This Original Side Appeal came on for hearing on the 29th and 30th days of January, 1929, and on the 18th; 19th and 20th days of February, 1929, before a Full Bench constituted as above.]
Messrs. K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, N. Rajagopalan, and P. V. Sudarsana Raju for Appellant.
Messrs. V. V. Srinivasa Aiyangar, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, V. Ramaswami Aiyar and K. Rajah Aiyar for the Respondents.
OPINION.
The Chief Justice. — The facts which give rise to the question we have to decide are set out at the beginning of the judgment of my brother Anantakrishna Ayyar. The point is a very short one and, were the whole matter to be regarded as being at large, I should attach very great weight to the arguments addressed to us with much learning by Mr. K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar. There can be no doubt of the logic of the statement that, until an actual partition arises, no member of a coparcenary can be said to have a share nor can any branch of the whole family; but in my opinion it is far too late to apply all those logical rules in their strictness to Hindu Law as we find it to-day. Modifications have been found necessary as, for instance, in the case of the alienee from a member of the coparcenary who is allowed to stand in his shoes and enforce a partition. See Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Shav Persad Singh where their Lordships frankly concede that the sanctioning of such transactions can be justified not by strict Hindu Law but by necessary implications of equity. Similarly with regard to a partial partition as in the present case, and I think it may be taken as settled law now that the separation of one branch of the family does not involve a notional partition of the whole property including all the members with the corresponding legal fiction that the remaining branches or members are to be deemed to have re-united. The appellant most strongly relied on the pronouncement of Lord Westbury in Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan in which he says:
“No individual member (of an undivided family) while he is remaining undivided can predicate of the joint and undivided property that he, that particular member, has a certain definite share.”
That is indisputable. But it is quite possible to predicate what would be the share of the branch to which the dividing brothers under the partial partition belong or of the individuals who pass out of the family on a partition on that date. It was held by this Court in Manjanatha v. Narayana that, when the eventual complete partition took place, the branch to which those members belonged and who had under the partial partition taken their shares and passed out of the family was to be debited in the ultimate reckoning and that the remaining members of the branch were not to be allowed to claim what would stand to be their share at that ultimate reckoning on the footing that the family property is to be regarded as divisible on the final partition among the co-sharers then existing without any reference to the partial partition which denuded the family property pro tanto to the extent taken away by the seceding members on the partial partition, the decision being based not on strict principles of Hindu Law but on necessary considerations of equity. With that view I am inclined myself to agree, having regard to the fact that the rules laid down under the old authorities were laid down at a time when partial partitions such as the present were not recognized in Hindu Law at all. They are now not only constantly carried out unchallenged by anybody but recognized by Courts. But I would rely rather on the principle of stare decisis. The decision reported in Manjanatha v. Narayana is nearly 50 years old. It has certainly never been questioned although, oddly enough, until the present case it has not, so far as I can ascertain, been explicitly referred to with approval or said to be followed. The inference, I think, must be that in this Presidency this principle has been followed and in numerable transactions must have taken place over that long period and I think to unsettle it now would be to cast a cloud over many titles which have stood unchallenged for long periods. It is quite true that a Division Bench in Bombay came to a different conclusion in Pranjivandas v. Ichharam and declined to follow Manjanatha v. Narayana. They put it on the ground that the decision of the Madras High Court was warranted by the authority of the Smriti Chandrika which is not followed in Western India. I do not myself wish to rest this case on the authority of the Smriti Chandrika but, so far as it goes, it does support the Respondent's position. I think it is rightly put by the learned Judges in Manjanatha v. Narayana, on the wider principle of equity which must compel the branch concerned to bring into account that portion of the family property which on the partial partition had gone to their share. That equity thus affirmed I refuse to disturb on abstract considerations based on the old Hindu Law, I think this is a case to which the maxim “Stare decisis” obviously applies and, however undesirable it is that there should be different rulings in two Presidencies on the same subject, it is after all to be remembered that the various Courts and Presidencies of this country do stand in water-tight compartments in many matters of Hindu Law and have worked out their own rules independently. The inhabitants of each Presidency in the absence of an authoritative ruling to the contrary from the Judicial Committee only act on the faith of undisturbed decisions of longstanding in their own Court. The matter is considered in detail in the judgment of Anantakrishna Ayyar, J. I only add these few words because, as the editor of the current edition of Mayne, I am in part responsible for the propositions laid down in paragraph 270 of that work on which the Appellant so strongly relies. I will take it that that paragraph lays down the strict rule of Hindu Law. As I have already pointed out, I think that there are countervailing and overriding equities which tell the other way. I agree that the answer to the question propounded should be in the affirmative.
