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Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was preferred by the 3rd defendant from a decree in O.S. No. 641 of 1924, City Civil Court. By that decree the appellant (3rd defendant) was directed to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiff (Govindammal, who is the 1st respondent in this appeal), and to pay mesne profits and the plaintiff's costs. The 5th defendant in the suit is impleaded as the 2nd respondent in this appeal.
The suit property (a house and ground in old Washermanpet) originally belonged to Venkatarama Chetti, who executed a will on 22 July 1904 creating a life estate in his son Rangan Chetti (no power of alienation) and an absolute remainder in his grandson Krishnappa Chetti with full powers of alienation; the will also provided an allowance to Venkatarama's daughter and her children. On 6 February 1905 the property was conveyed by a sale-deed to the 2nd defendant (Gurunatha Mudaliar) and his father by Rangan Chetti (for himself and as guardian of his minor son Krishnappa), Rangan's wife Angammal, and Venkatarama's daughter acting for herself and as guardian of her minor children. Thereafter the purchasers remained in possession; the 3rd defendant (appellant) was in possession and enjoyment of the property at the date of the suit.
Rangan Chetti died on 25 October 1913. On 7 March 1923 Krishnappa Chetti (the 1st defendant in the original suit) executed a sale-deed of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 1,500. The plaintiff filed the suit on 1 December 1924 seeking possession with mesne profits from defendants 2 to 4. The plaintiff's principal case was that the 1905 sale to the 2nd defendant and his father was invalid as against the 1st defendant (then a minor) and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to possession; alternatively, the plaintiff sought a decree against the 1st defendant for refund of Rs. 1,500 with interest.
Defences included the 1st defendant's admission of his sale to the plaintiff but denial that he must repay the consideration, the 3rd defendant's contentions that the property belonged to Krishnammal (later abandoned), denial of genuineness of the will (abandoned at trial), that the 1905 sale was valid (necessity / discharge of family debts), and that the suit was barred by limitation (continuous possession since 1905). The City Civil Judge held the will genuine, found the 1905 sale not binding on the minor, and held the suit not barred by limitation (applying Arts. 123 and 136 of the Limitation Act and treating the suit as within twelve years and within three years of majority). A decree for possession with mesne profits was given for the plaintiff against the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale of 6th February 1905 to the 2nd defendant and his father was made for any purpose binding on the 1st defendant (i.e., whether the transfer was operative against the minor).
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation and, in particular, whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act (three years from the date a ward attains majority to set aside a transfer by his guardian) applies to this suit or whether other articles (e.g., Arts. 123, 136, 140, 144 or Art. 126) govern.
- If Article 44 applies, whether the suit was instituted within the three-year period measured from the date the ward attained majority (a factual question depending on proof of the 1st defendant's date of birth).
- Whether, in the event the suit is barred as against defendants 2 to 5, the plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to the alternative monetary relief (refund of Rs. 1,500 with interest) against the 1st defendant and whether that issue must be tried by the lower court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (3rd defendant)
- The evidence shows the 1905 sale was made for a necessary purpose (partly, at least to the extent of Rs. 300 to discharge a mortgage), so it is binding to that extent.
- The suit is barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act (three years from the date the ward attained majority). The appellant disputed the lower Court's finding on when the ward (1st defendant) attained majority and argued that the suit was instituted more than three years after that date.
Respondent's Arguments (plaintiff / 1st respondent)
- The lower Court correctly found the 1905 sale was not made for any purpose binding on the minor; the sale was not a gift and consideration was proved.
- Article 44 does not apply to the present suit: it applies only to a suit by the ward himself and not to a suit by a transferee from the ward; the transferee's case should be governed by Article 136 (twelve years from date when vendor became entitled to possession) or other articles such as Arts. 126, 140 and 144 as relied upon.
- The lower Court's application of Arts. 123 and 136 (and the effect of Sects. 6 and 8) was correct to treat the suit as within twelve years from the relevant starting point.
Contentions and Pleadings of Other Parties (1st defendant and contesting defendants)
- The 1st defendant admitted he sold the property to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,500 but contended the 1905 sale was collusive and fraudulent and could not affect his title; he denied liability to refund the Rs. 1,500.
