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Ammani Ammal And Ors. v. Periasami Udayan And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two sisters, Vedambal and the 6th defendant (Mahalakshmi Ammal), succeeded to the estate of their father, Veerabhadra. They effected a division of the estate by a deed of partition (Ex. A), under which specific items of property fell to Vedambal and others to Mahalakshmi. Vedambal subsequently alienated item 3 and a portion of item 4 to the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants.
The plaintiffs are the sons of the 6th defendant. They sued for (a) a declaration that Vedambal's alienations were invalid and (b) possession of the alienated items. The District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action during the lifetime of the surviving life-tenant (Mahalakshmi). The District Judge reversed that dismissal and remanded the suit for trial. The present appeal is by defendants 3 to 5 against the District Judge's order setting aside the dismissal and remanding the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs, suing as reversioners (heirs of Veerabhadra), are entitled to claim possession of the disputed items during the lifetime of the surviving life-tenant (the 6th defendant).
- Whether the partition deed (Ex. A) effected such a relinquishment or transfer of interest between the sisters that the alienations made by Vedambal are invalid as against the reversioners or the heirs of Vedambal.
- Whether a co-sharer (daughter) can alienate or relinquish not only her life-interest in the other's share but also the whole of her interest (including what might otherwise be regarded as a right of succession), and whether such a transfer contravenes Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether it is a transfer of a mere spes successionis and thus void).
- Whether a reversioner's right can be accelerated by an agreement to which the reversioner is not a party.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs rely on title as heirs of Veerabhadra (i.e., reversioners of his estate) and seek possession and a declaration of invalidity of Vedambal's alienations.
- They contend that Ex. A effected a separation so absolute that each share became a distinct estate and that the reversioner's succession would open separately on the death of the sharer concerned — implying that the reversioners could assert rights immediately or that the alienations should be treated as void as against reversioners.
- They further argued (as an alternative suggested by the respondents) that Vedambal's heirs could maintain the action; the plaintiffs examined whether they might be heirs of Vedambal.
Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments
- The defendants (3rd to 5th) contested the plaintiffs' entitlement to possession during the life of the surviving life-tenant and maintained that Ex. A operated as a valid relinquishment or transfer by each sister of her interest in the other's share, effective so as to permit alienations by Vedambal against the plaintiffs.
- They relied on the proposition that a co-sharer can validly alienate her interest (including the interest that would otherwise pass on survivorship), and that such an alienation is not a transfer of a mere spes successionis under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- They argued that the plaintiffs, as reversioners, could not have their reversionary right accelerated by agreements to which they were not parties.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 M.H.C.R. 268 | Identified as the only authority expressly in favour of the contention that the reversioner might obtain immediate benefit; but the relied passage was non‑committal and referred to facts not before that Court. | The Court treated this as weak support only, observing that the passage relied on was non‑committal and not directly on point for the facts at hand. |
| Subbammal v. Lakshmana Iyer / Subbammal v. Krishna Aiyar (1914) 26 M.L.J. 479 | Considered for the proposition that wording of partition/relinquishment documents matters; recognized that a partitioning agreement can operate as a relinquishment. | The Court observed that the case turned on the document's wording and that nothing in the judgment directly supported the claim of a reversioner; it noted the lower appellate Court over‑relied on it. |
| Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 522 | Authority that a surviving life-tenant and an alienee from the deceased life-tenant — alienee held valid rights; a widow or life-tenant can alienate the life-interest she possesses. | The Court cited it to support the proposition that the interest of a deceased life-tenant was alienable and that such alienations could be effective against others; used to show that relinquishments may be valid. |
| Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) I.L.R. 33 M. 504 | Similar context to Ramakkal: disputes between surviving life-tenant and alienee; decisions favoured the alienee. | Used to infer that the interest of the deceased was regarded as alienable and that heirs of the deceased had no special protection in those authorities; does not directly deal with reversioners. |
