Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Venkatarama Reddiar And Another . v. Valli Akkal And Others

Madras High Court
Sep 19, 1934
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs held a money-decree against the first defendant. In execution of that decree they sought to attach a promissory note dated 23rd December, 1924, which had been executed by the second defendant in favour of the third defendant and subsequently endorsed by the third defendant to the fourth defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that the first, third and fourth defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiffs by having the note executed in the third defendant's name though the moneys were really due by the second defendant to the first, and that the transfer to the fourth defendant was without consideration.

An application to attach the promissory note was dismissed on objection by the fourth defendant on the ground that a promissory note standing in the name of the fourth (or the third) defendant could not be attached. The plaintiffs then instituted the present suit seeking a declaration that the promissory note was liable to attachment in execution of their decree against the first defendant.

Issues 1, 4 and 5 were taken up as preliminary issues in the Court of First Instance, which dismissed the suit on the basis that the plaintiffs sought relief "on the basis of the promissory note and on the promissory note alone" and therefore could not seek to displace the payee's apparent rights. On appeal the Subordinate Judge issued a brief judgment upholding the same approach, prompting this Second Appeal.

During the pendency of the second appeal the fourth defendant sued on the promissory note and obtained a decree; following that event the appellants were permitted to amend paragraph 12(a) of their plaint by adding the words "debt due under" before "promissory note, dated 23rd December, 1924".

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether parol evidence is admissible to show that a promissory note was taken benami (i.e., in the name of one person for the benefit of another), particularly where the claim is raised by a person other than the promisor.
  2. Whether a promissory note that stands in the name of a person other than the judgment-debtor can be attached in execution of a decree against the judgment-debtor.
  3. Whether a suit for a declaration that a person named as payee is merely a trustee (benamidar) in relation to a negotiable instrument is maintainable, and what remedies follow if such a declaration is obtained (including the application of the Trusts Act).
  4. What is the scope of the Negotiable Instruments Act and related evidentiary presumptions vis-à-vis the ordinary principles of substantive law and the rules of evidence in disputes involving negotiable instruments.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Plaintiffs)

  • The promissory note dated 23rd December, 1924 was executed and dealt with as part of a fraudulent scheme to defeat creditors: the first, third and fourth defendants colluded and the note represented moneys actually due by the second defendant to the first.
  • The note was transferred to the fourth defendant without any consideration and was therefore effectively held for the benefit of the judgment-debtor (benami).
  • The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the promissory note is liable to attachment in execution of their decree, and, after events in the appeal, amended their plaint to seek a declaration in respect of the "debt due under" the promissory note.

