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Chidambaranatha Thambiran v. P.S. Nallasiva Mudaliar
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was initiated by two plaintiffs with leave under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to represent themselves and other Tambirans and disciples of a mutt (religious institution) to declare certain alienations made by the Mahant (trustee) invalid and to have the alienated property handed over to the Mahant, the 1st defendant. The Mahant died during the pendency of the suit and was succeeded by the 1st plaintiff, prompting an amendment to the plaint to seek possession for the 1st plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge held that the mutt properties were not trust properties and that the suit was not barred under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, but ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue for possession in favor of the 1st defendant and that the suit was barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs, representing the beneficiaries of the mutt, have the right to sue for possession of the property in favor of the Mahant (trustee).
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 120 or other provisions of the Limitation Act.
- Whether mutt properties constitute trust properties and if the alienations by the Mahant are invalid.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs represent all beneficiaries of the mutt and have obtained leave to sue on their behalf under Order 1, Rule 8 CPC.
- The alienations made by the Mahant were invalid and the property should be restored to the mutt.
- The plaintiffs have sufficient interest to sue for possession and for the court to order delivery of possession to the current Mahant or a Receiver.
- The suit is not barred by limitation under Articles 120, 134, or 144 of the Limitation Act as the possession of the alienee is adverse to the institution and the plaintiffs.
- The plaintiffs act similarly to the Attorney-General in England, representing beneficiaries to recover trust property improperly alienated.
Defendants' Arguments
- The Subordinate Judge found that mutt properties were not trust properties and thus the suit was not barred under Section 92 CPC.
- The plaintiffs were not entitled to sue for possession and the suit was barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act.
- The alienee defendants raised various pleas and the suit was dismissed on pleadings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| St. Mary Magdale Oxford v. Attorney-General and Attorney-General v. Flint | Beneficiaries can bring information through Attorney-General to recover charitable property improperly alienated; limitation applies as if beneficiaries sued themselves. | Used to analogize plaintiffs’ role to Attorney-General’s in recovering trust property and limitation principles. |
| Govindan Nair v. Achutha Menon | Beneficiaries have sufficient interest to sue under Order 1, Rule 8 CPC for wrongful alienation of mutt property. | Supported plaintiffs’ right to sue and to seek possession delivery to trustee or Receiver. |
| Sharpe v. San Paulo Railway Co. | Individual beneficiaries cannot claim debt shares from debtor; trustee must sue unless impracticable. | Clarified limits of beneficiary rights; court distinguished between trustee’s refusal and inability to sue. |
| Dance v. Goldingham | Beneficiary may sue for injunction to prevent trustee’s contract completion. | Supported beneficiaries’ right to seek equitable relief. |
| Gandy v. Candy | Beneficiary can sue in equity if trustee refuses to join as co-plaintiff. | Supported beneficiaries’ right to sue directly when trustee refuses. |
| Conett v. Bell | Beneficiaries’ claim that trustee should be put in possession is within their rights. | Demonstrated scope of relief available to beneficiaries. |
| Attorney General v. Lady Downing | Equity courts ensure execution of trusts even if trustees fail, by appointing substitutes. | Supported court’s supervisory role over trusts and trustees. |
| Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnavi | Indian precedent on trust property and beneficiaries’ rights. | Referenced regarding rights of beneficiaries to sue. |
| Subramania Iyer v. Nagarathna Naicker | Beneficiaries’ right to claim possession be given to trustee. | Upheld plaintiffs’ right to seek possession in favor of trustee. |
| Subramanian Chettiar v. Rajah Rajeswara Dorai | Affirmed beneficiaries’ right to claim possession to trustee. | Reinforced right of beneficiaries to seek possession delivery to trustee. |
| Miyaji alias Mahomed Ghouse Sahib v. Sheik Ahmed Sahib | Where trustee is a defendant, possession can be given to him in suit instituted by beneficiaries. | Supported relief sought by plaintiffs in this case. |
| Muthusamier v. Sree Sreemethanithi Swamiyar | Alienation by trustee may bind during lifetime; raises questions about trust property alienations. | Identified issues for further factual investigation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed whether the mutt properties were held on trust and whether the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries, had the right to sue for possession in favor of the trustee (Mahant). It drew analogies to English equity principles, where beneficiaries can seek court intervention to recover charitable property improperly alienated, with the Attorney-General acting as parens patriae. The Court found that the plaintiffs in this case perform a similar function by representing all beneficiaries and thus have standing to sue under Order 1, Rule 8 CPC.