- The 3rd defendant (contestant at trial) initially challenged the will and asserted alternative title and necessity for the 1905 sale; at trial some of those defences (genuineness of will and ownership by Krishnammal) were given up.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam | Illustrates that Art. 126 (ancient/ancestral property rule) applies to ancestral property and is not applicable when the will creates distinct and separate interests. | Used to reject the respondent's contention that the father acted as managing member and that Art. 126 applied; supported the conclusion that the son's interest was exclusive and not ancestral. |
| Jagadamba Chaodhrani v. Dakhina Mohun Roy Chaodhri | Establishes that the form of relief does not determine the article of limitation; a suit for possession may be regarded as a suit to set aside a transfer where recovery depends on setting aside the transfer. | Relied upon to support the proposition that a suit for possession which necessarily requires setting aside a transfer must be governed by the article applicable to suits for setting aside the transfer. |
| Malkarjun v. Narhari | Holds that where defendant is in possession under a sale (valid until set aside) the appropriate limitation period for a suit to impugn that sale applies (example given in context of Art. 12). | Applied as leading authority for treating possession under a sale-deed as operative against the plaintiff until the transfer is set aside and hence for applying the more specific limitation article rather than a general long period. |
| Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu | Applied Article 44 to a suit where a minor's guardian had sold the equity of redemption without necessity; suit was dismissed as barred. | Used as an example and authority that Art. 44 can and has been applied where a guardian's alienation was impeached after the ward attained majority. |
| Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh | Supports that suits to set aside instruments (fraudulent or voidable transfers) are governed by the specific limitation article applicable to setting aside such instruments. | Referred to in the context of demonstrating that a suit framed as one for possession may in substance be one to set aside a transfer and thus governed by a particular article. |
| Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Taruck Nath Maitra | Similar support for the proposition that relief in substance determines the applicable article where a transfer must be set aside to obtain possession. | Referred to among authorities supporting the same principle as Janki Kunwar and Malkarjun. |
| Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga | Authority that Art. 44 applies to sales by guardians where the purchaser obtains a defeasible title and the ward must sue to set aside. | Used as supporting precedent for applying Art. 44 in cases of guardian-made alienations where the purchaser is in possession. |
| Kandasami v. Irusappa | Another case cited to show application of Art. 44 to guardian alienations. | Cited with Madugula Latchiah as a supporting authority for treating the purchaser's possession under a guardian's sale as requiring suit within Art. 44 period. |
| Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram | Deals with a void sale by a guardian (sale of office/management) and discusses whether Art. 44 or Art. 144 applies; recognizes that possession adverse for statutory period may bar relief. | Examined and distinguished: the Court noted the case's facts led to the suit being barred in any view and used it to clarify that Art. 44 is directed at voidable (not void) transfers; the present case differs because the present sale is not void. |
| Laxmava v. Rachappa | Holds that Article 44 applies to suits brought by transferees from the ward — transferees stand in the same position as the ward for limitation purposes (subject to lack of personal privileges). | Followed as authority for treating transferees under the ward as governed by Art. 44 so that the transferee cannot claim a longer limitation period than the ward would have had under Art. 44. |
| Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa | Expresses doubt (by learned Judges) whether Art. 44 applies to a suit by a transferee from the ward and discusses related consequences. | Quoted for the judicial doubt; the Court analysed the reasoning and ultimately rejected the doubt in favour of Laxmava's approach, while noting situations where a co-plaintiff ward may preserve the suit's timeliness. |
| Abbas Dhali v. Masabdi Karikar | Interprets the term 'vendor' in limitation contexts to include the first in a series of vendors entitled to sue for possession. | Referred to in discussion of Art. 136 and in support of the broader principle that articles should be read to apply to those claiming under the person mentioned in the article. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner addressing first the validity of the 1905 sale and then the limitation issue.
-
Validity of the 1905 sale:
- The appellate Court reviewed the trial Judge's appreciation of evidence concerning payment of consideration and any application of the consideration to discharge a mortgage. The Court found no reason to disturb the trial Judge's conclusion that consideration was in fact paid and that the transaction was not a gift.
- However, on the crucial question whether the sale was made for any purpose binding on the minor, the Court accepted the trial Judge's finding that the sale was not shown to be made for any purpose binding on the 1st defendant (the minor) to any extent.
-
Limitation — identification of applicable article:
- The trial Judge applied Arts. 123 and 136 of the Limitation Act (twelve years from date vendor became entitled to possession) and treated the suit as within twelve years from the date the 1st defendant's father died. The trial Judge also observed the suit was within three years from the 1st defendant's attainment of majority, apparently relying on Sects. 6 and 8 and Art. 44 (though the applicability of Art. 44 was not argued below).
- The appellant pressed that Art. 44 (three years from majority to set aside a guardian's transfer) is the proper article and that the suit is barred if Art. 44 applies. The respondent argued Art. 44 does not apply to a transferee from the ward and that other articles (including Art. 136) should govern.
-
Factual inquiry on attainment of majority:
- The Court examined the documentary evidence as to the 1st defendant's date of birth: Ex. F (a horoscope) gave 14 April 1904; Ex. E (an extract from the vaccination register) recorded that the child was one year and six months old in October 1904 (implying birth circa April 1903); and Ex. I (a document dated 6 February 1905) stated the child was two years old.
- The trial Judge had accepted the horoscope. The appellate Court found the horoscope unreliable: it was written on a stray paper, not in a family book; the maker of the horoscope was not called; the witness who produced it had a limited connection and was not closely related. The vaccination register's entry and Ex. I were found to be more reliable and mutually corroborative, pointing to a birth date in about April 1903.
- On that factual basis the Court concluded the trial Judge's finding that the suit was within three years of the 1st defendant's attaining majority was incorrect; in truth more than three years had elapsed when the suit was filed.
-
Legal analysis on whether Art. 44 applies to a suit by a transferee from the ward:
- The Court reviewed authorities (including Privy Council decisions and decisions of this Court and other High Courts) on the scope of Article 44 and the general principle that the substance of the suit, not its form, determines the applicable article of limitation.
- The Court summarised established points from authorities: a sale by a guardian though unauthorised vests a defeasible title in the alienee; the ward (or those claiming under him) has the remedy of suing to set aside such a transfer; where recovery of property depends upon setting aside the transfer, the specific article for setting aside applies even if the plaintiff frames the suit as one for possession.
- Addressing the specific question whether Art. 44 applies to a suit by a transferee from the ward, the Court analysed prior decisions. It highlighted Laxmava v. Rachappa and Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu as authorities for the proposition that transferees from the ward stand in the same position as the ward for limitation purposes. It considered the doubts expressed in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa but rejected the reasoning that would place a transferee in a better position than the ward.