Wallace, J.—The question referred to the Full Bench is:
“When there has been a partition of one or more members in a joint Hindu family, the other members remaining united, is this partition to be taken into account in determining the shares due to the various branches in a subsequent partition as laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana or should the subsequent partition be made rebus sic stantibus as at the time of such subsequent partition.”
This involves at the outset a consideration of what was laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana, and the reasons for the decision. The genealogy of the family in that case is given in the leading judgment of Muthuswami Ayyar, J. At a partition of 1867, of Venkatesa's branch Ramakrishna and his three sons were alive, and of Narayana's branch only his four grandsons were alive. Three of these and two of Ramakrishna's sons then separated, the former taking share and the latter leaving five shares to the joint family consisting of Ramakrishna, his third son and the remaining grandson of Narayana. In 1872 Ramakrishna died. In 1879 his third son sued the remaining coparcener and claimed three-fifth share. The Subordinate Judge held that he and his coparcener shared alike and awarded him 2½ out of 5 shares. The High Court held that he was entitled to the three shares claimed by him on the footing that Narayana's branch had already had 4 out of the 6 shares originally due to that branch, while Venkatesa's branch had only had 3 of the 6 shares due to that branch. Thus there were only 2 shares left for the Defendant in that suit, the grandson to Narayana, and 3 shares left for the Plaintiff; the grandson of Venkatesa.
The question to be decided by the High Court in that case reduced to the simplest terms was this; when there are two branches of a joint family and one member of one branch separates leaving the rest still joint, is the share already taken by him to be deducted from the share due to his branch at a subsequent partition, or is it to be entirely ignored and the subsequent partition effected as if it was in itself an entirely new and complete partition? The learned Judges proceeded on the footing that the root principle of Hindu Law to be applied to the case was the desire to “ensure equality of partition in eases of vested interests held in coparcenary”—thus premising that each branch, qua branch, has before partition a vested interest in its theoretical fractional share, the share which would be due to it on a mental computation of the share which would come to it at an actual partition if then made; that is, that each branch theoretically has a fixed fractional share which is the whole share available to its members—a share which would fluctuate only by increase or decrease in the branches and not by increase or decrease among the members of the branches. The right of survivorship would thus operate in water-tight compartments within each branch so long as that branch is not extinct. Except when the share of a branch has been increased or diminished by the extinction or addition of other branches, the fractional share allotable to the branch is fixed and is not enlarged by virtue of the separation of any members of it. Sons come in through their father and represent him, and so long as there are co-parceners in each branch) the operation of the right of survivorship is precluded by the right of representation.
The Bench in Manjanatha v. Narayana came to its decision on a consideration of three points:—
(1) The equality of sharing under the Hindu Law is an equality of the vested interest of each branch as representing each son of the same father who had each a capacity to confer an equal amount of spiritual benefit on him.
(2) Any other principle would, when there has been a partial severance of the joint family by one or more members taking his or their shares and going off, result in an inequitable division unfair to branches which had remained whole in the joint family.
(3) The assistance of the Smrithi Chandrika was called in in order to draw an analogy between this principle of partition and what the Smrithi Chandrika lays down as the principle of second partition among re-united coparceners, namely, that the shares will be proportionate to what each brought into the common stock at re-union, a theory evidently based on the idea that the separation by partition by one member involves notionally a complete partition of the whole family and a re-union of the rest.
