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Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion arises from a Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal that was initially heard by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. and Moore, JJ., who referred a question to a Full Bench. The underlying decree was passed in January 1895, described as a mortgage-decree directing sale of mortgaged properties if they were not redeemed within three months, and also containing a contingent personal decree against the first defendant and liability of family properties for any balance. An order absolute for sale was passed on 11 April 1900; the mortgaged properties were sold on 3 May 1901 and the sale was confirmed on 12 July 1901.
An execution petition out of which the present appeal arose was filed on 14 November 1912. The primary procedural question was whether that execution petition was barred by the twelve-year limitation period specified in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Where a mortgage-decree for sale also includes a provisional personal decree for recovery of any balance from the judgment-debtor's other properties (contingent on the sale-proceeds of the mortgaged properties being insufficient), from what date is the twelve years' period mentioned in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be calculated when an application is made to enforce the decree for the balance against the judgment-debtor's other properties?
- Whether section 48(1)(b) (which speaks of payment or delivery at a "certain date") applies to such composite mortgage-decrees where the personal remedy is contingent on a later ascertainable event (sale and confirmation of sale proceeds).
- Whether the phrase "the date of the decree sought to be executed" in section 48(a) refers to (a) the date on the face of the decree, or (b) the date when the particular relief sought becomes capable of execution (i.e., when the decree becomes executable as to that relief).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants' vakil (G.S. Ramachandra Ayyar) suggested that the construction of section 48 was not necessary to decide the present case because an earlier execution application in 1910 had already been held not to be barred when limitation was calculated from July 1901; the implication being that the present execution petition would likewise be in time. This was put forward as a contention relating to res judicata and the prior proceedings.
- Counsel for the appellants also invoked the effect of res judicata in relation to the 1910 decision, arguing the earlier decision on the question should govern; the bench recorded that such a question of law in one proceeding is not res judicata in a later proceeding except insofar as the right established as the object-matter cannot be questioned later (citing Mangalathammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar and Palaniappa Chettiar v. Savari Naidoo).
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents' learned vakil contended that the decree was executable at once against the person of the first defendant for the whole amount decreed (i.e., that the personal remedy was immediately available), and relied upon Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji in support of that construction.
- More generally, the respondents maintained that limitation should be calculated from the date of the decree itself (the face date), which would bar later execution applications such as the one filed in November 1912 if counted from January 1895.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Varadiah v. Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal | Referenced to support the view that the decree was not intended to be executable at once against the person of the first defendant. | Referred to by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. to show the decree should not be construed as giving an immediate personal remedy for the whole amount. |
| Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind | Holds that where a decree is not capable of execution at once, the date for limitation is when the decree becomes executable. | Considered analogous to the present case; the Full Bench (majority) endorsed this approach as correctly interpreting the date from which limitation should run. |
| Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu | Incidentally considered a similar construction point; the judge was inclined to follow Narhar Raghunath but a final opinion was not expressed there. | Referred to in the discussion of Narhar Raghunath; noted as an instance where the point was considered but not finally decided. |
| Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan | Analogy under old Article 179 (Limitation Act 1877) that date of decree must be the date when the decree can be executed. | Referred to in support of the Bombay High Court position; noted by the Court in surveying conflicting authorities. |
| Mangalathammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar | Authority concerning the limited scope of res judicata regarding questions of law between proceedings. | Cited by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in rejecting the appellants' contention that the prior 1910 decision on construction operated as res judicata for the present application. |
| Palaniappa Chettiar v. Savari Naidoo | Also cited on the limited effect of res judicata. | Used alongside Mangalathammal to explain res judicata limits. |
| Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji | Held that time for limitation runs from the date on the face of the decree (i.e., the decree date), even if part of the decree only becomes executable later. | Relied upon by respondents; ultimately the Full Bench majority stated that so far as this point is concerned Venkata Perumal must be overruled. |
| Dinabandhu v. Mashuda | Holds that a combined decree providing for sale and for recovery of any balance is valid between the parties despite not strictly conforming to the Transfer of Property Act. | Accepted as authority that combined decrees, though irregular, are binding; used to explain historical practice and competency of courts to pass such decrees. |
| Periyasami Kone v. Muthia Chettiar | Holds that in such composite decree cases it is not necessary to obtain another separate decree or order under section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act after exhausting the mortgaged property. | Relied upon to show that no further decree was necessary after sale of hypothecated property in the common practice. |
| Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar | States that a decree leaving matters to be subsequently ascertained becomes capable of execution as to them only when they are ascertained. | Adopted by the Full Bench majority as supporting the view that limitation runs from ascertainment of the balance. |
| Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter | Held that time for the whole of the decree may begin only from the ascertainment of the amount left undetermined. | Referred to as authority taking an even wider view; the majority cited it but did not express a final opinion on that broader holding. |
| Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company, Limited | Expressed the opposite view that the date of the decree on its face governs limitation. | Phillips, J. relied on this (and Venkata Perumal) in arguing for a strict construction that limitation runs from the decree date on the face of the document. |
| Kommachi Kather v. Pakker | Held that only on ascertainment of the deficit does the decree become executable. | Cited by Seshagiri Ayyar, J. to support the view that the personal remedy is contingent and becomes executable only upon ascertainment of deficit. |
| Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar | Observations that any application to execute the personal decree before the hypotheca is sold will not be in accordance with law. | Used to show that premature execution applications are not proper steps in aid of execution. |
| Sadho Singh v. The Maharaja of Benares | Authority referenced for the principle that certain premature applications should not be entertained. | Referred to alongside Periyasami Kone as authority discouraging execution applications prior to ascertainment of proceeds. |
| Sabhanatha v. Lakshmi | Case on limitation in respect of a decree for annual payments (maintenance) showing execution can be barred. | Referred to by Phillips, J. in surveying cases where limitation ran and barred execution of recurring-payment decrees. |
| Yusuf v. Sirdar | Also a case regarding limitation in recurring-payment/maintenance contexts. | Referred to by Phillips, J. in the review of conflicting authorities under limitation law. |
| Ashfaq Husain v. Gauri Sahai (Privy Council) | Held that where there were separate decrees, the period of limitation might begin from the date of a subsequent decree against a particular defendant. | Referred to by Phillips, J. to show instances where limitation did not run from the original decree date for all parties or parts. |
| Viraraghava Ayyangar v. Pannammal | Referred to for the proposition that a decree must be treated as a whole (in limitation context). | Used by Phillips, J. in discussing the difficulty of attributing different commencement dates of limitation to different parts of a single decree. |
| Shevdas Daulatram v. Narayen | Referred to in relation to the interpretative principle allowing avoidance of absurdity in statutory construction. | Cited by Seshagiri Ayyar, J. as part of the jurisprudential basis for construing section 48 so as to avoid absurd results. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench considered the nature of the composite mortgage-decree, the text of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and conflicting authorities on whether limitation runs from the date on the face of the decree or from the later date when the particular relief sought becomes executable. The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps (as reflected in the opinions recorded):
- Character of the decree: The decree was a combined mortgage-decree (sale of mortgaged properties if not redeemed) together with a contingent personal decree for any balance. The Court acknowledged this combined form was a common but irregular practice; prior authorities (e.g., Dinabandhu v. Mashuda) established such combined decrees are binding between the parties and that a separate order under s.90 Transfer of Property Act need not be obtained after sale (Periyasami Kone).
- Applicability of section 48(b): The Bench examined whether clause (b) (which applies where payment is directed at a "certain date" or recurring periods and measures limitation from the date of default) could cover the present case. The majority (Abdur Rahim, Seshagiri Ayyar) and the reasoning recorded by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. held clause (b) did not properly apply because the decree did not fix a "certain date" for payment — the personal remedy depended on a contingency (sale and ascertainment of proceeds).