| Sudalai Ammal v. Gomathi Ammal (1912) 23 M.L.J. 355 | Principle that one joint tenant may part with her life interest in favour of a stranger (or co-tenant); used to analogize co-widows/co-daughters. | The Court relied on it to support the conclusion that a joint tenant may validly surrender or alienate her life interest in favour of the co-tenant, and that the principle applies equally to daughters as to co-widows. |
| Papammal v. Venkatasami Naicken S.A. No. 356 of 1918 | Followed the prevailing current of authority on partition/relinquishment, though the judges doubted the correctness of that current. | The Court noted it as consistent with the line of authority permitting effective relinquishments by co-sharers, but observed it did not address reversioners' claims. |
| Kaliash Chandra v. Kashi Chandra (1897) I.L.R. 24 C. 339 | Reversioners' claim was dismissed as premature during the lifetime of the surviving female life-tenant; Dayabhaga law did not affect that part of the decision. | Cited to support the conclusion that reversioners cannot claim possession while the surviving life‑tenant is alive. |
| Muthlyala Chegappa v. Buradagunta (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 855 : 39 M.L.J. 567 | Holds that a reversioner's right cannot be accelerated by an agreement to which he is not a party; a relinquishment to a co-life-tenant does not accelerate the reversioner's right. | The Court relied on it for the central proposition that reversioners cannot have their right accelerated by agreements between co‑sharers and rejected the contrary argument as "a very startling proposition." |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by reference to the parties' pleadings and the wording of Ex. A. It emphasized first the nature of the plaintiffs' pleaded title: they sued only as heirs (reversioners) of the common father, Veerabhadra. Because of that pleading, the Court rejected any argument that the plaintiffs could sue as heirs of Vedambal.
The Court then analyzed Ex. A's language — which states the parties will "enjoy severally for ever absolutely the properties which have fallen to their respective selves" and that "neither should hereafter have a right over the properties set apart for the other" — and concluded that the deed must be construed, in view of its wide language, as a mutual relinquishment by each party of any right to the other's share, including the rights that would otherwise arise by survivorship.
The Court considered whether the relinquishment was void as a transfer of a mere spes successionis under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. It rejected that contention, adopting the reasoning in earlier authorities (for example Subbammal and Sudalai Ammal) that the surrender was of the entire interest and could not permissibly be dissected into a life-interest and a mere expectancy for the purpose of invoking Section 6.
Turning to the plaintiffs' status as reversioners, the Court held that reversioners cannot claim possession until the life-interest of the surviving life-tenant (the 6th defendant) is determined by death. It found authority (Kaliash Chandra and Muthlyala Chegappa) that a reversioner's right cannot be accelerated by an agreement to which he is not a party. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim for possession must be dismissed at this stage.
However, the Court distinguished the relief sought for a declaration of invalidity of Vedambal's alienations. It held that the plaintiffs, as reversioners, might — subject to limitation and other defences — be entitled to a declaration that Vedambal's alienations were invalid as against the reversioners. Because it was unclear whether the plaintiffs sought that relief only incidentally to their claim for possession, the Court modified the lower appellate Court's decision: the remand should be limited to consideration of the declaration claim and certain framed issues (issues ii, iii and iv), and the District Munsif should be given opportunity to permit additional pleadings and frame any further necessary issues before trial.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed in part. The Court held that the plaintiffs, as reversioners, cannot claim possession of the disputed properties during the lifetime of the surviving life-tenant (the 6th defendant), and accordingly the suit insofar as it seeks possession must be dismissed. At the same time, the Court held that the plaintiffs may, subject to the law of limitation and other defences, be entitled to a declaration that Vedambal's alienations are invalid as reversioners, and remanded the matter to the District Munsif only for consideration of the declaration and of issues ii, iii and iv (as framed).
Practical consequences and directions given by the Court:
- The remand ordered by the lower appellate Court is modified: the suit will not proceed on the possession claim but only on the declaration of invalidity and specified issues.
- The District Munsif must allow the defendants an opportunity to file additional written statements and must frame any further issues necessary in light of any new pleadings before proceeding with the trial.
- Costs incurred in this Court and in the lower appellate Court to date are to be treated as costs in the case and will be provided for in the decree to be passed.
