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Thayalai Achi And Another . v. Kannammal Alias Ponnammal Achi, And Another

Madras High Court
Nov 1, 1934
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal raised two discrete questions originating from a dispute over marriage form and the construction of a will. The first question was whether Ponnammal Achi had been married in the Asura form such that her stridhanam property would devolve to her brother, Nataraja Pillai. The second question was whether, under the will of her husband Samia Pillai, Ponnammal Achi took an absolute estate without any executory gift or other gift over in favour of Nataraja Pillai.

At trial the learned Judge heard evidence, made findings on credibility and concluded that it was not proved that Ponnammal Achi was married in the Asura form. The matter proceeded on appeal, and the appellate court reviewed the trial Judge's factual findings and the legal construction of the will. The appellate court stated its conclusions on both issues and addressed costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ponnammal Achi was married in the Asura form so that her stridhanam property goes to her brother Nataraja Pillai.
  2. Whether, under the will of her husband Samia Pillai, Ponnammal Achi took an absolute estate without any executory or other gift over in favour of Nataraja Pillai.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surajmani v. Rabi Nath (1903) I.L.R. 25 All. 351 Held (at the time) that a grant of an absolute estate to a Hindu widow did not confer upon her the right of alienation. Noted as an historical holding which was subsequently put right on appeal; cited as background to the historical uncertainty about alienation rights of a Hindu widow.
Muthu Venkata-narayanan Chetty v. Athi Pandu Rangu Naidu (1919) M.W.N. 103 Observation that "with full proprietary powers (Swatantrathudan)" is the strongest expression an alienor can employ to confer an absolute estate. Used to support the proposition that words conferring full rights of alienation are apt words to describe an absolute estate.
Manicka Mudali v. Muthachi Kavandan (1915) 18 M.L.T. 346 Ayling, J.'s view that words of alienation did not necessarily confer an absolute estate (a contrary approach). Cited as a case whose view was criticised in subsequent discussion and used to illustrate conflicting authorities on construction.
Nanjamma v. Nacharamma (1907) 17 M.L.J. 622 Where grant is to a wife "you shall enjoy the same all your life", the addition of "with power to sell and give away" would not enlarge the estate into an absolute estate. Applied as a cautionary example that additional words of alienation do not always convert a life interest into an absolute estate; the Court treated it as a limiting authority.
Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt (1896) L.R. 23 I.A. 37 : I.L.R. 23 Cal. 670 : 6 M.L.J. 75 (P.C.) Determined as a matter of construction that a gift to A with power of alienation by sale or gift conveys an absolute estate; ordinary implication that powers of alienation suggest an absolute grant. Relied upon as a significant authority for the proposition that words conferring powers of alienation ordinarily indicate an absolute estate; noted that the words there were stronger than those in the present will.
Constable v. Bulls (1849) 3 De G. and S.M. 411 : 64 E.R. 539 Principle that, when two clauses in a will collide, the latter clause prevails; subsequent bequests may have the effect of reducing an earlier interest. Invoked in the context of Section 88 and the English rule of construction to show that a later clause can cut down an earlier gift when repugnancy is involved.
Sherratt v. Bentley (1834) 2 My. And K. 149 : 39 E.R. 901 English authority on the rule of construction that where clauses collide the later provision prevails (cited in relation to Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act). Referred to as part of the English authorities embodied in Section 88 which the Court must bear in mind when construing wills; used to explain the rule that the latter clause prevails.
Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 153 (P.C.) Application of Horwood v. West relating to trusts: directions to a widow to leave "whatever property might remain" were treated as creating uncertainty and not a binding trust. Distinguished from the present case: Bhaidas involved a precatory or trust-like direction and uncertainty of subject-matter; the Court held that the doctrine of uncertainty did not apply to the present case because here there was a direct gift.
Horwood v. West (1823) 1 Sim. and St. 387 : 57 E.R. 155 Rule relating to trusts and the effect of precatory words/directions where subject-matter is uncertain. Referred to (through Bhaidas) to explain that trust-related rules of uncertainty are not applicable to a direct gift situation like the present case.
In re Dixon; Dixon v. Charles-worth (1903) 2 Ch. 458 Consideration of repugnancy/uncertainty doctrines in the context of trusts. Cited as another trust case to be distinguished from the present direct gift; used to show that repugnancy and uncertainty doctrines are typically trust-related.
Perry v. Merritt (1874) 18 Eq. C. 152 Trust-related consideration of repugnancy/uncertainty doctrines. Cited as an example of trust jurisprudence distinguishable from the present direct gift; used to support the distinction the Court drew.
Lallu v. Jagmohan (1896) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 409 Case where a will gave property to B as owner with absolute power of disposal and a gift on B's death to C as owner; the court held B only took a life estate. The Court observed the present case was weaker than Lallu v. Jagmohan; Lallu was a stronger authority for cutting down an apparent absolute gift to a life interest.
S.M. Hara Kumari v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar (1908) 12 C.W.N. 412 Bequest to a wife with power to alienate and a bequest to a daughter of "whatever properties shall remain after your death"; held widow took a life estate with power and daughter took what remained. Described as very near to the present case; used as a closely comparable authority where the widow was held to take a life estate with power of alienation and the remainder passed to the daughter.
Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 268 : I.L.R. 7 Luck 324 : 63 M.L.J. 336 (P.C.) Example where a bequest prima facie absolute was cut down by regard to other provisions of the will; caution against uncritical application of English concepts to Indian wills. Invoked to illustrate that a prima facie absolute interest may be reduced by other provisions and to warn against importing English assumptions mechanically into Indian will-construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided its analysis into the two issues raised.

