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Kizhakkiniyakath Kunhi Koyamutty Naha Haji v. Veeran And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant purchased the rights of defendants 1, 3, 4 and 7 (vendors) under a sale deed dated 14 December 1923 (Ex. A). The vendors and others were heirs-at-law of one Marakkarkutti. In 1910 all except one daughter entered into a partition evidenced by Ex. II; the excluded daughter filed O.S. No. 10 of 1915 and a final decree (Ex. G) was passed on 31 December 1918. The decree allotted various plots and contained Clause (17) and Clause (18) concerning possession and court-fees. The vendors of the appellant had sums payable under that partition decree and executed Ex. A partly to raise those sums.
After purchase, the appellant leased certain properties (Schedule B and items 2–5 in Schedule C) to the 7th respondent and one Kunhalan at an annual rent of Rs. 164-4-0; item 1 of Schedule C remained in the appellant's possession and is not part of the suit. On alleged default by his lessees, the appellant filed O.S. No. 356 of 1930 to recover the leased land; a decree was obtained, but execution was resisted by respondents 6, 8 and 10. Execution Application No. 610 of 1935 was dismissed. The present suit was then filed by the appellant to establish his right to the suit properties and to recover possession from contesting defendants.
The trial Court and the appellate Court dismissed the appellant's suit on the ground that the appellant or his vendors should have sought recovery of possession in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 10 of 1915 and that Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code bars a separate suit. The present opinion considers that question and ultimately reverses those decrees and remands the suit to the trial Court for further disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant's suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties is barred by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether the vendors (defendant-sharers) were obliged by Clause (17) of the partition decree to seek recovery of possession in execution of that decree (within the execution period) or whether they (and by succession the appellant) were entitled to bring a separate suit for possession.
Arguments of the Parties
Lower Courts / Respondents' Position
- The trial and appellate Courts held that the appellant (or his vendors) ought to have sought recovery of possession by execution of the partition decree in O.S. No. 10 of 1915 and that, accordingly, Section 47 CPC barred a separate suit for possession.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (through submissions on behalf of his vendors) contended that Clause (17) should be construed as giving an option to the other sharers to seek possession in execution of the decree by paying the necessary court-fee, but not as imposing an obligation to do so within the execution period.
- It was argued that a defendant in a partition action did not initiate the suit and might not want partition; he might lack funds to pay the court-fee within the three-year execution period, or his own allotted properties might be disposed of or required to pay monies to other sharers. For these reasons, it would be unfair and without warrant in the Civil Procedure Code or the Court-fees Act to impose a disability requiring execution within three years.
- The appellant relied on the proposition that a partition decree that merely declares the rights of sharers permits the defendants to file a separate suit for possession rather than being compelled to execute the partition decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Peda Nagabhushanam v. Pitchayya | Recognised that where a defendant in a partition action is allotted a share and wishes to execute the decree, it is reasonable that he should pay his share of the court-fee; the case supports that a defendant has an option to pay court-fees and execute. | The court relied on this decision to interpret Clause (17) as giving an option to defendants-sharers to execute the decree by paying the necessary court-fee, rather than as imposing an unconditional obligation that would bar a separate suit under Section 47 CPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined Clause (17) of the partition decree, which provided that "the remaining sharers other than plaintiff shall be put in possession of their respective shares on paying the necessary court-fees," and Clause (18) concerning levying court-fee in execution. The vendors of the appellant were among the sharers other than the plaintiff and thus were entitled under Clause (17) to be put in possession upon payment of the necessary court-fee.
The central legal question was whether Clause (17) imposed a binding obligation to seek recovery of possession by executing the partition decree (which must be done within the three-year limitation for execution) or whether it merely declared rights and gave the sharers an option to execute the decree if they wished.
The court accepted the appellant's argument that a defendant in a partition action did not initiate the suit and might not be in a position to pay court-fees within the execution period; there is no apparent warrant in the Civil Procedure Code or the Court-fees Act to impose such a disability. The decision in Peda Nagabhushanam v. Pitchayya was cited as authority that a defendant has the option to pay the necessary court-fee and execute the decree if he wishes.
The court distinguished cases where an unconditional decree expressly directs possession to be given (which could be executed and thereby potentially bar a separate suit under Section 47). Here, because Clause (17) conditions possession on payment of court-fees, the decree did not unconditionally give a right of execution to the defendant-sharers; instead it declared their rights and left open the option to execute or to sue separately. On this basis the court concluded the suit was maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the appellant's suit is maintainable and that Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the suit under the circumstances; it reversed the decrees of both lower Courts and remanded the suit to the trial Court for disposal on the other issues.
Direct consequences and remedial orders in the opinion:
- The decrees of the Courts below were reversed and the case was remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings on the remaining issues.
- The court directed that the court-fee paid on the second appeal be refunded.
- The trial Court is to provide for other costs in its revised decree.
- Leave to appeal was refused (as noted in the opinion).
Implications: The decision confines itself to the construction of the specific partition decree clauses and their effect on the right to execute versus the right to institute a separate suit. The opinion applies existing precedent (Peda Nagabhushanam v. Pitchayya) and does not purport to set a new general precedent beyond its interpretation of the decree before it. The immediate effect is restoration of the appellant's ability to pursue his claim in a separate suit and remand for determination of other issues.
