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R.M.C.T. Ramanathan Chettiar v. P.L.C. Lakshmanan Chettiar
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an ejectment suit originally instituted on 18 February 1920. The plaintiff claimed title under a sale-deed (Ex. B) dated 22 November 1898 from Kaliappan and Audiappan (sons of one Sethuraman Servai) and alleged possession up to 10 February 1919 with dispossession by the defendants on that date. The lower Court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiff had not proved possession within 12 years of suit; the plaintiff appealed.
The suit concerns punja No. 120 in Eravacheri village, Guttakainattu Taluk, Devakottah. The Court had the plot measured and determined its correct area to be 63,597 square feet. Historically the plot had been cultivated at some time, but cultivation and any usufruct appear to have ceased long before the 12 years preceding the suit. Numerous transactions and prior litigations affected parts of the plot, and certain parts were found to be already lost to third parties by earlier decrees.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff had proved effective possession within 12 years of the suit so as to maintain an ejectment claim based on dispossession.
- Whether the plaintiff's title under Ex. B was valid in respect of the whole plot or only a portion, i.e., (a) whether Sethuraman and his sons had title to pass to the plaintiff, and (b) if they had title, to what extent they could pass title by Ex. B.
- Whether, in circumstances where neither party proves effective possession for the 12-year period, possession should be presumed to follow the valid title-holder and, if so, to what extent.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff relied on Ex. B (sale-deed dated 22 November 1898) as vesting title in him from Kaliappan and Audiappan.
- The plaintiff claimed acts of possession: that he erected a prickly-pear fence on all four sides after purchase (P.W.3), stored timber in 1911, and removed earth about ten years before trial (P.W.1).
- The plaintiff asserted he had bought out a usufructuary mortgagee (Alagappan) as evidenced by Ex. 1 (dated 3 January 1901) and later produced Exs. D and II to show attempts to buy out interests under prior transfers (Ex. L).
- On the basis of title the plaintiff contended that possession should be presumed to follow title and continue until dispossessed, entitling him to restoration of possession for the extent of his valid title.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants produced an alleged patta (Ex. IV, dated 22 June 1909) in favour of one Alagappan (D.W.2) and cultivation accounts (Ex. III series for 1895–1897) to support title and user in their chain.
- They contended that Alagappan was either the usufructuary mortgagee (bought out by the plaintiff) or in fact the full owner, seeking to displace the plaintiff's title.
- The defendants relied on prior litigations (Ex. E series, Ex. VII series) and pleaded that statements in those proceedings showed that the plaintiff was not in possession under Ex. B.
- As a point of law the defendants argued the plaintiff could not succeed on mere title where he had alleged specific acts of possession and dispossession but failed to prove them.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogh | General rule that a plaintiff seeking to oust defendants on title and dispossession must prove possession within 12 years of suit. | The Court accepts the general rule but explains its qualification: where neither party proves effective possession, possession follows title to the extent of valid title. |
| Rakhal Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanta | Proposition that the presumption that possession follows title may not apply where acts of possession are pleaded and evidence for both sides is equally unworthy of reliance. | The Court considers the case but distinguishes it, rejecting an unquestioning application where in fact no effective possession by any party existed. |
| Runjeet Ram Pandav v. Goburdhun Ram Pandav (Privy Council) | Statement that the ordinary presumption that possession followed title cannot prevail in the presence of clearer evidence to the contrary; where there is strong evidence on both sides, the presumption's weight must be estimated accordingly. | The Court quotes this passage to show the limited circumstances in which the presumption may be displaced by competing strong evidence; here, the Court found no strong proof of possession on either side. |
| Thakur Singh v. Bhogeraj Singh; Lala Singh v. Mir Latif Hossein; Fakira Lal Sahn v. Munshi Ramacharan Lal | These cases (cited in the Calcutta Weekly Notes) were relied on for propositions about insisting on pleadings and acts of user in assessing possession. | The Court examines these authorities critically and finds they do not uniformly support the defendants' expansive proposition; the Court scrutinises the character of the land and the nature of possession required. |
| Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny (Calcutta Full Bench) | Test that possession consists of "such acts of ownership as are natural under the existing condition of the land" during the critical period (12 years before suit to dispossession). | The Court adopts this test to determine whether any party exercised the normal acts of user; finding none, it applies the consequence that title carries possession to the extent valid. |
| Mahammad Saheb v. Tilokchand; Venkata Somayajulu v. Satyanarayana | Authority for the proposition that where effective enjoyment was not the normal method of exercising rights, the title-holder obtains such possession as the property is capable of. | The Court relies on these authorities in concluding that when no effective possession is shown by any party, possession should follow the valid title-holder (here, to a quantified portion of the plot). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in two linked strands: (A) analysis of possession (user) in the 12-year period before suit, and (B) analysis of title and its extent as of the date of Ex. B (22 November 1898), followed by their interaction.