On the question of marriage form (Asura or ordinary)

The Court treated the first question as primarily factual. The appellant bore the burden of disproving the presumption that the marriage was in the ordinary form. The learned trial Judge had examined the evidence, assessed the credibility of witnesses and concluded that it was not proved that the marriage was in the Asura form. The appellate Court noted that it had not seen the witnesses and found nothing in the record to show that the trial Judge's conclusions as to credibility or weight of the evidence were wrong. Accordingly, the appellate Court accepted the trial Judge's factual conclusion that the Asura form of marriage was not proved.

On the question of construction of the will

The Court began by observing the particular complexities of construing wills, especially where (as here) the will was written in Tamil and uses terms that may lack the precision of technical English conveyancing language. The Court set out a translation of the operative clauses and focused on the phrase that the widow should be "enjoying with all rights and powers of alienation by gift, exchange or sale" the testator's properties, and on the clause that anything left at the widow's death should be taken by Nataraja Pillai.

The Court considered authorities both for and against the proposition that words conferring rights of alienation create an absolute estate. It stated the following legal propositions, grounded in the cited authorities and in Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act:

  • Prima facie, in India a gift to a widow in words such as "enjoying with all rights and powers of alienation by gift exchange or sale" denotes an absolute estate, unless the words are controlled or explained by the context.
  • These words indicate the extent of interest rather than operate merely as a power; they are not technical words like "in fee simple" but show an intention which can be displaced by clearer contrary words elsewhere in the will.
  • Where clauses collide, the rule enacted by Section 88 (derived from English authorities such as Sherratt v. Bentley) is that the later clause prevails; accordingly, a subsequent bequest might cut down an earlier gift in the event of true repugnancy.

Applying those principles to the present will, the Court concluded that the testator evidently intended to give the widow the fullest possible right to enjoy and alienate the property during her life. The Court emphasized the word "enjoy" and explained that the widow could consume, alienate, exchange, sell or even leave the property by her own will. However, the will also included an express clause that whatever property remained at the widow's death would be taken by Nataraja Pillai. The Court interpreted these provisions together: the widow's interest was as absolute as the will's language prima facie permitted, but the bequest to Nataraja Pillai operated to take whatever remained at her death (subject of course to payment of debts and funeral expenses).