- The Court reasoned that to construe Art. 44 as applying only to suits by the ward himself would create anomalous results: a ward could evade the operation of Art. 44 (and its extinguishment consequences) by transferring the right to another; similarly it would produce inconsistency with other provisions (e.g., Sects. 6 and 8 being personal concessions) and with the principle that persons claiming under another normally take subject to the same limitation burden. The Court also referred to Sect. 146 of the Civil Procedure Code to support the general principle that proceedings may be taken by persons claiming under others.
- Because the 1st defendant (the ward) was a party to the present proceeding and the plaintiff's right was asserted in respect of the 1st defendant's transferred interest, the Court concluded Art. 44 applies to the present suit (including suits by transferees from the ward in the circumstances of this case).
-
Final disposition of limitation issue:
- Given the Court's factual finding (that more than three years elapsed after the 1st defendant attained majority before this suit was filed) and its legal conclusion that Art. 44 applies to this suit, the Court held the suit as brought against defendants 2 to 5 is barred by limitation under Art. 44.
-
Ancillary matters:
- The Court found that the issue of the plaintiff's alternative claim for refund of Rs. 1,500 against the 1st defendant had not been tried in the lower Court because the lower Court's primary view made that issue unnecessary. In light of the appellate decision on limitation, the Court directed that the alternative claim be tried by the lower Court and remitted the case for that purpose.
- The Court also determined costs: contesting defendants 3 to 5 were allowed their costs of the appeal only and were directed to bear their own costs in the lower Court (the Court referred to the defendants' earlier denials and subsequent abandonment of certain defences as reason for limiting costs relief).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The decree of the lower Court is reversed in part and the suit is dismissed as against defendants 2 to 5 on the ground that it is barred by Article 44 of the Limitation Act.
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's claim for possession with mesne profits is dismissed as against defendants 2 to 5 because the suit was not instituted within three years from the date the ward (1st defendant) attained majority, and Article 44 is held applicable.
- Remittal: The case is remitted to the lower Court for trial on the plaintiff's alternative claim for refund of Rs. 1,500 (with interest) against the 1st defendant; that issue was not decided below and must be tried.
- Costs: The contesting defendants (3rd to 5th defendants) are awarded their costs of this appeal only; they must bear their own costs in the lower Court.
- Precedential note: The Court's reasoning aligns with earlier authorities that Article 44 applies to suits to set aside guardian-made transfers and supports the position that transferees claiming under the ward are, for limitation purposes, in the same position as the ward (subject to lack of personal privileges). The judgment follows established authorities rather than purporting to establish a novel rule; the immediate practical effect is dismissal as to defendants 2 to 5 and remand for trial of the monetary claim against the 1st defendant.
Order: Case remanded to the lower Court for trial of the alternative claim.
This is an appeal preferred by the 3rd defendant in O. S. No. 641 of 1924 on the file of the City Civil Court. By the decree passed in that suit the appellant is directed to deliver up to the plaintiff, who is the 1st respondent in this appeal, possession of the suit property and also pay him the mesne profits as ascertained therein and also his costs of the suit. The 5th defendant in the suit is impleaded as the 2nd respondent in this appeal.
The material facts of the case as to which there is now no dispute are as follows:
The suit property which is a house and ground in old Washermanpet belonged to one Venkatarama Chetti. He died on 6th September, 1904, leaving him surviving a son named Rangan Chetty, a grandson by that son named Krishnappa Chetty and also a widowed daughter and two grandchildren by her. On 22nd July 1904, he executed a will in respect of his properties which among others comprised the suit property. As regards the suit property, the provisions of the will gave to the son Rangan Ohetti a life estate therein without power of alienation and the remainder absolutely to the grandon Krishnappa Chetti with full powers of alienation. An allowance of Rs. 6 per month was also directed to be paid to the daughter and her children out of the income of the suit property until she got possession of her husband's estate. See Ex. A.
On 6th February, 1905, the suit property was conveyed by a deed of sale to the 2nd defendant Gurunatha Mudaliar and his father Raju Mudaliar by the following persons, namely (1) Rangan Chetti for himself and as father and guardian of his minor son Krishnappa Chetti; (2) Rangan Chetti's wife Angammal (3) Venkatarama Chetti's daughter whose name is herein given as Peddiammal acting for herself and as guardian of her two minor children. The sale-deed recites the receipt by the vendors of the consideration of Rs. 800 for which the property was sold and the delivery of possession of the property to the purchasers, Since then the suit property has all along been in the possession of the 2nd defendant's family. The 3rd defendant is the son of the 2nd defendant and by some family arrangement, which it is unnecessary to refer to, the suit property was in his possession and enjoyment at the date of the suit, a portion thereof having been let by him to the 4th defendant.
Rangan Chetti died on 25th October 1913. On 7th March 1923 his son Krishnappa Chetti the 1st defendant in the suit, executed a sale-deed for the suit property in favour of the plaintiff Govindammal for Rs. 1,500. The plaintiff has thereafter filed this suit on 1st December, 1924, for recovery of possession of the property with mesne profits from defendants 2 to 4. Her case is that the sale of 6th February 1905 to the 2nd defendant and his father was invalid as against the 1st defendant; it was not made for any purpose binding on the 1st defendant who was then a minor; and his father Rangan Chetti had no power under the will to dispose of the property in any manner. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to possession of the property with mesne profits from the date of the sale to her. In the alternative, the plaintiff prays that if the Court should hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for possession of the property, she should be given a decree against the 1st defendant for Rs. 1,500 being the consideration paid by her to him for the sale, with interest thereon from the date of the sale.
