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The Superintendent And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. Ludur Chandra Das .

Calcutta High Court
Dec 22, 1931
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Ludur Chandra Das (Opium Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused, Ludur Chandra Das, an Assamese from Bokakhat, was convicted by the trial Magistrate of offences under clauses (c) and (e) of Section 9 of the Opium Act (1 of 1878). The convictions were set aside on appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge of the Assam Valley Districts. The Government appealed the acquittal.

On the facts proved at trial: in May 1930 the accused sent telegrams from Cooch Behar to a relation, Khagendra Nath Saikia, in Bokakhat asking for money and indicating that parcels were being sent. Shortly afterwards a parcel addressed to Khagendra arrived at the Bokakhat post office. The Sub-Postmaster, suspicious, arranged for the parcel to be taken open delivery in the presence of witnesses; Khagendra refused to take delivery and the parcel was opened, revealing opium.

The defence claimed the accused had sent silver bangles and that opium had been substituted later; that defence was disbelieved. Khagendra testified that the accused asked him to receive letters and parcels sent from Cooch Behar for the accused's home and hand them to the accused's family. A letter (Exhibit 5) was seized from Khagendra's house. The critical legal question posed by these facts was whether the accused committed an offence under the Opium Act and, if so, whether the offence took place in Cooch Behar or in Assam.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accused committed an offence under the Opium Act (Section 9) by possessing, importing or exporting opium.
  2. If an offence was committed, whether the offence was committed in Cooch Behar or in Assam (i.e., whether the conduct amounted to importing into Assam).
  3. Whether the evidence established possession of the opium by the accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Defence / Accused

  • The defence asserted that the parcel originally contained silver bangles sent by the accused from Cooch Behar and that opium had been substituted into the parcel at a later stage. The court records state that this defence was disbelieved.

Trial Court (Magistrate)

  • The trial Magistrate convicted the accused of both possession of the opium and of importing it into Assam, imposing fines of Rs. 250 on each charge.

Additional Sessions Judge (on appeal)

  • The Additional Sessions Judge set aside both convictions. He was not satisfied that possession had been proved. As to the other charge, he viewed the matter as an offence of exporting opium from Cooch Behar and concluded the accused had not imported opium into Assam; accordingly he treated the offence as committed in Cooch Behar and noted that, for prosecution on that account, there was no certificate from the Political Agent of Cooch Behar.

Government / Appellate Counsel (as recorded)

  • The Government appealed the acquittal. The opinion records a point shown by Mr. Banerji: that since amendment of the Code, Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) overrides Section 179 in any case in which Section 188 is applicable (i.e., cases involving a native Indian subject committing an offence beyond the limits of British India or a British subject committing an offence in territories of a Native Prince), though the Court's final analysis rejects reliance on Section 188 for the facts of this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Munshi Lal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1922 All. 21 Illustrates that a person who exports goods from outside a province to a warehouse inside that province for his own account may be guilty of importing into that province (bringing goods into the territory for one's own account constitutes import). The Court relied on this principle to support the view that goods sent by the accused from Cooch Behar to Assam for his own account constituted an import into Assam, even though the accused also caused the shipment (i.e., was effectively both exporter and importer for his own benefit).
Emperor v. Govind Ram, A.I.R. 1924 All. 558 Affirms that the person who imports must be one who intends or has the right to take delivery or desires to take delivery inside the area (focus on control/intention to take delivery). The Court applied this principle to conclude that the accused's arrangement with Khagendra (to receive parcels on his behalf) and the sending of the opium to Bokakhat satisfied the requirement that the goods were for the accused's account and intended to be delivered in Assam; Khagendra's act of taking delivery under arrangement did not defeat the import offence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by isolating the legal definitions and the essential nature of the offence under the Opium Act. Section 9 makes it an offence for any person who, in contravention of the Act, possesses opium or imports or exports opium. The Court quoted the statutory definition of "import" as "to bring into the territories administered by any Local Government from sea or from foreign territory or from a territory administered by any other Local Government," and similarly quoted the definition of "export."

From this statutory language the Court drew a key legal principle: the offence of importing opium is constituted by bringing the opium into the territory in question (Assam). It is the act of "bringing" into the territory that completes the offence, irrespective of where the goods were previously located. Crucially, if the goods come across the border into Assam "for and on account of the accused" and with his consent, the offence of importing into Assam is complete.

The Court illustrated that the accused's conduct—going to Cooch Behar and sending a parcel to Bokakhat addressed to a person instructed to receive parcels on his behalf—was legally equivalent to sending the parcel to his own address in Assam. The Court emphasized that whether the accused personally crossed the border or a third person despatched the goods on his instructions (even from abroad) would not affect the commission of the import offence so long as the goods arrived in Assam for the accused's account.

