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Kuppusami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two minor plaintiffs, represented by their mother, instituted a suit for partition against their father (1st defendant). The plaintiffs joined multiple parties as defendants: the father's step-mother (2nd defendant), her daughter (3rd defendant), the father's uncle (7th defendant), two mortgagee-creditors of the father (4th and 5th defendants), and two mortgagee-creditors of the 7th defendant (8th and 9th defendants).
The father (1st defendant) was adjudicated an insolvent on 19 December 1916. The present suit was instituted on 2 March 1917, after the adjudication. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable after the father's adjudication as an insolvent. The Subordinate Judge also refused to permit the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that certain mortgage bonds (in favour of defendants 4 and 5) secured debts not binding on the plaintiffs on account of the father's alleged immorality, treating that matter as res judicata based on findings in prior suits (O. S. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1917), in which the mortgagees had been plaintiffs and the present plaintiffs had been defendants 2 and 3.
On appeal, the High Court considered: (a) whether the prior suits' findings operated as res judicata and (b) whether, on adjudication, the whole estate over which the father had a disposing power vested in the Official Receiver (including the sons' shares) or whether only a power vested in the Receiver to deal with the property to the extent that debts were binding and unobjectionable.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the findings in the prior suits (O. S. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1917) operate as res judicata and preclude the plaintiffs from proving that the mortgage debts were not binding on them because of the father's immorality.
- Whether, on the adjudication of the father as an insolvent, the whole estate over which the father had a disposing power (including the sons' shares in joint family property) vested in the Official Receiver, or whether only a bare power to dispose vested (i.e., whether vesting is contingent on the nature of the debts).
- Whether the plaintiffs' suit for partition was barred by the father's adjudication as an insolvent.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments Presented in the Record
- The Subordinate Judge treated the prior suits as dispositive and refused to let the plaintiffs prove that the mortgage bonds in favour of defendants 4 and 5 secured debts not binding on the plaintiffs due to the father's immorality.
- It was argued on appeal (as recorded) that the Subordinate Judge was wrong to consider the prior suits as res judicata. The High Court record notes that the plaintiffs in the prior suits had abandoned their rights to claim a mortgage decree against those defendants and that the defendants against whom the prior finding was made had no right of appeal on that particular finding; accordingly that issue was not finally decided between the parties.
- Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar (identified in the opinion as arguing the point) contended that it was a condition precedent to the Official Receiver's exercising the father's power to sell the joint estate for discharge of debts that those debts should be neither illegal nor immoral — i.e., vesting or exercise of the power should depend upon the nature of the debts.
- The opposing position, reflected in the Court's discussion, was that statutory provisions (Sect. 16 and Sect. 2(e) of the Provincial Insolvency Act) effect a vesting of the whole of the insolvent's property in the Receiver upon adjudication and that nothing in those provisions makes the vesting conditional on the nature of the debts; whether debts are illegal or immoral can be determined before or after adjudication in proper proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sellamuthu Servai, In re | That an Official Assignee standing in the shoes of an insolvent father can alienate family property to pay antecedent debts, provided those debts are not tainted with illegality or immorality. | Cited as an authority establishing that an Official Assignee may alienate family property to pay antecedent debts, subject to the character of those debts. |
| Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Ayyar | Held that the sons' interest does not vest in the Official Assignee by reason of the adjudication, though he could deal with their shares if the debts were binding on the interests. | The Court considered the decision but treated it as not decisive for the present Act (it arose under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act) and as a decision that should not be treated as ruling on a point unnecessary for the decision in that case; the judgment was discussed and its concession-based origin noted. |
| Rangayya Chetti v. Thanikachalla Mudali | After a vesting order the Official Assignee had power to transfer not only the insolvent's shares but also those of his coparceners, provided debts were shown to be binding on them. | Referred to as an authoritative decision supporting transfer of coparceners' shares where debts are binding; Court treated it as followed in subsequent cases. |
| Nunna Setti v. Chidaraboyina | Consistent with Rangayya Chetti; quoted Latham, J.'s opinion in Fakirchand Motichand; discussion of source of Official Assignee's powers. | Noted as following Rangayya Chetti and as supporting the view that an Official Assignee's powers can extend to coparceners' shares. |
| Fakirchand Motichand v. Motichand Harruckchand | Opinion of Latham, J., quoted on the scope of transfer/assignee powers (as cited in Nunna Setti). | Quotations from Latham, J.'s opinion were relied on (via Nunna Setti) to support the transferability of coparceners' interests in certain circumstances. |
| Bihari Lal v. Sat Narain (Full Bench, Lahore) | On insolvency of a Hindu father governed by Mitakshara Law, not only his own interest but also his sons' interests vest in the Official Assignee, so far as the Official Assignee is concerned. | The Court expressed respect for and inclination to adopt this Full Bench decision as a correct statement of the law and used it to support the proposition that the sons' interests may vest in the Official Receiver. |