The 1st defendant put in a written statement admitting the sale of the suit house and ground by him to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,500 and stating that the sale of the suit property by his father to the 2nd defendant and his father was a collusive and fraudulent transaction and that it cannot affect his title to the property. The plaintiff in virtue of the sale-deed he (1st defendant) has executed in her favour is entitled to a decree for possession of the property with mesne profits; but even if the Court should hold that she is not entitled to those reliefs she cannot claim the repayment to her by him (1st defendant) of the consideration paid by her for the sale.
The 3rd defendant, who was the contesting defendant in the lower Court, contended that the suit property did not belong to Venkatarama Chetti through whom the 1st defendant claimed but that it belonged to his wife Krishnammal whose heirs sold the same to the 2nd defendant and his father. He also denied the genuineness of the will of Venkatarama Chetti. He pleaded further that the sale was valid as it was made for discharging certain family debts of the vendors. Lastly he contended that the suit was barred by limitation as from the date of the sale-deed of 6th February 1905 he and his predecessors-in-title have been in continuous possession of the property as the owners thereof.
The genuineness of the will is not open to question as the 1st defendant obtained Letters of Administration for Venkatarama Chetti's estate with the will annexed. The plea that the property did not belong to Venkatarama Chetti but to his wife was also given up at the trial and the only questions upon Which the parties went to trial and which are necessary to be referred to in this appeal are: (1) Whether the sale of 6th February 1905 to the 2nd defendant and his father was made for any purpose binding on the 1st defendant and (2) whether the suit is barred by limitation.
The learned City Civil Judge decided both those questions in plaintiff's favour. His findings are (1) that the sale of the property by the 1st defendant's father to the 2nd defendant and his father was not made for any purpose binding on the 1st defendant; and (2) that the suit is not barred by limitation as it has been filed within twelve years from the date of the 1st defendant's father's death (25th October, 1923) when the 1st defendant's cause of action arose, the suit being governed by Arts. 123 and 136 of the Limitation Act. He finds also that the suit is instituted within three years from the date of the 1st defendant attaining his majority. Upon those findings he gave a decree to the plaintiff against the 3rd defendant for possession of the suit property with mesne profits. Against that decree this appeal has been preferred.
The main contention urged before us on behalf of the appellant are:(1) that the evidence in the case makes out the plea, that the sale was made for a necessary purpose, if not wholly, at any rate to the extent of Rs. 300 which went towards the discharge of a mortgage to which the property was subject at the date of the sale; and (2) that the suit is barred by limitation under Art. 44 of the Limitation Act which is the article which applies to the case.
On the first question, namely, as regards the validity of the sale-deed of 6th February 1905 in favour of the 2nd defendant and his father we have been referred to the evidence as to the payment of the consideration therefor and as to whether any portion thereof went towards the discharge of any mortgage then subsisting on the property which had been effected by Venkatarama Chetti. We see no reason for holding that the trial Judge has not correctly appreciated that evidence. We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent's advocate that no consideration is proved to have been paid for the sale-deed and that in substance it amounts to a gift. It seems to us hardly likely that not only Rangan Chetti against whose character aspersions are made by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant (whether with or without justification) but his wife who was interested in protecting her son's right in the property and was also a legatee under the will and his sister who had an interest in the property on account of the allowance provided for her and her childern out of its income would all have joined to execute an absolute conveyance to the 2nd defendant and his father and without the receipt of any consideration therefor would have delivered possession of the property to them and also acquiesced in their enjoyment of the same ever since as the owners thereof. We accept the finding that the sale was made for consideration but that it is not shown that it was made for any purpose binding on the minor to any extent.
On this finding the next question we have to consider is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The learned City Civil Judge considers the question in paragraph 13 of his judgment. He holds that the suit is governed by Arts. 123 and 136 of the Limitation Act and that their combined effect is to give a period of twleve years for the present suit from the date when the 1st defendant became entitled to possession of the property which was the 27th October 1913, the date of his father's death. He holds that the suit being instituted within that period is not barred by limitation. He finds also that when this suit was instituted the 1st defendant was under 21 years of age and that it is therefore within time in any case (The word plaintiff in this contest is an obvious slip for the 1st defendant). This observation of the learned Judge may be taken to refer to the provisions of Sects. 6 and 8 and Art. 44 of the Limitation Act. But the learned advocates on both sides who also appeared in the lower Court say that the applicability of Art. 44 to the case was not argued at all in the lower Court and that the observation has therefore reference only to Sects, 6 and 8 of the Act.
It is contended before us on behalf of the appellant that the article of limitation which has to be applied to this case is Art. 44 and that neither of the articles relied on by the learned Judge nor Art. 140 (suit by a remainderman for possession of immoveable property) nor Art. 144 under which the starting point is the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff apply to the case. Under Art. 44 the suit has to be instituted within three years from the date the ward attains majority. If that article applies to the case, the question as to when the ward (i.e, 1st defendant) attained majority becomes material. On that question the appellant contests the finding of the City Civil Judge and argues that he should have found that the suit was instituted more than three years after the 1st defendant attained majority and that it is therefore barred by limitation.
The respondent's advocate on the other hand contends that Art. 44 does not apply to the case; he supports the view taken by the lower Court as to the articles which apply to the ease. He relies also on Arts. 126, 140 and 144. As regards the applicability of Art. 44 he further contends that it applies only to a suit by the ward himself and not to a suit by a transferee from the ward; the tranferee's case is governed by Art. 136 under which he has twelve years from the date when his vendor became entitled to possession.