(A) Possession / User analysis:
- The Court corrected the plot's area to 63,597 square feet and examined evidence of user and cultivation. It found that any cultivation had ceased long before the relevant 12-year period and that no proof of payment of punja rent was produced.
- Documents produced by the defence (Ex. III cultivation accounts and Ex. IV patta) were regarded as insufficiently proved; the karnam who compiled them was not examined, and the witness (D.W.9) offered only weak testimony.
- The plaintiff's claimed acts of user (prickly-pear fence, storing timber, small earth cutting) were either unsupported by independent evidence or too trivial/uncertain in extent to establish effective possession of the whole plot.
- The earliest reliably proved act of user by defendants was erection of a chain of posts along the north boundary in 1916, but that did not amount to effective possession of the whole plot. The building of walls along the west and north lines early in 1919 by certain defendants was admitted and taken to be the earliest effective possession within 12 years of suit.
- Conclusion on user: neither party established effective possession of the suit plot for the full 12-year period prior to suit; effective possession was not proved earlier than 1919.
(B) Title analysis and interplay with possession:
- The Court examined the chain of prior transfers affecting portions of the plot. It accepted the lower Court's view that the Servai family had title from 1880 onwards (no competing documented title was produced for that period).
- However, prior transactions deprived the Servai vendors of the whole plot: (i) 7,200 square feet had been lost by a prior sale upheld in Ex. E litigation; (ii) Ex. L (31 October 1889) conveyed a northern block (sixty carpenter's cubits by thirty) equal to 13,612 square feet. Thus by the date of Ex. B the vendors could not have conveyed the entire 63,597 square feet — they had already parted with at least 20,812 square feet.
- The plaintiff later produced documents (Exs. D and II) suggesting attempts to buy out interests under Ex. L, and the Court found circumstances sufficient to show that the prior vendee under Ex. L had been bought out such that the plaintiff's title was cleared as to that portion by 1906. However, the Ex. VII litigation (1908) resulted in a decree (Ex. VII-C) that limited the plaintiff's title to the northern one-third of the plot, with specific performance in favour of another party for the southern two-thirds.
- The Court adjusted the arithmetical figures in light of the accurate measurement: the plaintiff's valid title was found to be one-third of (63,597 - 7,200) = 18,799 square feet, situated in the north of the plot.
- Given that neither party could establish effective possession for the 12-year period, the Court applied the legal principle (as expounded in cited authorities) that possession follows title to the extent of valid title where the property was not being effectively enjoyed by any party during the critical period.
The Court considered the defendants' legal point that a plaintiff who pleads definite acts of possession and dispossession cannot succeed on mere title if he fails to prove those acts. The Court held that this plea would carry force if defendants had proved effective possession prior to the alleged dispossession; since they had not, the plaintiff's presumption of possession arising from title was not displaced.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court modified the lower Court's decree and held that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of a quantified portion of the suit plot. The decree was modified to award the plaintiff possession of 18,799 square feet in the north of the suit plot.
The Court specified the geometric description of the awarded strip: a quadrilateral whose northern boundary is the suit plot's northern boundary, with east and west sides of equal length along the east and west sides of the suit plot, and whose area is 18,799 square feet. The plaintiff's plan will be attached to and form part of the decree.