All these propositions are attacked by the Appellant as being opposed to the Hindu Law. The first, in so far as the equality of sharing is based on the capacity of the sharers to confer spiritual benefit on the common ancestor, has admittedly now fallen out of favour so far as this Presidency is concerned as being not in accordance with the Mitakshara law. The third proposition must in view of the later development of the interpretation of Hindu Law, be regarded as no longer sound. It appears to be now well established that a re-union after partition restores the joint-family status so that that status does not in any essential differ from the status of the family before partition. See Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma Kristrayya v. Venkataramayya Kristnayya v. Guravayya and Govinddoss Krishnadoss v. Gokuldoss Govardhandoss. So that the question before us resolves itself into a consideration of the legality of predicating “vested interest” of a branch in its notional fractional share and of the alleged inequity to the joint family, which is the point noted above as point No. 2. The Appellant here maintains that such considerations of equity are irrelevant and that we must be guided entirely by the basic principle of Hindu Law, and quotes the well-known proposition of Lord Westbury in Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan, which is too familiar to require quotation. He contends that the predication by the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana of vested interests in branches is contrary to this principle, and that no member, and therefore no set of members and no branch, can while the family remains joint, predicate that it has a definite share. On the other side it is argued that, while this may be a correct statement of the original theory of the joint family status as applicable to a case of complete partition, Hindu law does not specifically deal with partial partition and therefore does not provide for any method of accounting and debiting which may be equitable when a partial partition has already occurred, and that the law itself as now laid down is continually predicating that at any given moment a coparcener can claim that he has a definite share and has it in his own possession, sp much so that he can alienate it to others for value or a Court of law will hold it under attachment for a decree debt due by him; [see Lakshman Dada Naick v. Ramachandra Dada Naik Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser], so that the above theory of the joint family status has been considerably modified in practice and is no longer good law, or perhaps to put it in another way, the rules of strict Hindu Law apply, and were only intended to apply to cases where there had been no previous partial partition and where no question arises of the rights of third parties. To this it is rejoined that such modifications as the law has allowed are founded entirely on considerations of equity towards strangers and do not affect the law on the status of the members of a joint family inter se, and that the statement of the Hindu Law enunciated by Lord Westbury still remains good law unaffected by the inroads of theoretical postulates carried out in the sacred name of equity, with which inroads the Court has nothing to do when the question for decision is entirely one between members of the joint family and in no way affects or involves the interests of outsiders.
Now I do not think it is possible to accept this last proposition in its entirety and hold that Hindu law is still such a water-tight compartment unaffected by what goes on outside. To take the law as to the rights of an alienee to whom a coparcener has transferred his share for valuable consideration, it has no doubt been repeatedly laid down from the earliest times that what the alienee obtains is no more than the right to claim partition as against the other coparceners, which was the right possessed by his alienor. [See Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser and in this Court Manjaya v. Shanmuga Maharajah of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu and Balabhadra Patro v. Khetra Doss(7)]. But if this is so, then in strict reasoning the alienee's right when he brings his suit would be no more than a right to stand in the shoes of his alienor if his alienor were then suing for partition instead of the alienee; that is, the alienee would be entitled to a decree for his alienor's share as at the time of partition however long that may be postponed after the date of the alienation. But the well-established law is that the alienee's right is to the fractional share to which his alienor was entitled on the date of the alienation, if he had then claimed and carried through a partition. Clearly then the alienee is held entitled not merely to claim partition but to claim to be given his alienor's interest in the property not at the time of partition but at the time of alienation. It follows that his alienor had at that time something to sell which was not merely a right to claim partition but some real and definite interest in the property which could be the subject of a legal transfer of property. This view is strengthened when it is remembered that it is also established law (see Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya that the death of the alienor between the date of alienation and the date of the alienee's suit makes no difference to the right of the alienee to enforce partition and to obtain a decree for the share which was alienated to him. If the alienee can claim nothing but the right to claim partition, a mere right in personam, then as that right could not survive beyond the death of the alienor he would take nothing but on the contrary the law says that he takes the interest of the alienor at the time of the alienation. Now all this clearly re-acts on the joint-family itself and its interests. Strict Hindu Law says that on the death of a coparcener his coparceners take his share by survivorship. It also says that a coparcener cannot alienate property at all because he is not individually possessed of any and that such an alienation is void against the joint family. Therefore as the law now stands, the equity done to the alienee is not only at the expense of his alienor but at the expense of the whole joint family.