The Court distinguished doctrines of repugnancy and uncertainty (and cases where those doctrines were applied) because those cases mostly concerned trusts or precatory directions where uncertainty of subject-matter prevented the creation of a binding trust. Here, by contrast, there was a direct gift to the widow and then an express gift of what remained to Nataraja Pillai; therefore the trust-based doctrines of uncertainty were not applicable in the same way.

The Court noted that while the line of cases cited by both sides was extensive, a detailed traversal of them served little purpose once the Court had reached its view on the intention manifested by the will's words and clauses viewed as a whole.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal succeeds. Specifically:

  • The Court held that it was not proved that Ponnammal Achi was married in the Asura form; the trial Judge's factual conclusion on that issue was upheld.
  • The Court held that, on construction of the will, the words conferring enjoyment "with all rights and powers of alienation by gift, exchange or sale" prima facie conferred upon the widow an absolute estate and the testator intended the widow to enjoy the property as fully as possible. Nevertheless, the will contains an express gift that any property remaining at the widow's death should pass to Nataraja Pillai; thus what remains at her death (after debts and expenses) passes to Nataraja Pillai.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the trial Judge's factual finding about the form of marriage stands and that, as to the will, the widow was given the fullest enjoyment and alienation powers the will's language could fairly bear, subject to the express gift over of any property remaining at her death to Nataraja Pillai. On costs, the Court directed that costs throughout should come out of the estate, noting that the plaintiff had succeeded on the marriage issue and that the will raised a genuine difficulty of construction. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel general rule of law beyond the application of established principles of will construction to the facts before the Court.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal raises two questions : (1) whether one Ponnammal Achi was married in the asura form so that her stridhanam property goes to her brother Nataraja Pillai, (2) whether she took an absolute estate without any executory or other gift over in favour of Nataraja Pillai under the will of her husband Samia Pillai.

2. The first question is primarily one of fact. The burden is upon the appellant to displace the presumption that the marriage is in the ordinary form. The learned trial Judge has considered the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. He has seen the witnesses and we have not. We see nothing in the record to show that his conclusions as to credibility or weight of testimony or evidence is wrong and we see therefore no reason for differing from his conclusion of fact. That conclusion was that it is not proved that Ponnammal Achi was married in the Asura form.

3. The second question raises a point on the construction of a will. Points of great complexity can arise when the will to be construed is written in a precise language possessing many terms of fact the content of which has been defined by Courts. Matters are made much more difficult where the will is in a language as uncertain and so lacking in precision as Tamil and terms are used which one side alleges have a technical meaning and the other side alleges have something less than a technical meaning and which if found in an English will would be construed as cutting down rather than as extending the bequest in question but which when found in this will admittedly, have not that effect.

4. The relevant words, in the translated form that seems best to render the original, are as follows:

After my death, my wife Ponnammal Achi, enjoying with all rights and powers of alienation by gift, exchange or sale the moveable and immoveable properties belonging to me by ancestral right and self-acquisition and situate in Tiruppu Melaiyur Village, Melaiyur vattatn, Melaiyur Mahanam, Kumba-konam Taluq, Madharajunam Sub-District, Tanjore District, shall herself discharge the debts payable by me on bonds and pro-notes amounting to Rs. 3,000 (Rupees three thousands).

I have hereby given full authority to the said Ponnammal Achi, my wife for effecting sales, etc., after my death, in respect of my immoveable and moveable properties either for the purchase of discharging the debts or for any other reason.... My wife shall have my obsequies performed at a cost of Rs. 300.

If after the alienations that may be made by my wife Ponnammal Achi for the purpose of discharging the aforementioned debts and for meeting the aforementioned expenses, there be any property moveable or immoveable, left at the time of her death, the same shall be taken, after her death by Nataraja Pillai.

5. It should not be overldoked that this will is dated 1899 at that time, it was a common or, at least a possible, opinion that a grant of the absolute estate to a Hindu widow did not confer upon her the right of alienation. Indeed that was so held by the High Court of Allahabad in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath (1903) I.L.R. 25 All. 351 That was put right on appeal.