The Court ordered that, in view of the parties' mutual shortcomings in presenting a wholly true case, each party shall bear his own costs in both Courts.
Implications: The direct effect is the partial restoration of possession to the plaintiff for 18,799 square feet and the modification of the lower Court's decree. The opinion applies established principles about the interplay of title and possession but does not assert the creation of a new legal precedent beyond the application of cited authorities.
N. R. R. — Decree modified.
The original suit from which this appeal arises was a suit in ejectment, the plaintiff alleging title under a sale-deed, Ex. B, dated 22nd November, 1898 from the two sons of one Sethuraman Servai, Kaliappan and Audiappan and alleging also possession up to 10th February 1919 and a dispossession by the defendants on that day. The suit was brought on 18th February 1920 for possession from the defendants and consequential reliefs. The lower Court dismissed the suit on its finding that the plaintiff had not proved possession within 12 years of suit. The plaintiff appeals.
The suit site is punja No. 120 in Eravacheri village, Guttakainattu Taluk, Devakottah. It has of late years owing to its potential value as house-site become the subject of a scramble for possession which has led to claims well and ill-founded based on documents or otherwise being put forward by various people and to litigation thereon. In the course of hearing before us the remarkable fact was disclosed that never in the whole course of the history of this plot in the Courts had it been measured, and that parties had throughout adopted hypothetical figure of area which bears small relation to the actual area. We have now had the plot properly measured and the correct area may be taken as 63,597 square feet. The plot appears to be an open site, regarded of late years as suitable for house-sites but for nothing else, and it has been dealt with as an area enclosing so many house-sites of 1,200 square feet each. At one time it appears to have been cultivated, and plaintiff himself at one time asserted (see Ex. 1, dated 3rd January, 1901) that he bought out a usufructuary mortgagee, Alagappan, so that presumably in those days there was some usufruct accruing from the land. Even if there was any such cultivation then and the plaintiff's allegation of having bought out a usufructuary mortgagee was not made merely to support a claim of title, any form of cultivation of the land seems to have ceased long before 12 years before suit. The plot is in a zemin tract, and if there had been cultivation, there must have been payment of a punja rent; but no one on either side has produced any proof of such payment.
One thing however seems clear, that in regard to a portion of the plot said to measure 7,200 kulis or square feet the possession of it had passed from the plaintiff, if he ever had it, by the litigation, Ex. E series. There one Chokkalinga Chetty claimed under a prior sale deed from Kaliappan, one of the plaintiff's vendors and from his father, Sethuraman Servai. In that litigation, which came on in 1900, Kaliappan pleaded that the plaintiff, who was a party to it, was not in possession under his sale-deed, Ex. B, and plaintiff himself claimed to be in possession but he remained ex parte and possession was decreed against him. In his written statement in another litigation, Ex. VII-b, paragraph 8, the plaintiff admitted that Chokkalingam Chetty got possession in that former suit. This 7200 square feet is in the eastern half of the middle portion of the land. Plaintiff has lost his title to it and that area goes out of this suit.
In answer to the plaintiff's claim of possession to the remaining part of the suit site, the defence produced an alleged patta, Ex. IV, dated 22nd June 1909 in favour of one Alagappan, D.W 2, from whom the defendants claim to derive title, and certain alleged cultivation accounts, EX. III series of the years 1895, 1896 and 1897, containing entries that one Alagappan, who is said to be the paternal uncle of D.W 2, cultivated in those years. The defendants of course contend that this Alagappan is the very usufructuary mortgagee bought out by the plaintiff as noted above and that he was not a mortgagee but full owner. But there is nothing in the description either in Ex. III or in Ex. IV to clinch this point. Ex. IV is by no means free of suspicion on the face of it. The entry of plot 120 is on the back of it and not above the signature of the karnam Mayandi Pillai and that signature has a very fresh look. We regard in any case these documents, Exs. III and IV as not sufficiently proved. Instead of examining the karnam, who wrote them who is alive and available the defendants contented themselves with examining a person D.W 9 who styled himself as a mirasi karnam of the village. But he admits that he never did karnam duties. All he is able to swear to is that the signature on the exhibits is that of the actual karnam who did duty. Clearly that is not proof that those accounts were properly kept or that the entries are correct and there is no presumption in the case of zemin accounts that they are regularly kept nor would that presumption avail much here when the person who complied the records appears to have been deliberately kept out of the witness-box and therefore not subject to cross-examination by the other side. Ex. XII series of “pattadars ledgers” are equally unproved and carry the case no further. No receipts for payment of kist or cesses are filed.
