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Meenakshi Achi v. Somasundaram Pillai
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued for (a) a declaration that he alone is entitled to the management of the "Pichai Kattalai" in the Amirtagateswaraswami temple at Tirukkadaiyur and to possession of the lands attached to it, and alternatively (b) that he should be given joint possession and management with the defendant. The plaintiff's primary claim rests on his being the seniormost male descendant of the founder Chidambaram Pillai and on the exclusion of female family members; the alternative claim asserted joint trusteeship as the only surviving male members of the junior branch.
Originally there was one defendant, Paratneswara (Parameswara). During the suit he died; his widow became the second defendant and a son-in-law alleged to be in possession of the lands is the third defendant. The Subordinate Judge had held that the plaintiff was solely entitled to management and enjoyment of the lands; that decree was attacked by both sides and the defendants appealed.
The Court traced the historical background: the original founder endowed the properties in the early nineteenth century; the Board of Revenue briefly managed the Kattalai and in 1857 restored management to two family members representing senior (Namasivaya) and junior (Ambalavana) branches. Disputes led to Original Suit No. 19 of 1866, which fixed shares among claimants (Exhibit A). Subsequent litigation in 1876 resulted in decrees for possession executed by Ambalavana and other plaintiffs; Ambalavana alone took muchilikas for several years, but the Court regarded that as management on behalf of the family rather than exclusive ouster. Transfers of interests to the Pandara Sannadhi (1878 and 1883) produced a suit in 1891 that was ultimately compromised and released in favour of the then-manager, Arunachala. Arunachala managed till 1902; his son Vythilinga succeeded and died in 1912 leaving a will in favour of Parameswara (the original defendant). The present suit was instituted in 1913.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff is solely entitled to the management and possession of the Pichai Kattalai and its lands by virtue of being the seniormost male descendant (and whether female members are thereby excluded).
- Whether, alternatively, the plaintiff and the defendant are entitled to be declared joint trustees entitled to joint possession and management as the only surviving male members of the junior branch.
- Whether Ambalavana, Arunachala, Vythilinga or their successors acquired exclusive trusteeship by will or by adverse (prescriptive) possession.
- Whether the office of trustee in this public institution is indivisible and must be governed by succession rules akin to impartible estates (as contended by some authorities relied upon by the respondent).
- Whether the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed because he did not seek a formal scheme of management.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by the Advocate-General)
- Ambalavana was in sole management when he willed away his right of management to Arunachala; Arunachala thereby became solely entitled under the will and by adverse possession for over twelve years.
- Vythilinga inherited that exclusive right and the defendant claiming under Vythilinga's will (Parameswara) is entitled to exclusive trusteeship and possession.
- The plaintiff had not sought a scheme of management and, on that ground, the suit should be dismissed.
Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar for the respondent)
- The plaintiff, as the seniormost male member of Chidambaram's family, was entitled to sole trusteeship and management to the exclusion of others (including female members).
- Alternatively, as the only male member of the junior branch, the plaintiff is entitled to rights excluding females in that branch.
- Relied upon precedents (Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti and Chenna Kesavaraya v. Vaidelinga) for the proposition that the office of trustee in a public institution is indivisible and succession should follow rules for impartible estates.
- The second defendant (the widow) is disqualified from management by reason of sex, relying on earlier suit-language describing the entitled persons as "descendants" of the founder.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti | Invoked by respondent for the proposition that the office of trustee in a public institution is indivisible and succession should be regulated like impartible estates. | The Court observed that the course of decisions in the Presidency (with sanction of the Judicial Committee) is opposed to this principle, and that Purappavanalingam Chetti has not been regarded as binding authority for that proposition. |
| Chenna Kesavaraya v. Vaidelinga | Also relied on by respondent for the indivisibility/impartible-estate principle in succession to trusteeship. | The Court stated this authority similarly has not been treated as binding in the Presidency and did not adopt the proposition urged by respondent. |
| Ramanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty | Principle that hereditary trusteeship in a public institution descends in the same manner as ordinary family property; the Judicial Committee held the trust to be public and management devolved on all members of the founder's family. | The Court applied this decision to the present case to hold that trusteeship devolved on the general body of the founder's heirs (including the plaintiff), and to reject the contention that the office was indivisible in the manner contended for by the respondent. |
| Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar | Contained observations (by Sir Walter Phillimore) referring to Ramanathan Chetty; some of these observations were used to question the application of Ramanathan Chetty. | The Court treated the relevant observations as obiter and as proceeding on a misconception of facts; the Court did not accept them as undermining the applicability of Ramanathan Chetty to public trusts like the present one. |
| Annaya Tantri v. Ammakka Hengau | Full Bench decision indicating that widows of divided members cannot be superseded by reversions in the context of religious offices (cited by the Court). | The Court relied on this decision to reject the submission that widows and daughters of divided members are necessarily excluded from management; it supported the view that females are not automatically disqualified from managing charitable or secular trust offices unless cogent evidence of custom exists. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by tracing the historical record of endowment, restoration of management, prior suits and transfers and then analysed the competing contentions against those facts.