This breach in the water-tight compartment is widened still further when we regard the present state of the law in a case of insolvency, that by the insolvency of a coparcener, of course for personal debts, his share vests in the Official Assignee and is thus lost to the joint family, a proposition evidently implied by the Privy Council in its judgment reported at Sat Narain v. Behari Lal. That share can vest in the Official Assignee only if it first vested in the insolvent coparcener, and the vesting of a share is a very different thing from a mere claim to partition. Here again the death of the coparcener before partition would not restore to the joint family the share which had vested in the Official Assignee.
A still further breach is made when we consider the law in this Presidency at least, that the share of a coparcener can be attached for a personal decree debt, and when once attached will be held by the Court to satisfy the debt even if the coparcener dies before the Court sale. It is difficult to realize how a mere claim to partition is attachable. Clearly, here also the theory is that some tangible interest vests in the coparcener which can be the subject of attachment and Court sale. The Privy Council has even gone so far as to speak of an attaching decree-holder having a charge on that interest (see Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh or a lien on the share (see Deendyal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh, though attachment per se cannot create a charge on any property, much less on what is not property at all but a mere claim to partition. I have indicated in Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Official Receiver of Tinnevelly my view that the meaning of the use of the word “charge” or “lien” is that the Court employs its hold over the attached property for the benefit of the attaching decree-holder. However that may be, the attaching decree-holder benefits at the expense not only of his judgment-debtor coparcener but of the joint family as well.
I do not think the conclusion can be resisted that as the law stands it involves the proposition that a coparcener possesses and can transfer something much nearer to real property than a mere claim to partition. It is an interest in property, indefinite from the point of view that it may fluctuate in extent from time to time, but definite and ascertainable at any particular point of time and actually made definite and ascertained by the act of the coparcener seizing and using it for his benefit and holding it as against the possession and use of it to which the joint family as a whole is entitled. The act of alienation makes definite the indefinite interest which the coparcener has and fixes it so that it is unaffected by any internal change within the joint family, or by any of the rules of Hindu Law about devolution on death. So far, the Courts have not gone so far as to hold that an alienation per se is such an expression by the alienor of his unequivocal intention to separate as is sufficient to effect a severance of the alienor from the joint family, and at present the law is that the alienor, in spite of the alienation, remains a member of the joint family Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya, although the suit by the alienee for partition would presumably sever an alienor entirely from the joint family and the alienee must always sue for partition of the alienor's whole share. See Manjaya v. Shanmuga.
As to the method of computation of the shares which the alienor can dispose of, it is now well settled in this Presidency at least by the Full Bench decision in Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetty relying on the Privy Council cases in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser that what passes is the fractional share at the time of the alienation, and neither the definite share to be determined at the time of partition nor the money value of the share. The constant factor, if that phrase may be used, is the fractional share and not the value.
The net result of the law as it stands seems to be this, that each member of the joint family, has at any definite period of time a present vested interest in the fractional share which would be his if a partition was then and there made, and which would, by a partition at his will and pleasure, be converted into a separate interest. It seems to follow that each branch has a similar vested interest in the share which would come to it, and could, I take it, equally well dispose of its share as the individual coparcener can dispose of his. The extent of the theoretical share, of course will, as pointed out already, fluctuate with births and deaths in the joint family but it is predicable with sufficient definiteness at any moment of time to be transferable. This sort of interest is just the sort of holding by a branch of an undivided fractional share at any moment of time as if divided, which is the essence of the principle in Manjanatha v. Narayana. That case is therefore not wrong in predicating such a vested interest in the branch.
