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S. Maruthamuthu Naicker v. P. Kadir Badsha Rowther
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a reference under Order 46, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure made by the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in a suit on a promissory note. The note was executed by the first and second defendants in favour of one Ponnuswami Naicker, who indorsed it to the plaintiff. Two sons of the second defendant (who together with him form an undivided Hindu family) were made defendants because the plaintiff sought to make them liable on the ground that the debt was incurred for family purposes by the second defendant in his capacity as the managing member. The sons pleaded that the plaintiff, as indorsee, was not entitled to sue them on the strength of the indorsement. The Subordinate Judge referred the following question for determination:
“Whether an indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member is entitled to recover the debt from the property of the non-executant coparceners on the ground of their liability under the Hindu Law or whether he is limited to the remedy available on the note.”
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member of a Hindu family may recover the debt from non-executant coparceners on the basis of their liability under Hindu law.
- Whether an indorsee is limited to the remedy on the negotiable instrument (the promissory note) or may enforce the underlying debt against persons whose names do not appear on the instrument.
- Whether an indorsement in blank transfers only the property in the instrument or also operates as an assignment of the underlying debt (and the consequences of Stamp Law compliance if an assignment is intended).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad (Privy Council) | Emphasises that the person or firm to be charged on a negotiable document must be clearly stated; §§26–28 Negotiable Instruments Act do not support treating a signatory as acting for an undisclosed principal so as to change liability. | Used to support the fundamental principle that only persons whose names appear on a negotiable instrument can be held liable on it and that undisclosed-principal contentions cannot be used to alter that position. |
| Lewin v. Edwards | Where a drawer indorses a bill in blank and it passes on, a later holder without privity cannot sue the drawer; delivery transfers only the contract on the bill. | Supports the point that there is no privity of contract between an indorsee and the maker/drawer and that an indorsee's rights are confined to the instrument. |
| In re Soltykoff, Ex parte Margrett | An indorsee of a bill cannot hold an acceptor (e.g., a minor) liable as if there were a separate contract; indorsee can sue only in the rights conferred by the instrument. | Illustrates that an indorsee's rights are limited to what the instrument confers and that external considerations (like supply of necessaries) do not change that rule for an indorsee. |
| Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan (Full Bench) | A creditor of a Hindu family (no negotiable instrument involved) could sue the sons and obtain a decree making their shares in family property liable for the father's debts incurred for family benefit. | Distinguished as a case about debts (not negotiable instruments); court accepted correctness but noted it does not decide issues about liability on instruments. |
| Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar | In a suit on a promissory note where the plaint was widely drawn to include a claim on the original debt, non-executant members were held liable because the suit could be regarded as on the debt rather than strictly on the instrument. | Interpreted as showing liability of non-executants only where the suit is framed as one on the underlying debt; not authority for holding non-executants liable on the instrument itself. |
| Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyasawmi Pillai | Held that an indorsee of a promissory note executed by a member of a joint Hindu family could sue other family members on the instrument. | The court held this decision was wrongly decided and explicitly overruled it. |
| Karmali Abdulla Allarakia v. Vora Karimji Jiwanji (Privy Council) | Was understood by some earlier judges to hold that non-signatory partners could be held liable on a negotiable instrument; in fact, the Judicial Committee treated the suit as one for an account embracing mercantile transactions. | Used to show that this case does not support the proposition that non-signatory members can be held liable on a negotiable instrument. |
| Nachiappa Chetty v. Dakshinamurthi Servai | Held that in a suit upon a promissory note against a Hindu father and sons the cause of action was the same as the cause of action against the father; sons might be joined to show debt was not binding on them. | Distinguished: the present court stated that this cannot be read as deciding that sons could be sued on the promissory note itself. |
| Thankammal v. Kunhamma | Held that a creditor could not join separate causes of action and that junior family members could be held liable on a promissory note executed by the manager for proper debts. | The present court dissented from this extension, regarding it as going too far. |
| Periakaruppan Chetti v. Mottayya Mudali | Indorsement in blank transfers the property in the instrument only and does not operate as an assignment of the debt unless the indorsement is expressly so worded and stamping requirements are complied with. | Adopted as authority for the proposition that ordinary indorsement confers rights merely on the instrument and not a separate right to sue non-signatories on the debt. |
| Muhammad Khumarali v. Ranga Rao | Where a note made in favour of two payees saw one indorse to the other, the indorsee could not sue as indorsee or as one of two payees on the note, but could sue as assignee of the chose in action if there was a transfer of interest. | Applied to reinforce that an indorsee seeking to make persons liable whose names do not appear on the instrument cannot do so unless there has been a valid assignment of the debt. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began from two fundamental principles derived from authorities:
- No person whose name does not appear on a negotiable instrument can be sued on it.