Respondents (Defendants), including the Fourth Defendant

  • The fourth defendant objected in the execution proceeding that the promissory note, standing in his (or the third defendant's) name, could not be attached.
  • In the courts below it was contended (and accepted) that the plaintiffs could not plead that the payee named in the promissory note was not the real payee and that such matters could not be permitted in a suit of this character.
  • Before this Court, counsel for the fourth defendant argued that even if the plaintiffs' view produced harsh results for creditors, that hardship should not induce the Court to lay down law contrary to the strict view asserted by the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar (1906) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 88 : 16 M.L.J. 508 (F.B.) Cases relied on by the courts below to assert that parol evidence is inadmissible to show a note was taken benami. The court held that the lower courts misapprehended the observations in this case and distinguished the proposition: parol evidence may be admissible to show benami status where the claim is between payee (or transferee) and a third person, even though such evidence may be barred in a suit on the note by the promisor.
Harikishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chaudhury (1930) I.L.R. 52 Cal. 752 (also cited as I.L.R. 58 Cal. 751) Observation that "property" in a note is in the person named as payee. The court said that this observation does not affect the question whether a beneficiary (not the payee) can prove that the payee is a trustee; the point is distinct from the question whether a real owner can sue on the note against the promisor.
Surajman Prasad Misra v. Sadanand Misra (1932) I.L.R. 11 Pat. 616 Referenced in connection with conflict of views whether a person not named as payee can maintain a suit on the note. Used as part of a list of authorities illustrating differing views; the court did not decide the larger question in this case but noted the citations.
Ramalinga Prasad v. Bishwanath Prasad A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 85 As above, cited in relation to the question of who may sue on a note. Cited for comparison; the court observed the present suit is not a suit of that particular kind (i.e., a real owner suing in his own name on the note).
Sewa Ram v. Hoti Lal (1930) I.L.R. 53 All. 5 As above, part of authorities on conflicting views about suits by persons not named as payees. Cited as part of the background of authority; not determinative in the present case.
Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67 at 78 Equity practice where beneficiary could compel trustee or have receiver appointed so that the beneficiary's interest could be realised. Relied upon to show that even if a beneficiary cannot immediately sue on a negotiable instrument in his own name, equitable remedies (receiver, compelling conveyance, or the trustee suing) enable the beneficiary to realise the debt.
Sharpe v. San Paulo Railway Co. (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 597 at 610 Equitable principles concerning enforcement of trusts and rights of beneficiaries. Used with Fletcher and Ex parte Kearsley to demonstrate established remedies in equity for beneficiaries of trust property.
Ex parte Kearsley In re Genese (1886) L.R. 17 Q.B.D. 1 at 37 Equitable remedies relating to choses in action and trustees. Supports the proposition that equitable procedures can enable beneficiaries or their transferees to vindicate rights in choses in action including negotiable instruments.
Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 597 Dissenting view (Davies, J.) advocating a stricter approach to negotiable instruments cases. The court noted that the stricter dissenting view was not followed and thus should not be taken as authoritative for excluding ordinary legal principles from disputes over negotiable instruments.
Shanmuganatha Chettiar v. Srinivasa Aiyar (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 727 : 31 M.L.J. 135 Authority for reading the Negotiable Instruments Act with due regard to other branches of law. Cited as part of a line of decisions indicating that the Act does not exclude application of other legal rules beyond its special provisions.
Gopala Pillai v. Kothandarama Aiyar A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 529 As above, authority for interpreting the Negotiable Instruments Act with reference to other legal principles. Submitted in support of the proposition that rights and liabilities arising out of the debt underlying negotiable instruments can be enforced notwithstanding the Act's special rules.
Ramanathan Chetti v. Katha Velan (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 353 : 33 M.L.J. 627 As above, further authority on the scope of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Reinforces the court's view that the Act's special provisions do not wholly exclude other rules of law.
Subramania Aiyar v. Subban Chettiar (1924) 21 L.W. 696 Again cited among authorities showing that the Negotiable Instruments Act should not be interpreted to exclude general law. Used to support the court's textual and purposive approach to the Act in context.
Somu Naidu v. Sanyasayya (1934) 39 L.W. 520 Authority relied upon (by respondents) to suggest that an auction-purchaser on attachment might not be able to sue the promisor after endorsement by the executing Court. The court considered this judgment but observed it focused on the endorsement by the executing court and did not address the consequences under the Trusts Act; the present court found Somu Naidu insufficient to resolve the point here and noted that subsequent events made the point academic in this appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the dispute in several connected strands and applied both statutory provisions and equitable principles:

  1. Misapprehension of prior authority: The Court found that the lower courts had misread the observations in Subba Narayana Vathiyar and similar cases. It distinguished between (a) a promisor in a suit on the note being precluded from asserting that another (not the payee) is entitled to sue, and (b) the admissibility of evidence showing that the payee was a benamidar when the dispute is between the payee (or his transferee) and third parties. The Court held these are distinct questions.
  2. Scope of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Evidence Act: The Court emphasised that the Negotiable Instruments Act creates certain special rules of evidence and presumptions (and bars particular pleas in suits on negotiable instruments), but this does not mean the Act excludes the operation of ordinary substantive law and general rules of evidence except insofar as the Act expressly or necessarily implies such exclusion. The Court referenced Sections 118–122 and Sections 43–44 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 117 of the Evidence Act to illustrate that the Act itself contains specific, limited bars and presumptions.
  3. Plea of benami as resulting trust: The Court noted that a plea of benami is essentially a plea of resulting trust. Nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act prevents a beneficiary (the real owner) from proving that the named payee is a trustee for another. The Court clarified that Harikishore Barna's observation about legal "property" being in the person named as payee does not decide the trustee/benami question between third-party claimants and the payee.
  4. Trusts Act remedies and attachability: The Court relied on Section 63 of the Trusts Act, which permits a beneficiary to require a person holding trust property to admit the property is comprised in the trust or to sue for a declaration to that effect. Section 64 creates limited exceptions specifically referring to negotiable instruments and protects bona fide holders in circulation. The Court inferred that where a negotiable instrument is not in the hands of a bona fide transferee, the beneficiary can call upon the transferee to admit trustee status or sue for a declaration. The Court further explained that equitable remedies (e.g., compelling the trustee to execute the trust, appointing a receiver, or compelling conveyance) allow the beneficiary or his transferee to realise the debt even if he cannot immediately sue on the instrument in his own name.
  5. Statutory provision for attachment: The Court relied on the concluding words of Clause 1 of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code, which expressly refers to attachment of bills of exchange and promissory notes "whether the same be held in the name of the judgment-debtor or by any other person in trust for him or on his behalf". The Court held there is nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act that should be construed as rendering these words meaningless; therefore attachment of a negotiable instrument held in trust for a judgment-debtor is permissible under the Civil Procedure Code.
  6. On the executing purchaser and suing the promisor: The respondents had relied on Somu Naidu v. Sanyasayya to argue that even if a note were attached and sold, the auction-purchaser could not sue the promisor. The Court observed that Somu Naidu focused on endorsement by the executing court and did not consider remedies available under the Trusts Act; moreover, subsequent factual developments (the fourth defendant suing and obtaining a decree) made the point immaterial in the present appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for trial on the merits. Costs in this Court and the lower appellate Court were directed to abide the result of the suit. The plaintiffs were entitled to refund of the Court-fees paid on the Memorandum of Appeal in both this Court and the lower Appellate Court. The appellants were permitted to amend paragraph 12(a) of their plaint by adding the words "debt due under" before the words "promissory note, dated 23rd December, 1924".

Implications:

  • The Court made clear that the Negotiable Instruments Act must be construed in the context of its purpose and scope and does not, beyond its express provisions and necessary implications, exclude application of ordinary substantive law or rules of evidence in disputes over negotiable instruments.
  • The Court affirmed that a plea that a promissory note was benami is in the nature of a resulting trust plea and that a beneficiary (real owner) may seek a declaration against a person holding a negotiable instrument as trustee; such a declaration may be practically effective because equitable remedies (receiver, compelling conveyance, or trustee to sue) can enable realisation of the debt.
  • Clause 1 of Section 60, Civil Procedure Code, was held to permit attachment of negotiable instruments whether held in the name of the judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him; the Court rejected the view that the Negotiable Instruments Act rendered these words ineffective.
  • The immediate practical effect is that the plaintiffs' suit will proceed to trial on the merits on the amended plaint and the lower decrees dismissing the suit in limine have been set aside. The Court did not lay down an exhaustive rule resolving all situations in which a non-payee may sue on a note, and it expressly declined to decide some wider questions about the ability of a person not named as payee to sue the promisor; thus the decision remands factual issues for trial rather than establishing a categorical new rule beyond the principles applied.
Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiffs appeal against the decree dismissing their suit in limine. They had obtained a money-decree against the first defendant and in execution thereof they attempted to attach a promissory note, dated 23rd December, 1924, executed by the second defendant in favour of the third defendant and endorsed by the third defendant to the fourth defendant. The allegations in the plaint were that, with a view to defraud the plaintiffs of the amount clue to them under their decree, the first, third and fourth defendants joined together and got this promissory note executed by the second defendant in favour of the third defendant in respect of a sum of money really due by the second defendant to the first and that in pursuance of the same fraudulent scheme the note was transferred to the fourth defendant without any consideration. An application to attach this promissory note was dismissed, on objection raised by the fourth defendant, on the ground that the promissory note standing in his name or in the name of the third defendant could not be attached. This suit was then laid for a declaration that the promissory note is liable to be attached in execution of the decree obtained by the plaintiffs against the first defendant.