| Sanyasi Charan Mandal v. Asutosh Ghose | Unreported decision (C.M.A. No. 110 of 1919) to the effect that property vested in the Receiver includes all property over which the insolvent had a disposing power. | Referred to as a decision of the Court (by Krishnan, J. and the Offg. C.J.) consistent with the view that the Receiver obtains property over which the insolvent had a disposing power. |
| Sama Rao v. Vannajee Vapuji | Referenced for the proposition that plaintiffs may protect themselves against a father contracting further debts on joint family property by seeking division (i.e., becoming divided). | Invoked as authority for the remedy that plaintiffs may seek division (partition) as protection against further encumbrance by the father. |
| Jagabhai Lallubhai v. Bhukhandas Jagivandas | Used historically to support the long-standing construction that a father's power to dispose of his sons' shares is a potential power over the entire property, exercisable validly but subject to challenge by the sons. | Adopted as a basis for construing the words "property over which ... a disposing power" consistently with long-standing judicial interpretation copied into statutory language (CPC Sect. 266). |
| Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy | Held that a finding against an occupancy right in a suit dismissed as premature should not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. | Applied by analogy to support the conclusion that the prior suit's finding should not operate as res judicata in the present suit because the issue ceased to be substantially in issue between the parties in the earlier proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) the res judicata point; and (B) the nature and effect of the statutory vesting on adjudication of insolvency.
A. Res judicata
The Court examined the prior suits (O. S. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1917) and the judgment in Appeal No. 356 of 1919. It found that the plaintiffs in those earlier suits had abandoned their rights to claim a mortgage decree against the defendants in question and that the defendants against whom the find as to the nature of the debts had been made did not have a right of appeal on that finding. Consequently the question was not finally decided between the opposing parties. The Court held that the question was not res judicata and that the lower Court should permit the issue (issue 1) to be tried on the evidence.
B. Vesting on adjudication and the nature of the Receiver's powers
The Court examined Sect. 16 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, III of 1907, which declares that upon an order of adjudication the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Receiver, and Sect. 2 clause (e), which defines "Property" to include any property over which a person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. The Court observed that nothing in those provisions indicates that vesting depends upon the nature of the debts. Therefore the vesting of the property on adjudication is not made conditional by the statute upon whether debts are illegal or immoral; those matters can be determined in proceedings before or after adjudication.
The Court rejected the narrower view that what vests in the Official Receiver, where undivided shares in a joint family are concerned, is only a bare power rather than the property itself. It compared Sect. 2(e) with Sect. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code and cited an array of authorities (both in favour of and distinguishing from the narrower view). Specifically:
- The Court noted earlier case law (Rangayya Chetti; Nunna Setti) recognizing that an Official Assignee could transfer coparceners' shares where debts were shown to be binding on them.
- The Court expressed respect for the Full Bench of Lahore in Bihari Lal v. Sat Narain, which held that both the father's and sons' interests vest in the Official Assignee, and the Court was inclined to adopt that view.
- It treated the decision in Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Ayyar as not fully authoritative for the present statutory context and as based in part on concessions in argument; consequently that decision was not taken to be controlling here.
The Officiating Chief Justice concluded that the present suit was not barred by the father's adjudication: the property had vested in the Official Receiver, but that vesting does not preclude the plaintiffs from prosecuting their claim to have particular debts declared illegal or immoral and thus not binding on their shares, or from seeking division so as to protect themselves from their father contracting further debts on the joint estate.
Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar, while concurring in the result, added a detailed analytical exposition: he observed that the statutory phrase "property over which ... a disposing power" was copied from Sect. 266 CPC and should be construed in light of long-standing decisions beginning with Jagabhai Lallubhai. He emphasized practical difficulties of construing the father's power as merely conditional and advocated viewing the vesting as inclusive of the sons' shares (so far as the Receiver is concerned), subject to the sons' right in proper proceedings to have it determined which debts can properly be satisfied out of the property. He proposed that the vesting may be regarded in the nature of a trust enabling the Receiver to exercise the father's power to discharge antecedent debts of an unobjectionable character and to ascertain and deliver any residue to the sons.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed and the case was remanded. The Court held that the plaintiffs' suit was not barred by the father's adjudication as an insolvent and that the matter of whether certain debts were illegal or immoral (and therefore not binding on the plaintiffs' shares) must be tried.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The lower Court must take the suit back on its file and decide the relevant issue (issue 1) on such evidence as may be adduced by either side concerning the illegality or immorality of the debts secured by the mortgage bonds in favour of defendants 4 and 5.