-
Interpretation of "date of the decree sought to be executed" in s.48(a): The core dispute was whether the phrase means the date on the face of the decree or the date when the particular relief becomes capable of execution.
- Majority view (Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J.; Seshagiri Ayyar, J.; and Sadasiva Ayyar in the Order of Reference): the legislature's wording "the date of the decree sought to be executed" contemplates reference to the time when the specific part of the decree sought to be executed becomes executable. The majority relied on established principles of statutory interpretation to avoid absurdity — if limitation were to run from the face date in cases where a relief is contingent (e.g., sums payable on a future marriage), the decree-holder could be deprived of any remedy. The majority treated distinct reliefs in a single decree as, for the purposes of execution, effectively separate adjudications and concluded limitation runs from the date when the particular relief becomes ripe for execution (i.e., when the balance is ascertained after sale of the mortgaged property).
- Support from authorities: The majority relied on earlier decisions such as Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar and Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind (holding that limitation begins when the decree becomes executable or when the amount is ascertained), and considered Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter as supportive of the same approach.
- Dissenting view (Phillips, J.): While acknowledging clause (b) did not apply, Phillips, J. favoured a stricter construction that the date of the decree (the single date a decree bears) is the datum from which twelve years must be calculated. He emphasized the clear words of s.48(a), the legislative purpose of fixing a maximum twelve-year period, and the difficulty of attributing different commencement dates of limitation within a single decree. Phillips, J. preferred earlier decisions taking the face-date approach (Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji and Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company) and would have held the period begins from the date of the decree as drawn up.
- Conclusion on the reference question: The majority concluded that limitation under section 48 runs from the date when, after remedies against the mortgaged property have been exhausted, it is ascertained that a balance remains due to be recovered from the defendant and his other properties. In other words, the twelve-year period is to be calculated from the date the particular personal remedy becomes executable (ascertainment of deficit), not necessarily from the decree's face date.
- Treatment of conflicting authorities: The majority expressly overruled Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji so far as it held that limitation must be calculated from the face date in such cases, and preferred the line of authorities (including Narhar Raghunath and Ratnachalam Ayyar) that treat ascertainment of the amount as the starting point for limitation where parts of a decree become separately executable at later dates.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the following terms: the period of limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure runs from the date when, after the remedy against the mortgaged property has been exhausted, it is ascertained that there is a balance due to be recovered from the defendant and his other properties.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: For composite mortgage-decrees of the kind in this case, an application to execute the contingent personal remedy will not be barred provided it is presented within twelve years from the date when the balance is ascertained (i.e., from the date the personal remedy becomes executable). The Court therefore endorsed calculating limitation from the ascertainment date rather than necessarily from the face date of the decree.
- Precedential effect: The Full Bench majority explicitly stated that the decision in Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji should be overruled insofar as it held that limitation under section 48 must be computed from the face date of a composite decree even when a portion of the decree is not capable of execution until a later ascertainable date.
- Dissent: The judgment was not unanimous. Phillips, J. dissented on the key point and would have preferred a strict construction holding that limitation runs from the date borne by the decree (the face date), following decisions such as Venkata Perumal and Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company, Limited.
- Practical consequence: The ruling recognizes that where a decree grants relief enforceable at different times (some immediate, some contingent), limitation for enforcement of a particular contingent relief begins when that relief becomes capable of execution; this avoids depriving decree-holders of remedies that only become actionable after events outside their control (e.g., sale and confirmation of sale-proceeds).
Note: This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No facts, holdings, or implications beyond those expressly stated in the opinion have been added.
