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Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Ramaswami

Madras High Court
Mar 21, 1933
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to eject the defendant from a disputed site (plot C) and to remove a pial erected by the defendant. The defendant's plea was that the land belonged to the Municipal Council and that the defendant had erected the pial with the Municipality's permission; accordingly the defendant contended that the Municipal Council was a necessary party to the suit. This objection was raised as issue No. 3 at trial and was repeated on appeal.

The trial Court (District Munsif) found that the plaintiff had "made out a better title to the suit lane than the Municipality" but the judgment "reads throughout as if it were a decision between the plaintiff and the Municipality." The lower appellate Court (Subordinate Judge) stated that "there is no proof" that the site was part of the Municipal lane. Both Courts ultimately decreed the suit in the plaintiff's favour.

The matter reached this Court on second appeal, the principal contention being that the Municipality was a necessary party and that the lower Courts erred in adjudicating title in the absence of the Municipality. The opinion also records factual details about ownership of adjoining house sites: the plaintiff owned sites A and A-1, the defendant site B, and plot C was the disputed lane. The defendant's (written) statement asserted that A, B and C originally belonged to a joint family and that the Municipality had long since acquired the suit land.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Municipal Council (Municipality) was a necessary party to the ejectment suit concerning the disputed lane (plot C).
  2. Whether the lower Courts erred in deciding questions of title in the absence of the Municipality and whether that non-joinder was fatal to the suit.
  3. Whether this Court could, under Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code, interfere with a decree on account of non-joinder of a party (i.e., whether misjoinder/non-joinder precludes interference on appeal where jurisdiction or the merits are affected).
  4. Whether the evidence available (receipts granted by the Municipality, testimony of the Municipal Town Surveyor, and facts about permissions to open gates/doorways) supported the view that the disputed site was a public lane.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendant (appellant) contended that the suit land belonged to the Municipality and that the pial was erected with the Municipality's permission; therefore the Municipality was a necessary party to the suit.
  • In support of the necessity to join the Municipality (and analogous authorities or persons with an interest), the appellant cited a number of precedents, notably Umed Mal v. Chand Mal (Privy Council), Haran Sheikh v. Ramesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee, Mahomed Israil v. J.P. Wise, and other authorities discussed in the opinion.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (plaintiff) asserted exclusive ownership of the disputed lane and maintained that it was unnecessary to implead the Municipality; the trial Court had accepted the plaintiff's exclusive claim in its issue No. 3 findings.
  • The respondent relied on a set of cases (as cited in the opinion) contending, by analogy or distinction, that the Municipality need not be a party — for example Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh, Kashi v. Sadashiv, Subramania v. Ananthakrishnaswami Naidu, and Poonit Singh v. Kamal Singh — and argued those authorities supported non-joinder or were distinguishable from the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Umed Mal v. Chand Mal (1926) L.R. 53 I.A. 271; I.L.R. 54 Cal. 338; 52 M.L.J. 368 (P.C.) Held that Lower Courts acted with material irregularity in deciding title to mortgaged property in the absence of the mortgagor; High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in revision under Section 115. The Court described the present case as stronger than Umed Mal and relied on it to support the proposition that a person with an interest (here, the Municipality) is a necessary party where title is to be decided in their absence.
Haran Sheikh v. Ramesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee (1920) 25 C.W.N. 249 Non-joinder of a person interested in the servient tenement was held a fatal defect; suit dismissed despite earlier overruling because no effective decree could be made without the interested party. Cited as authority that non-joinder can be fatal; Court noted the present case was stronger because the objection was taken from the start.
Mahomed Israil v. J.P. Wise (1874) 21 W.R. 327 Where Government had resumed lands or was otherwise interested, Government ought to be made a party to suits affecting rights in such lands. Quoted as supportive of making authorities a party; the Court noted one of five judges expressed no opinion and that the point was apparently not necessary for the earlier decision's determination.