To reinforce this interpretation the Court relied on the two precedent decisions cited above (Munshi Lal and Govind Ram), which support the proposition that sending dutiable or restricted goods to a location in the province for one's own account constitutes an import even if the sender is also the exporter, and that the importer's intention or right to take delivery is critical.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found the evidence amply proved that the accused had the goods sent from Cooch Behar into Assam for his own account via Khagendra. The Court therefore concluded the offence charged—importing opium into Assam—was committed within Assam. On the narrower question of possession, the Court agreed with the Additional Sessions Judge that possession had not been proved because the article was not in fact taken into possession (Khagendra refused to take delivery after becoming suspicious).

The Additional Sessions Judge's view that the accused had only exported the opium from Cooch Behar and that the offence was committed in Cooch Behar (with the resulting need for a Political Agent's certificate) was rejected by the Court: the Court held that the offence was not committed in Cooch Behar but in Assam when the goods were brought into Assam for the accused's account. Consequently, Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code (dealing with offences beyond British India or in Native States) was held inapplicable to negate Assam's jurisdiction over the import offence.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed; the acquittal entered by the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside; the accused is convicted of the offence of importing opium into Assam.

Immediate consequences for the parties: The judgment of the trial Magistrate is restored in respect of the importing charge and the penalty imposed by the Magistrate on that count (a fine of Rs. 250, in default six months' rigorous imprisonment) is directed to stand. The Court agreed that possession was not proved on these facts and did not uphold the Magistrate's possession conviction.

The opinion does not announce that it is laying down any new broad precedent beyond applying the cited authorities; its practical effect is to restore the conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrate for importing opium into Assam in the circumstances shown by the evidence.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; acquittal set aside; conviction for importing restored; penalty of Rs. 250 fine (in default, six months' rigorous imprisonment) to stand.

Show all summary ...

Rankin, C.J:— In this case, the accused Ludur Chandra Das was convicted by the trial Magistrate of an offence under Cl. (c) and also Cl. (e), Section 9 of the Opium Act (1 of 1878). On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge of the Assam Valley Districts has set aside both those convictions. The Government has brought this appeal against that order of acquittal made by the learned Judge.

2. The facts of the present case as proved by evidence are particularly short and conclusive. The accused is an Assamese living in Assam. The part of Assam to which he belongs is a place called Bokakhat. In May 1930, he sent some telegrams to a relation of his named Khagendra Nath Saikia who also lives in Bokakhat. These were sent from Cooch Behar but the original writing of the telegrams has been produced and proved. The telegrams asked Khagendra not only to send him money but intimated that certain things were being sent by the accused from Gooch Behar to Khagendra in Bokakhat. One telegram ran: “Silver parcel is sent; am penniless; wire 150.” On 29th May or soon after, there arrived by post in the Bokakhat post office a parcel addressed to Khagendra. The Sub-Post master was suspicious and he made arrangements to request Khagendra to take open delivery in the presence of two witnesses of this parcel. Khagendra refused whereupon the parcel was duly opened and it was found to contaia, opium. There can be no doubt that the defence which was to the effect that the accused had sent the parcel from Cooch Behairi but that the parcel contained silver bangles and that opium had been substituted at a later stage broke down entirely. It was disbelieved and it need not trouble us. Khagendra who gave evidence for the prosecution said that the accused told him that he was going to Tezpur and that he would send letters and parcels meant for his (accused's), own home to the address of Khagendra who was to hand them over to his (accused's) family. A letter (Ex. 5) was seized, as a matter of fact, from Khagendra's house and whether or not Khagendra is just as bad as this accused person, it is at any rate certain that the accused went to Cooch Behar having arranged with Khagendra to receive opium on his behalf and despatched the opium to Khagendra in order that it might get into the accused's own control. In these circumstances and on these facts, the question is whether the accused has committed an offence under the Opium Act (1 of 1878) and, if he has committed offence, has he committed the offence in Coooh Behar or in Assam?

3. For the present purpose, it will be as well to assume that we know nothing about the law prevailing in Cooch Behar and we may even assume—though I daresay it is not in the least true—that people who send opium from Cooch. Behar to other States commit no offence against that State whatever. Clarifying our ideas in this way we come to ask whether the accused has committed any offence under the Opium Act and we find this: By S. 9 of the Act, any person who in contravention of the Act possesses-opium or imports or exports opium in liable to be convicted of an offence. If we ask what is meant by “any person who imports opium,” there is a definition. Import means

“to bring into the territories administered by any Local Government from sea or from foreign territory or from a territory administered by any other Local Government”

and, in like manner, “export” means

“to take out of the territories administered by any Local Government to sea or to any foreign territory or to any territory administered by another Local Government.”