This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal came on for hearing in the first instance before Sadasiva Ayyar, J. and Moore, JJ., who made the following Orders of Reference to a Full Bench:—
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— The plaintiff is the first appellant. The decree was passed so long ago as in January, 1895. The execution petition out of which this appeal arose was filed on the 14th November, 1912. The question is whether it is barred by the twelve years' period mentioned in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The decree, as I construe it, is a mortgage-decree directing sale of the mortgaged properties, if they are not redeemed within three months by payment of the decree amount. It is also a personal decree against the first defendant and a decree realizable by the attachment and sale of the family properties of the defendants for any balance which might be left after the mortgaged properties are sold. Instead of postponing the passing of the personal decree till after the mortgaged properties are sold and the price fetched at the sale is ascertained to be inadequate to satisfy the amount due to the mortgagee, a personal decree contingent on the mortgaged properties not fetching the whole of the decree amount was passed at once on the 16th January, 1895, according to the old practice in the mufassal. I do not think that, as contended by the respondents, a decree executable at once against the person of the first defendant for the whole amount decreed was intended to be passed, that is, executable even before the mortgaged properties were brought to sale: see Varadiah v. Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal(1).
An order absolute for sale was passed on the 11th April, 1900. The passing of an order absolute was made in execution under the old Civil Procedure Code and did not mean the passing of a final decree (according to the decisions of this Court). In accordance with the order absolute, the mortgaged properties were sold on the 3rd May, 1901 and the sale was confirmed on the 12th July, 1901 and the right to proceed against the person of the first defendant and against the family properties of the defendants granted by the decree of 16th January, 1895 became ripe on there being an unsatisfied balance out of the decree amount after the gale of the mortgaged properties.
If the twelve years' period mentioned in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure be calculated either from the date of the combined decree of 1895, or the date of the order absolute for sale, April, 1900, the present execution petition of November, 1912 is clearly barred. If, however, it is calculated from July, 1901 when alone the decree-holder's right under the decree to proceed against the person of the first defendant and the other properties of the defendants could be, for the first time, enforced, then the execution petition is not barred by limitation.
As I have held that the decree did not give a right to proceed against the person and other properties for the decree amount at once on the date of the passing of the decree and as no “certain” date was fixed for the accruing of that right to the decree-holder, it is arguable that section 48(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits any fresh application for execution after the expiration of twelve years from the date of default in making a payment which is directed by the decree to be made at a “certain date” does not apply to this case. The data on which the decree directs the balance to be paid, in default of which execution can proceed against other properties, is the data of the confirmation of a future sale of the mortgaged properties, the latter date depending on when the decree-holder applies for sale of the mortgaged properties and when the proceedings for sale become ripe and when the Court fixes the date for sale, etc. But it can so be made certain by the decree-holder bringing the mortgaged properties to sale and may we not apply the doctrine that is certain which can be rendered certain? In Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind, it was held that section 43, clause 1(a), itself must be interpreted as meaning
“the data of the decree sought to be executed if the decree is capable of execution at once or, if the decree is not capable of execution at once, the data when the decree becomes executable.”
I have incidentally considered this decision in my judgment in Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu(2). Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind is, in respect of the material facts analogous to the present case. There a decree passed in 1892 became for the first time capable of execution in 1908 in respect of the personal remedy given to the plaintiffs in the fourth part of that decree. Until 1908 the decree in respect of that part of the remedy was merely ancillary and provisional. It was held that the twelve years' period mentioned in section 48 must be calculated from 1908 when only that part of the decree became capable of execution. Though I was inclined to follow Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind in my judgment in Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu, it was unnecessary to express a final opinion on that point for the purpose of that decision, Mr. Justice Napier who took part with me in the decision in Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu, expressed still greater doubts than myself as regards the correctness of the construction of section 48 in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind, and of the construction of article 182, old article 179, in Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan, the analogy of which decision was relied on in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind.
Mr. G.S Ramachandra Ayyar suggested that the decision as to the construction of section 48 is not necessary is this case because it had been held in a prior execution application of 1910 that application was not birred as the twelve years should be calculated only from, July, 1901. But as the applicability of the bar by section 48 to the present execution application does not necessarily depend upon the former application of 1910 being barred, in other words, as this application need not necessarily be within time if the formar application of 1910 is held to be within time, I do not think that there is anything in the contention of the appellants' vakil on this question of res judicata, the decision on a question of law in one proceeding not being res judicata in any later proceeding except to this extent, namely, that the right which was she object-matter of the former proceeding and was established in favour of one party cannot be questioned in the subsequent proceeding: see Mangalathammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar(3) and Palaniappa Chettiar v. Savari Naidoo(4).
