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Annamalai Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Ramanathan Chettiar And Others
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
These petitions were filed by some of the respondents in A.S. No. 418 of 1932 seeking leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of this Court and for the issue of a certificate that the case is a fit one for such appeal under Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
A.S. No. 418 of 1932 arose from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Devakotta dated 7th November 1932, which dismissed O.S. No. 109 of 1930 on the preliminary ground of "multifariousness" or misjoinder of defendants and causes of action. On appeal (A.S. No. 418), this Court held there was no such misjoinder and remanded the suit to the original Court for disposal on the merits. The present petitions seek to appeal that remanding order to His Majesty in Council.
The substantive suit (O.S. No. 109 of 1930) alleges that, following the death of the plaintiff's father in 1915 when the plaintiff was a child, the plaintiff's estate was managed by relatives and agents (variously identified as defendants 1–4, 6–12 and 15). The plaint alleges large-scale embezzlement during the plaintiff's minority (1915–1929), resulting in a huge shortfall in assets; the plaintiff seeks an account of the estate's management from the responsible defendants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present order remanding the suit (not being a decree or final order) is a matter from which leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council can properly be granted under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 109 CPC.
- Whether Order I Rule 3 of the CPC can be interpreted so as to permit joinder of causes of action when such joinder is not permitted under Order II Rule 3 of the CPC (a pure question of law).
- Whether, on a proper construction of Order I Rule 3 of the CPC, the allegations in the plaint plead "the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions" (a question of applying law to facts).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by the Advocate-General)
- The Advocate-General intimated that he did not propose to argue that the impugned order was a decree or final order (i.e., he did not press that the order fell under Clauses (a) or (b) of Section 109), while indicating he had not abandoned the point.
- It was contended that Clause (c) of Section 109 (granting leave in special cases) covers cases where a substantial question of law is raised which is of great public or private importance.
- Two substantial questions of law were formulated for the purpose of seeking a certificate under Clause (c): (1) whether Order I Rule 3 can be construed to permit joinder of causes of action inconsistent with Order II Rule 3; and (2) whether the plaint properly alleges the "same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions".
Other Parties' Arguments
The opinion does not set out any detailed arguments advanced by the opposing parties (the plaintiff or other respondents) in these petitions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 11 Rang 581 | Authority of the Judicial Committee indicating that the remanding order in question is not a "decree or final order". | The Court relied on this ruling to conclude that the impugned order could not be treated as a decree or final order and therefore the petitions were not maintainable under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 109 CPC. |
| 23 All 2272 (Lord Hobhouse) | Explains Clause (c) of Section 109 CPC is intended for special cases — e.g., disputes not measurable by money though of great public or private importance. | The Court cited this passage to frame the limited scope of Clause (c): it is meant for exceptional matters of importance rather than ordinary procedural questions. |
| 44 Mad 2933 (Lord Buckmaster) | Observation that Clause (c) contemplates disputes impossible to value in money and questions of wide public importance. | Used to support the Court's characterization of Clause (c) and to assess whether the present questions fall within that category. |
| 44 MLJ 2174 (Sir Walter Schwabe, C.J.) | Describes the class of cases for Clause (c): those involving public importance or important precedents, or where the subject-matter is not exactly measurable in money but is of great importance. | The Court extracted this formulation to evaluate whether the present petitions presented matters appropriately falling under Clause (c). |
| 49 Mad 836 (Full Bench) | Full Bench decision settling the law on the point of interpretation (presumably the relation of Order I R.3 and Order II R.3). | The Court held that this Full Bench decision had finally settled the legal issue and therefore the first question was not a substantial or doubtful point fit for Privy Council consideration. |
| 1928 Mad 4486 | Held that where a Full Bench decision of the Court has settled the law, a conflict with another High Court's decision does not by itself make the case fit for appeal to the Privy Council. | The Court relied on this principle to reject the contention that any inter-High-Court conflict made the case fit for a certificate under Section 109(c). |
| 1934 Pat 5647 (Patna High Court) | Observation that in granting a certificate under Section 109 CPC the Court must consider whether litigation will be made oppressively expensive or whether elucidation of real issues will be unduly postponed. | The Court invoked this consideration to emphasize that granting the certificate here would further delay trial and increase expense, weighing against granting leave to appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- Characterization of the impugned order: The Court accepted that its order remanding the suit for trial was not a "decree or final order." The Advocate-General conceded he would not argue it was a final order, and the Court relied upon the Judicial Committee authority (11 Rang 581) to support that position. Consequently, the petitions could not succeed under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 109 CPC.
- Scope of Clause (c) of Section 109 CPC: The Court examined Clause (c) as a residual, exceptional jurisdiction to grant certificates in "special cases" — those involving questions not measurable in money but of public or private importance, or issues likely to be important precedents. The Court reviewed authoritative formulations of this principle (23 All 2272; 44 Mad 2933; 44 MLJ 2174).