Decision of Sundaram Chetty, J. in S.A. No. 1502 of 1927 (this Court) Objection for non-joinder of an alleged interested person (an adopted minor) was good; cited earlier authorities on non-joinder. Quoted by the Court; noted that although the Judge found non-joinder good, it did not result in setting aside the decree in that case because the matter was later adjudicated in another suit.
Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 753 Government (or authority) was a necessary party where tenure-holder's rights and obligations to Government affected the rights in dispute (e.g., Digwari tenure with public/service obligations). Used to illustrate instances where Government/authority must be joined; supported the Court's view that the Municipality could be a necessary party in appropriate circumstances.
Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh (1925) 23 L.W. 75 at 79 (P.C.) Discussed in relation to joinder; in that decision the person from whom the appellant claimed was made a defendant (Defendant 5). The Court found this authority quite irrelevant to the present facts and observed limits to its applicability, particularly regarding the nature of the jus tertii relied upon.
Kashi v. Sadashiv (1895) I.L.R. 21 Bom. 229 Held Government was not a necessary party in a peculiar case where both parties claimed under the Government (priority of title issue). The Court described the case as peculiar and of limited relevancy; it did not displace the principle that a necessary party must be joined where absence prevents an effective decree.
Subramania v. Ananthakrishnaswami Naidu (1932) 36 L.W. 378 Matter of landlord suing tenant under a lease; tenant estopped from disputing landlord's title under Section 116, Evidence Act. Cited by respondent but the Court regarded it as not directly relevant to the necessity-of-joinder question in the present ejectment between owner and alleged municipal interest.
Poonit Singh v. Kamal Singh A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 172 Decision on inclusion of a mortgagor; comparable to Umed Mal on the point of including mortgagors. The Court considered this single-Judge decision to be inconsistent with the Privy Council decision (Umed Mal) and said it must be held wrong in the light of the Privy Council authority.
Berkeley v. Dimery (1829) 109 E.R. 393 Principle that in ejectment the tenant in possession must be sued. Quoted (via Bullen & Leake) to state the fundamental rule that persons in physical possession should be defendants in ejectment actions.
Minet v. Johnson (1890) 63 L.T. 507 Where numerous persons occupy premises claiming title under the same lessor, the plaintiff may make that lessor defendant rather than joining all occupants. Used to explain a relaxed rule in cases of multiple occupants claiming under a common lessor; cited from Bullen & Leake's discussion.
Green v. Herring (1905) 1 K.B. 152 Similar principle to Minet v. Johnson concerning joinder where many persons claim under the same lessor. Cited as additional authority for the relaxed approach to joinder in cases of numerous occupants under a single lessor.
Yakkanath Eacharaunni Valia Kaimal v. Manakkat Vasunni Elaya Kaimal (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 436; 20 M.L.J. 344 Contains an obiter remark that 'misjoinder' in Section 99 might include non-joinder; discussed in relation to the scope of Section 99. The Court treated this remark as obiter and noted it had been noticed in later authority; the present Court did not accept that it settled the meaning of Section 99.
Mahabala Bhatta v. Kunhanna Bhatta (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 373; 8 M.L.J. 139 Decision under the old Code; discussed in relation to the meaning of misjoinder/non-joinder under the earlier provisions. The Court observed it was under the old Code and thus not authoritative as to the meaning of the present Section 99; could not be taken as settling the contemporary point.
Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Annamalai Mudaliar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 249 Commentary on Section 99 and whether misjoinder includes non-joinder; noted the Yakkanath case reference. Cited as part of the discussion on Section 99's scope and prior commentary; used to show judicial uncertainty on whether 'misjoinder' includes non-joinder.
Amichand Nagindas & Co. v. Raoji Bhai Moti Bhai Patel (1929) 58 M.L.J. 613 Held that Section 99 would not prevent the Court from interfering in appeal in a case of misjoinder if the Lower Court acted without jurisdiction. Relied on by the Court to show that Section 99 does not bar appellate interference where non-joinder/misjoinder results in the Lower Court acting without jurisdiction; supported intervention in the present appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the factual record and the law relating to necessary parties and joinder. Key elements of the Court's reasoning, drawn directly from the opinion, are:

  1. Evidence on Possession and Municipal Interest: The Court noted that there was evidence that supported the defendant's contention that the site was part of a public lane — specifically receipts granted to the defendant by the Municipality and the testimony of D.W.4, the Municipal Town Surveyor, who swore it was a public lane. The Court rejected the lower appellate Court's characterization that "there is no proof" as a misstatement if by "proof" it meant absence of evidence.
  2. Factual Context Concerning Titles: The plaintiff owned sites A and A-1 and had purchased A and A-1 recently (eight months earlier), whereas the defendant had held site B for twenty years. The defendant's written statement (as quoted) asserted that A, B and C had been treated as a joint lane by a joint family and that the Municipality had acquired the land long ago. The Court treated the defendant's contention that the Municipality acquired the land as the clear case for considering necessity of joinder.
  3. Precedential Analysis on Necessary Parties: The Court surveyed authorities (including Privy Council authority) which support the proposition that where an interested party's rights are directly affected — and where an effective decree cannot be made in their absence — that party must be joined. The Court relied on Umed Mal and related decisions to hold that the Municipality was a necessary party here.
  4. Section 99 and Appellate Review: The Court considered whether Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code precluded interference with the decree on account of non-joinder. It observed that prior remarks that 'misjoinder' includes 'non-joinder' were obiter and under the old Code, and referenced decisions (including Amichand Nagindas) holding that Section 99 does not prevent appellate interference where the Lower Court acted without jurisdiction. On that basis the Court concluded it could and should interfere.
  5. Errors in Lower Courts' Reasoning: The Court identified several legal and factual errors in the lower appellate Court's judgment that undermined its conclusions — notably: (a) the statement that there was "no proof" of municipal ownership, which the Court found incorrect given available evidence; (b) the Subordinate Judge's view that decisions of the Municipal Survey authorities were not res judicata (the Court held that surveys made under the Survey and Boundaries Act, if not challenged, do become res judicata); and (c) the Subordinate Judge's mistaken application of the requirement for municipal permission to open a gate, confusing the scope of Section 196 of the District Municipalities Act.
  6. On the Specific Point of Permission to Open a Gate/Doorway: The Court observed that Section 196 of the District Municipalities Act only requires permission for opening a gate into a public street. Therefore, if the plaintiff had obtained municipal permission to open a gate into site C, that fact would strongly indicate that C was a public street rather than private property — an admission fatal to the plaintiff's case. The Court found the Subordinate Judge's treatment of this matter to be a grave mistake of law affecting the decision.
  7. Conclusion from Law and Fact: Considering the evidence that the Municipality had an interest, the precedents on necessary parties, and errors in the lower Courts' treatments, the Court concluded that the Municipality was a necessary party and that the non-joinder (despite objection from the start) rendered the suit unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed; the suit is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the Municipality was a necessary party to the ejectment suit and that failure to join it, when objection was taken from the outset, was fatal to the suit. As a result the decree in favour of the plaintiff was set aside and the suit dismissed.
  • The Court identified material errors in the lower appellate Court's judgment (including misstatements about the absence of evidence, incorrect views on res judicata of survey decisions under the Survey and Boundaries Act, and a grave mistake about the legal import of municipal permission under Section 196), which together undermined the lower Court's decision.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's decree is vacated and the suit is dismissed; the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
  • The opinion applies and discusses existing authorities on necessary parties and joinder; it does not purport to announce a new general precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts and holding non-joinder fatal in this case.
Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff brought the suit to eject the defendant from a site and to remove a pial erected by him thereon. The plea of the defendant was that the land belonged to the Municipal Council, that he put up a pial with its permission and that the Municipal Council was a necessary party to the suit. This latter point was raised as issue No. 3 and the objection was repeated in appeal. With regard to issue 3 the trial Court said:

According to the plaint allegations, plaintiff exclusively claimed the suit lane as his property. So it is unnecessary for him to implead third party on the contentions raised by the defendant.

2. In respect of this its judgment reads throughout as if it were a decision between the plaintiff and the Municipality. The District Munsif says in para. 6:

I am constrained in this state of evidence as observed (sic) that plaintiff had made out a better title to the suit lane than the Municipality, and later on in the same paragraph As already observed there is some dispute between plaintiff and Bezwada Municipality about the ownership of this lane. As the available evidence is not before the Court, I am constrained to find in this state of evidence that plaintiff had made out a better title than the Municipality.