The Court rejected the Subordinate Judge’s view that plaintiffs could not sue for possession or that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120. It held that if the Mahant is a trustee, plaintiffs can seek possession to be delivered to him or a Receiver. Even if the Mahant is not strictly a trustee, plaintiffs have sufficient interest to sue for wrongful alienation.
The Court examined relevant Indian Trusts Act provisions (Sections 59 and 63) and limitation laws (Articles 120, 134, 144 of the Limitation Act), concluding that the suit is not barred by limitation. It reasoned that possession by alienees is adverse to the institution and beneficiaries, and beneficiaries suing in right of the trustee derive their right through him, making the limitation period applicable to them as plaintiffs.
Precedents from English and Indian law were analyzed to affirm beneficiaries’ right to seek possession in favor of the trustee, especially where the trustee refuses or is unable to sue. The Court emphasized the equitable maxim that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee and the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over trusts.
Finally, the Court noted some factual questions, such as the binding nature of alienations by the trustee during his lifetime, require further investigation on remand.
Holding and Implications
The Court REVERSED the decision of the Subordinate Judge and REMANDED the suit for disposal according to law. Costs were to abide the result.
The direct effect is that the plaintiffs, representing the beneficiaries, have the right to sue for possession of the mutt property in favor of the current Mahant or a Receiver, and the suit is not barred by limitation. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing principles of trust law and beneficiary rights in this context.
Wallis, C.J — This is a suit brought by the two plaintiffs with leave under O. 1, R. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as representing themselves and other Tambirans and disciples of the suit mutt to declare certain alienations made by the Mahant, invalid and have the property alienated handed over to the Mahant, the 1st defendant. The Mahant having died during the pendency of the suit and been succeeded by the 1st plaintiff, the plaint was amended accordingly and now prays for possession to be given to the 1st plaintiff.
The Subordinate Judge Has held that Mutt properties as such are not trust properties and that consequently the suit is not barred under Sect. 92, Civil Procedure Code, but he has also held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to sue for possession to be given to the 1st defendant and that the suit must be treated as one for a declaration and is barred under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act.
If the suit properties were held by the Pandara Sannadhi on trust I think the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the claim for possession was not maintainable and that the suit was barred under Act. 120 of the Limitation Act.
As regards the first point it seems to me that the present suit which is brought on behalf of all the beneficiaries stands in some respects on the same footing as an information filed by the Attorney-General in England on the information of relators to recover charitable property improperly alienated by the trustees. This was the regular method of recovering charity property improperly alienated and it has been explained that in such a proceeding the beneficiaries are the persons on whose behalf the information is brought and that the function of the Attorney-General representing the Crown as parens Patriæ is simply to bring the case to the attention of the Court and ask it to provide for the due execution of the trust by securing for it the properties that belong to it. On such information the Court of Chancery recovered the property so alienated by cancelling the conveyance and directing possession to be given up to the trustees who ex-hypothesi did not formally occupy the position of plaintiffs in the suit, St. Mary Magdale Oxford v. Attorney-General and Attorney-General v. Flint and in the former case it was held that the claim for relief was barred by limitation in the same manner as if the beneficiaries on whose behalf the information was filed had themselves been plaintiffs.
The case was argued on the footing that the Mahant was in the position of a trustee. If this be so there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not be treated in this country as performing the same function as the Attorney-General on an information and asking the Court to undertaket he execution of the trust and to recover possession of the suit properties which have been improperly alienated such possession being given to the trustee as the person entitled to it on behalf of the institution. But even if the Mahant be not in the position of a trustee a question it is unnecessary to consider I think that the plaintiffs as held in Govindan Nair v. Achutha Menon have sufficient interest in the institution to entitle them in India to sue under O.1, R. 8, Civil Procedure Code, in respect of an alleged wrongful alienation of Mutt property and that if they are allowed to sue there is no sufficient reason tinder bur procedure for not granting them their full relief by ordering the property to be delivered to the present Mahant or to a Receiver.
