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Vaithinatha Pillai v. Kuppu Thevar
This Second Appeal came on for hearing in the first instance before Abdur Rahim and Kumaraswami Sastri, JJ., who made the following
Order of Reference to a Full Bench
Abdur Rahim, J.:— In this case the point on which I felt considerable doubt was whether we could say that the decree of the District Judge was wrong on the ground that he refused to admit in evidence the decree in Original Suit No. 26 of 1879. That document had undoubtedly a material tearing on the question whether the property in dispute was validly dedicated to charity as found by the District Judge. The decree was not produced in the Court of first instance, but the appellant's affidavit shows that the appellant who is the purchaser of the property was not aware of the existence of this decree. He discovered it after the Court of first instance had pronounced judgment and an appeal had been preferred to the District Judge. An application was made to the lower Appellate Court for admission of this decree, but it was rejected on the ground that, if such an application was granted, there would be no end to litigation.
Can we in Second Appeal admit that document on the ground that the lower Appellate Court's refusal to exercise the power it had under Order XLI, rule 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure supposing the application came within the scope of the rule— was wrong? The well-known ruling of the Privy Council in Kessowji Issur v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company(1) on the subject has been considered in a number of recent rulings of this Court, it may now be taken to be well established so far at least as this Court is concerned that the words “but if an Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause” entitle an Appellate Court to admit fresh evidence if it finds it necessary to do so to enable it to pronounce judgment to its own satisfaction. The words “any other substantial cause” should not be read in an ejusdem generis sense so as to confine the application of the rules to cases of lacuna [See Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan(2), Ambuja Ammal v. Appadurai Mudali(3), Subba Naidu v. Ethirajammal(4), Kameswaramma v. Ghelapathi(5) and Venkatachella Pillai v. Ranga Pillai(6).]
It has been further held in Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan and Venkatachella Pillai v. Ranga Pillai that the Appellate Court acting under rule 27 of Order XLI, clause (b) may admit fresh evidence on the same grounds as would justify the Court of first instance to admit a review. In all these case?, the Appellate Court had in fact admitted fresh evidence and the question discussed before the High Court was whether it had the power to do so.
In the present case the lower Appellate Court refused to admit the evidence produced by the appellant. Supposing it went wrong in this, as I am inclined to think it did, are we entitled to say that it ought to have
“required the document to be produced to enable it to pro-nomce judgment or for any other substantial cause”?
The very statement of the proposition shows to my mind that it is untenable. It cannot come within the scope of the rule even interpreting it and the ruling of the Privy Council as liberally in any of the decisions mentioned above have done. As pointed out in Subba Naidu v. Ethirajarrimal the test laid down by the legislature has reference to the state of mind of the Judge hearing the appeal when he has heard the arguments with a view to pronouncing judgment in the case. Here the order refusing to admit further evidence was passed on an especial application made by the appellant before the hearing of the appeal and the lower Appellate Court apparently found no difficulty in pronouncing judgment without that evidence. I am of opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the District Judge cannot be assailed on this ground. But as my learned brother takes a different view and the question is one of general importance I would refer it to the Full Bench for its opinion, in these terms:—
“Whether the High Court can interfere in Second Appeal with an order of the lower Appellate Court rejecting an application made to it by a party to the appeal before the hearing of the appeal to admit certain material evidence discovered since the date of the decree appealed against and which was not available to the said party with the exercise of due diligence during the trial of the suit”?
I may mention that on the other questions raised before us, namely, as to the identity of the lands specified in exhibit IX and mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit I agree with my learned brother and to this extent there should be a further inquiry and finding.
Kumabaswami Sastri, J.:— The first plaintiff is the appellant. He sued in the Subordinate Judge's Court, at Negapatam to recover possession of certain properties sold to him by the first and second defendants for Rs. 18,000. The third and fourth defendants are the sons of the first defendant and the fifth and sixth defendants are persons claiming under an agreement to sell prior to the date of the sale to plaintiff. Saveral defences were raised by the defendants, but the only question material to the Second Appeal is as to the, dedication of certain items of property conveyed to the plaintiff to a charity. This defence was raised by the third and fourth defendants. In paragraph 3 of their written statement they made the hold allegation that 36 acres of the said lands have been set apart by the family for charities, when or how is not stated. Issues were settled on the 24th February 1912 but no issue was askad for or raised as to this alleged dedication though as many as eleven issues were raised with respect to the allegations in the written statements. On the 3rd March 1913 two additional issues were raised but even then no issue was raised as to the dedication. After the commencement of the trial and the examination of the plaintiff's witnesses and on the 25th February 1914 the following additional, issue was raised on a petition of the third and fourth defendants:—
“Whether the items noted in the petition of the third and fourth defendants, dated 25th February 1914, are properties burdened with charity and are not liable to be alienated by the first defendant?”