Returning then to the main question, Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji(5) was quoted by the respondents' learned vakil as in his favour. The decree in that case was construed by the District Judge (see his “finding”) as a decree granting coly a provisional personal remedy, provisional on the sale of the mortgaged property not fetching the full decree amount. But it does not appear that the learned Judges of this Court (Oldfield and Tyabji, JJ.) accepted that finding as the following sentence occurs in their judgment:
“We think it sufficient that the decree before us was never at any time, after it was passed, inexecutable.”
But they also state that
“It did not provide for the payment of any money by defendant on a certain date,”
thus showing that on the date of the decree, the mortgagor was not made liable at once to pay personally the whole decree amount, Anyhow, I have been unable to fully understand the reasoning of the judgment in that case. Narhar Raghunath v. Kishnaji Govind is referred to in the judgment as also Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu but no dissent is expressed from Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind. I think that even if the words of section 48, clause (1)(a) cannot be extended as held by the Bombay High Court in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govindi so as to include the later date when a decree becomes executable, the decision therein can be supported on the ground that the words “certain date” in clause (1)(b) might be made to include the future date which as rendered certain by proceedings and facts ordinarily expected to take place. For instance, let us take a case where a compromise decree is passed making a certain sum payable to a minor girl on her marriage, the minor being six years old on the date of the decree. Supposing that the marriage takes place when she attains her nineteenth year more than twelve years after the decree—Is section 48 to be treated as a bar to execution because the date of her marriage was not “certain” in the ordinary sense on the date of the decree?
I would therefore refer for a decision of a Full Bench the following question:—
Where a mortgage-decree for sale includes also a provisional decree for recovery of any balance from the other properties of the mortgagor in case the sale-proceeds of the mortgaged properties are found insufficient to satisfy the entire decree amount and where the mortgaged properties are afterwards soli and the sale-proceeds are found insufficient, from what date is the twelve years' period mentioned in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be calculated where an application is made to enforce the decree for the balance against the judgment debtor's other properties?
Moore, J.:— The decree in this case is similar in its terms to the decree which the learned Judges had to construe in Venkata Perumal v. Frayag Dassji which is against the appellants.
The decree directs first the sale of the mortgaged properties in default of payment of the decree amount within three months and that the first defendant personally and the common family properties of the defendants shall be liable for any balance not obtained by the decree. The decree was not, I think, executable against first defendant personally and the family properties until after the sale of the mortgaged properties had taken place. In fact, as my learned brother has pointed out, the right to proceed against first defendant personally and the family properties of the defendants was contingent on there being an unsatisfied balance out of the decree amount after the sale of the mortgaged properties. Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind is referred to but not expressly dissented from in Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji and I confess that I have found some difficulty in following the reasoning of the judgment in the latter case.
The learned Judges (Oldfield and Tyabji, JJ.) observe that authority is unsettled as to the portion of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to such a decree, and go on to say:
“that the decree before us was never at any time inexecutable, and that it did not provide for the payment of any money by the defendant on a certain date.”
The effect of the decision appears to be that in the opinion of the learned Judges the period of twelve years' limitation in that particular case must be calculated from the date of the decree and not from the date when the sale-proceeds of the mortgaged properties prove insufficient and the balance is ascertained.
In Venkatamma v. Manikyam Nayani Varu my learned brother was inclined to follow Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind while Napier, J., doubted the correctness of the decision.
I accordingly agree in the question which my learned brother proposes to refer to a Full Bench.
On this Reference—
A.V Viswanatha Sastriyar for G.S Ramachandra Ayyar for the appellants.