6. The words " enjoying with all rights and powers of alienation by gift, exchange or sale ", are words which standing alone or uncontrolled by the context are apt words to describe an absolute estate. Thus Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Muthu Venkata-narayanan Chetty v. Athi Pandu Rangu Naidu (1919) M.W.N. 103 at 105, 106, observes:

I venture to think that with full proprietary powers (Swatantrathudan) is the strongest expression that an alienor can employ to confer an absolute estate on the alienee.

7. That observation emerged when discussing and criticising Manicka Mudali v. Muthachi Kavandan (1915) 18 M.L.T. 346, where Ayling, J., expressed the view that those words did not confer an absolute estate. It was noted by Spencer, J., in Muthu Venkatanarayanan Chetty v. Athi Pandu Rangu Naidu (1919) M.W.N. 103 at 105, 106 that those words do not occur in the document then under discussion. The words were I have gifted in lieu of maintenance... the house with rights of alienation by sale.

8. Spencer, J., took the view that the Judicial Committee in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt (1896) L.R. 23 I.A. 37 : I.L.R. 23 Cal. 670 : 6 M.L.J. 75 (P.C.) had decided as a matter of construction that a gift of property to A with power of alienation by sale or gift conveys an absolute estate and accordingly held that where the words of grant confer on the grantee powers of alienation the ordinary implication is that the grant is an absolute one. It was pointed out (Nanjamma v. Nacharammal (1907) 17 M.L.J. 622, being cited on the point that where the grant is to a wife in the words " you shall enjoy the same all your life" the addition of the words "with power to sell and give away " would not enlarge the estate into an absolute estate.

9. Jageswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt (1896) L.R. 23 I.A. 37 : I.L.R. 23 Cal. 670 : 6 M.L.J. 75 (P.C.), above mentioned was a case of the construction of a will. The bequest was to the youngest widow and her son " for your maintenance" with power to alienate by sale or gift. It was held that an absolute estate passed, the words " for your maintenance " not reducing the interest to one for the life of the respective legatees. The actual words (in translation) there were " upon my death you and your sons and grandsons in due order of succession shall hold possession... and I give you the power of making alienations by sale or gift." Those words are words clearly giving an estate of inheritance with power of alienation. Indeed that appears not to have been disputed. The question was whether they were cut down by the words " for your maintenance". They are of course much stronger words than are here present.

10. The result we have come to on this branch of the case is that prima facie a gift to a widow in the words "enjoying with all rights and powers of alienation by gift exchange or sale" is an absolute estate unless the words are controlled or explained by the context. That is, unlike in England where the addition of such words would suggest a life estate with a power, in India prima facie such words confer an absolute estate the words being used not to confer a power but to indicate the extent of the interest. But such words, though having that effect, are not words like "in fee simple" which as a matter of conveyancing describe in succinct and technical form the estate; they are words which merely show intention and may submit to other words more clearly and positively showing another intention as in the case in Nanjamma v. Nacharamma (1907) 17 M.L.J. 622 above cited.

11. In this case the testator proceeds to explain why he has given his wife authority to dispose of his property. The language used is such that it does not cut down the authority. She is stated to have been given this authority "for the purpose of discharging debts or for any other reason". But we think, taking into account the next clause, which gives anything that may be left at the time of the widow's death to Nataraja Pillai and looking at the will as a whole the testator had the intention of giving to his wife a right to enjoy the property as absolutely as possible. We lay stress on the word "enjoy". The widow could use the property, could consume the property, could alienate the property. She could in the fullest possible sense enjoy the property. She could, we think (it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to determine the point) have left the property by will and have thus enjoyed in relation to it the pleasure of giving it away after her death* she could have exchanged it for other property, she could have 1 sold it and spent the proceeds. But if she did not, during her lifetime, thus get rid of the property, or that into which it had been turned, and did not leave it by will, her enjoyment comes to an end with her death and what is left (subject of Course1 to the payment of debts and expenses) passes to Nataraja Pillai.

12. This being our view of the intention as deduced from all the words used by this testator very little purpose is served by examining the long line of cases cited on both sides. That would become, perhaps, necessary were we construing this will as giving an absolute estate with executory limitation over in favour of Nataraja, or if we were cutting down an absolute estate because of the gift over to Nataraja Pillai.