The trial went on that date and on the 27th February; the case was adjourned to the 2nd March and was closed on the 18th March 1913. Judgment was delivered on the 23rd March. The Subordinate Judge held that the sale of the items referred to in paragraph 61 of his judgment making 31 acres and 15 cents was invalid
“as they relate to an endowment for maintaining a choultry at Tagattur”
and gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the remaining items claimed. The defendants beyond filing exhibit IX, an agreement of partition, dated 29th August 1870, adduced no evidence on the point. The plaintiff filed documents showing that the property had been, dealt with by the first defendant as his own property from 1882.
Plaintiff appealed against the decree of the Subordinate Judge in so far as it dismissed his suit and during the pendency of the appeal applied for the admission of a decree of the Subordinate Court of Negapatam in Original Suit No. 26 of 1879 which according to him showed that there was no dedication of lands in Ekkur village as alleged by the third and fourth defendants but that on the contrary the lands fell to the share of the first defendant. He alleged he was not aware of the decree before the suit was disposed of by the Subordinate Judge. The District Judge dismissed his application not on the ground that he was aware of the existence of the suit or the decree or could have known it if he had exercised reasonable diligence but that the admission of the document would necessitate a remand and that
“there would be no end to litigation if parties were allowed to call further evidence in this way.”
I have already pointed out how the issue as to’ dedication was raised during the trial of the suit and what little time the plaintiff who is found to be a bona fide purchaser who paid the large sum of 18,000 rupees had to adduce evidence on the point. He was a stranger and it is not suggested what means he had of knowing of a partition suit between the members of the family of the vendor about 32 years before his purchase. He did his best and the District Judge does not find that the non-production of the decree was due to any neglect or default of the plaintiff and the reasons he has given for refusing to admit it are unsound. There can be little doubt that the decree sought to be filed was a very material document.
The following table sets out the relationship between the parties:—
The agreement of partition, exhibit IX, relied on by the third and fourth defendants as evidencing the dedication to charity was executed by Vairappa Tevan, Kuppa Tevan, Palaniappa Tevan, Namasivaya Tevan and Vairappa Tevan and purports to set apart over 30 acres of land in Ekkur village for the upkeep of the choultry besides other lands in other viljages. Sattayappa Tevan and Shunmuga Tevan, the sons of Vairappa Tevan, who were alive at the date of exhibit IX were not parties to the deed of partition and they filed Original Suit No. 26 of 1879 for a partition of all the family properties. The plea raised was that there had been a prior partition effected by Vairappa Tevan evidently under exhibit IX. The parties entered into a rizinama and a decree was passed in terms of the razinama. This is the decree sought to be put in. It appears from the decree that the lands in dispute in this appeal were not dedicated to charity but fell to the share of the first defendant. It is contended that the agreement of partition, exhibit IX, would not bind sons of Vairappa not parties to it as it purported to alienate a considerable extend of lands (about 120 acres) for the upkeep of the choultry and that the power of a Hindu father to effect a division is only validly exercised when it is a fair and equitable partition, he having no power to give properties to strangers. The decision of the Privy Council in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal is relied on.
It is also contended that when the sons not parties questioned the partition, exhibit IX, and there was a razinama decree between the parties whereby other lands were given for the charity it was prima facie the only valid source of title for all parties including the charity.
It may be that defendants have a good answer but unless they show that exhibit IX continued in force in spite of the decree in Original Suit No. 26 of 1879 or was not affected by it the decree will prima facie support the contention of the first plaintiff.
As the document was very material, and as the allegations in the first plaintiff's affidavit (printed at page 68 of the documents) have neither been traversed by the other side nor found to be false by the District Judge, I think that, having regard to the fact that the issue as to dedication was raised only during the course of the final hearing, the decree in Original Suit No. 26 of 1879 (as to the genuineness of which there is no dispute) should have been admitted in evidence by the District Judge.