There can be no doubt that if Art. 44 does not apply to this case, the suit will be within time under any of the other articles which have been referred to as applicable to it, as the starting point of limitation under all those articles from which he has a period of 12 years for the suit is undoubtedly the date when the 1st defendant became entitled to possession viz., 25th October, 1913. The question we have therefore to consider is whether Art. 44 applies to the case and that involves a consideration of the question of fact as to when the 1st defendant attained majority. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove when his vendor attained majority. The evidence adduced by him on this question is considered by the Judge in the first portion of paragraph 13 of his judgment. He therefore refers to two documents, namely, Ex. E, which is an extract from the register of vaccination maintained by the Corporation of Madras for the month of October 1904, and Ex. F, a horoscope alleged to have been cast in connection with the birth of the 1st defendant. According to the entries in Ex. E, which is said to relate to 1st defendant Krishnappa Chetti, he was one year and six months old in October, 1904. The horoscope Ex. F gives the exact date of his birth as 14th April, 1904. The Judge evidently accepts the horoscope as a reliable document and finds that the 1st defendant was born on the date mentioned in it. On that finding he says that the suit was filed within three years from the date of 1st defendant attaining majority. The Judge evidently considers that the entry in the horoscope is corroborated by the entry in the vaccination register because according to a rule in this city, every new-born child must be vaccinated within six months of its bi rth. But he overlooks the actual age of the child as given in the said register which is one year and six months in October, 1904, and not six moths only as required by the rule. If the entry in the vaccination register which is said to refer to the 1st defendant is to be relied on, it shows that he was born in or about April, 1903 and not in April 1904 as stated in the horoscope. The horoscope is spoken to by the plaintiff's second witness who says he was all along in possession of it and that he gave it to the 1st defendant evidently to be used in this suit. It is not written in any family book, but it is written on a stray paper. The person who cast the horoscope is not called and the plaintiff's second witness though a casteman of the 1st defendant is not related to him. Moreover as already pointed out the entry in the vaccination register which has also been exhibited by the plaintiff goes a long way to discredit the horoscope. In our opinion the horoscope Ex. F is not a document which has been proved, or on which any reliance can be placed. The only reliable document as to the 1st defendant's age is Ex. I which however has altogether been overlooked by the Judge in considering this question. In that document which is dated 6th February, 1905 the 1st defendant is stated to be two years old. That being a statement made by the 1st defendant's father and mother who were both parties to the document is admissible in proof of his age as both of them are dead. They had then no interest to mis-state his age and we find also that the statement in Ex. I fits in approximately with the entry as to his age in the vaccination register. We are therefore unable to accept as correct the finding of the lower Court that the suit was filed within three years of the 1st defendant attaining majority. On the other hand we are of opinion that when the suit was filed more than three years had elapsed after 1st defendant attained majority and if Art. 44 applies to the case, we must hold that the suit is barred by limitation.
The next question we have to consider is whether this is a suit by a ward who has attained majority to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian. It is now well-settled that this article applies not only to setting aside the transfer of property made by a guardian appointed by a Court or by will but also to suits for setting aside a transfer of property made by a natural guardian. Turning to Ex. I, which is the sale-deed for the suit property, under which the contesting defendants claim, it will be seen that under it the property is conveyed to the purchasers by all the persons who under the will were interested in that property. The vendors under Ex. I are (1) 1st defendant's father who had a life-interest in it; (2) the 1st defendant a minor represented by his father and guardian who was entitled absolutely to the remainder subject to the life estate of his father (3) Ettiammal, the daughter of the testator, and her minor children represented by her as their guardian to whom a monthly allowance was payable out of the income of the property until Ettiammal got possession of her deceased husband's estate. The minor's mother Angammal was also a party to the document though she was not given any rights in this property, but was a legatee under the will. It is evident that all those interested in the property and also Angammal who was interested in the minor joined in the conveyance in order to convey the entire interest in the property to the purchasers and that it was their combined rights under the will (Ex. A) which they conveyed to the purchaser. So far as the 1st defendant is concerned, he had then a vested interest in it which was transferable and it was transferred on his behalf by his father and natural guardian.
The respondent's advocate contended that the 1st defendant's father in making the transfer of his minor son's interest in the property must be regarded as acting in his capacity as father and managing member of the family and in that view Art. 126 will apply to the case. That contention will have force if the property dealt with by him was joint ancestral property of himself and his minor son, but the will did not create any joint interest in the property in favour of the 1st defendant and his father but only a distinct and separate interest therein in favour of each of them. The interest of the son though vested was to take effect only from the death of the father. The will further provides that the grandson “alone (i.e, the 1st defendant) shall use and enjoy the same with power to gift, mortgage or sell the same and no other person shall be entitled to possession of or have concern in respect of the aforesaid house and ground.”
This clause clearly shows that the property devised to the 1st defendant should be regarded as his exclusive property and not as ancestral property coming to him from his grandfather. Art. 126 which applies to suits by a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara to set aside alienations of ancestral property cannot therefore apply to the case. See Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam(1).
It is next contended that Art. 44 does not apply to this suit because (1) it is a suit for posssession of the property and not merely to set aside the transfer and (2) the suit is brought not by the ward but by his transferee.