We cannot find that there has been any real effective possession proved by way of cultivation or any kindred activity over the land by either party. Both parties have no doubt attempted to prove acts of user and, as is usual in such cases, have tried to support their plea by dubious evidence. Plaintiff as P.W 3 alleges that when he purchased the land in 1898 he put up a fence of prickly pear on all four sides. There is not a scrap of independent evidence to support this and we do not believe it. Other evidence adduced by him is that in 1911 he stored some timber on it. P.W 1 adds that 10 years ago the plaintiff took some earth from the land—it is not stated over what area. Such evidence is quite useless, and, even if accepted, the mere storing of timber of a few square yards or excavation of earth from an unknown extent cannot be of any use to prove effective possesion of the whole plot. In 1914 there were some criminal proceedings, Ex. XI series, under Sect. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure between the agent of the 8th defendant and D.W 7, which ended in an order, Ex. XI-a, dated 7th November, 1914, whereby the Magistrate prohibited D.W 7, who was ex parte, from interfering with the possession of the 8th defendant. The assertion in the petition is that 8th defendant's agent is being prevented by D.W 7 from putting up a fence. We have no reliable evidence here that any fence was actually put up earlier than 1916. Even assuming that these proceedings in 1914 were wholly bona fide, in view of the scramble of claims for this land it is an assumption which we are not prepared to subscribe to that there was in 1914 any effective possession of the whole plot by virtue of the Magistrate's order. The earliest act of user of which there is satisfactory proof is that in 1916 a chain of posts was put up along the north boundary by the 8th defendant. There is independent evidence of that in the records, Ex. V, of a litigation, concerned with a site immediately north of this one, namely, plot 121. In connection with that litigation, the Commissioner, D.W 1 visited the plot in 1916, and he deposes now, what he reported then in Ex. V that he saw a chain of posts there. It is not claimed by the plaintiff that these were put up by him, and there can be no doubt that they were put up by the 8th defendant as the defence asserts and as the parties to the litigation about plot 121 stated in 1916 to the Commissioner, D.W 1. But no attempt was then made to enclose anything, so far as the evidence goes, and things remained in that state until 1919. We are not prepared to infer from the mere existence of a chain of posts along the north boundary that the 8th defendant was in effective possession of the whole plot. The next act of user is the act by which the plaintiff says he was dispossessed, namely, that early in 1919 walls were built along the west and the north lines of the plot by the defendants 1 to 4 and 8. This act being admitted, it may be taken to be the fact, and it forms in our view the earliest effective possession of the site within 12 years of suit proved by any party to the suit. Both the plaintiff and defendants have relied upon pleadings by parties to the various previous litigations, the plaintiff on the fact that he was sued in Ex. E litigation and Ex. VII litigation as a person then in possession, and the defendants on the fact that in the Ex. E litigation the Servais denied that they gave plaintiff possession. It is obvious that in the scramble for possession which was taking place such statements were probably made for the immediate purpose of the litigation and have practically no evidentiary value one way or the other, even assuming, without admitting, that they are evidence admissible under Sect. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The net result of this discussion is that for the period of 12 years before suit up to the date of the alleged dispossession in 1919 there was no sort of effective enjoyment of the plot by any one, and the land had not been put to any sort of use which can be styled effective possession. The claims of each party to have been in effective possession before early in 1919 are unsupported by any reliable evidence, and must be rejected.