As regards limitation if the plaintiffs have right to sue it arose at the time of the alienation or later and is not barred under Art. 144 or under Art. 134 if that is the article applicable and I think the possession of the alienee must be regarded as adverse to the institution and to the plaintiffs who claim on its behalf. I Would therefore reverse the decree and remand the suit for disposal according to law.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—The properties in suit were purchased by a Pandarasannadhi of the Dharmapuram Adheenam in the year 1869. Another Pandarasannadbi sold them to the various contesting defendants in July 1901. The plaintiffs are the Tambirans of the Mutt. They obtained leave under O. 1, R. 8 of the Code of Civil procedure 1908 to institute a suit on behalf of all the persons interested in the Mutt. Their case was that the properties belonged to the Mutt and that their alienation in 1901 was invalid. They grayed for a declaration that the alienation was not binding on the Mutt and for possession being delivered to the 1st defendant who was at the time of the suit, the Pan darasannadhi. Since then, the 1st defendant has died and the 1st plaintiff has succeeded him in the office. The plaint was thereafter amended to the effect that the 1st plaintiff should be given possession on behalf of the Mutt. There has Keen some dispute as to the scope of this amendment and of the undertaking given by the plaintiffs at the time. Although the language of the petition for amendment is not very clear it seems to me that all that was agreed upon was that the parties should proceed on the footing that the name of the 1st plaintiff was to be substituted for that of the deceased 1st defendant.
The alienee defendants raised various pleas. The Subordinate Judge disposed of the case on the pleadings. His conclusions were that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue for possession that they were not competent to ask that possession should be given to the 1st defendant and that the suit was parred by limitation. These findings were given on issues 1, 9 and 16 and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs have appealed.
The question which was debated with great ability at the bar mainly related to the right of the plaintiffs to ask for possession in favour of the 1st defendant the head of Mutt.
The plaintiffs by obtaining the leave already referred to represent the whole body of the worshippers. They may be said to be the beneficiaries. There is no doubt that the legal owner of the properties is the Pandarasannadhi. Ordinarily he alone could sue for their possession and for other reliefs in respect of them. The general right of the beneficiaries is to see that there is no violation of the trust, and if the trustee does not discharge his duties properly to apply for his removal and for the appointment of a new trustee. These are the ordinary remedies; but circumstances may arise which may estop the trustee from suing to recover possession and the beneficiaries may not desire that he should be removed from his office. In such cases it is in the interests of the Mutt that the cesti qui trustent should have the right to move the Court to deprive the wrong-doer of his possession and to vest it in the trustee.
The authorities in England as I shall show presently have recognised this right. The principle upon which the English Courts have acted is that “It is a rule in equity which admits of no exception that a Court of Equity never wants a trustee.” Once the Court is appraised that there has been a violation of the trust it acts on the maxim that a trust shall never fail for want of a trustee. It is obvious that such a resort to the extraordinary powers of the Court should be made under exceptional circumstances. The authorities have laid down the limitations under which alone the beneficiaries would be permitted to sue for possession but the rule stands good that under proper safeguards, the cesti qui trustent have the right to invoke the aid of the Court to deprive the trespasser of his wrongful possession and to vest possession in the trustee.