- There is no privity of contract between an indorsee and the maker or acceptor of a negotiable instrument; an indorsee's rights are those conferred by the instrument itself.
The Chief Justice reviewed relevant English and Privy Council authority to show that these principles are clearly stated in those jurisdictions (citing Sadasuk Janki Das and English decisions such as Lewin v. Edwards and In re Soltykoff). From those decisions the court emphasized that the holder of a negotiable instrument can sue only upon the contract embodied by the instrument and cannot create privity with a maker who is not a party to the holder's direct contract.
The court then examined Indian precedents that had been cited in argument. It distinguished cases that involved debts generally (for example, Ramasami Nadan) from cases involving negotiable instruments. It explained that Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar had been correctly interpreted by some judges as permitting suits against non-executant members only because the plaint was framed so as to proceed on the original debt rather than strictly on the promissory note. The Chief Justice criticized decisions (notably Nataraja Naicken) which had read earlier cases as authority for holding non-executant coparceners liable on the instrument itself, concluding that those earlier judges had misunderstood both Krishna Aiyar and the relevant Privy Council authority.
On the question of indorsements, the court relied on Periakaruppan Chetti and Muhammad Khumarali to explain that:
- An indorsement in blank transfers merely the property in the instrument and does not, by itself, operate as an assignment of the underlying debt.
- An indorsement may operate as an assignment of the debt only if it is so worded and the requirements of law (including stamping) are complied with; where such an assignment exists the transferee is governed by principles applicable to assignees (Transfer of Property Act, Chapter VIII), and not by all privileges of an endorsee under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
On the basis of these legal principles and the authorities reviewed, the court concluded that an indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member of a Hindu family is ordinarily limited to remedies available on the instrument and cannot, by virtue of an ordinary indorsement, sue non-executant coparceners on the ground of their liability under Hindu law.
The court therefore framed its answer to the reference narrowly: an indorsee is limited to his remedy on the note unless the indorsement is so worded as to transfer the debt as well and the Stamp Law is complied with.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member of a Hindu family is limited to his remedy on the note, and, in the case of an ordinary indorsement, cannot sue the non-executant coparceners on the ground of their liability under the Hindu Law.
Additional holdings and direct consequences:
- If an indorsement is expressly worded so as to transfer the underlying debt (and the stamping requirements are complied with), the transferee may sue as assignee of the debt under principles in Chapter VIII of the Transfer of Property Act, but will not enjoy all privileges of an endorsee under the Negotiable Instruments Act beyond what the instrument confers (see reference to s.137 Negotiable Instruments Act).
- The court expressly overruled Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyasawmi Pillai to the extent that it held an indorsee could sue non-executant coparceners on the instrument.
- The costs of the reference are ordered to be costs in the cause.
Broader implications: The decision clarifies and restricts the rights of indorsees of negotiable instruments vis-à-vis non-signatory members of Hindu undivided families, reaffirming the classical negotiable-instruments principles of identity of parties and privity; it corrects earlier conflicting interpretations in Indian case law by overruling the authority that had permitted suits on the instrument against non-signatories.
Concurrences: Varadachariar, J. concurred and added commentary about the transferee's status as assignee being governed by the Transfer of Property Act; Mockett, J. agreed with the Chief Justice.
The Chief Justice.—This is a reference under O. 46, R. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in a suit on a promissory note. The note was executed by the first and second defendants in favour of one Ponnuswami Naicker who indorsed it to the plaintiff. The two sons of the second defendant who constitute with him an undivided family have been made defendant, as it is sought to make them liable on the ground that the debt was incurred for family purposes by the second defendant in his capacity of managing member. The sons having raised the plea that the plaintiff as the indorsee is not entitled to sue them on the strength of the indorsement of the instrument, the Subordinate Judge has referred to us this question:—
“Whether an indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member is entitled to recover the debt from the property of the non-executant coparceners on the ground of their liability under the Hindu Law or whether he is limited to the remedy available on the note.”