The plaintiff on this footing argues that he is entitled to stand upon his title, and upon the legal presumption that possession follows title and continues until the title-holder is dispossessed. To see how far that will carry him, it is necessary to inquire into his title. He claims, as is noted, under the sale-deed, Ex. B, dated 22nd November, 1898, in his favour by the two sons, Kaliappan and Audiappan, of Sethuraman Servai. Two main questions arise in this part of the case: first, had Sethuraman and his sons any title to pass on, and secondly, if they had title, to what extent had they title when they sold to the plaintiff? As to the first point there is no title-deed in favour of Sethuraman filed, but on the other hand there is no title deed filed by anyone else. It is very clear that Sethuraman and his sons were dealing with the property from 1880 onwards by way of sale and mortgage. There is first the sale of 7,200 square feet to Chokkaliagam Chatty's father on 24th December 1930 which formed the subject of the litigation in Ex.E series and which was upheld against the plaintiff and Kaliappan, the son of Sethuraman. The decree, Ex. F-3 in a prior suit in 1887 by the father of Chokkalingam Chetty indicates that there had been a prior sale by Sethuraman and others of a portion of the site in the south to one Arunachalla Chetty, but the date and extant of that transaction are unknown. Next on 31st October 1889 the three brothers sold a block in the north side of the plot under Ex. L to the father of the present 8th defendant. On 28th May 1892 by Ex. H two of the brothers Subbiah and Audiappan, mortgaged the whole plot to one Subramaniam Chetty. Then comes the sale to the plaintiff. Now of course it may have been that all these transactions were in the nature, not of real transfers of property but of stepping stones to claims, and were designed to oust persons then effectively in possession, and that is the general contention of the defence. But in the absence of any evidence worth the name on the side of the defence that any one was in effective possession, we can see no reason to suppose that they were not genuine transactions. Had any one else than these transferors been in effective possession at least during the time when the land was being cultivated, even if no transfers had taken place, it should not have been difficult for the defence to produce evidence of, for example, zemin pattas, kist receipts and so on. As it is, there is no documentary evidence proving that any one else but this Servai family and those deriving from them had title to the land from 1880 to 1898. We can see no reason to differ from the Lower Court's view that the title was in the Servai family in 1880 and onwards. The first point, therefore, is answered that the Servais had title to the plot which they could have passed on to the plaintiff.
As to the second point, it is clear from their dealings with the property prior to the sale to the plaintiff that they could not have passed him a title to the whole plot as they professed to do under Ex. B. First of all, as already noted the 7,200 square feet, was irrecoverably gone, as decided in the Ex. E litigation. As to the sale to Arunachalam Chetty, noted in the decree Ex. F-3, we have no information about it and it may be left out of account, especially as it was for a portion in the south and as we hold, for reasons to be given later, that the plaintiff has lost the title to the whole of the southern portion. Under Ex. L on 31st October, 1889 the three Servai brothers had sold sixty carpenter's cubits by thirty in the north, that is, at 33 inches to the cubit, 13,612 square feet. On the date of Ex. B therefore the plaintiff's venorse had lost title to 13,612 plus 7,200 out of a total of 63,597 square feet. Plaintiff cannot on the footing of title claim to have been in possession under Ex. B of that 20,812 square feet.
Whether when he took Ex. B the plaintiff was or was not aware of these subtractions from his title he appears later on to have endeavoured to buy out the vendee under Ex. L. He produced in proof of this Exs. D and II. Ex. D is dated 29th December 1900 at which time the Servai brother Subbiah was dead and only Kaliappan and Audiappan remained. Ex. D purports to be a receipt to plaintiff by the father of 8th defendant, the vendee under Ex. L, for the value of his interest in Audiappan's half share. Ex. II dated 29th September 1906 purports to be a vartamanam executed in plaintiff's favour by Kaliappan. It is a rather unintelligible document. The plaintiff wants to use it to show theft he had then bought out the interest of the vendee under Ex. L in Kaliappan's share also, but the best proof of that would be a receipt for the value of that interest similar to Ex. D, but none such is filed. Apart from this, however there is a strong indication that 8th defendant's father's full interest under Ex. L was bought out from the fact that 8th defendant himself subsequently bought the suit plot under Ex. IX from 7th defendant. D.W 3, who claims to have bought it from Alagappa, D.W 2, under Ex. VIII on 31st August 1909. 8th defendant, who is one of the contesting defendants here, has not gone into the witness-box to assert that ha was not so bought out, and that his title therefore dates from earlier than Ex. IX, while ha obviously admits by his father's transaction under Ex. L that the three Servai brothers had some title to the plot. We think these circumstances are enough to show that 8th defendant did not contest the fact that his prior title, under Ex. L had vanished.