As regards the first point, it has been well settled by several decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council that it is not the form of the relief claimed which determines the real character of the suit for the purpose of ascertaining under which article of the Limitation Act the suit falls. Though the relief claimed in the suit is possession of immoveable property, yet if the property sued for is held by the contesting defendant under a sale or other transfer which is not void, but only voidable and he cannot obtain possession without the transfer being set aside, the suit must be regarded as one brought to set aside the transfer though no relief in those terms is prayed for, but the prayer is only for possession of the property. It has been so held with reference to Art. 12 of the Limitation Act where the defendant is in possession under a sale held in execution of a decree of a Court and also as to Art. 91 where the instrument under which the defendant claims is one which is prima facie binding on the plaintiff. The same view was also taken with regard to the article in the old Limitation Act relating to suits brought to set aside an adoption. Their Lordships held in Jaqadamba Chaodhrani v. Dakhina Mohun Roy Chaodhri that even when the plaintiff did not in terms sue to set aside an adoption but only to recover possession of property on his prima facie title as reversionary heir he was bound to bring his suit within the time allowed by Art. 129 of Act. IX of 1871, provided the defendant was in possession by virtue of an apparent adoption; and the plaintiff was not at liberty to bring his suit within the time allowed to reversionary heirs by Art. 142 of that Act. As regards Art. 12 of the Limitation Act which relates to suits to set aside a sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court, the leading case is Malkarjun v. Narhari.(2) Their Lordships in that case held that though the suit was brought for redemption of a mortgage of immoveable property for which the period of limitation is 60 years, yet as the defendant the mortgagee had purchased the equity of redemption in a judicial sale which was operative against the plaintiff, though liable to be set aside for due cause, the suit is governed by Art. 12 and must be brought within the period of one year prescribed by that article. At page 350 after referring to the case in Jagadamba Chaodhrani v. Dakhina Mohun Roy Chaodhri as supporting that view their Lordships observe with regard to that case:
“There was difficulty in the case because the expression ‘set asids an adoption’ is inaccurate. An adoption cannot be set aside though its validity may be impeached and in fact the language was altered in 1877 before the appeal was heard,”
Turning to the case before them their Lordships observe with regard to: Art. 12:
“It is obvious that the expression ‘set aside a sale ‘is not attended by any such difficulty because a sale valid until set aside can be legally and literally set aside and anybody who desires relief inconsistent with it may and should pray to set it aside.”
In Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu(3) which was also a suit for redemption of a mortgage, Art. 44 was applied following Malkarjun v. Narhari and the suit dismissed as no suit had been brought to set aside the transfer made to the mortgagee of the equity of redemption by the minor's mother, within the period allowed by that article.
The same view was taken with regard to Art. 91 of the Limitation Act of 1877 when the plaintiff sought to recover immoveable property which he had himself transferred under a sale-deed to the defendant on the ground that it had been obtained from him by fraud and undue influence. Their Lordships held that it was not a suit for possession of immoveable property in the sense to which the limitation of twelve years is applicable. The immoveable property could not be recovered until the deed of sale is set aside and the suit therefore falls within Art. 91 (Sch. II) of the Limitation. Act (Act XV of 1877). See Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh; also Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Taruck Nath Maitra.
The same view has been taken with regard to Art. 44, with which we are here concerned, by this Court in the following cases: Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga, Kandasami v. Irusappa(4), Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam(5) and by the Bombay High Court in Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu(6) which has already been referred to. These cases are authority for the position that a sale-deed executed by the guardian of a minor though unauthorised, vests the title to the property in the alienee and the minor has therefore to sue to set it aside. In the language of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari(7) such a transfer is operative against the minor and those claiming under him though liable to be set aside for due cause. These cases also establish that though Art. 44 describes the suit to be brought by the ward as a suit merely to set aside the transfer of his property by his guardian, if the transferee has obtained and is in possession and the ward has therefore to add a prayer for the relief of possession Art. 44 alone still applies to the suit though brought for both the reliefs and that if the suit is not brought within the time allowed by Art. 44, the title of the ward becomes extinguished under Sect. 28 of the Act.
The appellant's advocate relies also on the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram(8). in that case the minor Chocklinga's mother sold his right of management of a pagoda for a consideration. The sale was made on 17th September 1868 and from that time the purchaser was in enjoyment of the office and its endowments. The minor attained majority in 1880 and brought the suit in August, 1892 for recovery of the office and possession of the immoveable properties forming the endowment of the temple. Their Lordships held that the sale by the mother of the office was void and did not give any title to the purchaser which remained in the minor and the possession which was taken by the purchaser was adverse to him. Their Lordships in upholding the plea of limitation raised by the defendant observed as follows:—
“Chockalinga attained majority in 1880 and had by Art. 44 of the Act three years for suing to set aside the sale by his guardian. He did not do so and by Sect. 28 of the Limitation Act his right became extinguished. Their Lordships are of opinion that there is no distinction between the office and the property of the endowment. The one is attached to the other; but if there is, Art. 144 of the same schedule is applicable to the property. That bars the suit after twelve years' adverse possession.”