13. It may however be desirable to point out that on this latter; point a certain confusion seems to have crept into the argument. It is said that such a gift over would be void for repugnancy alternatively for uncertainty. But in construing a will one has to bear in mind the provision of Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act which enacts for India the rule of construction of wills developed in England (see Jarman on Wills, 7th Edition, p. 543), and applied in Sherratt v. Bentley (1834) 2 My. And K. 149 : 39 E.R. 901 and the other cases which follow that case, vis., that where11 two clauses in a will collide the latter clause prevails. Thus if repugnancy is regarded it would be the earlier and not the latter gift that would have to be cut down. This is made cteaf in Constable v. Bulls (1849) 3 De G. and S.M. 411 : 64 E.R. 539 and the cases following that case. There the gift to the wife was absolute. There was a later bequest not of the same property but, as here, of what remained of the same property at the widow's death. Apart from the words:

Whatever remains of" V.C. Knight Bruce stated as though it were a. perfectly clear and obvious proposition that "the subsequent bequests would have the effect of so reducing the interest given to the widow.

14. He also held that the words in question made no differ* ence. See also the judgment of the Judicial Committee ih Bhaidas Shivdas v, Bai Gulab (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 153 at 159, 160 (P.C.).

15. Repugnancy and uncertainty are, when examined, not applicable in the construction of a will like this when considering what if anything Nataraja Pillai took. The cases such as Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 153 (P.C.), In re Dixon. Dixon v. Charles-worth (1903) 2 Ch. 458 and Perry v. Merritt (1874) 18 Eq. C. 152 where the doctrines of repugnancy or uncertainty have been considered will be found to be cases of trusts. Thus the Privy Council in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 153 (P.C.) applied the rule in Horwood v. West (1823) 1 Sim. and St. 387 : 57 E.R. 155 a rule that relates to trusts, because there was no direct gift over but a direction to the widow to leave "whatever property might remain" in a certain way. That direction had no binding effect or it constituted a precatory trust. It was held not to constitute a trust because of uncertainty of subject-matter. Here there is no trust but a direct gift. The doctrine of uncertainty does not apply.

16. This case is certainly weaker than Lallu v. Jagmohan (1896) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 409 where the will gave property to B as owner, with absolute power of disposal equal to the testators, with a gift on B's death to C as owner. Yet there it was held that B only took a life estate.

17. This present case, seems to be very near to S.M. Hara Kumari v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar (1908) 12 C.W.N. 412 where the bequest was to a wife in the following terms:

You shall become possessor of my properties. You shall have the right and power to alienate by gift or sale. My daughter shall be entitled to and possessor of whatever properties shall remain after your death and the said daughter shall have the same rights as you have.

18. The only difference is that there is a distinction drawn between being entitled to and being possessor of. There were also other indications in the will of a desire on the part of the testator to benefit the daughter. It was indicated that if one looked at the bequest to the widow alone it looked like an absolute gift but that one could not, in construing the will, shut one's eyes to the words relating to the daughter. It was held that looking at the will as a whole the widow took an estate for life with a power of alienation and to the extent to which the power was not exercised the daughter similarly took the property. In the same sense is Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 268 : I.L.R. 7 Luck 324 : 63 M.L.J. 336 (P.C.), though there the facts are somewhat different. The applicability of that case lies in this that abequest of what would prima facie be an absolute interest was cut down by regarding other provisions of the will inconsistent with such prima facie meaning. That case also issues a warning against applying to the construction of words used in an Indian will ideas proper in the construction of English wills brought into existence in a different environment.

19. The appeal accordingly succeeds. With regard to costs the plaintiff has succeeded throughout on the issue as to the form of marriage. On the issue relating to the construction of the will the learned trial Judge came to one conclusionina very careful judgment. We it is true have come to anqther conclusion. But it cannot be said that the will does not raise a difficulty of construction and we think in all the circumstances the costs throughout should come out of the estate as would be the case where the question raised was simply as to the true construction of a will.