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Pl. Pl. Palaniyappa Chettiar v. N.S.P. Chockalingam Chettiar
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the agreement contained in Exhibit A was illegal under Sect. 37 of the Contract Act, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover money which the defendant had collected under certain decrees. The factual matrix in the opinion is as follows (as stated): the plaintiff himself was a judgment-debtor under those decrees and apparently asked the defendant to take an assignment of a decree on his behalf and to execute the decree against the other judgment-debtors. The defendant realised certain assets in execution. Exhibit A provided that the defendant would submit accounts to the plaintiff of amounts spent and realised, deduct a commission of 20% and pay the balance to the plaintiff.
Relevant procedural provisions discussed in the opinion include O. 21, R. 15 and O. 21, R. 16 (rules about transfer of a decree for payment of money and its execution). The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit; the matter is before the appellate bench (Sir Abdur Rahim, J. and Oldfield, J.), which reviews the dismissal and the legal issues raised by the parties and authorities cited.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement contained in Exhibit A is illegal under Sect. 37 of the Contract Act and therefore unenforceable.
- What is the effect of Order 21, Rule 15 (and the related Rule 16) of the Code of Civil Procedure on execution of a decree after its transfer to one of the judgment-debtors, and whether the execution carried out by the defendant was one which the executing Court ought to have refused if the true facts had been disclosed.
- Whether the court may assist the plaintiff to recover moneys realised by the defendant where the recovery arose from execution that would be prohibited by O.21, R.16, or whether such assistance would violate Sect. 23 of the Contract Act (i.e., whether the illegality or public-policy bar prevents recovery).
- How English and Indian authorities on illegality and restitution apply to a situation where an agent (or assignee) of a judgment-debtor realises money under execution and retains or accounts for it.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff)
- The opinion states that the plaintiff sued to recover the moneys realised by the defendant under the decrees; the plaintiff's suit sought repayment of the balance after the defendant's commission as set out in Exhibit A.
- No detailed, structured exposition of the plaintiff's legal arguments appears in the opinion beyond the factual basis for recovery and the contention that he was entitled to the moneys realised by the defendant.
Respondent (Defendant / Respondent's Counsel)
- It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the executing Court would have been bound to refuse execution under O.21, R.16 if it had been informed that the defendant was merely an agent or benamidar of the plaintiff (a judgment-debtor) who had obtained transfer of the decree.
- The respondent contended that if the appellate Court now assisted the plaintiff in recovering moneys realised by the defendant (effectively giving aid after the fact), that would violate Sect. 23 of the Contract Act, and was therefore barred by the rule against enforcing illegal contracts.
- Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Rashyam Iyengar) relied on English authorities, with emphasis on Sykes v. Beadon and also referred to Booth v. Hodgson and Battersby v. Smyth.
- Another respondent argument (as framed by Mr. Bashyam Aryangar) was that the creation of the agency was part of the plaintiff's machinery to deceive the Court and secure execution in violation of procedural rules; this, it was contended, should bring the agency and contract within Sect. 23 and render them unenforceable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anant Vinayak v. Nagappa Subraya | Illustrates that where a decree for payment against two or more persons is transferred to one of them, the transferee may sue co-debtors for contribution. | Cited to explain that transfer does not discharge liability of other judgment-debtors and that the judgment-debtor who obtains transfer can sue co-debtors for contribution. |
| Sykes v. Beadon | Statement of principle that courts will not lend assistance to carry out an illegal contract; illegal contracts cannot be enforced directly or indirectly. | The Court considered and distinguished this authority, holding the present case did not fall within its proposition because purchase of a decree by a judgment-debtor was not illegal and the case fell within an exception identified by the Master of the Rolls. |
| Booth v. Hodgson | English authority relied upon concerning illegality and unenforceability. | Discussed by the Court and held not to govern the present facts in the way the respondent urged. |
| Battersby v. Smyth | English authority on illegality and enforcement. | Mentioned with Booth v. Hodgson; Court found these cases did not require rejection of the plaintiff's claim in the present circumstances. |
| Bridger v. Savage (Bridget v. Savage) | Illustrates principle that a person who has received money under an illegal contract cannot be allowed to retain it; shows that a collateral illegality does not always defeat recovery by the principal from the agent. | Described as a leading example that governs the present case; the Court relied on its reasoning to permit recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant who realised money as agent. |