Both the learned Advocate-General and Mr. T. Rangachariar relied upon Sects. 59 and 63 of the Indian Trusts Act. These provisions only relate to private trusts, but the underlying principles are applicable to public and charitable trusts as well. Sect. 59 of the Trusts Act lays down that where “for any other reason, the execution of a trust by the trustee is impracticable the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust.” An inadvertent ratification by the trustee in office of an alienation by his predecessor would be covered by clause, “the execution of a trust by the trustee is impracticable.” This would let in the beneficiary. No doubt he can only claim that the trust be executed that is to say he can ask that the trust be administered. It would be in the discretion of the Court when it is seized of the trust either to direct the existing trustee to carry out the terms or to appoint a new trustee in that behalf or to entrust, the management to an interim Receiver. By giving any of these directions the Court would be executing the trust. There is no machinery in this country for the Court itself administering to its fullest extent the trust until the objects of the trust and the funds are exhausted. Consequently the Court often appoints a receiver until the right to the trusteeship is settled. Sect. 63 is a very important provision. Mr. T. Rangachariar contended that this section expressly limits the right of the beneficiary to a bare declaration and that consequently he is not entitled to ask for possession. I do not think that the Word declaration should be given such a narrow interpretation, Even in a suit for possession there must be an antecedent declaration. I am inclined to think that the legislature did not intend to prevent a beneficiary from suing for possession in favour of the trustee. The beneficiary is only entitled to a declaration in his own right but that would not prevent him from asking that the declaration be followed up by giving possession to the trustee. However that may be, Sect. 63 is not in terms applicable to charitable trusts and consequently its language is not conclusive of the rights of a public trustee. If this section is read along with Sect. 10 of the Limitation Act it is clear that wherever trust property has gone into the hands of a stranger the beneficiary can take all the necessary steps to place it in the hands of a person who can legally administer the trust.
As regards decided cases, the learned Vakil for the appellant relied strongly on Sharpe v. San Paulo Railway Co.. It was decided in 1873. The decision was that individual beneficiaries were not entitled to claim their share of a debt from the debtor. Lord Justice James pointed out that a bare allegation “that the trustee would not sue” cannot, give a right to the beneficiary. Then the remedies open under such circumstances are pointed out. This is not a pronouncement that where a trustee could not sue (not would not sue) the beneficiaries are not entitled to claim that possession should be given to them. The same learned Lord Justice a few months later held that a beneficiary can sue for an injunction that a contract of the trustee should not be completed (Dance v. Goldingham. If a claim for an injunction is competent I fail to see why a suit for possession should not be. The decision in Gandy v. Candy is exactly in point. In that case the trustees refused to be made co-plaintiffs with the beneficiaries. Lord Justice Cotton negatived the contention that the only remedy possessed by the beneficiaries is to sue for the removal of the trustee and said ‘that where a covenant is entered into with one person for the benefit of another then if the covenantee will not sue, the person beneficially interested may sue in equity.” Lindley, J. and Bowen, L.J, concurred in this view. Yeatman v. Yeatman and Bening field v. Baxter are to the same effect. See also observations of Lord Hobhouse in 12 Appeal Cases at page 641. The latest case on the subject is 56 Law Times 471. Mr. Justice Kay reviewed all the earlier authorities and said: “Therefore in this case I have first to see whether there are real grounds for the trustee not suing. I have to ascertain whether there has been simply a refusal on his part or whether it is a case in which the circumstances are such as to render it an inconvenient or ineffectual course that he should sue.” It is clear from this dictum that it is a question in each case whether the beneficiary should be allowed to ask for the reliefs which prima facie should be claimed only by the trustee. The learned Advocate-General drew our attention to the nature of the relief claimed by the beneficiaries in Conett v. Bell as showing that a claim that the trustee should be put in possession is within their rights. In none of the above cases was any decree passed giving the trustee possession at once. That is so, because the Chancery Court itself administered the estate and was not over-anxious to part with its control over the trust. The peculiar jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Chancery is thus stated by Wilmot, C.J, in Attorney General v. Lady Downing. The person who creates a trust means it should at all events be executed. The individuals named as trustees are only the nominal instruments to execute that intention and if they fail either by death or by being under disability or by refusing to act, the constitution has provided a trustee…… where no trustees are appointed at all, this Court assumes the office……There is some personality in every choice of trustees ……and if the trust cannot be executed through the medium which was in the primary view of the testator, it might be executed through the medium which the constitution has substituted in its place.’ The same conditions do not apply in India although the Courts here have the same general right of supervision over trusts and trustees. In Perry on Trusts after examining the English and American authorities the law, is thus summarised;—“If a cestui que trust desires to bring a suit against a stranger he should apply to the trustee to allow his name to be used as co-plaintiff and the trustee is bound to comply on being indemnified against the costs. If the trustee refuses improperly he may be made a defendant.” This is exactly what has been done in the present case.