- Identification and assessment of the questions put forward: The Advocate-General formulated two principal questions (one purely legal; the other a question of applying law to particular facts). The Court classified the first as a question of law and the second as primarily factual.
- Evaluation of the first question: The Court found the first question presented "no difficulty" and was conclusively settled by a prior Full Bench decision of the Court (49 Mad 836). It emphasized stare decisis and the settled nature of the rule in procedural matters; because the Full Bench had decided the matter many years earlier and no authority had shaken that decision, the issue could not be regarded as a substantial question of law fit for Privy Council review. The Court also cited 1928 Mad 4486 to show that conflict with another High Court does not make a case fit for appeal if a Full Bench has settled the law.
- Evaluation of the second question: The Court treated this as largely a question of applying legal tests to facts (i.e., whether the plaint pleads a "same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions"). It concluded this presented even less difficulty and was not a substantial question of law of public importance, being concerned with formal matters of joinder. The Court observed that misjoinder, even if present, may not be fatal and that the Subordinate Judge's remedy (to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to elect) had been appropriate.
- Additional considerations weighing against granting the certificate: The Court emphasized the policy against permitting procedural pleas to be used to delay substantive trials, especially where the suit (instituted in July 1930) had already been pending for years. It invoked the Patna Court's observation (1934 Pat 5647) that the Court must avoid making litigation oppressively expensive or postponing trial of the real issues. The Court expressed concern that the petitions' real object was delay rather than obtaining Privy Council adjudication on a matter of genuine public importance.
- Conclusion of analysis: Given that (a) the order was not a final decree, (b) the questions were not substantial questions of law of public importance and (c) granting a certificate would cause further delay and expense, the Court concluded the case was not a proper one for a certificate under Clause (c) of Section 109 CPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Petitions dismissed with costs.
The Court refused to grant a certificate under Clause (c) of Section 109 CPC authorizing an appeal to His Majesty in Council from the order remanding the suit for trial. The petitions were dismissed and costs were awarded (including one set of costs in the main petition, C.M.P. No. 3349 of 1934).
Implications:
- Direct practical effect: The applicants are denied leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the remanding order; the suit was to proceed to trial in the original Court on the merits as ordered by this Court.
- On legal precedent: The Court relied on existing Full Bench and other authorities to apply settled principles (stare decisis) and did not purport to create a new rule; the opinion does not indicate that any new precedent was laid down.
- Policy implication emphasized by the Court: Procedural pleas (such as multifariousness) are not suitable grounds for invoking Clause (c) of Section 109 where the underlying questions are not of substantial public importance and where allowing an appeal would merely delay determination of substantive rights.
Disposition
Petitions dismissed. (As recorded: "10. Petition dismissed.")
1. These are petitions by some of the respondents in A.S No. 418 of 1932* for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the order therein and for issue of a certificate that the case is a fit one for such appeal. A.S No. 418 of 1932 was an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Devakotta dated 7th November 1932 dismissing O.S No. 109 of 1930 on his file on the preliminary ground of ‘multifariousness’ or misjoinder of defendants and of causes of action. In appeal this Court held that there was no such misjoinder and remanded the suit to the original Court for disposal on the merits. It is this order which is sought to be taken in appeal to His Majesty in Council. It is clear that this order is not a ‘decree or final order.’ The Advocate-General who appeared for the petitioners intimated that he did not propose to argue that the order was a decree or final order, though he desired it to be noted that he did not abandon the point or make any concession regarding it. The point is however well settled, and it is enough to refer to the latest ruling of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 11 Rang 581. It follows therefore that the present petitions are not maintainable under. Cls. (a) and (b) of Section 109 of the CPC, and they were actually argued as if they were made only under Cl. (c) of that section and can be allowed only on the ground that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was pointed out by Lord Hobhouse in 23 All 2272, that this clause is clearly intended to meet special cases, such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance.
2. In a later case, 44 Mad 2933, Lord Buckmaster observed that this clause contemplates cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute, and where there are questions as for example those relating to religious rights and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, of such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies, as well as questions of wide public importance.
3. Again, in the words of Sir Walter Schwabe, C.J in 44 MLJ 2174:
What is contemplated is a class of cases in which there may he involved questions of public importance, or which may be important precedents governing numerous other cases, or in which, while the light in dispute is not exactly measurable in money, it is of great public or private importance.
4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that this clause would cover a case in which a substantial question of law is raised which is of great public or private importance. The substantial questions of law raised in the present case, as formulated by the Advocate-General, are (1) whether O. 1. R. 3 of the CPC, can be so interpreted as to permit of joinder of causes of action when such joinder is not permitted under O. 2, R. 3 of the CPC, and (2) whether on a proper construction of O. 1, R. 3 of the CPC, the allegations in the plaint allege ‘the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions.’