This case was relied on as supporting the contention that Art. 44 applies even to an alienation by the guardian which is void and under which no title passes to the purchaser. The observations of their Lordships may seem open to that construction. But when the facts of the case are looked at, it will be seen that the purchaser of the office under the void sale held possession thereof and of its endowments adversely to the minor for more than the statutory period prescribed by Art. 144 and their Lordships held that the suit was also barred under that article. Whether Art. 44 applies or not, the minor had three years under Sect. 7 of the Act after he became a major for bringing the suit and as he did not bring the suit within that period his title became extinguished under Sect. 28. In the other cases referred to above, their Lordships clearly lay down that a suit to set aside the sale has to be brought because the purchaser acquires a title under the sale, though it is defeasible at the instance of the plaintiff. In other words, Art. 44 applies to transfers which are voidable and not void. The view taken in these cases must be followed as the point directly arose in them and was the basis of their Lordships' decision whereas in Gnanasambanda Pandarasannadhi v. Velu Pandaram the suit was in any view held to be barred—whether under Art. 44 or Art. 144. In the present case there is no question of the sale being void. We have already disposed of the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the transfer under Ex. I was really a gift and was therefore void as one which we cannot accept as correct. We are therefore of opinion that if this suit had been brought by the 1st defendant himself it would be barred under Art. 44 of the Limitation Act.
The next question we have to consider is whether the contention that the Art. 44 does not apply to a suit by a purchaser from the ward and that to a suit by the purchaser the 12 years rule of limitation should be applied is sustainable.
This contention is based on the wording of the first column of this article which is
“by a ward who has attained majority to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian”.
The expression ‘by a ward’ if construed literally no doubt lends itself to such an interpretation and if that is the correct view to take, a suit by those claiming under the ward for recovery of property transferred by the ward's guardian will be governed by some other article. The contention advanced before us is that a suit by those claiming under the ward either as his legal representative or as his assignee will be governed by the article which will apply to the ward himself for the recovery of the property if Art. 44 is to be excluded; in other words a suit by those claiming under the ward will so far as the present case is concerned be governed by Art. 140 or 144. Under either of those articles the starting point of limitation is the date when the ward became entitled to possession viz., the 25th October 1913 from which date the possessionof the purchaser under Ex. I became adverse to him. This contention if upheld will save the suit from the bar of limitation. So far as the authorities are concerned the only cases bearing on the question to which we were referred are Laxmava v. Rachappa, Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu and Hanmant Guruuath v. Ramappa Lagamappa.
In Laxmava v. Bachappa which was a suit brought by the transferee of the ward after the latter attained majority for possession of property which had been alienated by the ward's natural guardian, it was held that Art. 44 applied to the case and that the suit was barred by limitation under that Article. In the next case Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu a Hindu minor's mother acting as his natural guardian has sold in 1891, to the mortgagee of the minor's property, the equity of redemption, without necessity. The son attained majority in 1895 and died in 1901, leaving a widow who died in 1908. In 1916, the next reversioner sued to redeem the mortgage. It was held that the suit was barred under Art. 44 as the son ought to have sued to set aside the alienation within 3 years after his attaining majority. These two cases are clear authorities for the proposition that so far as Art. 44 is concerned, those claiming under the ward stand in the same position as the ward himself and if he is barred under Art. 44 they are in no better position. Upon the facts of the case in Laxmava v. Racappa the suit was brought on the 12th August, 1913 for possession of properties alienated by the ward's natural guardian on the 31st May, 1909 and if the respondent's contention is sound and the article of limitation to be applied is Art. 144 the suit by the purchaser would be within time. It is, however, to be observed that in this case the conclusion is not reached by any discussion of the question but rather assumed as obvious. These two cases further show that Art. 44 may often operate to curtail the 12 years period of limitation for the recovery of the property (or the 60 years period for the redemption of a mortgage) which the ward would have if Art. 44 is out of the way. That would be the result in all those cases where the guardian makes the alienation shortly before the ward attains majority and if the ward does not sue within the three years period allowed by Art. 44 from the date of his attaining majority, his right to the property becomes extinguished under Sect. 28 [See Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram, Malkarjun v. Narhari and Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga]. When that happens he is no longer in a position to convey any right to his purchaser but so long as his right to the property is not extinguished he can transfer it, and if he does so, the transferee will prima facie have to sue within the same period as his transferor; but if the 12 years rule is to be applied to the assignee of the ward the result will be that the assignee's suit will be barred where it is instituted after 12 years from the date of the purchaser taking possession of the property, but it will be within time if it is instituted within 12 years from that date. In other words in some cases the purchaser is barred when the vendor is not, while in other cases he is not barred though his vendor is barred. An interpretation which results in such anomalies cannot be readily accepted as sound. In Hanmaat Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa the learned Judges doubted whether Art. 44 applies to a suit by a transferee from the ward. On that point they observe as follows:
“It would be difficult to apply this Art. 44, to the case of a transferee from the ward. We are not by any means clear that Art. 44 would apply to a suit filed by a transferee from the ward. It is, however, not necessary on the facts of this case to decide the question. It is enough to point out the difficulty of applying Art. 44 to a simple suit by a transferee from the ward. The article refers to a suit by a ward who has attained majority. Assuming without deciding that Art. 44 would not apply to a suit by a. transferee, it does not follow that where the ward joins with the transferee in suing to set aside the sale the ward cannot do so if the suit is brought within 3 years from the date of his attaining majority.”