2. Issues 1, 4 and 5 were argued as preliminary issues in the Court of the First Instance and that Court held that the present suit was one to obtain relief "on the basis of the promissory note and on the promissory note alone", that neither the first defendant nor the second defendant could be allowed to prove that the third defendant did not advance the amount for the promissory note or that his endorsee the fourth defendant is not entitled to recover the amount due there under and that as the plaintiffs could have no higher rights than the first defendant, the suit must fail. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge, in a very brief judgment, also held that it was not open to the plaintiffs to plead that the payee under the promissory note is not the fourth defendant but somebody else. Hence this Second Appeal.

3. The Judgments of the Courts below rest upon a misapprehension of the observations in Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar (1906) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 88 : 16 M.L.J. 508 (F.B.) and similar cases. It is not right to say generally that that class of cases lays down that parol evidence is not admissible to show that a note has been taken benami in the name of a person for money advanced by another. It is one thing to say that the promisor cannot, in a suit on the note, plead that somebody other than the payee is the person entitled to sue, nor plead discharge by payment to the alleged real owner, and a wholly different thing to say that as between the payee named in the document and persons other than the promisor there is any rule which precludes the admissibility of evidence showing that the payee was only a benamidar for another. The Negotiable Instruments Act lays down certain special rules of evidence and certain special presumptions and precludes certain pleas being raised in particular circumstances; but it will not be right to say that beyond the scope of such rules or what may follow as necessary implications therefrom, the applicability of the general principles of law or the ordinary rules of evidence is excluded. For instance, it may be noticed that in Sections 120, 121 and 122 of the Act, particular pleas are barred only in suits on negotiable instruments. In Sections 118 and 119, certain presumptions are laid down with reference to negotiable instruments, and in Sections 43 and 44 certain pleas, such as, absence of consideration, etc., are permitted to be raised between immediate parties but not as against other holders. By Section 117 of the Evidence Act an acceptor of a bill of exchange is precluded from denying that the drawer had authority to draw such bill and to endorse it. But beyond special rules thus enacted, there is no reason whatever, for holding that the ordinary principles of substantive law or the rules of evidence will not govern claims relating to negotiable instruments, especially where they arise not between the promisor and the promisee or the drawer and the drawee but between the promisee or drawee on the one hand and a third person on the other.

4. It has often been recognised that a plea of benami is only a plea in the nature of resulting trust and there is nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act which justifies a payee, who is in the position of a trustee, insisting that the beneficiary should be precluded from proving that he is only a trustee. The observations in Harikishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chaudhury (1930) I.L.R. 52 Cal. 752 that the 'property' in the note is only in the person named as payee, does not affect this question at all. It is unnecessary in this case to express an opinion upon the conflict of views as to whether a person claiming to be the real owner, though not named as payee in a promissory note, can under any circumstances maintain a suit on the note against the promisor. Cf. Surajman Prasad Misra v. Sadanand Misra (1932) I.L.R. 11 Pat. 616, Ramalinga Prasad v. Bishwanath Prasad A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 85 and Sewa Ram v. Hoti Lal (1930) I.L.R. 53 All. 5, and again Harikishore Barna v. Guru Mia Chaudhury (1930) I.L.R. 58 cal. 751. The present suit is not really a suit of that kind.

5. The analogy of the provisions of the trusts act clearly goes to show that a suit for a declaration that a person is only in the position of a trustee towards the plaintiffs, will lie even in the case of negotiable instruments. Section 63 of the Trusts Act contains a general provision that where trust property comes into the hands of a third person inconsistently with the trust, the beneficiary may require him to admit formally or may institute a suit for a declaration that the property is comprised in the trust. Section 64 enacts certain' exceptions to this rule, and in so doing, refers specifically to negotiable instruments; and the exception in respect of negotiable instruments is confined to cases where the instrument is in the hands of a bona fide holder to whom it has passed in circulation. This clearly implies that if the transferee, even of a negotiable instrument from a trustee is not a bona fide holder, the beneficiary is entitled to call upon him to admit that he is only a trustee or sue for a declaration to that effect. It may be that even upon getting a declaration to this effect, the beneficiary will not directly be able to sue upon the promissory note; but that does not mean that a declaration of this kind will be futile. Under other provisions of the trusts act, the beneficiary can sue for the execution of the trust by compelling the trustee to take the necessary steps and have a Receiver appointed in the course of such proceedings so that the Receiver may sue for the debt, or the beneficiary may also insist upon the trustee conveying the legal title to himself and after such transfer there will be no difficulty in his suing upon the promissory note in his own name Cf. Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67 at 78, Sharpe v. San Paulo Railway CO. (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 597 at 610 and Ex parte Kearsley In re Genese (1886) L.R. 17 Q.B.D. 1 at 37. The Trusts Act also recognises that the right of the beneficiary is capable of being transferred and that the transferee will have all the rights of the beneficiary as against the trustee. (Cf. Sections 56, 58, 61 and 69 of the Trusts Act.)