S. Muthiah Mudaliyar for the respondents.
This case again cooling on for hearing before the Full Bench, the Court expressed the following Opinions:—
Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J:— The answer to the question referred to the Full Bench should be that the period of limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure runs from the date when, after the remedy against the mortgaged property has been exhausted, it is ascertained that there is a balance due to be recovered from the defendant and his other properties. The decree in this case was passed before the present Code of Civil Procedure came into operation, and under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Properly speaking, there should have been first a decree for sale of the mortgaged properties, and if the mortgaged properties were found insufficient, a separate decree or order should than have been made for realization of the balance from the person and other properties of the judgment-debtor. But there was a very prevalent practice in the mufassal Courts to draw up one decree providing for the sale of the mortgaged property and if the sale-proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the decree, for recovery of the balance from the other properties of the mortgagor. A combined decree like this, though irregular, has been held to be within the competency of the Court and binding on the parties; see Dinabandhu v. Mashuda. It has farther been ruled that in such cases, it is not necessary to obtain another separate decree or order under section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act: see Periyasami Kone v. Muthia Chettiar.
That was the state of law, when section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now provides the limit of time for execution was enacted. It is in these words:
“Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from—(a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.”
I am not prepared to hold that clause (b) applies to decrees like the one under consideration, for they cannot be said to direct payment or delivery of property at a “certain” date. For that clause to apply, the date should be fixed in the decree or at least should be ascertainable from its terms. We have not been referred to any authority for applying the maxim “whatever can be made certain is to be treated as certain” to the construction of a statute of limitation and I am not aware of any.
I think however the case falls under clause (a). There is no good reason for holding that the date of the decree sought to be executed must necessarily be the date put down at the time it was drawn up. The legislature by using the qualifying words “sought to be executed” seems to me to have indicated that the data is to be ascertained with reference to the time when the decree becomes capable of execution. Otherwise, there are cases in which, if time were to be reckoned from the date when the judgment is pronounced, which, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (Order XX, rule 7), is the date which the decree must bear, the result would be that the decree-holder would not be able to execute the decree at all; for instance, where a decree directs something to be done upon a certain contingency, such as in the case mentioned by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., where a decree for partition provides for an amount to be spent for the marriage of a girl belonging to a Hindu family in the event of and when the marriage takes place. A decree may give more that one relief, some of them may be enforceable at once and some can only be enforced at future dates either fixed in the decree or depending on the happening of a particular event. A decree is defined as
“the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit.”
When the reliefs given in respect of those rights are distinct and enforceable at different periods of time, then for purposes of execution, there is in fact, more than one decree though embodied in one document. In such cases, it is only reasonable to hold that the date of the decree sought to be executed within the meaning of section 48, clause (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, may not be what it bears on its face. It is the date when the particular adjudication sought to be enforced becomes ripe for execution according to the terms of the decree.
This is the view of the law adopted in Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar, and in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind. In Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter, the learned Judges seem to have gone even further, holding that in cases of this class, time begins to run for the whole of the decree only from the time of the ascertainment of the amount left undetermined. But I do not wish to express any decided opinion as to whether this is correct. The opposite view was expressed in Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company, Limited and by this Court in Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji where it was held that time must be calculated from the date which the decree bears on the face of it, and it makes no difference whether that part of the decree which is sought to be executed did not become capable of being enforced until afterwards. For the reason which I have given, I am of opinion that the ruling in Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar and Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind is correct and the case reported in Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji so far as this point is concerned must be overruled.
The answer will be as proposed by Seshagiri Ayyar, J., and myself.
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— I am of the same opinion. The decree in this case was passed in January, 1895. Its terms are:
“that the defendants do pay to the plaintiff the suit amount with costs and with interest on the suit amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the plaint till the date of realization of the amount within three months from this date, that in default the mortgaged properties shall be sold by public auction and if there be balance even after that, it shall be recovered by the plaintiff from the first defendant and the common family properties of both the defendants”.