I am of opinion that the District Judge had power under the circumstances to admit the document in appeal. In Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan it was held that the words “or for any other substantial cause” in section 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 (which corresponds to Order XLI., rule 27, of the present Code) need not be ejuidem generis with the causes stated in the previous part of the section. In Ambuja Ammal v. Appadurai Mudali a similar view was adopted and it was held that the words confer a wide discretion on the Appellate Court to admit additional evidence when the ends of justice require it. The learned-Judges were of opinion that section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred on the Appellate Court all the powers of the Court of first instance and were not inclined to follow the view taken by Abdur Rahim, J. (differing from Phillips, J.) in Subba Naidu v. Ethirajammalia that the expression “any other substantial cause” in Order XLI, rule 27, is not to be understood in a wide and unrestricted sense but should be construed ejusdem generis with the causes in the other parts of the rule. The decision of Phillips, J., was confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal. See Vellayappa Chetty v. Nellaya Pillay. In Venkatachella Pillai v. Ranga Pillai it was held that the expression “for any other substantial cause” gave power to the Appellate Court to admit fresh evidence on the same grounds that would justify the Court of first instance in granting a review and that the discovery of fresh and material evidence after disposal of the suit the decree in which is appealed against would be a substantial cause within the meaning of Order XLI, rule 27. In Peddibotla Kameswaramma…Defendant v. Bezwada Chelapathi…Plaintiff . the decision in Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan was followed. Arasappa Pillai v. Maniki Mudaliyar(7) is distinguishable on the ground that the party had declared in the first Court that he had, no evidence and the District Judge suo motu remanded the case for fresh evidence to be taken. The learned Judges, while referring to Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan, were not prepared to extend the rule to such cases. In Marimuthu Pillai v. Velu Pillai no grounds were shown why the evidence was not adduced in the lower Court and the District Judge acted suo motu and remanded the case.
It is argued that where fresh evidence is discovered after judgment which would justify the original Court in granting a review the party should withdraw the appeal and apply for a review. This would obviously work hardship where the fresh document or evidence would only cover one or more of the issues and would not affect the decision of the other matters decided by the lower Court which are included in the grounds of appeal. Besides if Order XLT, rule 27, empowers the Appellate Court to admit the evidence so discovered there is no reason why a party who has paid Court fee; for the appeal should be again compelled to pay Court fee for a review of judgment especially as he will have to pay the full Court fee if the review is presented after ninety days and one half of it is paid before.
As the District Judge had power to admit the document, there can be little doubt that he failed to exercise his discretion judicially. The only ground given by him for not admitting the document is that there would be no end to litigation if parties were allowed to produce further evidence in appeal. His duty was to see if the applicant's allegitions were proved and the document sought to be filed was material and was discovered after the judgment in the lower Court was passed. If he had thought that the document was not material or that even if it was admitted it would not have influenced him in coming to a decision as to the correctness of the lower Court's judgment, it would be another matter. But he did not apply, his mind to any such question but dismissed the petition on a ground that is in my opinion irrelevant to the question in issue.
It is argued that the District Judge had a discretion under Order XLI, rule 27, and that the High Court cannot in Second Appeal interfere even if he did not exercise his discretion properly. It is well settled that an Appellate Court has power to interfere even if the matter is one relating to the exercise of discretion if the lower Court has exercised the discretion on wrong principles or has disregarded any principle of law—In re Oriental Bank Corporation; Berdan v. Greenwood; in re Terrell. As pointed out by Lindley, L.J, in Young v. Thomas the Appellate Court will interfere if the judgment of the lower Court proceeded on an erroneous principle and had not really exercised any discretion at all. In Sanderson v. Blyth Theatre Company Sterling, L.J, was of opinion that to enable the Appellate Court to interfere there must be either a disregard of principle or a misapprehension of facts.
Section 109, clause (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, gives a right of second appeal when there has been a substantial error or defect in that procedure provided by the Code which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. This applies obviously to error or defect of procedure of the lower Appellate Court as well as the Original Court.