-
On the claim of exclusive management by will or by adverse possession:
- The Court found that Ambalavana's joining others in the 1876 suit and his taking possession in execution of that decree did not indicate an intention to oust other family members. Rather, his management was on behalf of the whole founder's family.
- Consequently Ambalavana could not be treated as having the sole management right to will away adversely to others; Arunachala's subsequent management was likewise held to be on behalf of the family.
- The fact that the Magistrate maintained Arunachala, the plaintiff and the defendant in possession after complaints from the Pandara Sannadhi demonstrated that others were not ousted; the Court therefore rejected any finding that Arunachala (or Vythilinga) had acquired prescriptive rights to exclude other family members.
-
On the senior-most male rule (exclusive right of the seniormost male):
- The Court observed that the contention had not been established by cogent evidence: there were senior members during Arunachala's and Vythilinga's lifetimes who did not assert exclusive rights, and the alleged custom or tradition was not proved.
- The presence and transactions of persons such as Kanakasabhai (who had parted with rights) complicated the contention, but even so the Court held the seniormost-male rule was not proved applicable.
-
On exclusion of female members from management:
- The Court rejected the submission that widows and daughters were necessarily excluded. It examined the language in earlier suits and noted it did not properly translate into an exclusion of females.
- Citing authority (including a Full Bench decision), the Court emphasised that, absent cogent evidence of usage excluding females, widows and daughters cannot be treated as disqualified from managing charity property; in a secular office like the present there was no justification for excluding them.
-
On the nature of trusteeship and application of precedent:
- The Court relied on Ramanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty (including the Judicial Committee's view) to hold that hereditary trusteeship of a public institution devolves on the general body of the founder's heirs and descends like ordinary family property.
- Accordingly, the Court declined to accept the indivisible/impartible-office rule urged for public institutions and applied the reasoning of Ramanathan Chetty to the present facts.
-
On remedy and scope of plaintiff's suit:
- The Court rejected the Advocate-General's argument that the plaintiff's failure to seek a scheme of management mandated dismissal. It held that a co-heir may sue for a declaration of his right to share in management and for joint possession; a scheme can be fixed later by heirs or by the Court if necessary.
- Accordingly the Court modified the Subordinate Judge's decree: rather than declaring the plaintiff solely entitled, the Court declared the plaintiff entitled to manage the trust along with the second defendant (the widow in possession) and any other family members who have not lost their rights.
- The Court did not decide the rights of Vythilinga's widow or other non-parties about whom the record was silent.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court modified the decree below and declared that the plaintiff is entitled to manage the trust along with the second defendant (the widow now in possession). The Court rejected the claim that any of the active managers had acquired exclusive trusteeship by will or by prescription, and rejected the contention that female members are automatically disqualified from management.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiff is entitled to joint management and possession of the Kattalai with the second defendant and any other members of the founder's family who retain their rights.
- The earlier decree of the Subordinate Judge (which had awarded sole management to the plaintiff) was modified to reflect joint entitlement rather than sole entitlement.
- Each party was ordered to bear his or her own costs; the Court directed that no portion of the costs should be paid out of the charity property.
Broader implications: The Court applied and affirmed the approach in Ramanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty for hereditary trusteeship in public institutions — treating such trusteeship as devolving upon the general body of the founder's heirs rather than as an indivisible office governed by rules of impartible succession. The Court did not purport to create a new general rule beyond its application of existing authorities.
N.R
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
The plaintiff sues for a declaration that he is solely entitled to the management of ‘Pichai Kattalai’ in the Amirtagateswaraswami temple at Tirukkadaiyur and to the possession of the lands attached to the said Kattalai; in the alternative, he claims that he should be given joint possession and management with the defendant. His first claim is based on the plea that as he is the seniormost male among the descendants of the original founder, Chidambaram Pillai, he alone is entitled to the sole management and possession of the Kattalai. Incidentally, he contends that the female members of the family of Chidambaram Pillai have no right. His second claim is based on the ground that as he and the defendant are the only surviving male members of the junior branch of the original founder's family, they should both be declared trustees entitled to joint possession and management, of the Kattalai and its emoluments. This claim also involves the contention that female members have no right.