- The suit is remanded for retrial on the issues relating to the alleged illegality or immorality of the debts and for declaring the plaintiffs separate from their father in status and for fixing the amount of the shares to which they are entitled.
- Because the property has vested in the Official Receiver, division by metes and bounds cannot be effected until administration of the estate is completed; the passing of the final decree is deferred pending the divestment of the estate from the Official Receiver.
- The Official Receiver is to recover his costs of opposing the appeal out of the insolvent 1st defendant's estate. The costs of the other parties in the lower Court and in the appeal will be determined and provided for in the final decree.
- On the legal principle, the Court articulated that the statutory vesting on adjudication extends to property over which the insolvent had a disposing power — inclusive, for the purposes of the Receiver's functions, of the sons' shares — but that the sons retain the right to challenge the character of debts and to claim any surplus after administration. The opinion treats earlier decisions and practice as supporting this construction rather than the narrower view that only a bare, conditional power vests.
Final dispositive line recorded in the opinion: Appeal allowed: Case remanded.
C. K. Appeal allowed: Case remanded.
The Offg. C. J. — The two plaintiffs, who are minors, represented by their mother, brought a suit to obtain a partition from their father, the 1st defendant. They made their father's step-mother (2nd defendant) and her daughter (3rd defendant) and their father's uncle (7th defendant) and two mortgagee-creditors of their father, 4th and 5th defendants and two mortgagee-creditors of 7th defendant (defendants 8 and 9) parties to the suit. The plaintiffs' father was adjudicated an insolvent on December 19th, 1916, and this suit was instituted, on March 2nd, 1917, after the 1st defendant had become an insolvent in law. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, on the ground that the suit was not maintainable, after the plaintiffs' father had become insolvent. He refused to give the plaintiffs an opportunity of proving that the mortgage bonds in favour of defendants 4 and 5 were executed to secure debts not binding on the plaintiffs, on account of the immorality of their father, on the ground that this matter was res judicata, owing to the finding in the previous suits, O. S. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1917, on the file of the Sub-Court Coimbatore, which were suits brought by those mortgagees as plaintiffs, in which the Court found that the plaint debts had not been proved to be not binding on these plaintiffs, who were defendants 2 and 3 in those suits.
The first point argued in appeal is that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in regarding the decision in the prior suits as res judicata. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court in Appeal No. 356 of 1919, that the plaintiffs abandoned their rights to claim a mortgage decree, against these defendants in those suits. The defendants against whom the suit had been dismissed had no right of appeal, upon the finding as to the nature of the debts and therefore this question was not finally decided, as between the opposing parties to the suit. The lower Court must therefore take the suit back on its file and decide issue 1, upon such evidence as may be adduced on either side.
The main point upon which we have heard arguments in this appeal is whether the whole estate, of which the 1st defendant was manager, vested in the Official Receiver, upon the 1st defendant's adjudication as an insolvent. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar tried to persuade us that it was a condition precedent to the Official Receiver, exercising the father's power to sell the joint estate, for the discharge of his debts, that those debts should be neither illegal nor immoral. Sect. 16 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, III of 1907, declares that upon the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Receiver and that, during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings, no creditor shall have any remedy against the person or property of the insolvent, in respect of the debt, or commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except with the leave of the Court. Sect. 2 Cl. (e) defines ‘Property’ as including any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power, which he may exercise for his own benefit. Now, there is nothing in these provisions to indicate that the vesting of the property will depend upon the nature of the debts. Therefore, there is no condition precedent to the vesting of the property and it may be ascertained whether the debts were incurred for illegal or immoral purposes, in proceedings either before or after the adjudication. The argument that what vests in the Official Receiver, where the interest of undivided members of a joint family is concerned, is not the property itself, but only a power exercisable over that property is, in my opinion, not sound. The definition in Sect. 2 (e) corresponds to the provision in Sect. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, O. 21, R. 60 of the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), by which a creditor may attach in execution all saleable property over which the judgment-debtor has a disposing power, which he may exercise for his own benefit. It has been laid down by a Full Bench in Sellamuthu Servai, In re, that an Official Assignee standing in the shoes of an insolvent father can alienate family property to pay his antecedent debts, provided that those debts are not tainted with illegality or immorality. In Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Ayyar(2), a Bench of this Court to which Schwabe, C. J., and Coutts Trotter, J., were parties, held that the interest of the sons does not vest in the Official Assignee, by reason of the adjudication, although it would be competent to him to deal with their shares, if the debts of the insolvent were of such a nature as to be binding on their interests. At the hearing of that case, the learned Advocate-General conceded, (I think erroneously), that the sons' shares did not vest in the Official Assignee and their Lordships adopted what he conceded, as being the correct law upon the point. But the decision is one under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, and having regard to the manner in which the case was disposed of, should not be treated as a ruling on a point, which was not necessary for the decision of the case. So long ago as 1895, Subramania Aiyar, J., decided in Rangayya Chetti v. Thanikachalla Mudali(3), that after the making of a vesting order, the Official Assignee had power to transfer not only the shares of the insolvent but also those of his coparceners, provided that the debts were shown to have been incurred for purposes binding upon them. This decision was followed in Nunna Setti v. Chidaraboyina(4), quoting the opinion of Latham, J., in Fakirchand Motichand v. Motichand Harruckchand(5), although Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., was inclined to treat the Official Assignee's powers, as derived from Sect. 30 of the Indian Insolvency Act, which deals with powers, rather than from Sect. 7, which deals with property. A Full Bench of the Lahore Court has definitely decided upon this point, in Bihari Lal v. Sat Narain(6), that on the insolvency of a Hindu father governed by Mitakshara Law, not only his own interest, in the joint family estate vests in the Official Assignee, but also his sons interests, which must be treated as the property of the father, so far as the Official Assignee is concerned. I am respectfully inclined to adopt that decision as a correct statement of the law. An unreported decision, in C. M. A. No. 110 of 1919, by Krishnan, J., and myself, was to the same effect, viz., that the property, which vested in the Receiver, upon the adjudication of the judgment-debtor as an insolvent, included all property over which he had a disposing power, which he might exercise for his own benefit. I think that Sanyasi Charan Mandal v. Asutosh Ghose, which was quoted to us in the arguments has no bearing on this question as what was dealt with in that case was the power of a Receiver to deal with the interests of a minor, who had not been adjudicated as an insolvent in a partnership property, upon which different considerations from those applying to coparcenerships apply.
It is clear that the present suit is not barred by the adjudication of the 1st defendant as an insolvent and the lower Court should not have dismissed it on that ground. The plaintiffs may reasonably wish to protect themselves against the father contracting further debts; on the security of the joint family property and their only means of protecting themselves is (vide., Sama Rao v. Vannajee Vapuji, by becoming divided. The suit must therefore be remanded for retrial on the issue, relating to illegality or immorality of the debts, incurred in favour of the 4th and 5th defendants and for declaring the plaintiffs separate from their father in status and for fixing the amount of the shares to which they are entitled. As the property has vested in the Official Receiver, it will be impossible to effect a division by metes and bounds, until the administration of the estate is completed. The passing of the final decree must therefore be deferred, pending the divestment of the estate from the hands of the Official Receiver. The Official Receiver will get his costs of opposing this appeal, out of the insolvent 1st defendant's estate. The costs of the other parties to the suit in the lower Court and in the appeal will abide and be provided for in the final decree.
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.—I agree with my Lord, the Officiating Chief Justice, in the order made by him Having regard, however, to the very important nature of the questions raised in this appeal, I feel constrained to add some observations of my own. The main question is whether on the adjudication of an undivided Hindu father what vests in the Official Receiver is only the power to dispose of the sons' shares for the satisfaction of the debts, which are neither illegal nor immoral, or the entire property inclusive of the shares of the sons therein. The decision in The Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Ayyar, though it related to an insolvency under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, proceeded on a construction and consideration of language identical in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act, It is true that the decision of the learned Judges seems to be based on the concession made by the learned Advocate-General, at the very opening of his argument. It is also true that the definition of property contained in Sect. 2, 01. (e) of the Act was not referred to, or its effect on the question before the Court considered.
However, personally speaking, in view of the very definite statement of the law set out in the said judgment, I should have been disposed to consider the matter of sufficient importance to deem a reference to the Full Bench necessary in the matter. But in the view of the intimation by my Lord the Officiating Chief Justice in a matter, which is essentially one of etiquette, 1 felt bound not to disagree with his decision that it is not necessary to make any such reference.