The Court's decision does not purport to set a new, broad precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; it clarifies that a partitioning instrument in wide language can constitute a valid mutual relinquishment of interests between co-sharers and that reversioners cannot have their reversionary interest accelerated by agreements to which they are not parties.
Additional Judicial Remarks
Justice Venkatasubba Rao concurred in full. His reasoning emphasized (a) the acceptability under Hindu (Mitakshara) law of agreements by co-heirs that surrender the survivor's right of survivorship, (b) the unacceptability of classifying the surrendered interest as merely a spes successionis for the purpose of invoking Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and (c) agreement with the view that a reversioner's right cannot be accelerated by agreements between co-sharers to which the reversioner is not a party.
This summary is based strictly and exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.
1. The four items of suit property and others fell to two sisters, Vedambal and 6th defendant, in succession to their father; but Vedambal was in separate possession of the suit items under Ex. A, by which they, to the extent open to them, divided the estate. Vedambal died after alienating item 3 and a portion of item 4, to which this second appeal relates, to 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants. The plaintiffs, the sons of 6th defendant, have sued for a declaration of the invalidity of those alienations and for possession of those items. The question is whether they are entitled to sue, the lower appellate Court having held that they are and remanded the suit for trial on the merits.
2. In the plaint the title relied on is that the plaintiffs are the heirs of Veerabhadra, the father of Vedambal and 6th defendant; that is, reversioners of his estate. It is therefore impossible to proceed on the alternative ground, on which it was proposed to support the lower appellate Court's decision, that they could sue as heirs of Vedambal. Moreover, even if that ground were not excluded by the pleading, further reference to it would serve no purpose. For, whatever the extent of Vedambal's interest, it does not appear on principle or authority how her heirs can have had any vested or other right in the property during her life time, which could debar her from alienating it to their prejudice or which they can rely on against 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants, her alienees.
3. The plaintiffs' claim as reversioners of Veerabhadra's estate would ordinarily be negatived by the fact that the interest of the 6th defendant, his surviving female heir, is still outstanding; and they accordingly contend that the agreement between her and Vedambal, Ex. A, effected a separation between the two shares, into which the estate under it was divided, so absolute as to constitute each share a distinct estate, in respect of which the reversioner's succession would open separately on the death of the sharer concerned. Ex. A. no doubt is expressed in unqualified language, the parties to it agreeing to "enjoy severally for ever absolutely the properties which have fallen to their respective selves" and reciting that "neither should hereafter have a right over the properties set apart for the other," and, if it was open to them to relinquish their whole actual and future interests, each in the other's share, it must be held that they did so. It is urged that, whilst they could do so with the effect of depriving the survivor of the succession to the share of the one first deceased, the latter's share would pass, not to her own heirs, until the life estate might be determined on the survivor's death, but at once to the reversioners.
4. In favour of this contention there is only one authority. Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 M.H.C.R. 268; but the passage relied on it is, as a later case points out, only a non-committal reference to a possible conclusion on facts other than those actually before the Court. In Subbammal v. Lakshmana Iyer (1914) M.L.J. 479, on which the decision of the lower appellate Court is based, the dispute was between the surviving female life-tenant and her deceased co-tenant's heir. But it turned to some extent on the wording of the document under construction and there was nothing in the judgment directly in favour of the last male owner's reversioner, there being nothing to show that the deceased's heir was regarded as possessing that character. And in fact the lower appellate Court would seem to have erred, because it paid no attention to this aspect of the case. In Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 522 and Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal (1899) I.L.R. 33 M. 504 the parties were the surviving life-tenant and an alienee from the deceased life-tenant, the decision in each case being in favour of the latter. The inference from these two authorities is that, as the interest of the deceased was alienable, so it would in the absence of an alienation have passed to her heirs in the ordinary course of inheritance, although in them again the reversioner was not before the Court and his right was not pleaded; and there is nothing inconsistent with that inference in Sudalai Ammal v. Gomathi Ammal (1912) 23 M.L.J. 355, although there the claim of the deceased's heir rested on a provision in the document of partition, or in Papammal v. Venkatasami Naicken S.A. No. 356 of 1918 in which the learned Judges followed the clear current of authority, although they doubted its correctness. Those decisions also do not deal with the claim of reversioners. But they are important, because they are consistent with the view, expressed in Subbammal v. Lakshmana Aiyar (1914) 26 M.L.J. 479 that the agreement for division must be regarded, as in view of its wide language we must regard. Ex. A., as a transfer by way of relinquishment by each party to (sic) in case she should survive, of her right to the other's share and that such a transfer does no offend against Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and must receive effect. The relinquishment is and legally can be, when that is entailed by the language used, not only of the life estate, so far as it can be enjoyed simultaneously by the sharers, but of that estate, as they take it, limited only by the life time of the survivor; and the uncertainty as to which of the transferors will survive to benefit does not make the transfer one of a spes successions.