I fail to see why the refusal of the lower Appellate Court to exercise its discretion under Order XLI, rule 27, when such refusal is based on a misapprehension of the law or the nature and extant of the powers of an Appellate Court under rule 27 cannot be said to be an error or defect in the procedure adopted by it in hearing the appeal within one meaning of section 100, Civil Procedure Code. The evidence tendered may be such as to show that the decision appealed against cannot be supported and the party may have been perfectly bona fide. To hold that in such cases an Appellate Court may on a totally erroneous, view of its powers under Order XLI, rule 27, reject the evidence tendered and that the High Court in Second Appeal though convinced of the error cannot interfere would lead to obvious hardship. There is nothing in the provisions of section 100 which compel the Court to place such a restriction on its power. In Moni Lal Bandopadhya v. Kheroda Dasi which was a case where the District Munsif refused to grant an adjournment asked for to produce certain witnesses it was held that this was a substantial error in procedure which would justify the High Court in interfering in Second Appeal. The report also contains a judgment by three learned Judges of the High Court where they held that it was open to the High Court in Second Appeal to examine the proceedings to see whether the Court below exercised a sound discretion or not. In Hafiz Abdul Kurrim v. Sri Kissen Rai it was held that improper admission of evidence by the Appellate Court in the exercise of its discretion may be set aside in Second Appeal and in Arasappa Pillai v. Manika Mudaliyar and Marimuthu Pillai v. Velu Pillai already referred to by me the High Court in Second Appeal set aside the Appellate Court's decree on the ground that evidence was wrongly admitted. If a discretion wrongly exercised in admitting evidence under Order XLI, rule 27, can be set aside, I fail to see why a wrong exercise of discretion in refusing to admit material evidence should be allowed to stand.
Two other questions remain for determination. There is nothing to show that the lands specified in exhibit IX are included in the sale-deed to the plaintiff and form part of the plaint mentioned items. The lauds in exhibit IX are described by paimash numbers and there is nothing to show what the corresponding survey numbers are. I find no admission appearing anywhere to show that the items excluded by the decree of the Subordinate Judge as charity properties are the items in exhibit IX. The allegations by the vakil for the appellant that certain items specified in the third defendant's petition to raise additional issues (printed at page 84 of the printed papers) are not in the decree and certain items not in the petition find their place in the decree are not shown to be incorrect. There should be a clear finding as to which on the items claimed in the plaint and covered by the sale-deed to plaintiff were included in exhibit IX and dedicated to charity.
As regards mesne profits no reason has been assigned for not granting the prayer of the plaintiff for future mesne profits in respect of the lands which have been decreed to him. Order XX, rule 12, empowers the Court to assess future mesne profits and there is no reason to drive plaintiff to another suit.
I would reverse the decree of the Subordinate Judge in so far as it dismisses the plaintiff's suit and direct the District Judge to dispose of the appeal after admitting the document sought to be filed in the light of the above observations. It will be open to the District Judge to raise further issues. Costs will abide and follow the result.
As my learned brother takes a different view as to the powers of the High Court to interfere in Second Appeal, I agree to the order of reference to the Full Bench proposed by him.
On this Reference
K. Bhashyam Ayyangar (with him S. Panchapagesa Sastri) for appellants.—The additional evidence is admissible under the latter portion of clause (b) in Order XLI, rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, which mentions “other substantial cause” as a ground for admitting evidence. This portion is not controlled by the words that the Court “requires to be produce, etc.” The learned Judges in the Order of Reference agree that additional evidence can be admitted under the latter portion of clause (b) of rule 27, Order XLI. It is at best a question of discretion for the lower Court. But an appeal lies even in a case of discretion, if the lower Court has not exercised a discretion at all or exercised it on wrong principles. In such cases the High Court can interfere in second appeal. The only ground given by the District Judge for refusing to admit evidence is that there would be no end to litigation if parties were allowed to produce further evidence on appeal. There has been here no exercise of discretion at all, or, even if there were, there is no exercise on sound principles. There is a discretion to be exercised by the Court even in cases falling on clause (a); under clause (b) also, the discretion exercised can be revised by the High Court on similar grounds. The same considerations apply for admitting additional evidence in appeal as on review. See Venkatachella Pillai v. Ranga Pillai. If a document was admitted as additional evidence for sufficient cause, it has been held that the High Court can interfere in Second Appeal, and hold that such evidence was not properly admitted. See Kameswaramma v. Ghuapathi. The High Court can go into the sub-stantiality of the cause for admitting evidence, though not into the merits of the case, and either reject or admit the evidence. See Arasappa Pillai v. Maniha Mudaliyar, Marimuthu Pillai v. Velu Pillai Ram Piari v. Kallu, Durga Prasad v. Jai Narain and Gauri Rai v. Bhaggina. There is a discretion to be exercised in the awarding of costs, under section 35, Civil Procedure Code. The language used is similar to that used in Order 41, rule 27. It has been held that an Appellate Court can interfere if costs were awarded on wrong principles. In this case the issue, for which the additional evidence was sought to be admitted, was framed as an additional issue at a very late stage of the case and depended on facts which were not within the knowledge of the plaintiff who was an outsider (purchaser) and related to a compromise decree which nullified an alleged partition now set up contrary to the compromise decree. The refusal to admit the evidence was an irregular and improper exercise of discretion by the lower Court. Though a matter may be discretionary with the lower Court, an Appellate Court can interfere on appeal; e.g, in cases of adjournment, though discretionary, the High Court has interfered in Second Appeal. See Moni Lal Bandopadhya v. Kheroia Dasi, Talma Singh v. Bhagwan Das, Queen v. Adamson(8), Bhaxoani Kunwar v. Himmat Bahadur(9), Sanderson v. Blyth Theatre Company(10), In re Terrell(11), Young v. Thomas(12), Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram(13) and Sharp v. Wakefield(14). Reference was made to “Yearly Practice,” page 965, as to appeal in discretionary matters.