| Tenant v. Elliott | Quoted for the language (Eyre C.J.) that "a person who has received money from another under an illegal contract cannot be allowed to retain it." | Quoted to support the principle applied in Bridger v. Savage and relied on by the Court in distinguishing Sykes v. Beadon. |
| Bhola Nath v. Mul Chand | Indian decision referred to in the opinion; discussed in relation to brokers and wagering analogies and the effect of knowledge on agency. | The Court referred to this as one of two Indian decisions "directly against the contention of the plaintiff" and (in Oldfield, J.'s view) as an authority showing that knowledge of the unlawful use of the agency does not necessarily make the agency itself unlawful or release the agent from liability to account. |
| Nagendrabala Dassi v. Guru Doyal Mukerji | Indian decision cited alongside Bhola Nath v. Mul Chand concerning similar questions of agency and knowledge. | Cited by the Court as one of two Indian decisions on the point; used in the appellate judges' reasoning about the effect of knowledge on an otherwise innocent agency. |
| Gosvami Shri Purushotamji Maharaj v. B. Robb | Bombay High Court decision discussing suits involving levying of a prohibited cess and related principles. | The Court read it as not differing from Bridger v. Savage and noted it only holds that a suit could not be sustained for levying a cess prohibited by law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate bench's analysis proceeds in stages and is recorded in two opinions (Sir Abdur Rahim, J. speaking at length and Oldfield, J. concurring):
1. Preliminary analysis of the procedural rule (O.21, R.15 and R.16)
The Court noted that Order 21, Rule 15 provides that where a decree for payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others. The bench accepted the legal position (as interpreted in Anant Vinayak v. Nagappa Subraya) that transfer does not wholly discharge the liability of other judgment-debtors but limits execution: execution should not be enforced against co-debtors once the decree is transferred. The Court proceeded on the assumption that, had the executing Court known that the defendant was an agent or benamidar for the plaintiff judgment-debtor, the executing Court would have been bound to refuse execution under O.21, R.16.
2. Consideration of illegality under Sect. 23 and Sect. 37 of the Contract Act
The Court confronted the respondent's contention that aiding the plaintiff now to recover moneys realised by the defendant would violate Sect. 23 (public policy/illegality) and relied upon English cases, notably Sykes v. Beadon, which holds broadly that courts will not assist in carrying out illegal contracts. The appellate bench distinguished Sykes v. Beadon: it found that purchase of a decree by one judgment-debtor was not itself illegal and that the present case fell within an exception recognized by the Master of the Rolls — namely, the class of cases where a contract was at an end and the court will intervene to prevent those who obtained money under an illegal contract from retaining it on the representation that the contract was legal.
3. Reliance on the Bridger v. Savage line of authorities
The Court applied the principle from Bridger v. Savage (and supporting authorities, including Tenant v. Elliott) that a person who has received money from another under an illegal contract cannot be allowed to retain it; moreover, where money due to a principal is paid to an agent, the payment may be good as between principal and agent notwithstanding a collateral illegality. The appellate Court held that because the defendant acted as agent to realise assets and received money belonging to the plaintiff, the defendant could not be permitted to keep it simply because the underlying arrangement had an unlawful aspect in relation to execution procedure.
4. Treatment of English and Indian precedents and counter-arguments
The Court considered Booth v. Hodgson and Battersby v. Smyth but found them distinguishable. It referred to Indian authorities: Bhola Nath v. Mul Chand and Nagendrabala Dassi v. Guru Doyal Mukerji, describing them as decisions directly against the plaintiff's contention (as stated in the opinion) and, in the separate concurrence, using them to illustrate that knowledge of the agent (or broker) that the transaction might effectuate an unlawful design did not automatically make the agent's accepted sums irrecoverable or the agency itself unlawful.
5. Oldfield, J.'s concurrence and reasoning
Oldfield, J. stated that even if Sect. 23 were applicable, the defendant's agency to execute the decree was itself innocent. The defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's design or intention to defeat O.21, R.16 did not, in his view, absolve the defendant from liability to account for what he realised on the plaintiff's behalf. He distinguished the English authorities relied upon by the respondent on the ground that in those cases the association or combination itself was the unlawful element, whereas here the contract of agency was not in itself unlawful — the illegality lay in the plaintiff's design which could have been effected even without employing the defendant.