5. That is material, when (as here) the claim is by reversioners. For there can be no reason why the effect of such a transfer should be less as against them. And two cases, Kaliash Chandra v. Kashi Chandra (1897) I.L.R. 24 C. 339 and Muthlyala Chegappa v. Buradagunta (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 855 : 39 M.L.J. 567 support this. In the former the reversioners' claim was expressly dismissed as premature during the life time of the surviving female life tenant, the application of Dayabhaga Law not affecting this part of the decision. In the latter the grounds of decision were that that a reversioner's right could not be accelerated by an agreement, to which he was not a party, and that no acceleration could result from a relinquishment, not to a reversioner, but to a co-life-tenant, the fact that there the relinquishment was not, as it is in the case before us, mutual, but of the right to a share in exchange for a money payment, not impairing the validity of these, considerations.
6. The conclusion then must be that plaintiffs cannot, as reversioners, claim possession until the death of the surviving life tenant, 6th defendant; and that, as already pointed out, they cannot claim it by right of heirship to Vedambal, because against that right (if they have it) her alienation must prevail. So far the appeal must succeed and the suit, so far as it is for possession, must be dismissed. The plaintiffs however asked also for a declaration of the invalidity of Vedambal's alienations. They may subject to the law of limitation and other objections be entitled to such a declaration as reversioners; and it is not clear that they asked for this relief only as ancillary to their prayer for possession. The lower appellate Court's decision must therefore be modified in this sense, the remand to the District Munsif being allowed only for the consideration of the prayer for a declaration and of issues ii, iii and iv as framed by him.
7. In view of the course of pleading, the District Munsif should, before proceeding with the trial, give defendants an opportunity to file additional written statements and should frame any further issues, which may be necessary with reference to them. Costs in this and the lower appellate Court to date will be costs in the case and will be provided for in the decree to be passed.
Venkatasubba Rao, J.
8. I entirely agree. This, is an appeal by the defendants 3 to 5 against the order of the District Judge setting aside the dismissal of the suit by the District Munsif and remanding it for fresh disposal. Vedambal and Mahalakshmi Ammal, daughters of Veerabhadra Udayan who inherited their father's property, partitioned it by Ex. A. and certain items of property fell to the share of Vedambal and certain other items to the share of her sister Mahalakshmi. The deed contains the following clause:
We have each of us taken delivery of the properties as have been set apart for our respective shares. We shall in future ourselves severally enjoy for ever absolutely the properties as have fallen to our respective selves, from progeny to progeny and fit for sale, gift, exchange, etc. We shall severally pay the Government tax for the lands as have been respectively set apart for us. Neither of us have a right over the properties set apart for the other.
9. The plaint contains an allegation that Vedambal Ammal executed a sale deed in respect of certain properties set forth in paragraph thereof and that the defendants 3 to 5 claim a title under the sale deed. The plaintiffs are the sons of Mahalakshmi who was impleaded as the 6th defendant in the suit.
10. The District Munsif holding that the plaintiffs have no cause of action during the life time of Mahalakshmi dismissed the suit, and the District Judge as observed above reversed the decision of the District Munsif. The argument before us ranged over a wide ground. But the point that presents itself for decision is extremely simple.