5. The first of these two questions is no doubt a question of law; the second however is not so much a question of law as a question of applying the law to the facts of a particular case. The present suit is directed against defendants 1 to 4, 6 to 12 and 15, the relief sought in it being only against these defendants for an account of the management of the plaintiff's estate during his minority from 1915 to 1929. Defendants 2 and 3 are the undivided sons of defendant 1 (Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar) a cousin of the plaintiff's father; defendant 4 is the son of the late Ramaswami Chettiar, another cousin of the plaintiff's father; defendants 6 to 12, and the deceased defendant 13 (whose legal representative defendant 15 is) are alleged to have been agents employed in the administration of the plaintiff's estate. The substance of the plaint is that after the plaintiff's father died in 1915 leaving his widow (D. 5) and the plaintiff, then a child of three years behind him, the widow allowed defendant 1 and defendant 4's father to manage the plaintiff's estate, that the latter did in fact jointly manage the estate till the death of defendant 4's father in October 1918 since when defendant 1 carried on the management solely, and that throughout such management by them they acted in collusion with the agents employed in the management, viz defendants 6 to 13, and defrauded the plaintiff to such an extent that while the true assets of the plaintiff's estate excluding jewels and immoveable property, on plaintiff's attaining majority should have been ‘considerably over a crore of rupees’ only a sum of thirteen lakhs was found to exist, the great bulk of hie-assets and profits having been ‘either misappropriated, or retained and with, held by defendant 1.’ In short, the plaintiff alleged that there had been embezzlement on a very large scale of his estate during his minority by those who were managing the same, and asked for accounts from those responsible for suck embezzlement.
6. The two questions formulated by the-Advocate-General do not appear to be substantial questions of law, and they are certainly not of great public importance. It was conceded in the reply that every question of law is not a substantial question of law, and that a question of law will not be substantial merely because much is at stake on the answer to it. It was further conceded that a substantial question of law must be a question of some difficulty in which the pros and cons are about evenly balanced. The first question is one which presents no difficulty, and it was certainly one on which no doubt could be entertained by the Bench which decided it in the appeal, in view of the Full Bench decision in 49 Mad 8365, which had settled the matter finally. As observed in the order sought to be appealed from the Full Bench decision is as binding upon our Bench as it was upon the Subordinate Judge, and since it was pronounced almost ten years ago nothing has arisen to shake its validity. On the contrary the Bombay High Court which once held a different opinion is now aligned with. Calcutta and Madras…. Especially in mere questions of procedure, the rule that-usually prevails is stare decisis…. The point has not been argued before us, and 49 Mad 836, unless it is reversed by a superior Court, must stand as the accepted law.’ It has been held in 1928 Mad 4486 that where a Full Bench, decision of our Court has settled the law the fact that there is conflict between that decision and a decision of another High Court does not render the case a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council.
7. In the present case there is no such conflict; on the other hand three High Courts have arrived at the same conclusion on the point. When the question has been so well settled it cannot be said hat it is a substantial question of importance which is fit to be taken on appeal to His Majesty in Council.
8. The second question formulated by the Advocate-General presents even less difficulty, and it is certainly not a substantial question of law of any importance. The questions and the answers to them do not affect substantial rights they relate only to such formal matters as the joinder of parties and of causes of action. Even if there is misjoinder it is not necessarily fatal, and in the present case it was held that if there had been misjoinder an opportunity to elect should have been allowed to the plaintiff. Where substantial rights are in no way affected by an order there is prima facie no reason for issuing a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. On the other hand, as observed by the Patna High Court in 1934 Pat 5647, ‘another consideration which we must keep in view in granting the I certificate under Section 109 of the CPC, is that the litigation is not made oppressively expensive and the elucidation of the real issues in the case by a trial of the suit is not unduly postponed or delayed.’ The present suit was instituted in July 1930, i.e, more than years ago; an appeal to the Privy Council from the order remanding the suit for trial of the merits will mean further delay in the trial of the real issues in the suit. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the real object of these petitions for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is to delay the trial of the suit further, and, not to obtain the decision of His Majesty in Council on any substantial question of law of importance. The propensity of litigants, especially well-to-do litigants, occupying the position of defendants, to delay the trial of suits against them by every means in their power has increased, is increasing and must be diminished. One would naturally expect that persons in the position of the petitioners, against whom gross embezzlement of an estate during the owner's minority is alleged, would be anxious to have the earliest opportunity to repel such a disgraceful charge, and not to seek a further opportunity of having the claim against them dismissed on the technical plea of multifariousness. This natural attitude is not the attitude adopted by the petitioners in these petitions.
9. No case has been brought to our notice in which leave to appeal to His Majesty in Privy Council has been granted from an order deciding a point of procedure like a plea of multifariousness. In the present case the plea of multifariousness is moreover devoid of any real substance; persistence in such a plea deserved no encouragement. It is no doubt open to us under Cl. (c) of Section 109 of the CPC, to grant a special certificate in a proper case, but the present case is in our opinion not a proper case and we must therefore decline to grant it. The petitions are dismissed with costs; one set of costs in the main petition (C.M.P No. 3349 of 1934).
C.R.K/R.W
10. Petition dismissed.
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