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Varada Ramaswami And... v. Vumma Venkataratnam ...
The respondent in this case obtained a decree against a certain judgment-debtor, Mottivala Usman, in O.S No. 776 of 1916 on the file of the Ellore District Munsif. In execution he attached certain monies belonging to the judgment-debtor. Various other decree-holders who are appellants now before us applied for and obtained reteable distribution under Sect 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The money was distributed. On appeal the order for rateable distribution was set aside by this Court. The respondent then applied for the return of the money which had teen paid to the other decree-holders and this was ordered by the District Munsif the order being confirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge. The matter now comes up before us on Second Appeal.
The lower Courts purported to have directed the return of the money under Sect. 144, Civil Procedure Code though the Subordinate Judge in his judgment also refers to Sect. 151. It is represented on behalf of the appellants that Sect. 144 has no application to the present case on the ground that the order for rateable distribution cannot be treated as a decree within the meaning of Sect. 144, Civil Procedure Code. Referring to the definition of decree in Sect. 2 of the Code, it is clear that the order for rateble distribution can only be so treated if it is to be considered as an order under Sect, 47. In the present case the order was passed on contest between rival decree-holders. No objection to the rateable distribution was raised by the judgment-debtor nor is it suggested that his interests were directly or indirectly affected.
We are referred to Rajah of Karvetnagar v. Venkata Reddi by respondent's vakil as showing that an order for rateable distribution may be treated as an order under Sect. 47. But that was a case in which the order was passed on an objection raised by the judgment debtor to the effect that a particular decree-holder was not entitled to participate because he had no subsisting application for execution pending. The learned Judges are at pains to distinguish between such a case and the case where the contest was between rival decree-holders and to say that such a case as the latter was not governed by Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code. They refer to Balmer Lawrie & Co. v. Jadunath Banerjee(2) as authority to this effect. In our opinion the distinction is sound and the order for rateable distribution in this case cannot be regarded as an order under Sect. 47 or as a decree within the purview of Sect. 144. Viewed therefore as an order under Sect. 144, the order under appeal was without jurisdiction and must be set aside.
The learned vakil for the respondent seeks to support it with reference to the inherent powers of the Court conferred by Sect. 151. The Subordinate Judge merely refers to these inherent powers but does not discuss them; nor does he consider whether their exercise is called for in the circumstances of this case. He further declines to consider the objection raised by the appellants to the effect that the respondent's decree was fraudulently obtained on the ground that this has nothing to do with the question of restitution (clearly meaning under Sect. 144). It may be that the respondent is entitled to relief to be granted under the inherent powers of the Court under Sect. 151, but whether relief should be granted under this section will have to be carefully considered. The lower Court will have to determine whether the excercise of these powers are necessary for the ends of justice, that is to say, whether this is the only legal method by which the respondent can obtain his dues; and the objection raised regarding the alleged fraudulent nature of the respondent's decree will be an objection to be legitimately considered.
In this connection, it has been suggested that Sect. 73 Cl. (2) would afford respondent an alternative means of redress. This, we may remark, is not so. If the assests were not liable to be rateably distributed Cl. 2 of Sect. 73 would have no application. With these remarks we must set aside the orders of the lower Courts and direct that the petition restored to the file of the District Munsif and disposed of according to law. Costs in this and in the lower appellate Court will be provided in the order to be ultimately passed.
C.KAppeal allowed.
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