6. Result of the analysis
On the combined reasoning, the Court concluded that the lower courts were wrong to refuse relief to the plaintiff on the basis urged by the respondent and the authorities relied upon by the respondent. The appellate Court therefore reversed the lower court judgments and remanded the case for disposal on the remaining issues.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal allowed; the judgments of the lower courts are reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of first instance for disposal on the other issues.
Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The appellate Court reversed the lower courts' decisions that had dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground of illegality of the contract in Exhibit A.
- The matter is remanded to the trial court for disposal on the other issues not decided in the present judgment.
- Costs will abide the result of the remand (i.e., costs to be decided ultimately by the trial court or in accordance with further proceedings).
- The Court fees paid on the Second Appeal memorandum and in the appeal in the lower appellate court will be refunded to the appellant (as expressly ordered).
The opinion applies and distinguishes existing English and Indian authorities to the facts, but it does not purport to lay down a novel, broader precedent beyond the application of established principles: the decision is directed to the resolution of the dispute between the parties and remits remaining issues for determination by the trial court.
Sir Abdur Rahim, J. — The plaintiff's suit has been dismissed on the ground that according to Sect. 37 of the Contract Act, the agreement on which the suit is based as contained in Ex. A is illegal and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover the money which the defendant had collected under certain decrees. The plaintiff himself is the judgment-debtor under those decrees and he apparently asked the defendant to take an assignment of the decree on his behalf and to execute the decree against the other judgment-debtors and the defendant realised in execution certain assets. By Ex. A, it is provided that the defendant will submit accounts to the plaintiff of the amount spent in collecting the money and of the amount realised and after deducting a commission of 20 per cent to pay over the balance to the plaintiff.
O. 21, R, 15 says that “where the decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others.” It is not contended that on such transfer, the liability under the decree becomes altogether discharged but that the decree shall not be enforced in execution, It is open to the judgment-debtor who has obtained a transfer of the decree to sue his co-debtor upon it for contribution as held in Anant Vinayak v. Nagappa Subraya(1). In this case the judgment-debtors did not raise any objection to execution on the strength of O. 21, R. 16. The defendant must be taken to be an agent of the plaintiff for the actual realisation of the money. But it is argued on behalf of the respondent that it was the duty of the Court to refuse execution and the Court would have done so, if it were brought to its notice that the defendant was merely an agent or benamidar of the plaintiff who was one of the judgment-debtors. Having regard to the language of O. 21, R. 16 we may proceed on the assumption that if the facts were known to the executing Court, it would have been bound to reject the application for execution
Then it is contended that if the Court were now to help the plaintiffs in recovering the moneys realised by the defendant by means of the execution of the decree in spite of the prohibition of the law, that would be a violation of the rule laid down in Sect 23 of the Contract Act. Mr. Rashyam Iyengar in support of the judgment of the Lower Court has referred us to a number of rulings of the English Courts. The English authority on which much emphasis was laid down was the case of Sykes v. Beadon(2). There Jessel M.R upheld the proposition that a Court of law or equity will not lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out an illegal contract; therefore such a contract cannot be enforced by one party to it against the other, either directly by asking the Court to carry it into effect, or indirectly by claiming damages or compensation for breach of it. The case before us does not fall within the proposition laid down in Sykes v. Beadon. In the first place the purchase of a decree by one of the judgment-debtors is not illegal and nextly this case comes within the class of cases mentioned in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls: “But in cases where the contract is actually at an end or is put to an end to, the Court will interfere to prevent those, who have, under the illegal contract obtained money belonging to other persons on the representation that the contract was legal, from keeping the money.” It the plaintiff in the present suit were suing the defendant to enforce the contract and to compel him to execute the decree against the co-judgment-debtors or to recover damages for having failed to do so, in that case, it would be asking the Court, to carry out an illegal contract. But that is not the case here. The same answer is to be given to the cases in Booth v. Hodgson, and Battersby v. Smyth. On the other hand, this case in my opinion is governed by the classes of cases of which Bridger v. Savage(3), is a leading example. There the plaintiff had employed the defendant for a commission to make bets