4. It is clear enough therefore that the offence of importing opium is an offence constituted by bringing it into the territory in question. It does not matter where it was before provided it was out side the province. The offence is in bringing it in and the word “bring” may be specially noticed as part of the definition. If the goods once come across the border of Assam into Assam, if they come for and on account of the accused with his consent let alone by his procurement the offence of importing into Asssam is complete it is not necessary to show (that the accused did anything outside ???. In this particular case, the accused went outside of Assam into Cooch Behar and posted the parcel in effect to Bokakhat for himself which was exactly the same as if he had posted it to his own address and in this own name: bub the offence of importing into Assam would be equally complete had the goods been despatched pursuant to the accused's order by somebody in New York and it would be equally complete if when the goods crossed the border the accused had been taking a voyage on the high seas for the benefit of his health. The coming of the goods for the accused, on his account and with his consent is bringing them into Assam and is an offence of importing the goods. That this is the right view to take appears from cases which have been decided in other Courts. The first decision is that of Munshi Lal v. Emperor . A.I.R 1922 All. 21. Walsh, J., said this:

“I say nothing to discourage the view that a person who exports from outside the United Provinces to a warehouse inside the United Provinces of which he is really the proprietor or temporary possessor, even under a false name, is, in fact, committing an offence under the Act of in porting into the United Provinces, although he is also the person who exported from outside. It is perfectly possible for me to send an article for myself from the High Court at Allahabad to my Chambers in London, and, if I did so with a dutiable article without declaration, I should be guilty of importing into England”;

and a Bench of the same High Court confirmed this view in the subsequent case of Emperor v. Govind Ram . A.I.R 1924 All. 558, the learned Judges pointing out that the person who imported must be a person who was intending or had the right to take delivery or desired to take delivery inside the area. I am quite satisfied on the evidence in the present case that the substance of the matter is that those goods were sent by the accused from Cooch Behar to himself in Assam on his own account and the fact that they were to be taken delivery of by Khagendra under an arrangement with him has no importance at all. The position under the Opium Act is exactly the same as if he had kept a warehouse in Assam and he had sent the goods to that spot.

5. In these circumstances, I come to consider the view taken by the Courts below. The trial Magistrate found that the accused was guilty both of possession of this opium and also of importing it and be imposed a fine of Rs. 250 on each of the charges. As regards possession, I cannot say that it appears to me that offence is at all made out having regard to the fact that the article was not, in fact, taken possession of, Khagendra having refused altogether to take possession of it after he became suspicious. The Magistrate however found that the accused caused it to be imported from a foreign territory and he convicted him of that offence. When the case came before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the learned Judge was not satisfied that there was any proof of possession and, so far as that ruling is concerned, I am disposed to agree with him on the facts of this particular case. But his view on the other question was this: that what was shown was an offence of exporting opium from Cooch Behar and he thought that while Khagendra might be placed on his trial for importing opium into Assam the accused had not imported opium into Assam but had only exported it from Cooch Behar. Accordingly the learned Judge took the view that as the offence alleged against the accused was an offence committed in Cooch Behar and as there was no certificate from the Political Agent of Cooch Behar prosecution on that account did not lie. The Magistrate had thought and said that the case was one under S. 179 and not under Section 188 of the Cr PC. Of course, if it was under S. 188, it would be no answer to say that the case was under S. 179, because Mr. Banerji has shown that since the Code was amended S. 188 overrides S. 179 in any case in which S. 188 is applicable; that is to say, where the question is as to a native Indian subject committing an offence without and beyond the limits of British India or a British subject committing an offence in the territories of a Native Prince and so forth.

6. It appears to me however that the learned Judge was wrong. The offence of which the Magistrate rightly convicted the accused was of importing the goods into Assam and that offence it appears to me is amply proved. That is not an offence committed in Cooch Behar at all from the nature of the offence. The offence is entirely committed within Assam, and Section 188 of the Cr PC, has no application to the case. In my judgment therefore the Government appeal must be allowed, the acquittal must be set aside and the accused must be convicted of the offence of importing this opium into Assam. It is very unfortunate that although this accused has been found to be trafficking in opium notwithstanding the great trouble the legislature in Assam has taken to stop the evils of opium smuggling, this accused person who had engaged himself in committing such an offence in order to get rich is punished only by a fine of Rs. 250. Trial Magistrates dealing with these cases should have sufficient business sagacity to impose heavy penalties in cases where traffic is clearly brought home to the accused, because obviously a man trafficking in opium can well afford to pay a fine of Rs. 250 and still make a handsome profit. However in the present case, the question of sentence is not one which at the moment we have any jurisdiction over. It will be sufficient to restore the judgment of the Magistrate and to direct that on this count the penalty imposed by him shall stand, namely, a penalty of Rs. 250 fine, in default, to undergo six months' rigorous imprisonment.

C.C Ghose, J.:— I agree.

R.M/R.K

7. Appeal allowed.