T.M Krishnaswami Ayyar for respondents.—Order XLI, rule 27, negatives the right of the party to adduce additional evidence. Section 107, Civil Procedure Code, should be read subject to rules prescribed, i.e, under Order XLI, rule 27. It is not the right of the party but the option or discretion of the Court. The party cannot ‘require’ the Court to do a thing. If the Appellate Court does not require a document, the party cannot compel the Court to receive it. Under Order 41, rule 27, the Judge must foll a need for additional evidence and then alone jurisdiction arises for the Judge to exercise a discretion. In the old Code of 1859 also, the language used is “if the Court require” same as in, the present Code; the Calcutta High Court has uniformly held that the discretion cannot be interfered with by the High Court—Beckwith v. Kishto Jeebun Buchihee, Golam Mukdoom v. Mussamut Hafeezoonissa, Kulpo Singh v. Thakoor Singh. In the goods of Premchand Moonshee Upendra Mohan Ghose v. Gopai Chandra Ghose, Ram Piari v. Kallu, and Durga Prasad v. Jai Narain. If the Appellate Court does not require further evidence, there is no scope for exercise of jurisdiction, and the High Court has no scope to interfere in the matter. The Privy Council has held in Kessowji Issur v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, that ‘requires’ means ‘needs’ or ‘finds needful.’ There is no case in Bombay or Madras or anywhere in which additional evidence refused to be admitted by the lower Appellate Court has been admitted by the High Court. Reference was made to Ambuja Ammal v. Appadurai, Mudali, Garden Bench Spinning and Manufacturing Company v. Secretary of State for India. In this case the petition and the appeal were heard together and the lower Appellate Court did not require the document to enable it to pronounce judgment, and there is an end of the matter.
K. Bashyam Ayyangar in reply.—There are practically three clauses in Order XLI, rule 27. This question is under clause 3, i.e, latter portion of clause (b). The Court may allow the evidence for other sufficient cause, and need not ‘require’ it as under the first portion. The three categories should be kept separate. See Andiappa Pillai v. Muthukumara Thevan, Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal, Satis v. Takurdas and Kaniz Mustafa v. Musi Imram. In the Code of 1859, there was no splitting up of the clauses; in the Codes of 1877, 1882 and 1908; the clauses were split up; in the Code of 1882, there was a semicolon after the first, portion of clause(b) in section 568. In the old Calcutta cases, a discretion had been judicially exercised, and they do not touch the present point. Where the lower Appellate Court has declined to exercise it or exercised it on wrong principle?, the High Court can and will interfere with the order of the lower Court.
Opinion
Wallis, C.J:— The attention of the learned Judges who made the reference does not appear to have been called to the long catena of decisions in Calcutta and to the decisions to the same effect in Allahabad. Shortly after the coming into force of the Code of 1859 it was decided by Sir Barnes Peacock and Jackson, JJ.—Beckwith v. Kishto Jeebun Buckshee—that no special or Second Appeal lay from a refusal by the lower Appellate Court to admit fresh evidence under section 355 of that Code which reappears as Order XLI, rule 27, of the present Code. The decisions in Mohesh Ghunder Sheet v. Shoshee Mookhee Debia, Golam Mukdoom v. Mussamut Hafee-Zoonissa, Kulpo Singh v. Thakoor Singh, and in the goods of Prem Ghand Moonshee Upendra Mohan Ghose v. Gopal Chandra Ghose, are to the same effect, as are the decisions of the Allahabad Court in Ram Piari v. Kallu and Burga Prasad v. Jai Narain. There are no reported decisions in Madras and Bombay, as there must have been, if this long line of authorities had ever been questioned in these Courts. It has, I chink, long been the practice of all the High Courts not to entertain second appeals from refusals of the lower Appellate Court to admit fresh evidence under this rule. I am not prepared to depart from this practice and would answer the question in the negative.