for him on horses. The defendant accordingly made such bets, and he received the winnings from the persons with whom he had so betted. In an action by the plaintiff for the amount which the defendant had so received, it was held that 8 and 9 Vic. Ch. 109 Sect. 18 which makes null and void all contracts by way of wagering, did not apply to the contract between plaintiff and defendant and that, therefore notwithstanding that statute the plaintiff was entitled to recover in respect of the bets which had been so paid to the defendant. The learned Judges of the Court of Appeal, point out that the principle is that “a person who has received money from another under an illegal contract cannot be allowed to retain it” to quote the language of Eyre, C.J, in Tenant v. Elliott(4). Bowen, L.J, observed as follows: “If the person who has betted pays his bet, he does nothing wrongs, he only waives a benefit which the statute has given to him, and confers a good title to the money on the person to whom he pays it. Therefore when the bet is paid the transaction is completed and w hen it is paid to an agent, it cannot be contended that it is not a good payment for his principal. If not, how monstrous it would be that the agent who has received the money which belonged to his principal and which he received for his principal, and only on that account should be allowed to say that the payment was bad and void. The truth is that the contract under which he received the money for his principal is not affected by the collateral contract under which the money was paid to him.” It seems to me that these observations apply to the present case. I may also point out that in Bridget v. Savage, which was argued by eminent counsel on both sides, Sykes v. Beaden, was not cited at all as establishing a contrary proposition nor the cases in Terms Reports cited by the respondent. So far as the Indian Courts are concerned, there are two decisions directly against the contention of the plaintiff. Bhola Nath v. Mul Chand, Nagendrabala Dassi v. Guru Doyal Mukerji. In the former decision Chief Justice Stanley takes the law as quite settled on the authority of the English decisions. On the other hand, we have been referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Gosvami Shri Purushotamji Maharaj v. B. Robb. But as I read the case, it does not lay down anything different from the law enunciated in Bridget v. Savage. All that it lays down is that a suit could not be sustained for levying a cess prohibited by law.
I am therefore of opinion that the judgments of the Lower Court are wrong. I must reverse them and remand the case to the Court of the first instance for disposal, on the other issues. Costs will abide the result. The Court fees paid on the Second Appeal memorandum and in the appeal in the lower appellate Court they will be refunded to the appellant.
Oldfield, J.—If it were necessary to consider whether Sect. 23 of the Contract Act was applicable to the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, I should have no difficulty in holding that the plaintiff's object, which he has unlawfully accomplished, was to defeat the provisions of O. 21, R. 16. It is not disputed that the defendant entered into the contract with full knowledge of the circumstances and of the character of the plaintiff's intention in making it. That however is not enough to justify the defendant in repudiating the liability lor what he realised on plaintiff's behalf. His agency to execute the decree was, it should be remembered, in itself innocent. His knowledge that the execution of the decree on plaintiff's behalf might defeat O. 21, R. 16 will no more make his agency guilty than did the similar knowledge of the brokers referred to in Bhola Nath v. Mul Chand that they were encouraged in wagering transactions. See also Nagendrabala Dassi v. Guru Doyal Mukerji. Mr. Bashyam Aryangar for the respondent has put the case in this way. The creation of an agency by the plaintiff was part of the machinery, by which he intended to deceive the Court and thus to secure the successful execution of his unlawful design. This, he contends, is enough to bring the agency and the contract, by which it was created, within the principle of Sect. 23 and to make the latter unenforceable. He cited to support this Booth v. Hodgson, Battersby v. Smyth and Sykes v. Beadon besides Indian Cases of less importance. It does not seem to me that these authorities go to the length which he requires. In them the relation between the parties was not merely the means employed to carry out the unlawful transactions, but it was the transaction itself. In the three English Cases, the material fact was that something was done by a number of persons, which according to law either could not be done by that number of persons without some formality being complied with or could not be done by that number of persons at all. It was the association, which was in fact the unlawful element and which made the transaction unlawful. Here there is nothing of that sort, because the contract by which the parties were associated, here one of agency, was not in itself unlawful and was not what made the whole transaction unlawful, since the unlawfulness would have been the same, had plaintiff succeeded in carrying through his execution himself without ever employing the defendant at all.
For these reasons I agree with my learned brother and concur in the order proposed by him.
C.KAppeal allowed case remanded.
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