Ex. L then had been by 1906 cleared out of the way of the plaintiff's full title, but there is a further complication. In 1908 there was another litigation as set out in Ex. VII series. One T. A. Chidambaram Chetty sued (1) S. K. P. S Kuppan Chetty (2) the present plaintiff, and another for specific performance of an agreement by Kuppan Chetty to sell him his share, namely, the southern two-thirds, of the suit plot. This Kuppan Chetty was the assignee under Ex. G, dated 19th September 1899, of the decree in Ex. J which the mortgagee of the suit plot under Ex. H had obtained on 1st November 1897. The present plaintiff then admitted that his ostensible title was not wholly for himself but partly for himself and partly for Kuppan Chetty, although he claimed that Kuppan Chetty's title had become barred by time. The Court, however, rejected that plea and declared in Ex. VII-C that the extent of the plaintiff's title was only to the northern one-third of the plot and gave Chidambaram Chetty a decree against Kuppan Chetty and the plaintiff for specific performance of sale of the southern two-thirds of the suit plot. Thus the plaintiff lost what title he had in respect of the southern two-thirds of the suit plot.
In the Ex. VII litigation it was taken for granted that the area of the suit plot excluding 7,200 square feet belonging to. Chokkalingam Chetty was 96,000 square feet but by some mistake in arithmetic the southern two-thirds was estimated to be 72,000 square feet and the plaintiff's northern one-third as 24,000 square feet. Obviously these figures cannot be right and have to be, adjusted in the light of present measurements. The result will be that the plaintiff's title is prima facie good to the extent only, of one-third of 63,597 minus 7,200; that is, 18,799 square feet in the north of the plot. It is not open to the plaintiff to plead for more than this. The question whether or not the decree-holder in Ex. VII-E had or had not enforced his decree and obtained possession is irrelevant when the plaintiff must succeed, if at all, merely on title. It is not open to him claiming on title alone to claim that the Court should presume possession to any extent larger than that for which he has proved a valid title in himself. An invalid title carries with it no presumption of possession.
The defence case on title is weak. It does not start before 1909 when D.W 2, the alleged pattadar under Ex. IV, sells under Ex. VIII to 7th defendant. D.W 2 produced no title deed and claimed that the property was ancestral. All his pattas, he says, except Ex. IV, were burnt in a fire, and later on he says he never had more than 2 pattas, one of which is lost and the other is Ex. IV. He executed no muchilikas. His theerva receipts were also burnt. Obviously no reliance can be placed on such a witness. This patta, Ex. IV, which is here already noted as suspicious and insufficiently proved, is only 4 months before the date of Ex. VIII and was probably cooked up for a title deed, and that was at the time when the Ex. VII litigation was going on. The 7th defendant sold to 8th defendant in 1913 under Ex. IX and 8th defendant agreed in 1918 to sell to defendants 1 to 4. In so far as possession is to be inferred from title there is nothing produced by the defence to rebut the prima facie conclusion we have already drawn regarding the extent of plaintiff's title, and we find the plaintiff has proved a pre-existing valid title to 18,799 square feet in the north of the suit plot.
To sum up, so far as effective possession goes, neither party has established it earlier than 1919. So far as title goes, that of the plaintiff is superior to, and more reliable than, that of the defendants to the extent of 18,799 square feet in the north. To that extent the plaintiff's title carries with it a presumption that he was in such possession, as the land was capable of, which possession his vendors had, and his possession was not effectively invaded till 1919, only 2 years before suit. He is entitled to have that possession restored?