It is a fundamental principle of the law relating to negotiable instruments that no one whose name does not appear on the instrument can be held liable thereon, but this principle has unfortunately been lost sight of in some of the cases which have come before this Court. Before examining the reports which have been quoted to us in the course of the arguments I wish to refer to a decision of the Privy Council and to two English cases as the law is to be found there clearly stated. The decision of the Judicial Committee is that in Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad(1) which was an appeal arising out of a suit on a hundi. Lord Buckmaster in delivering the judgment observed:
“It is of the utmost importance that the name of a person or firm to be charged upon a negotiable document should be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document, so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognised as the document passes from hand to hand.”
Later in the judgment, Lord Buckmaster said:
“Their Lordships' attention was directed to Ss. 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, and the terms of these sections were contrasted with the corresponding provisions of the English statute. It is unnecessary in this connection to decide whether their effect is identical. It is sufficient to say that these sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rules, that in an action on a bill of exchange or promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument, it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal.”
In Lewin v. Edwards it was held that where the drawer of a bill indorses it in blank, and delivers it to another, who passes it without a fresh indorsement to a third person, the latter cannot maintain an action of debt against the drawer. The contract transferred by the delivery of the bill being only the contract on the bill the holder could not sue the drawer with whom he had no privity of contract. In In re Soltykoff, Ex parte Margrett(2) Lord Esher M.R had to consider the claim of an indorsee of bills of exchange accepted by a minor. It was said that the bills were accepted for necessaries supplied to the minor. Lord Esher in deciding that the petitioner was not entitled to hold the minor liable said:
“He supplied no necessaries to the infant; he is only the indorsee of some bills of exchange accepted by him. As regards an indorsee of a bill of exchange it is immaterial whether there was any consideration for the bills as between the drawer and the acceptor; he can sue the acceptor as the indorsee of the bills, and nothing else. The question therefore, whether necessaries were supplied to the infant by the drawer of the bill, is immaterial”.
From these decisions it will be observed that there are two principles to be borne in mind. The first is the principle which I have already stated, namely, that no one whose name does not appear on a negotiable instrument can be sued on it. The second is that there is no privity of contract between an indorsee and the maker or acceptor.
Turning now to the cases quoted to us, in Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan(3), a Full Bench of this Court consisting of Shephard, Subramania Aiyar, Benson, and Moore, JJ., held in a suit brought by a creditor of a Hindu family in respect of debts which were said to have been incurred for the benefit of the family that the plaintiff could have prosecuted his claim against the sons in that suit and have obtained a decree, making their shares in the family property liable for the debts of the father. There was no negotiable instrument here and the correctness of the decision is, therefore, not open to question. In Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar(4), Shephard, Subramania Aiyar and Davies, JJ., had to consider a suit on a promissory note, in which the plaint was sufficiently widely drawn to cover a claim on the debt as well. In this case a member of an undivided Hindu family had borrowed moneys from the plaintiff to purchase lands for the benefit of his family and executed a promissory note in respect of the loan. It was sought to make the other members of the family also liable, and it was held that they were, Davies J., dissenting. It is clear, however, from the judgments of Shephard and Subramania Aiyar JJ. that the non-executant members of the family were held liable because as against them the suit could be regarded as being on the debt and not on the instrument. In the course of his judgment Shephard J. said:
“It is argued that the present suit was strictly confined to a demand for payment of the note and that the plaint did not include a demand in respect of the original debt. It appears to me on reading the plaint that it contains all the allegations that are needed in order to charge the appellants with liability. The charge is that the debt was incurred for the expenses of the family and that they are bound to discharge it. There can be no doubt that the Courts below as well as the appellants understood fully the case which the plaintiff was seeking to establish.”