The question then is whether we can go further with it and say that the fractional share which represents that vested interest remains a constant factor so long as there is no increase or decrease in the branches. Undoubtedly, when a coparcener disposes of his share or part of it, he will, on a partition, be debited with what he has taken. See the judgment of Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., in Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya. I can see nothing illegal or inequitable in the same principle being applied to a branch. We have seen that equity towards the alienee demands the sacrifice of the joint family as well as of the alienor. Equity equally demands that the alienor shall make good to the joint family, so far as he can, the sacrifice he has made it suffer. Hence the system of accounting and debiting against the coparcener has a sound foundation in equity, and the principle is not different for a branch, especially when, as the Manjanatha v. Narayana case points out division under Hindu Law involves first the reckoning of the number of branches and a division equally among them. The branch has had for itself whatever any member of it has taken from the joint family. I can see no difference in principle between predicating for the sake of equity this sort of definite interest in his share by a coparcener and debiting against him whatever he has allocated to himself and uses for himself, and predicating also for the sake of equity the same sort of interest by a branch in the share due to the branch and debiting it with whatever has been taken away from the other branches by any member of it, the share in each case being reckoned as the fractional share to which the coparcener or branch is entitled.
It is clearly not the case that this modification of the strict Hindu Law is entirely evoked in order to do equity to the outsider. It is as necessary for the purpose of doing equity to the joint family as a whole, and it is here I think that Manjanatha v. Narayana rests upon firm foundation. When once equity has been allowed to invade the realm of strict Hindu Law it is merely a question of how far it is to be allowed to go. The Manjanatha v. Narayana case has laid down that it shall be allowed to interfere so far as to distribute the proportion of shares in the manner there laid down, and it is not difficult to see that that method is based on considerations of equity towards the joint family itself. In such cases, a mental, although not a real, ledger is maintained against the appropriating coparcener or branch even while the joint family remains joint. If some principle of this kind is not adopted clearly there would be a wild rush amongst coparceners to alienate their shares, and those who are hind most, particularly minors, would suffer grievous loss.
It is not difficult, of course, to conceive of cases in which any kind of distribution would be inequitable towards some members. From one point of view, it might be considered inequitable that a separated member should lose his share in any increase in the general joint family property. In some cases the value of the fractional share alienated by the alienating coparcener may by no means be the same as the value of the share which the Court actually decrees to the alienee at the time of his suit. But the manifest inequity of rejecting the principle laid down in the Manjanatha v. Narayana, case was put before us in a hypothetical case by the learned counsel for the respondents, and I do not think that the learned counsel on the other side gave an adequate answer to that by saying that the joint family can always avoid such results by a suit for complete partition. The interests of minors in particular would be grossly prejudiced thereby, while compulsory separation amongst members who do not wish to divide is not necessarily an advantage to them, and the law, as it at present stands, does not allow several coparceners of a joint family to sue jointly in order to expel one delinquent member. It may be that, under considerations of equity, in future the law may decide that it should go further towards modifying the strict principles of Hindu Law than it has so far done, but at present it is not necessary for us to decide more than the question referred to us namely, whether the Manjanatha v. Narayana ruling is still good law. Equality amongst the sons of fathers is of the essential spirit of Hindu Law and the Manjanatha v. Narayana, case endeavours to secure that result by preventing any branch from eating part of its cake and keeping the whole. Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam which is relied upon strongly by the other side, endeavours to secure that equality by ignoring the fact that any of the cake has already been eaten and by dividing the remainder equally. The Manjanatha v. Narayana case decides that equity demands that at a second partition regard must be had to the state of the family before the first partition; the Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam case decides that equity does not demand such an in road on Hindu Law. Of the two principles, I prefer that laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana especially as the secondary principle of stare decisis is also in its favour. The judgment in Manjanatha v. Narayana has stood for over forty years as the law in this Presidency, and we cannot doubt that numbers of partitions have been effected, or deliberately abstained from, on the faith of the decision there given that the rights of members of the family inter se were thereby legally determined. I cannot therefore see any justification for upsetting what has been the recognized law in this Presidency for so long a period. I would therefore answer the reference by saying that the law laid down in Manjanatha v. Narayana is still good law.
Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.—A Hindu Mitakshara undivided family consisted of four brothers and their sons. One of the sons of one of the four brothers filed a suit for partition and delivery to him of his share in the joint family properties; the Court granted him a decree in respect of his share and all the other members of the family remained joint. Some years afterwards; and after the death of the four brothers, a suit for partition was brought by the remaining members of that branch, i.e, by the other brothers of the person who was Plaintiff in the previous suit, against the sons of the other three brothers, and the question raised is whether in this second partition the share that was decreed to the Plaintiff in the prior suit should be taken into account.
The Hindu Law texts do not contemplate cases of partial partition, partial either as regards the property to be divided or partial as regards the coparceners who seek to become divided. But such partial partitions have been taking place for a long time and the law relating to the same is practically Judge made law.
In the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, alienations by Hindu coparceners of their shares in the joint family property for consideration have been recognized by Courts and held valid; also creditors of such coparceners have been permitted by Courts to bring to sale the shares of their debtors who happen to be coparceners in joint Hindu families. Creditors have been allowed to attach the shares of such coparceners, and in spite of the subsequent deaths of such judgment-debtors, Courts have allowed such decree-holders to realise the decree amounts by the sale of the shares of the deceased coparceners. It has been held by a Full Bench of this High Court that an alienee of the share of a Hindu coparcener gets the quantum of share which the coparcener was entitled to if partition had been effected at the date of the alienation. It has also been held that a purchaser of a specific item of joint family property from a coparcener, may be allotted the whole of the specific item, if the Court should think that the same could be done without working any injustice to the other coparceners.
As remarked by the Privy Council in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh.
“there can be little doubt that all such alienations whether voluntary or compulsory are inconsistant with the strict theory of a joint and an undivided Hindu family, and the Jaw as established in Madras and Bombay has been one of gradual growth, founded upon the equity which a purchaser for value has to be allowed to stand in his vendor's shoes and to work out his rights by means of a partition.”
The doctrine is thus founded upon principles of equity which the Courts have thought fit to apply to such cases.
Now it is unquestioned Hindu Law that when a joint Hindu family is comprised of coparceners belonging to different branches, the share of each of the branches is first taken into account whenever partition is sought for; and the shares of the members included in a particular branch are then calculated having regard to the share of the branch itself. This doctrine is based on well known principles of Hindu Law. It does not follow when one branch of a joint Hindu family separates that the other branches also become separated inter se. Just as it is open to the other branches of a joint Hindu family to remain joint even after one of the branches has separated from the rest, it is open to all the branches to remain joint even after one coparcener belonging to one of the branches became separated. When such a coparcener is partitioned off, notionally the share fraction due to the branch to which he belongs will have to be considered with a view to ascertain the exact share fraction to which such coparcener is entitled on the partition sought for by him. The share allotted to him is really a share of the share fraction to which his branch would be entitled if that branch sought partition and separation at that time from the other branches of the joint family.
The question then is when that branch (whether composed of the other members who existed at the time of the first partition or others who came to represent that branch) subsequently claims partition from the other branches of the joint family, whether the share fraction which was already allotted and given to the coparcener of that branch during the first partition should be taken into account in ascertaining the share fraction in working out the partition sought by that branch.
This question has been answered in the affirmative by Innes, O. C. J., and Muthusami Aiyar, J., in the case reported in Manjanatha v. Narayana. A contrary view, however, has been taken by the Bombay High Court in the case reported in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam.