Originally there was only one defendant, Paratneswara. During the course of the suit he died, and his widow is the second defendant, and the son-in-law, who is alleged to be in sole possession of the lands, is the third defendant. The Subordinate Judge, in a judgment which both sides have attacked as being inconsistent with itself and as being inconclusive as regards the findings, held that the plaintiff was solely entitled to the management of the Kattalai and to the enjoyment of the lands appertaining thereto. The defendants have appealed.
Before dealing with the contentions raised on either side, it is desirable to state some facts.
The original founder, Chidambaram Pillai, No. 1, is said to have endowed the properties in the beginning of the nineteenth century after some years, the Board of Revenue took up the management of the Kattalai but in 1857, they restored to two members of the family, Namasivaya and Ambalavana, representing respectively the senior and the junior branches, the management of the Kattalai and the enjoyment of the lands. Disputes soon arose as regards the rights of the other members for a share in the management. Original Suit No. 19 of 1866 was filed by three persons representing both the senior and the junior branches against Namasivaya and Ambalavana and others belonging to both the branches, for the purpose of defining the respective rights of the members of the family. Exhibit A is the judgment in the case, and it shows that the rights of the various parties to the suit were adjusted by giving them definite shares. It may be pointed out that the shares fixed do not exactly correspond with what would have been obtained under the Hindu Law had the Kattalai been regarded as private property.
The next litigation was in 1876 by Ambalavana, Chidambaram Pillai (No. 2) and others, against some of the tenants. A decree was obtained for possession and it is clear that decree was executed not only by Ambalavana but also by the other plaintiffs to whom shares were allotted in the suit of 1866. It is true that after the execution of the decree against the tenants (vide Exhibit VI series) muchilikas were taken for a number of years by Ambalavana alone. This is not sufficient evidence to show that Ambalavana had ousted the other members of the family from possession or management. The previous suits and the course of events suggest that as a matter of convenience Ambalavana was permitted to manage the Kattalai without prejudice to the rights of the other members of the family.
In 1878, one Muttuswami, son of Kuttala Pillai, one of the plaintiffs in the suit of 1866, transferred his share of management to the Pandara Sannadhi of Dharmapuram (Exhibit B). In 1883, Namasivaya's son, Kanakasabhai, transferred his right to the same Pandara Sannadhi (Exhibit B-1). On the strength of these two docuisents the Pandara Sannadhi instituted a suit in 1891 for a share in the management of the Kattalai. Arunachala Pillai, who belonged to the second branch, was the first defendant. Somasundaram Pillai, the present plaintiff, was the second defendant. Paraineswara Pillai, the original defendant in this suit, was the third defendant. The fourth defendant was the widow of Ambalavana Pillai. It may be mentioned that, at this time, Arunachala Pillai was in sole management of the Kattalai under a will left by Ambalavana in his favour. The allegation of the Pandara Sannadhi was that the defendants were unlawfully excluding him and his transferors from the management of the Kattalai, that an attempt made by his transferors to obtain possession of the lands under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code had failed, inasmuch as the Magistrate maintained the possession of the defendants, and that by virtue of the right possessed by his transferors, he was entitled to a share in the management of the Kattalai and the enjoyment of the properties (vide Exhibit C, paragraph 6). The plea of Arunachala in this suit was that the senior branch from whose members the Pandara Sannadhi had obtained the transfer had been totally excluded for over the statutory period, and that therefore the plaintiff had no subsisting right which he could enforce. He pleaded that the management should be in the family of the founder, and that a stranger was not, entitled to acquire any rights in it. He accepted the statement that the Magistrate maintained him and his co-defendants in possession of the property as correct (vide Exhibit C-1, paragraph 6). He further stated that he was exclusively managing the Kattalai. The other defendants, including the plaintiff and the Original defendant in the present suit, stated that they adopted the contentions of Arunachala (Exhibit C-2). The suit, was ultimately compromised by the Pandara Sannadhi receiving back, the consideration paid by him to his two transferors and executing a release in favour of Arunachala of all his rights (Exhibit C-5). Arunachala continued in management till 1902. Muchilikas were executed by tenants to him alone (Exhibit VI series). His son Vythilinga succeeded him and died in 1912. He left a will in favour of Parameswara, the original defendant in this case. This suit was instituted in 1913.