11. According to the Mitakshara School, two or more daughters succeeding, as heirs to their father take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. It is well settled that they may effect a partition each daughter giving up her right of enjoyment over the properties allotted to the other daughter during the life time of the latter. The question then arises : Can an arrangement be entered into by which each daughter may give up her interest not merely during the life time of the other daughter but during the whole of her own life time? It is difficult to see why such an agreement cannot be entered into. A and B inheriting their father's estate partition the property, B agreeing that in regard to the property that falls to A she gives up not only her interest, for the life time of A, but also for her own life-time in the event of B surviving A. Why should such an agreement not be valid? If the arrangement amounted to a mere partition, the result is that B. would give up her right in the property that fell to the share of A only for the life time of A and B's right to take by survivorship the share that fell to A would be unimpaired. But, if to an arrangement amounting to a partition was super-added the surrender by B of her right to take by survivorship, the effect would be to dispose of the entire interest of B in favour of A. For convenience I have, in the illustration, referred to B's disposal of her interest. It makes no difference whether we consider the case from the standpoint of A or B. The act of the nature referred to above on the part of either of the co-sharers amounts to an alienation of her interest in the property falling to the share of the other. Such an alienation is both on principle and authority perfectly valid and binding.
12. As was pointed out in Sudalai Ammal v. Gomathi Ammal (1912) 23 M.L.J. 355 if it is not denied that one of the joint tenants may part with her own life interest in favour of a stranger, it becomes difficult to imagine why she may not part with it in favour of the other joint tenant. In the above case the question in regard to two co-widows was under consideration. But on this point there is no difference between the case of widows and daughters and the principle is equally applicable to the case on hand.
13. What Mahalakshmi gave up under the deed was her interest in the property that fell to the share of Vedambal. That interest, as observed above, no doubt consists of two portions, (1) the interest which she would possess for the life time or Vedambal, (2) the interest which she would possess beyond the life time of Vedambal in the event of her surviving Vedambal. Does it therefore follow that in regard to the second portion she was dealing with spes successionis and therefore that her alienation of that portion contravenes Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act? The argument seems to me grotesque, and I have no hestitation in rejecting it as was done in Subbammal v. Krishna Aiyar (1914) 26 M.L.J. 479 The fact is, that what she surrendered, was her entire interest and it is not permissible to divide it into two interests for the purpose of making Section 6 applicable.
14. Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicken (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 522 is a very useful authority in this connection. A Hindu died leaving two widows who divided his property by a partition deed under which each took possession of her share with powers of alienation over the property Comprised in it. Certain alienations were made by one widow who subsequently died. On the surviving widow claiming the whole of her husband's property including the portion she alienated, it was held that a widow could alienate for her life any estate which came to her as such and that she could therefore enter into such a deed as would preclude her from recovering during her life, property which she had alienated to the full extent of such alienation, provided it did not extend beyond her life interest.
15. The light to the property after Vedambal's death would, under the Hindu Law, vest in Mahalakshmi for her life. The latter disposed of that interest in favour of Vedambal. If Mahalakshmi is bound by the alienation, I fail to see how it can be questioned by any other. But then, it is argued that the effect of Mahalakshmi's act was to accelerate the interest of the reversioners. The identical argument was advanced in Muthiyala Chegappa v. Buradaguwa alias Akula Venkataswami (1920) I.L.R. 43 M. 855 : 39 M.L.J. 567 and was overruled, Sadasrva Aiyar, J., observing :
"That a male reversioner's right should be accelerated by agreements to which he is not a party is, to me, a very startling proposition,"and I entirely concur in this view.
16. It is necessary to notice another argument put forward on behalf of the respondents. It is said that even assuming that the interest transferred to Vedambal was to enure for the life time of Mahalakshmi, still that interest would pass to Vedambal's heirs and that the plaintiffs as her heirs are entitled to maintain the action. The reference to heirs succeeding, seems to me quite beside the point. Such interest as Vedambal acquired was alienated, in favour of the appellants before us and the question of inheritance therefore does not arise. In this view it is needless to enquire whether the plaintiffs are the streedhanam heirs of Vedambal.
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