3. In dealing with this issue the lower appellate Court says:

As for the contention of the defendant that it is part of the Municipal lane, there is no proof of it.

4. If by proof the learned Subordinate Judge means evidence, he is clearly in error. There is the evidence of the receipts granted to the defendant by the Municipality as well as the direct evidence of D.W. 4, the Municipal Town Surveyor, who swears it is a public lane. An attempt was made in arguing the case before me to state that what the defendant got the license receipts for was not the present pial but some other in a different position. That cannot be maintained, for it is seen from the plaint that the pial in its present position has been there for four years which is within the period covered by two receipts. Both the Courts decreed the suit in plaintiff's favour and the main contention in this second appeal is that the Municipality was a necessary party.

5. The plaintiff, is the owner of house sites A and A-l and the defendant of house site B. Plot C is the one in dispute. The written statement has not been printed. If the defendant's written statement as regards the origin of the suit is as extracted in paragraph 3 of the judgment of the District Munsif, it is very badly expressed. It is there stated as follows:

The defendant contends that the alleged land C is not the exclusive one of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title had no interest in that site. The sites A and B originally belonged to one joint family. When they were divided they kept this suit land C as their joint lane. Plaintiff purchased A and A-1 marked land only eight months back, while defendant purchased site marked B twenty years back. The Municipality acquired this suit land long ago.

6. I think that the defendant clearly means that A, B and C originally belonged to the joint family. If that were not so, there was no meaning in saying that when they divided they kept the suit land C as joint lane. However, the matter is not of very much importance because the defendant's clear case was that the Municipality acquired the suit land long ago and the question is whether the Municipality is not a necessary party to the suit in the circumstances.

7. For the appellant is quoted Umed Mal v. Chand Mal (1926) L.R. 53 I.A. 271 : I.L.R. 54 Cal. 338 : 52 M.L.J. 368 (P.C.), a Privy Council case. In that case where a mortgagee as purchaser of the mortgaged properties in Court-auction in execution of his mortgage decree sued a third party, not being the mortgagor, in ejectment of one of the items alleged to have been included in his mortgage and purchased by him in execution of his mortgage decree, without making the mortgagor a party to the suit and the Lower Courts decreed the suit, it was held that the Lower Courts acted with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction in deciding the question of title to the mortgaged property in the absence of the mortgagor and, that the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in revision under Section 115. The present case is very much stronger than that because there the mortgagee had actually purchased the mortgagor's property. The next case is Haran Sheikh v. Ramesh Chandra Bhuttacharjee (1920) 25 C.W.N. 249. In that case where in a suit for declaration of a right of way as a village road and for removal of obstruction thereon, an objection was taken that one of the persons interested in the servient tenement had not been made a party to the suit, which was overruled by the Courts below on the ground that it was taken at a late stage, and the Courts below decreed the suit, it was held that the non-joinder of the person in question as a party to the suit was a fatal defect and on that ground the suit was dismissed ; and it was also held that notwithstanding the provisions of Order 1, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court will not entertain a suit in which no effective decree can be made in the absence of an interested party. Here again the present case is much stronger for the objection was taken from the start. The next case is Mahomed Israil v. J.P. Wise (1874) 21 W.R. 327. There it was held that in a suit for possession of land, where the plaintiff alleged that he is the rightful owner of the lands which have been resumed by the Government, but that the defendant by false allegation of ownership and of possession induced the Revenue authorities to enter into settlement with him, the Government ought to be made a party. Of the five Judges one expressed no opinion on the point. So it was apparently not necessary for the determination of the case. A recent decision of Sundaram Chetty, J. in this Court in S.A. No. 1502 of 1927 is also quoted. In that case the plaintiffs as reversioners to the estate of one Sattigadu sued for recovery of possession of the plaint properties. The defendant resisted the claim setting up the title of a minor Subbulu as the adopted son of Sattigadu. Sundaram Chetty, J. held that the objection taken by the defendant that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the alleged adopted boy was good, quoting the decisions which I have already quoted. He did not however find it necessary to set aside the decree and remand the suit because in a subsequent suit the matter of the alleged adoption with the boy as a party had been gone into and the adoption found not true. Another case quoted is Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 753. In that case a Digwari tenure-holder granted a lease of all the surface and the sub-soil rights. Upon a suit by the landlord without making the Government a party, for a declaration that the mineral rights belonged to him as landlord and that the defendant had no right to grant such a lease, it was held that the Government was a necessary party to the suit as the Digwari tenure was held on the condition of the performance of certain police or public services for the due discharge of which the holder had been responsible to the Government.