It was argued that the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana is opposed to the fundamental conception of an undivided Hindu family and that the share due to each branch should be ascertained according to the well recognized principles and without regard being had to any shares that might have been previously allotted to particular coparceners of particular branches. The dictum of Lord Westbury in Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan was strongly relied on. At page 89, Lord Westbury stated as follows:
“According to the true notion of an undivided family in Hindu Law, no individual member of that family while it is remaining undivided can predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member, has a certain definite share. No individual member of an undivided family could go to the place of the receipt of the rent, and claim to take from the collector or receiver of the rents, a certain definite share.”
Seeing that partial partition was not recognized by the old Hindu Law givers and none of the Hindu Law texts refer to the same, it is clear that the rules relating to such partial partitions should be sought for in places other than original Hindu Law texts. The law relating to partial partition is essentially Judge made Law. Such law was moulded out of considerations of principles of Equity. Therefore one has to look to principles of Equity in adjudicating on questions relating to partial partitions. A share fraction of a branch of joint Hindu family having been allotted and given to some coparceners of that branch, it is against principles of Equity that that branch should again claim as against the other branches of the family the full share fraction due to it without in any way being affected by the share fraction already given to some coparceners of that branch. If for example branch “A” was entitled to one-third share fraction of the properties of a joint Hindu family and each of the branches B and C to a similar one-third fraction, and a coparcener of branch A entitled to a moiety of that one-third share belonging to branch A demanded partition and was allotted a moiety of one-third share of branch A, then in the subsequent partition which the remaining coparcener of branch A should demand as against branches B and C, it is just that he should be awarded only a moiety of one-third share, whereas each of the branches B and C should be allotted a one-third share. The increase or decrease in value of the property that remained after the previous partition should not be taken into account, and that which remains should be taken to represent the value of the share fraction to which the branches that remained joint were entitled. The principle of survivorship, result of new births and deaths, would all apply to the joint property that remained after the previous partition and allotment of share to the coparcener of a branch; instead of the ordinary share fraction to which branch A would ordinarily, and in the absence of special circumstances, be entitled at the time of the subsequent partition, it would be entitled only to that portion of that share fraction which remained to it after the partition was effected at the instance of the coparcener belonging to that branch. Equity and justice speak in favour of such a rule, and I do not think that we are precluded by any rules of Hindu Law from giving effect to the same.
There are observations in Mayne's Hindu Law that at the time of actual partition, a coparcener may be debited with amounts of separate expenditure incurred not for the purpose of the family in the sense in which that expression is understood, but for exclusive private and personal purposes of the coparcener. In paragraph 293 of Mayne's Hindu Law the following judgment from the Supreme Court of Bengal is quoted:
“We apprehend that at the present day when personal luxury has increased and the change of manners has somewhat modified the relations of the members of the joint Hindu family, it is by no means unusual that in the common khatta book, accounts of the separate expenditure of each member are opened and kept against him; and that on a partition even in the absence of fraud or exclusion, those accounts enter into the general account of which the final partition and allotment are made.”
In the Full Bench case reported in Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya, Justice Bhashyam Aiyangar observes as follows:
“An undivided member of a family, though he may alienate either the whole, or any part of his undivided share will continue to be an undivided member of the family with rights of survivorship between himself and the remaining members in respect of all the family property other than what he has transferred. No doubt such a member acts unfairly towards the rest of the family, and if they are dissatisfied with his so doing, their only remedy is to become divided from him, When a partition is effected subsequent to such alienation, either amicably or by suit, the property alienated will be included in such partition and debited to the share of the alienor … but sale operates upon the interest and the share of the transferor as the same existed at the date of the transfer and the transferee must work out the transfer by bringing a suit for ascertaining what the share and interest of the transferor was at the date of the transfer.”
So, the principle of debiting to the share of a coparcener at the date of the partition something with which he was specially concerned is not a new one.