The expression “property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power, which he may exercise for his own benefit” is by no means easy to construe. It cannot, of course, be said that a father who exercises the power of sale over the joint property in which his sons have also a vested interest for the payment of antecedent debts of his, is not exercising the power of sale for his own benefit, because though primarily the benefit accruing from the sale is the creditors, still the freedom from liability for a personal debt is undoubtedly benefit of the kind contemplated. But the power of sale possessed by the father under the Hindu Law is not an absolute power of sale, and it is possible to regard the power, as argued by Mr. T. R. Ramachandra Aiyar, the learned vakil for the appellant, as conditional upon the existence of antecedent debts and the requisite that such debts should not have been contracted for illegal or immoral purposes.
Were the matter res integra, one would have been inclined to avoid the monstrous result that the family estate, including the sons' shares, should vest in the Official Receiver or Assignee, on the insolvency of the father, by holding that the father's power being merely conditional, the vesting of the property in the Official Receiver or Assignee, both in quantity and quality, would only be such, as to tantamount to a vesting, merely of the bare power, as held in the case of the Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Ayyar. But the expression ‘property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power, which he may exercise for his own benefit’ was by no means new to the Indian Legislature and has been bodily copied from Sect. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882.
Remembering that the provincial law of Insolvency is a development of the old law of Civil Procedure, it seems to me that we are bound to construe that expression, in the same manner as it has been construed by Courts in India, for a long time, beginning at any rate with the case of Jagabhai Lallubhai v. Bhukhandas Jagivandas. That case and the numerous cases that followed ft have proceeded on the basis that the power of a father to dispose of his sons' shares also, for the payment of his debts was not in the nature of a latent power, which came into existence, on the coming into existence of certain conditions precedent but a potential power over the entire property, exercisable by him validly, subject only to the sons successfully questioning the same in proper proceedings.
It in therefore impossible to hold that when the property of the insolvent is said to vest in the Court or the Official Receiver and property is defined to include all property over which the insolvent has a disposing power, what so vests is not the entire property itself, inclusive of the shares of the sons therein, but only the power of disposal which a father has.
There would also be enormous difficulties of a practical nature, in holding that the power of a father is only a conditional power and that the vesting is contingent upon or proportionate to the debts of the father, which are neither illegal nor immoral. But though the entire property, inclusive of the shares of the sons, vests in the Official Receiver or Assignee, it is clear that it so vests, for the purpose of enabling him to exercise the power of sale, which the father had of disposing of the property, for the discharge of debts of an unobjectionable character, and it follows therefrom that the sons can, in proper proceedings, require to have it determined, in respect of which debts, such power can be exercised and in respect of which not. And it also follows that, the sons can, in proper time, require that what is left over, after the administration of the insolvent's estate, and the due exercise of the powers by the Official Receiver or Assignee, should be made over to them.
The proper way, it seems to me, of regarding the vesting, so far as the sons are concerned, would be to regard it, as in the nature of a trust, for the exercise of the father's power of disposal of the family property for his antecedent debts on the one hand and on the other for the ascertainment and delivery over to the sons of the remainder of the property, if any.
I am not at all sure whether it ought not to be held that on the mere making of a vesting order by a Court, as regards the father, or as for that matter another co-parcener of the joint family, the indeterminate share possessed by the co-parcener becoming defined and definite, there is not brought about, in law, a status of partition between him on the one hand and the other co-parceners on the other. However, that may be there can be doubt at any rate that the sons are at least entitled to have the status of division declared and further to have their rights to the residue of the property, if any, ascertained, declared and decreed. The lower Court was therefore wrong in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit entirely, on the mere ground, that the plaintiffs' shares became vested in the Official Receiver and that therefore the plaintiffs had no cause of action whatever.
As regards the other question, namely, whether the finding in the previous suit by the creditors that the debts were neither illegal nor immoral, operates as res judicata in the present suit, I agree, that it is not a case in which the rule of res judicata applies. In the case of Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the finding against the occupancy right, claimed by tenants, in a suit against them, which was dismissed as premature, should not operate as res judicata, in a subsequent suit, and the ground of decision is that in the former suit, the tenants had no occasion to go further, as to the finding against them.
If it should be necessary to bring the case, within the terms of Sect. 11, Civil Procedure Code, I should be disposed to regard it, not as a case, in which there has been no final decision, but as a case in which the issue was not substantially in, issue between the parties in the previous suit, for the reason that though directly and substantially in issue at one stage, it ceased to be substantially in issue, on the finding of the Court, with regard to another issue, which was sufficient to dispose of the case.
I therefore agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the plaintiffs' suit should be restored and remanded on the terms set out in the judgment of my Lord the Officiating Chief Justice.
C. K.Appeal allowed: Case remanded.
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