Davies, J. dissented because he considered that the suit as framed was on the note alone, which did not allow the non-executant members of the family to be held liable. While it is manifest that Shephard and Subramania Aiyar, JJ. did not hold that where a promissory note has been signed by the managing member of the family alone the other members of the family can be made liable on the instrument itself, it has unfortunately been interpreted in the contrary sense. The case which I have at present in mind is that of Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyasawmi Pillai where Ayling and Seshagiri Aiyar JJ., held that an indorsee of a promissory note executed by a member of a joint Hindu family could sue not only the maker, but the other members of the family on the instrument. The learned Judges here not only failed to appreciate the real nature of the decision in Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar but also understood the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Karmali Abdulla Allarakia v. Vora Karimji Jiwanji which they considered to decide that on a negotiable instrument executed by one member of a partnership the other members can be held liable. Their Lordships did not so hold. A perusal of the judgment shows that they treated the suit as being one for an account embracing mercantile transactions between the parties.
In Nachiappa Chetty v. Dakshinamurthi Servai, Wallis, C.J, and Hannay, J., held that in a suit upon a promissory note against a Hindu father and his sons the cause of action was the same as the cause of action against the father and it was not necessary for the holder of the note to prove that the debt was incurred for family purposes. The sons could be joined in order to give them an opportunity of showing that the debt was not binding on them. The learned Judges regarded the decision in Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar being the authority for this. The case cannot be interpreted as deciding that the sons could be sued on the note. In Thankammal v. Kunhamma, however, Sadasiva Aiyar, J., sitting with Spencer, J. went much further and held that a creditor could not join two separate causes of action in the same suit, one on the debt and one on the note, and that the junior members could be held liable on a promissory note executed by the manager for proper debts. This is going too far, and we must express our dissent. The maker alone can be sued on the note and the fact that under Hindu Law sons are liable in respect of debts incurred on behalf of the family or by the father for his own purposes, provided that they are not incurred for illegal or immoral purposes, does not affect the principle involved. We are not in this reference called upon to decide whether the decision of the Privy Council in Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad affects the decisions in Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar and Nachiappa Chettiar v. Dakshinamurthi Servai as these were not suits by indorsees.
Where the indorsement is in blank it only operates to transfer the property in the instrument and not as an assignment of the debt, as was pointed out by Madhavan Nair, J., in Periakaruppan Chetti v. Mottayya Mudali(5). An endorsement may operate to assign the debt as well when it is so worded and the requirements of the law with regard to stamping are complied with, but unless there is an indorsement of this nature the indorsee has rights merely on the instrument. In Muhammad Khumarali…(Plaintiff); v. Ranga Rao…(Defendant).*(6), Shephard and Bhashyam Aiyangar, JJ., decided in a case where a promissory note had been made in favour of two payees, one of whom indorsed it to the other, that the indorsee could not sue on the note in the capacity of indorsee or in the capacity of one of two joint payees, but he could maintain a suit for the sum due under the instrument as the assignee of the chose in action by reason of the other joint payee having transferred his interest therein to him. The plaintiff there sued a person whose name appeared on the face of the instrument as the maker which is quite a different matter. We are concerned here merely with a case in which an indorsee is seeking to make liable persons whose names do not appear on the instrument. This he clearly cannot do. Accordingly, we answer the reference in this way:—The indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member of a Hindu family is limited to his remedy on the note, unless the indorsement is so worded as to transfer the debt as well and the Stamp Law is complied with, and therefore, in the case of an ordinary indorsement the indorsee cannot sue the non-executant coparceners on the ground of their liability under the Hindu Law. It follows from this that we consider that Nataraja Naicken v. Ayyasawmi Pillai was wrongly decided and it is overruled.
The costs of this reference will be costs in the cause.
Varadachariar, J.—I concur in the above answer. (See also I Camp. 175: 170 E.R 918). I only wish to add that in his capacity as assignee of the debt the transferee will be governed by the principles laid down in Chap. VIII of the Transfer of Property Act and will not be entitled to all the privileges of an endorsee under the Negotiable Instruments Act. S. 137 must be deemed to exclude these principles in the case of negotiable instruments only to the extent that they are dealt with and are sought to be enforced as such instruments. I have elsewhere dealt with Nachiappa Chetty v. Dakshinamurthi Servai and reserve my opinion on the point dealt with therein.
Mockett, J:—I agree with my lord the Chief Justice.
N.R.R
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