As regards Indian decisions, Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnavi is directly in point. In Madras it was field in Padmanabha Chettiar v. Williams. that the proper procedure is to apply either for the removal of the trustee of to have a Receiver appointed. It does not appear whether in that case possession was asked to be given to the trustee. The same remarks apply to Kamaraju v. Asanali Sheriff. There is an observation in this case that if a representative suit were brought the result might be different. I do not think that those two cases have laid down anything more than that a few among the beneficiaries are not entitled to sue for possession being given to themselves on behalf of the trust. If they negative the right of the beneficiaries, under certain circumstances to ask for possession being given to the trustee defendant, I respectfully decline to accept them, as good law. The decision in Chattappa Nambiar v. Koman does not affect the present case. The trustee was not a party nor did the plaintiffs ask that possession should be given to them. On the other hand Subramania Iyer v. Nagarathna Naicker is in point. In a later case Subramanian Chettiar v. Rajah Rajeswara Dorai after full argument on the question, the right of beneficiary to claim that possession should be given to the trustee was expressly upheld. When the case was taken before the Judicial Committee in Subramania Chettiar v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai(7) the eminent Equity Lawyer who appeared for the appellant apparently did not consider the question arguable. Although Miyaji alias Mahomed Ghouse Sahib v. Sheik Ahmed Sahib(8) proceeds on the construction of Sect. 14 of Act XX of 1863, the judgment shows that where a trustee is made a defendant, possession can be given to him in a case instituted by the beneficiaries. I am therefore of opinion that the Subordinate Judge is wrong in his view that under no circumstances can the beneficiaries sue that possession should be given to the lawful trustee.
On the question of limitation Mr. Rangachariar contended that Art. 120 of the Limitation Act applies to the case. I am tillable to agree. It may be that before Art. 134 of the Limitation Act is held applicable more facts and more of the history the institution of which the plaintiffs are the disciples may have to be ascertained. The allegation in the plaint state that the properties in suit appertain to the trust. The learned Advocate -General argued that the words bequeathed in trust” contemplate an original entrustment and that if the properties can be shown to have been acquired from the income of the trust property, the acquisitions would be included in it. There is great force in this contention. It is not necessary to decide this question at this stage of the case, nor the other question whether a Madathipathi is not a trustee. In my opinion Art. 144 of the Limitation Act directly applies to this case. The suit is for possession of immoveable property and consequently the first column applies. The learned vakil for the appellant contended that the third column is inapplicable, as the possession of the alienees is not adverse to the plaintiffs, the beneficiaries but only to the trustees. Authorities were quoted to show that the beneficiaries have not the same character as the trustees. I do not think it necessary to pronounce any opinion on this question as the word ‘plaintiff’ in column 3 would include the beneficiary plaintiff according to the definition of that expression in the Limitation Act.
The beneficiaries sue only in the right of trustees. They are only the aliases for the trustees. Under the common law of England the beneficiaries were compellable to use the name of the trustee as plaintiff. Consequently the beneficiaries derive their right to sue through the trustee. It is his action that they are prosecuting. In this view what is adverse to the trustee is also adverse to the person who derive their right to sue through him. Art. 144 therefore applies and there is no necessity for seeking the aid of the residuary Art. 120 in this case. The suit is not barred by limitation.
Another aspect of the question of limitation relates to the character in which the trustee held the properties. The dictum of Miller, J. in Muthusamier v. Sree Sreemethanithi Swamiyar. that the alienation may be binding on the alienating trustee during his lifetime opens up a question which requires investigation. The learned Judge, as I understand him, did not lay down that such a proposition is applicable to all trust properties. It may be that his view may have to be reconsidered after the facts have been ascertained. At this stage I do not think it advisable to say more on that question.
For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and remand the case to him for disposal. Costs will abide the result.
K. V. S.Case remanded.
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