8. For the respondent four cases are quoted. Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh (1925) 23 L.W 75 at 79 (P.C.) is a decision which is quite irrelevant because it will be found that the person from whom the appellant claimed was made a defendant (Defendant 5). Even if he had not been, it is doubtful if the decision would have any relevancy because the appellant is described as his assignee. What is meant by the right jus tertii pleaded by a party in connection with this question whether that third party should be impleaded in the suit is of course a present right and not one which has been extinguished by assignment. The next case is Kashi v. Sadashiv (1895) I.L.R. 21 Bom. 229. This was a peculiar case where both parties claimed under the Government. It was held that the Government was not a necessary party. It was really a case of priority of title. The next case is Subramania v. Ananthakrishnaswami Naidu (1932) 36 L.W. 378. This was merely a matter of landlord suing his tenant under a lease. The tenant was estopped from disputing his landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The last case quoted is Poonit Singh v. Kamal Singh A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 172. This case is exactly on all fours with Umed Mal v. Chand Mal (1926) L.R. 53 I.A. 271 : I.L.R. 54 Cal. 338 : 52 M.L.J. 368 (P.C.) as to the inclusion of a mortgagor. It is the decision of a single Judge and must be held wrong in the light of the Privy Council decision. There appears to be either a misquotation or a misunderstanding of some quotation from Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings, 7th Edition, which is quoted as follows:

Strictly all persons who are actually in physical possession of the property should be made defendants. It is neither necessary nor proper to join any person who is merely in receipt of the rents and profits of the land.

9. I have looked up Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings. I have unfortunately not got the 7th Edition hut only the 8th. Bullen and Leake seems to have been remodelled for, the first remark now appears on page 20. I shall quote the whole passage as it stands there: "Strictly, all persons who are actually in physical possession of the property should be made defendants." 'In ejectment the tenant in possession must be sued' per Lord Tenterden, C.J., in Berkeley v. Dimery (1829) 109 E.R. 393 : 10 B. & C 113. But where a larger number of persons are in occupation of the premises who all claim title under the same lessor, the rule is relaxed and the plaintiff is allowed merely to make that lessor defendant: Minet v. Johnson (1890) 63 L.T. 507 and Green v. Herring (1905) 1 K.B. 152 : 74 L.J. K.B. 62. It being provided by Order 16, Rule 9, "Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court or a Judge to defend in such cause or matter, on behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested". There is no sentence here at all that it is neither necessary nor proper to join any person who is merely in receipt of the rents and profits of the land. On the other hand the passage quoted above shows that where there are a large number of persons in occupation all claiming title under the same lessor the plaintiff is allowed merely to make that lessor defendant. If therefore there is any such remark in the 7th Edition it cannot refer to the landlord but must refer to some person who is merely in receipt of the rents and profits of the land by some arrangement with the landlord. Dicey on Parties to an Action, Rule 113 (p. 495) says:

The persons who have a right to defend in an action of ejectment are any persons named in the writ, and any person who is in possession by himself or his tenant.

10. The learned author proceeds:

The object of the plaintiff in ejectment is to obtain, not damages, but possession of the land. He brings his action against the persons actually in possession, and if he succeeds, e.g., through their letting judgment go by default, he turns them out and himself obtains possession. This may cause damage to a person, who owns but does not himself actually occupy the land and is therefore not made a party to the action. A, for example, brings an action of ejectment against X and Y who are in the occupation of land as tenants of Z from week to week; Z is not made a party to the action, the tenants let judgment go by default, and A obtains possession. This is obviously an injury to Z, for he must, in order to re-gain possession, either enter and then turn A out, or, in his turn, bring an action of ejectment against A. But the injury may extend far beyond this, and Z may be deprived of his property, for A may have no title and therefore Z may be able if sued to resist his claim.