Even under the Transfer of Property Act, the decree for the balance ought to have been passed only on ascertaining the amount remaining due after the sale of the hypotheca. Nona the less, the loose practice of passing a combined decree for sale as well as for the recovery of the balance in case the sale-proceeds resulted in a deficit, was generally prevalent. The new Code of Civil Procedure by making section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act part of the procedure to be followed in the framing of decrees has drawn pointed attention to what a mortgage-decree should contain at the outset, and when the personal decree for the balance should be passed. It was held by Mookerji, J., in Dinabandhu v. Mashuda, that a composite decree like the present one,
“though not strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, is a good and valid decree as between the parties thereto.”
It has also been held that in the case of such decrees it is not necessary to apply for a further order under section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, after exhausting the mortgaged properties: Sadho Singh v. The Maharaja of Benares and Periyasami Kone v. Muthia Chettiar.
If the decree is binding on the parties, and if it is executable without a further application for granting a personal decree, the next question is when does it become executable. In Kommachi Kather v. Pakker it was held by this Court that it is only on the ascertainment of the deficit that the decree is executable. The observations of Banerji and Richards, JJ., in Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar show that any application to execute the personal decree before the hypotheca is sold will not be in accordance with law, and will not be regarded as a step in aid of execution. Periyasami Kone v. Muthia Chettiar speaks of such an application as one which the Courts should never entertain.
Now comes the crucial question whether under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, time begins to run against the decree-holder from the date of the composite decree or only from the date when it becomes executable against the person and the other properties of the judgment-debtor. If the parties are bound by the terms of the decree, and if it cannot be given effect to until the happening of a contemplated contingency, limitation cannot be said to run against the party seeking to enforce his rights until he is in a position to avail himself of the advantage. The essence of the law of limitation is to provide against dilatoriness and negligence in the enforcement of a man's rights. But where the party is unable to seek his remedies, it cannot be said that he has failed to avail himself of the cause of action that has accrued to him.
It is true that under section 48, the twelve years' period runs from the data of the decree sought to be executed. As pointed out by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in the Order of Reference, the literal construction of this section would render nugatory clauses in partition decrees directing payment of sums of money for marriages, etc., on the performance of the ceremonies. Ex facie such sums would not be recoverable at once; for the contingency may never happen. Consequently, if the twelve years are to be reckoned from the date of the decree, the party in very many cases will be without a remedy.
It is a well-recognized principle of jurisprudence that
“where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, page 344.
It is on this principle I take it, that the decision of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in Shevdas Daulatram v. Narayen proceeds. Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter and Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar lay down that notwithstanding the date of the decree, it becomes executable so as to invite limitation against the party not able to seek relief at once, only when the decree is capable of execution and not before. The learned Judges who decided Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji have taken a different view, and they are supported by Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company, Limited. The course of decisions in this Presidency is the other way. I would, therefore, overrule Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji and answer the reference by saying that limitation began to run in the case of the decree under execution only when the balance was ascertained.
Phillips, J.:— This reference has arisen from the fact that the question referred has been answered in two different ways, in one way by this Court is Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji and in another way by the Bombay High Court in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind. The Bombay High Court has held that the date from which the limitation is to run is the date when the decree became in all its parts ripe for execution, that is to say, when the personal remedy became available to the decree-holder, In Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji. Oldfield and Tyabji, JJ., have held that the period of limitation must run from the date of the decree. The decision of the Bombay High Court is supported by a decision in Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan where it was held that, under article 179 of the Limitation Act of 1877, the date of the decree from which the three years' limitation is to run must necessarily apply only where there is a decree or order which can at its date be executed. In Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter it was held:
“For the purposes of limitation regarding execution of a decree the decree must be taken as a whole and ordinarily when a portion of the decree is not executable by reason of the fact that the amount due under that portion is left to be determined at a future time, limitation begins to run as regards execution of the whole decree only from the time of ascertainment of the amount left undetermined, even though it might have been open to the party to have executed the other portions earlier.”