The question is not so much whether an admitted principle of Hindu Law shall be carried out to its apparently logical consequences as what are the limits of an equitable doctrine established by judicial decisions. Hindu Law text writers knew nothing of partial partition. Therefore the theory and incidents of joint family and joint family property according to the genius of the Mitakshara are not the sole questions that should govern us, but it is the nature and extent of the equitable principles relating to partial partition established by modern decisions that have to be really considered and applied to such cases.
I need not consider the arguments adduced in the judgment in Manjanatha v. Narayana, derived from the doctrine of re-union or from Smrithi Chandrika; I think that the principle laid down in that case is supportable from considerations other than those derived from the doctrine relating to re-union or from the provisions of the Smrithi Chandrika. The principle of that decision has been accepted in this Presidency without any question from 1882. People have obviously on the faith of that decision regulated their conduct. Ordinarily it is open to the other coparceners of a Hindu family to claim separation of their shares whenever any co-parcener demands severance. It is clear that but for the enforcement of the principle laid down in the Manjanatha v. Narayana, the members who elected to remain joint would be seriously prejudiced if the view put forward by the plaintiff in the present suit and the view that recommended itself to the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court be accepted (see the details worked out in the Appendix at the end). The Learned Judge who tried the suit (Kumaraswami Sastri, J.), has mentioned in his judgment that the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana, has never been questioned in this Presidency, but that it has been acted on for several years, and that the principle of stare decisis requires that the said decision should not be questioned at this stage after it was taken to lay down the law in the Presidency for the last 47 years. It goes without saying that owing to various circumstances that exist at present, partial partition has become more common now-a-days. We should be unsettling rights of various persons and title to property in this Presidency should we at present overrule such a decision passed in 1882, as we were invited to do, on considerations of abstract theories regarding joint family properties and the rights of coparceners, and inferences that should logically follow from the same. It may be mentioned that even in Appovier v. Ramasubba Aiyan, the Privy Council were anxious to emphasize the doctrine of stare decisis for at page 90 it is stated.
“Undoubtedly their Lordships would be unwilling to reverse any rule regarding property which had been long and constantly acted upon in the Courts of the Presidency.”
We find that in the present case that the decision in the Manjanatha v. Narayana, has never been questioned but has been accepted as correct and acted upon in this Presidency. It will work great prejudice and injustice if such a rule should be reversed on grounds such as those suggested before us.
As regards the case reported in Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam, evidently there was no decision of the Bombay High Court prior to Pranjivandas Shivlal v. Ichharam, such as we have got in Madras. Further Mayukha is a special authority in Bombay.
The question is a difficult one. Injustice could not be totally avoided in whatever way it is answered.
The decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana has not been discussed in detail either by Mayne, Trevelyan or Ghose. Sir E. J. Trevelyan merely submits that the Bombay view is the better of the two views whereas Dr. Ghose simply says in Vol. 1, page 577 of his book (3rd edition) that the Madras view seems to be more equitable.
In the circumstances, I think, we should follow the decision in Manjanatha v. Narayana.
We must however take care to point out that it is not the actual number of shares that is to be taken into account in such cases, but only the share-fraction; otherwise anomalies are likely to occur.
What the fractional share to which any branch would be entitled would depend on the circumstances that exist at the time of partition. A fractional share of such share having been allotted to a member of that branch, it would be entitled only to the remaning fractional share of the fractional share to which it would in the circumstances be entitled in the partition.
As representing one of the four branches, the branch of which the plaintiff, the 10th Defendant, and Sudarsana Sah, were members would be entitled to one-fourth of the family properties. A third of the one-fourth, was allotted to and taken away by Sudarsana Sah by the partition proceedings of 1910. The Plaintiff and the 10th Defendant who now represent that branch of the family, would be entitled to two-thirds of that one-fourth—that is—two-twelfths of the family properties. The plaintiff is entitled to one-twelfth, his brother 10th Defendant to the other one-twelfth.
My answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is in the affirmative.
N.R.RQuestion answered in the affirmative.
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