11. This rule of Dicey is quoted in Poonit Singh v. Kamal Singh A.I.R. 1924 pat. 172 as if it supported the decision there but, with respect, in my opinion it is opposed to it for I take it that if a person has a right to defend, it is the same thing as saying that he is a necessary defendant, for it is not within the discretion of the Court to say whether it will add him or not.

12. It is then argued that this Court cannot under Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code interfere with a decree on account of the non-joinder of a party. In this connection Yakkanath Eacharaunni Valia Kaimal v. Manakkat Vasunni Elaya Kaimal (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 436 : 20 M.L.J. 344 is quoted to show that for purposes of Section 99 misjoinder includes non-joinder. The remark is obiter and the case on which it relies, Mahabala Bhatta v. Kunhanna Bhatta (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 373; 8 M.L.J. 139, was under the old Code. Section 578 of the old Code corresponding to Section 99 of the present ran as follows:

No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal, on account of any error, defect or irregularity, whether in the decision or in any order passed in the suit, or otherwise, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.

13. The words "misjoinder of parties or causes of action" were introduced in the Code of 1908; so Mahabala Bhatta v. Kunhanna Bhatta (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 373 : 8 M.L.J. 139 is no authority as to the meaning of the section as it now stands. This obiter remark in Yakkanath Eacharaunni Valia Kaimal v. Manakkat Vasunni Elaya Kaimal (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 436 : 20 M.L.J. 344 has been noticed in Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Annamalai Mudaliar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 249 where Sir Walter Schwabe, C.J., says:

Under Section 99 of the Code, of Civil Procedure no decree is to be reversed on account of any misjoinder of parties not affecting the merits of the case or of the jurisdiction of the Court, and it has been held, how far correctly I am not prepared at present to say, that 'misjoinder' in that section includes non-joinder.

14. In Amichand Nagindas & Co. v. Raoji Bhai Moti Bhai Patel (1929) 58 M.L.J. 613 a Bench of this Court held that Section 99 would not prevent the Court interfering in appeal even in a case of misjoinder if the appeal was that the Lower Court acted without jurisdiction.

15. I must therefore hold that the Municipality was a necessary party to the suit and not having been made one in spite of objection taken from the start, the suit must be dismissed.

16. I cannot help observing however that there are several defects in the lower appellate Court's judgment which would probably have by themselves justified the setting aside of its decree. I have noted above the statement that there is no proof of the contention of the defendant that the site is part of the Municipal lane; and that if by this it is meant there is no evidence it is a complete mis-statement of fact. The Municipal authorities refused to produce the survey plan and in connection with this the Subordinate Judge observes:

Unless the plaintiff or his predecessor had raised a dispute at the time of the Municipal survey and the point had been found against him, the decision of the Survey authorities cannot be res judicata against the plaintiff.

17. That is entirely wrong. The survey was made under the Survey and Boundaries Act. Decisions under that Act if not challenged become res judicata. Finally there is the remark:

It is alleged for the defendant (appellant) that when opening a gate into C the plaintiff took the Municipality's permission. But this was necessary under the Act even if the site C belonged to plaintiff.

18. Section 196 of the District Municipalities Act only requires permission to the opening of a gate into a public street. Therefore if plaintiff had really taken the Municipality's permission to open a gate into the site C it would have been almost conclusive against his contention that C was his private property. The mistake in law here made by the Subordinate Judge is so grave that it might reasonably be said that it affects his whole decision. I have looked at the actual evidence on the point. Apparently what the plaintiff said was that he applied for permission from the Municipality to open a doorway. It was not elicited exactly where this doorway was. Though one cannot be absolutely certain, it is not easy to see where else it could have been than at the point A (1) opening into the site C. In any case the learned Subordinate Judge clearly took it as meaning that the gate opened into the site C, and if so, the admission was fatal to the plaintiff's case.

19. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the suit will be dismissed.