These two cases did not raise a question under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under the Limitation Act, and they are not direct authority for the present case. In Sabhanatha v. Lakshmi in the case of a decree for payment of a certain sum annually as maintenance, it was held that execution was barred by limitation when the application was put in more than three years from the previous application, and similarly in Yusuf v. Sirdar(6). In Ratnachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar(7) it was also held:
“A decree which leaves matters to be subsequently ascertained becomes capable of execution as to them only when they are ascertained; and an application for execution will not be barred if presented within three years of the time when, by such matters being settled, it becomes executable.”
The authorities are clearly conflicting, and I think we must turn to the section for determining what is the correct interpretation of it.
section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down:
“Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or, (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made aft a certain data or aft recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.”
It is suggested by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in his order of reference, that, possibly, clause (b) might cover the present case
“on the ground that the words ‘certain date’ might be made to include the future date which is rendered certain by proceedings and facts ordinarily expected to take place.”
But, with all deference, it appears to me that, in the present case, there is no decree for payment at a certain date because the decree provides firstly for the sale of the mortgaged properties, and it is only in case the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to extinguish the debt that any necessity arises for payment under the personal decree, and it can hardly be said, when it is not even certain that any payment will have to be made, that it orders payment at a certain date. In this view, clause (b) is not applicable to the present case, and the application would be barred unless it is in time under clause (a). Under clause (a), we have to compute the period from the date of the decree sought to be executed. The words, in themselves, are very clear, for a decree can only bear one date, but the matter has been somewhat complicated by the rulings to which I have referred above, that similar words in the schedule to the Limitation Act are to be modified by reading into the words “the date of the decree” the words “the date when the decree becomes executable.” This addition to the words of the statute has, it appears to me, been suggested in order to avoid hardship and to give a reasonable meaning to the words contained in the statute. A similar addition may be read into section 48(a) but this is no authority for going even further. The Legislature has laid down a period of twelve years as the maximum period within which a decree can be executed (save in the case of fraud) and presumably this period has been fixed with a view to avoid a prolonged harassing of the judgment-debtor, and consequently I think the section must be strictly construed. Assuming that “the date of the decree” means “the date when the decree becomes executable,” I can see no reason for adding the words “and any subsequent date on which a further relief is granted” more especially when the decree is one which ought not to have been passed in its present form. The trouble in this case has arisen from the fact that the decree is erroneous. The decree for the sale of the mortgaged properties should first haver been made, and subsequently a personal decree given for any balance outstanding. It would have been open to the decree-holder to have the decree amended by omitting the personal decree. In that case, if a personal decree had been subsequently given, twelve years' time would have run from the date of that decree. It has been held that a decree must be treated as a whole: vide, Vydianatha Aiyar v. Subramania Patter and Viraraghava Ayyangar v. Pannammal. In Ashfaq Husain v. Gauri Sahai it was even held by the Privy Council that, where there were two decrees, one against several defendants and a subsequent decree against another defendant who had been ex parte at the first hearing, the period of limitation did not begin to run until the date of the subsequent decree against this one defendant. These cases are authority for holding that there can be only one date from which limitation is to proceed. What is suggested should be done in the present case is that limitation as regards one part of the decree should run from the date of the decree, and as regards another part of it, from the date when that portion becomes ripe for its execution. If, however, there is only one date from which limitation begins to run, it does not appear to me possible to construe this one decree as having two separate dates for the commencement of limitation. There is nothing in the words of section 48, clause (a), to support this theory, unless one can read something into that section which is not there. In consequence of the law having been laid down to that effect, I would prefer to interpret the words as they stand, and would hold that the data of the decree must be one date alone and from that date twelve years must be calculated. It is the view taken in Venkata Perumal v. Prayag Dassji by a Bench of this Court and also by the Calcutta High Court in Jnanendranath Bose v. Khulna Loan Company, Limited and I would prefer to follow these decisions rather than the one in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind. In this view, in answer to the question referred, I would hold that the data mentioned in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the data of the decree and not the date when the sale-proceeds of the mortgaged properties had been found to be insufficient to satisfy the decree.
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