In that case the ward who had transferred the property was also a co-plaintiff and in the view that he was entitled to sue in order to effectuate his transfer to the other plaintiff by securing to him possession of the property, the learned Judges held that the suit must be treated as one rightly brought by the ward and was therefore within time and that in such a suit a decree may be given to the transferee. In this case if Art. 44 did not apply the suit would be barred under the 12 years rule though brought within 3 years from the date of the minor attaining majority, as the provisions of Sects. 6 and 8 by which an extended period of limitation is given to a minor or other person under disability have been held to be in the nature of privileges or exemptions to which the person under disability alone is entitled, but not a transferee from him or even his legal representative unless the person under disability dies while the disability still lasts. But Sects, 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act do not apply to suits under Art. 44 as under that article the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned begins only after the minority has ceased; and this is also pointed out by the learned Judges in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa. If the policy of the legislature as appears from Sects. 6 and 8 be to give to a minor some concessions which are only personal to himself and which an assignee from him is not entitled to it, can hardly be inferred that as regards Art. 44 the transferee may be in a better position than his transferor. If that is not the correct view a ward who for any reason is unable to institute a suit within the 3 years, may get rid of the operation of Art. 44 which will extinguish his title by simply transferring his rights to some other person. To take another case, if the ward dies soon after he attains majority but more than 12 years after the date from which time begins to run, his legal representatives will be barred if Art. 44 does not apply to them as they will not have the benefit of Sub-Sect. (3) of Sect. 6 as the minor died after his disability had ceased. A construction which leads to such anomalous results can hardly be accepted as satisfactory. In our opinion Laxmava v. Rachappa takes the right view. It proceeds on the principle that a person who claims under another whether as his legal representative or as assignee should in suchicharacter be governed by the same rule as would apply to the person from whom he derives his claim, the only limitation being that he is not entitled to any privileges or exemptions which the latter had. This principle is recognised in the Limitation Act itself in the definition of ‘appellant,’ ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ and though the word ‘plaintiff’ does not occur in this article as it does in some others, the plaintiff in a suit under Art. 44 must on principle be held to be in the same position as the ward under whom he claims. We may also in this connection refer to Sect. 146 of the Civil Procedure Code as recognising the same principle. It says:
“save as otherwise provided by this Code or any other law for the time being in force where any proceeding may be taken and application made by or against any person then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him.”
We may also point out that there are other articles in the schedule besides Art. 44 as to which also a literal reading thereof may lead to the same doubt viz., Whether they apply to persons claiming under the person specified in the article. We may first refer to Art. 136 which relates to a suit by a purchaser of immoveable property for possession thereof. Can it with any reason be contended that the article does not apply to those claiming under the purchaser? Turning to the 3rd column of that article, a literal interpretation thereof will make the period of limitation under that article run from the date when the immediate vendor to the plaintiff became entitled to possession. That would clearly be an erroneous interpretation. In Abbas Dhali v. Masabdi Karikar it has been held that where there have been transfers by successive vendors all out of possession the term ‘vendor’ includes the first in the series of vendors entitled to sue for possession; or take Art. 140 “suit by a remainderman or devisee for possession of immoveable property;” obviously it should apply also to those claiming under him whether as his legal representatives or as assignees. In these articles the word ‘plaintiff’ does not occur in the 1st column; or the word ‘defendant’ in the 3rd column. We have considered this question at some length on account of the doubt expressed by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa So far as the suit by the legal representatives of the ward is concerned it may be that if the ward dies during his minority Art. 44 will not apply to a suit by his legal representative for recovering the property alienated by the guardian whereas if the ward dies after the attainment of majority Art. 44 will apply. But that result follows from the express provisions contained in the Act itself, though it may be that there is no fresh cause of action for the ward on his attaining majority. The principle of Art. 44 seems to be that when the ward attains majority he should if he desires to avoid the alienation made by his guardian bring his suit within the time limited under that article irrespective of the period which he had otherwise.
As regards the ward's assignees however the only article which could be applied is Art. 44 as it is only after the ward becomes a major, he acquires the capacity to make the transfer and any transfer made by him during his minority is under the law void. There need be therefore less hesitation in applying Art. 44 to the assignee from the ward. Moreover the ward himself is also a party to the present suit and though he is impleaded as a defendant he is substantially a co-plaintiff as it is his right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce and it is a mere matter of form that he is not also a co-plaintiff as in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa.
We are therefore of opinion that Art. 44 applies to this case and the suit not having been instituted within 3 years from the date of the 1st defendant attaining majority we have to hold that it is barred under Art. 44 and on that ground the suit must be dismissed as against defendants 2 to 5.
The respondent's advocate contended that in such an event he is entitled to the alternative relief claimed by him (i. e.) to a decree against the 1st defendant for the refund of Rs. 1,500 with interest. The 1st defendant was originally not made a party to this appeal but subsequently upon the application of the respondent he was brought on the record. When the appeal came on for hearing subsequently he did not appear. We find that in his written statement he admits the sale to the plaintiff and the receipt by him from the plaintiff of the consideration therefor viz., Rs. 1,500 but at the same time he denies the plaintiff's right to claim a refund of that amount from him in any event. An issue was framed in the suit with regard to this alternative relief but in the view taken by the lower Court this question did not arise. But in the view we take, the trial of that issue becomes necessary and for that purpose the case will go back to the lower Court. In the result we reverse the decree of the lower Court and dismiss the suit as against defendants 2 to 5.
As regards costs we find that the contesting defendants 3 to 5 denied the genuineness of the will of Venkatarama Chetty and also set up that the suit property belonged to Krishnammal and not to Venkatraman Chetty a defence which they abandoned in that Court itself and they did not also contend that Art. 44 applies to the case. For these reasons we allow to the contesting defendants their costs of this appeal only and direct them to bear their own costs in the lower Court. The case will be remitted to the lower Court for the trial of the alternative case put forward against the 1st defendant.
N. R. R.Case remanded.
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