6. That the Negotiable Instruments Act should be understood with due regard to its scope and purpose and be not interpreted as affecting other branches or rules of law, has generally been recognised in this Court and even in suits upon Negotiable instruments rights and liabilities arising out of the debt which the negotiable instruments relate, have in several instances been permitted to be enforced. The stricter view which Davies, J. was inclined to take in his dissenting Judgment in Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 597 has not been followed. This again is a further indication that, except to the extent necessarily implied by the special provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the operation of other rules of law is not to be excluded Shanmuganatha Chettiar v. Srinivasa Aiyar (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 727 : 31 M.L.J. 135, Gopala Pillai v. Kothandarama Aiyar A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 529, Ramanathan Chetti v. Katha Velan (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 353 : 33 M.L.J. 627 and Subramania Aiyar v. Subban Chettiar (1924) 21 L.W. 696. The present case itself affords an illustration of the deplorable consequences that must follow from any other view; because, if the fourth respondent's contention is right, any judgment-debtor can practically defeat his creditors by lending his moneys to others and taking promissory notes in the names of his friends; and a decree-holder will have no means of getting at the funds thus lent. In answer to repeated questions from us, the fourth respondent's learned Counsel could only say that even a hardship of that kind ought not to induce us to lay down bad law. We are unable to believe that such was the policy of the Negotiable Instruments Act and there is no specific provision in the Act itself which compels us to accede to such a contention.

7. As regards attachability, the matter seems to us to be placed beyond all doubt by the language of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code, Clause 1 of which specifically refers to the attachments of bills of exchange and promissory notes and the concluding words are

"whether the same be held in the name of the judgment-debtor or by any other person in trust for him or on his behalf"
. There is nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act which must be understood as practically making these concluding words meaningless in the case of attachment of negotiable instruments. It was asked (on behalf of the Respondent) what course could the attaching decree-holder adopt on the strength of an attachment in such cases and reference was made to a judgment of Curgenven, J., in Somu Naidu v. Sanyasayya (1934) 39 L.W. 520 as showing that even if the promissory note should be attached and brought to sale in the present case and an endorsement obtained from Court, the Court-auction-purchaser will not be entitled to sue the promisor for the money. The judgment in that case has only proceeded Upon a consideration of the endorsement to be made by the executing Court and has not noticed the bearing of the provisions of the trusts act under which the purchaser of the beneficiaries' interest could call upon the trustee to convey the legal title to him. A similar situation was well known to the English Law under which, prior to the Judicature Act, an assignee of a 'chose in action' could not maintain a suit for money in his own name and the Court of Chancery met the situation by compelling the assignor to allow his name to be used in actions at law, on an indemnity against costs. We need not say more about that question in the present case, because by reason of events which have happened during the pendency of the second appeal, the question of suing on the promissory note is not material to the present case.

8. We have been informed that, during the pendency of the second appeal, the fourth defendant has sued upon the promissory note and obtained a decree. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss what the proper procedure will be if the promissory note should still remain outstanding and the auction-purchaser of the beneficiaries' interest is to realise the money from the promisor. On account of this course of events, we have also permitted the appellants to amend paragraph 12(a) of their plaint by adding the words "debt due under" before the words "promissory note, dated 23rd December, 1924". We see no objection in law to their getting a declaration 'in terms of paragraph (a) of the plaint as now amended, if they are able to prove the necessary allegations of fact. The prayer in' paragraph 12 (b) has now become unnecessary.

9. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and send the case back to the Court of First Instance, for trial on the merits. Costs in this and in the lower appellate Court will abide the result of the suit. The plaintiffs will be entitled to refund of Court-fee paid on the Memorandum of Appeal both here and in the lower Appellate Court.