The question in this case is whether the appellant's suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties is barred under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The appellant is the purchaser of the rights of defendants 1, 3, 4 and 7 who are respondents 1, 3, 4 and 7. The four vendors of the plaintiff along with some others were the heirs-at-law of one Marakkarkutti who died before 1910 leaving considerable properties. In 1910 all except one daughter of his entered into a partition evidenced bs Ex. II. The daughter who was they left out filed O.S No. 10 of 1915 for in partition and a final decree Ex. G was passed in that suit. Defendants 1, 3, 4 and 7 in this suit who are the vendors of the plaintiff were also defendants in the partition action. These defendants had to pay some sums to the plaintiff in the partition action under the final decree. Partly for raising the money payable by them under the partition decree to the plaintiff in that suit and partly for some other purposes, the sale deed Ex. A was executed on the 14th December 1923 in favour of the presentappellant. He filed the suit after purchase. His case is that after the purchase, he leased the properties in Sch. B and items 2 to 5 in Sch. C to the 7th respondent and another Kunhalan on a rental of Rs. 164-4-0 per year. Item 1 of the Sch. C which is also purchased under Ex. A continues to be in his possession and the suit does not comprise that item. As his lessees committed default, he filed O.S No. 356 of 1930 to recover the land leased to the 7th respondent and Kunhalan and made respondents 1, 3, 4 and 7 in this suit and Kunhalan parties. A decree was passed and in execution, resistance was caused by respondents 6, 8 and 10. E.A No. 610 of 1935 was filed to remove the obstruction and that application was dismissed. Thereupon the present suit was filed to establish the right of the appellant to the suit properties and to recover possession from the contesting defendants. The suit has been dismissed by the Courts below on the ground that the appellant or his vendors should have sought recovery of possession of these properties in execution of the decree in O.S No. 10 of 1915 and that therefore S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar. The decree in that suit is Ex. G. The plaintiff was, as already stated, the daughter and the defendants were the other heirs at law of Marakkarkutti. The final decree allotted various plots to the different sharers and made provision for payment of various sums of money by one party to another. Then Cl. (17) which is material runs thus:
“That the remaining sharers other than plaintiff shall be put in possession of their respective shares on paying the necessary court-fees.”
The next Cl. (18) runs thus:
“The court-fee in respect of the excess amount allowed to plaintiff as mesne profits should be levied in execution.”
The vendors of the appellant were some of the main sharers other than the plaintiff in that suit and therefore under Cl. (17) of the decree in that suit (O.S No. 10 of 1915) they were entitled to be put in possession of the properties on payment of the necessary court-fee. The question is whether they were bound to seek recovery of possession in that decree in the execution department or whether they are entitled to file a separate suit. If it is execution of that decree, they must seek execution within three years. The sale in favour of the appellant was in the year 1923 more than three years after the date of the final decree. The final decree was on the 31st December 1918 and the sale in favour of the plaintiff was on the 14th December 1923, i.e, nearly five years. And if it is a question of executing that decree, the execution was barred even before the purchase by him of the property in question.
It is urged for the appellant that his client was only a defendant in the partition action and that the proper construction to be put on Cl. (17) is that it gives an option to the other sharers to seek possession in execution of that decree on payment of the necessary court-fee. He urges that a defendant in a partition action, though for some purposes is also a plaintiff, did not file that suit. He did not seek partition. He may not want one. If in granting a decree to the plaintiff, the Court allots certain properties to the share of the defendant, it is urged that the Court cannot oblige the defendant to pay court-fees within a particular time and to get the properties allowed to him from the other party if those properties are in the possession of the other party. It is conceivable that he may not be in possession of funds necessary for the payment of the court-fee which alone would enable him to get possession of the properties in the possession of the other parties. The properties in his possession might be allotted to another sharer and he might be dispossessed of those properties. He might also be directed to pay certain monies to the other sharers; as in this case the defendant might be obliged to pay that sum even after three years provided the other sharers keep the execution alive. Why then should the defendant be obliged to seek execution within three years and find the court-fees within the three years? Is it a disability placed upon him if really it is construed that the defendant must find the court-fee within the three years' period available for execution of that decree? For imposing this disability upon him there does not appear to me to be any warrant either in the Civil Procedure Code or in the Court-fees Act. It seems to me that the proper method of reading such a decree is that it declares the right of the sharers of the properties allotted to them and to give an option to the defendants-sharers to pay the court-fee in respect of the properties allotted to them and seek possession if they like in execution of that decree. But it does not oblige them to do so and this seems to me the effect of the decision in Peda Nagabhushanam v. Pitchayya(1) where dealing with an application of a defendant in a partition action to recover the properties allotted to him on payment of the court-fee, the learned Judges Abdur Rahim and Kumaraswami Sastri, JJ. said this:
“The contention is that there is no provision in law for the defendants to pay any court-fee. But if a defendant under a decree or award for partition, such as we are concerned with in this case, gets a share allotted to him of the property and if he wishes to execute the decree it seems to be reasonable that he should pay his share of the court-fee payable on the entire decree…………”
Therefore it is an option given to the defendant in a partition action to pay the court-fee on the entire properties allotted to him if he wishes to execute the decree. But if he does not, the allotment of certain properties to him under the partition decree stands. His rights are declared by that document and there is no reason why in such a case a separate suit ought not to be entertained.
It is possible that a decree may be passed in favour of the defendant without any condition, particularly as regards the payment of court-fee. If the decree allots certain properties to the parties and directs each party to be in possession of the properties allotted to him under the decree, then it might be a decree which is executable by each and S. 47 may bar a separate suit by a defendant who could execute the decree unconditionally; but to bring about that result, it seems to me, you must have an unconditional decree giving the defendant a right to execute the decree to get the properties allotted to him.
I hold that the suit is maintainable and I reverse the decrees of both the Courts and remand the suit to the trial Court for disposal on the other issues. The court-fee paid on the second appeal to be refunded. The other costs will be provided for by the trial Court in its revised decree. (Leave refused)
Decrees reversed.
N.R.R
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