It is urged as a point of law by the defendants that the plaintiff cannot succeed on the mere plea of title when he comes into Court with an allegation of definite acts of possession and dispossession and has failed to prove this. This plea is based on the fact that the plaintiff alleges acts of possession, of storing timber and putting up a prickly-pear fence, neither of which acts we can regard as proved. The plea might have force if effective acts of possession by the defendants prior to the dispossession alleged in the plaint had been proved. But we find none such are established and they certainly cannot be presumed. The net result therefore is that the plaintiff's possession presumed by law upon his title has not been displaced by any act of dispossession prior to 1919, and his failure to prove specific acts of possession does not afford any proof of defendants’ possession or any displacement of the possession which under the law is presumed from his title. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to go at length into the law on the subject. It is true of course as a general rule that when the plaintiff seeks on the strength of title and dispossession to oust defendants in possession he must prove possession within 12 years of suit. [Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogh ]. But the possession to be proved is such possession as the property is Capable of or such as has been the normal method of user. When each party who claims possession is unable to prove any act of effective possession and therefore the normal method of possession is not referable to any such act, possession must follow title, since the defendants are no more able than the plaintiff to claim effective possession for 12 years before suit. Possession in such circumstances is with the party holding title. The case in Rakhal Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanta , is strongly relied upon for the proposition that this presumption does not follow in a case where acts of possession have been pleaded and the evidence of both parties is equally unworthy of reliance. That ruling sought to carry further the proposition of the Privy Council in Runjeet Ram Pandav v. Goburdhun Ram Pandav :
“Now the ordinary presumption would be that possession went with the title. That presumption cannot of course be of any avail in the presence of clearer evidence to the contrary; but, where there is strong evidence of possession, as there is here, on the part of the respondents—opposed by evidence, apparently strong also on the part of the appellant—their Lordships think that, in estimating the weight due to the evidence on both sides, the presumption may, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, be regarded.”
The Calcutta Weekly Notes case cited as authority for its proposition Thakur Singh v. Bhogeraj Singh Lala Singh v. Mir Latif Hossein and Fakira Lal Sahn v. Munshi Ramacharan Lal (6). In the first of these cases we do not find the proposition contended for set out in the judgment although it does appear in the head note. In the second case the Bench quotes Thakur Singh v. Bhogeraj Singh as if it had in fact set out the proposition which we do not find set out. The character of the property in that case and the nature of the possession that would ordinarily be exercised oyer it is not noted. The third case makes a special exception in the case of land of a special character such as waste, jungle or land under water. In the Calcutta Weekly Notes case the land appears to have been cultivable and in fact cultivated until a tank was excavated. If parties are to be held strictly to their pleadings, no doubt land over which acts of user are asserted is land over which acts of user may be and have been exercised and therefore can be ordinarily exercised. But we think the real test is whether in fact acts of user were being regularly exercised over it by one or the other party so as to constitute in the words of the Calcutta Full Bench in Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny “such acts of ownership as are natural under the existing condition of the land,” during the critical period between 12 years before suit and the actual dispossession which forms the causa of action. And we find that none such were in this case in fact exercised. In such circumstances it does not seem to us proper that, where there has been no effective possession by any one, the title holder should be deprived of what he has acquired merely because he equally with the other side has exaggerated his case in the pleadings. In a case like the present when effective enjoyment was not the customary method of exercising the right of possession, it must be held that the plaintiff by his title obtained such possession as the property was capable of, and therefore his possession goes with the title to the extent to which that title is found valid [See Mahammad Saheb v. Tilokchand and Venkata Somayajulu v. Satyanarayana ]. For these reasons we think that the lower Court's decree should be modified and the plaintiff given a decree for the possession of 18,799 square feet in the north of the suit plot. The strip will be a quadrilateral figure whose northern boundary is the northern boundary of the suit plot whose east and west sides are of equal length along the east and west sides of the suit plot and whose area is 18,799 square feet. In view of the fact that neither party has put forward a true case, we direct that each party bear his own costs in both Courts. Plaintiff's plan will be attached to and form part of the decree.
N. R. R.Decree modified.
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