Ayling, J.:— In my opinion the answer to the reference must be in the negative. The effect of Order XLI, rule 27, clause (b), is to empower an Appellate. Court to admit additional evidence provided it requires the evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. Whether it requires the additional evidence or not is for the Appellate Court itself to say, and it is not for a superior Court to control its discretion, or to say that it ought to have required it, where, as a fact, it did not., I would respectfully adopt the reasoning of Sale, J., in In the goods of Prent Ghand Moonshee Upendra Mahan Ghose v. Gopal Chandra Ghose, which is in accordance with a long catena of early Calcutta decisions beginning with a judgment of Peacock, C.J, and Jackson, J., reported in Marshall's Reports, page 278. That the word ‘requires’ in the corresponding section 568 of the old Code means nothing more than needs or finds needfull has been expressly decided by the Privy Council in Kessowji Issur v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, and this pronouncement, as it seems to me, concludes the matter if authority were needed.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— I regret that I have the misfortune to differ from my Lord and Ayding, J., on this reference. It having been now settled in this Court that good grounds for review are also good grounds for the Appellate Court to allow further evidence to be adduced, the question whether the Appellate Court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to admit such evidence seems to be clearly a question of law which we are entitled to consider in Second Appeal.
As regards clause (b) of Order XLI, rule 27, I am clear that “or for any other substantial cause” is not governed by the expression “the Appellate Court requires.” The 355th section in the old Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) from which this Order XLI, rule 27, has come down clearly shows that ‘or for any other substantial cause’ is an independent ground and is not governed by the words in the first portion of clause (b), there being no division into clauses in the old Act of 1859, section 355. It cannot be argued for a moment that if the Appellate Court notwithstanding that the condition in clause (a) has been fulfilled (namely, the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred having refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted) refuses in appeal to admit such evidence, the second Appellate Court cannot interfere with that discretion so improperly exercised by the first Appallate Court. I do not see why when the condition in what I call the third clause, namely, the existence of any other substantial cause, is fulfilled and yet the discretion to admit additional evidence in such a case is wrongly exercised by the first Appellate Court, the second Appellate Court should be prevented from interfering. As regards the Allahabad and Calcutta cases, if they meant more than that the discretion given in cases falling under clause (b) to the first Appellate Court should not be lightly interfered with by the Second Appellate Court, I respectfully differ from those decisions. Lat me put the following illustration: The trial Court in a clear case where it ought to have granted a review on the ground of conclusive evidence which was not in the power of a party to produce having been afterwards discovered rejects the application for review—such rejection is not appealable. But this Court has power under its general revisional powers to direct the trial Court to accept the application for review. If so, why should the Court be powerless because a Second Appeal has been preferred from the decision of an Appellate Court which, in a similarly clear case, refused to exercise its discretion to admit additional evidence, such a case being (as I said) fully analogous to an application for review? Further section 105, clause (1), shows that even where an appeal might not lie from an order made by the Appellate Court (such as an order refusing to admit additional evidence) where the decree of the Appellate Court itself is appealed against in Second Appeal, the error in the interlocutory order refusing admit additional evidence may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of Second Appeal.
Again suppose that treating the order of a District Court refusing to admit additional evidence as an independent order, a revision petition had been filed to this Court against that order, I see nothing to prevent us in a clear case from setting aside that order in revision. Why should such a prayer for revision of that order be not embodied as a ground in the memorandum of Second Appeal?
In the result, I agree with Kumabaswami Sastri, J., in saying that this Court has power in Second Appeal to consider the propriety of the exercise of the discretion of the District Judge as regards the admission of additional evidence though, of course, that discretion would not be interfered with lightly any more than the discretion of a Court rejecting a review petition would be lightly interfered with in revision. I think that the power to consider and decide on the question should be affirmed as existing in this Court in Second Appeal.
K.R
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