We have thus far traced the history of this litigation up to the date of the suit. Now, we shall deal with the contentions put forward on either side. The learned Advocate-General, for the appellant, contended that Ambalavana was in sole management when he willed away his right of management to Arunachala, that Arunachala became solely entitled to it under the will as well as by adverse possession for over twelve years, that Vythilinga inherited this right, and that the defendant who claimed under the will of Vythilinga was therefore entitled to the exclusive right of trusteeship and to the possession of the property. We are unable to agree with this contention. So far as Ambalavana is concerned, it is clear that by joining the other members of the family in instituting the suit against the tenants and in taking possession jointly with them of the property from which the tenants were evicted he never intended to set up any right adversely to the members of the family. His management must be taken to have been on behalf of all the members of the founder's family. It is the commonest thing in this part of India for one of the members of a family who happens to be more intelligent than the others to manage charities like the present one. It stands to reason that such management should be regarded as being held on behalf of all the members and not adversely to them, therefore, we must hold that Ambalavana had not become the sole manager and that he had no right to will away that right in favour of Aruna-ohala. In our opinion, Arunachala also took up the management on behalf of the other members of the family because he was considered to be better fitted than others to conduct the affairs. Arunachala in his own statement in the suit of the Pandara Sannadhi (Exhibit C-1) says that he assisted Ambalavana during his lifetime. It was therefore natural that he should have been selected to continue the management.
As regards the contention that Arunachala himself by exclusive management became solely entitled to it, the facts are against it. In 1883, immediately on the death of Ambalavana, the transferors of the Pandara Sannadhi complained to the Magistrate and asked that Arunachala, the present plaintiff, and the defendant should be restrained from interfering, with theft possession. The Magistrate held that Arunachala, the plaintiff, and the defendant should be retained in possession. This fact is alleged in the plaint of the Pandara Sannadhi (Exhibit C), and is accepted in the written statement of Arunachala (Exhibit C-1). As we have stated already, the fact that he was solely looking after the affairs of the Kattalai is not, without more, evidence of ouster of the others, in view, especially of the fact that they were also maintained in their possession by the order of the Magistrate. We must, therefore, negative the contention that Arunachala had acquired a prescriptive right against the other members of his family. Vythilinga managed only for ten years and we are not prepared to say that his management was adverse to the others. On his death disputes at once arose. In our opinion, it has not been proved that any of the active trustees acquired by prescription the right to exclude the other members of the family through whom the plaintiff claims.
We must now deal with the contention of Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar for the respondent. He argued that the plaintiff, as the seniormost male member in the family of Chidambaram, was entitled to the sole trusteeship. The first answer by the learned Advocate-General to this suggestion was that there is the Kanakasabhai who belongs to the senior branch and who is older than the defendant. If the contention, of the respondent that the senior most male member is entitled to manage to the exclusion of the other members is well-founded, it would have to be considered whether the existence of Kanakasabhai is any bar to such a right, because we find that Kanakasabhai had not only parted with his rights in favour of the Pandara Sannadhi by Exhibit B-1, but that after the suit of the Pandara Sannadhi by a document, dated 7th September 1891 (Exhibit C-6) he and the other members of the senior branch of the family in terms relinquished, their rights in favour of Arunachala. But, in our opinion, the contention of the learned vakil for the respondent that the seniormost male is entitled to sole management has not been made out. As pointed out by the Subordinate Judge, during the lifetime of Arunachala and Vythilinga, there were senior members who did not assert their rights to sole management as against the active trustee. The custom or tradition in the family in this behalf has not been established by any cogent evidence. We must overrule this contention.
It was next argued by Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar that, as the plaintiff is now the only male member in the junior branch, he is entitled to the right to the exclusion of the females. He relied upon Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti and on Chenna Kesavaraya v. Vaidelinga, for the proposition that the office of a trustee in a public institution is indivisible and that succession to it must be regulated as in the case of impartible estates. However much one may wish that such a rule of law should obtain in regard to the management of trusts, we are of opinion that the course of decisions in this Presidency, which has the sanction of the Judicial Committee, is opposed to this principle. In Ramanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty, Sir V. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., pointed out that the right of trusteeship in a public institution possessed by the members of a family, when it is hereditary, descends in the same manner as the right to the enjoyment of ordinary family property. In that case, the founder who was the last trustee, had two wives. Both the wives had a number of sons. The dispute was as regards the right of management among the sons. The Madras High Court holding that the senior branch had lost its right owing to adverse possession decided that the arrangement among the members of the junior branch to manage the trust by rotation must be upheld. The matter was taken up to the Privy Council and in the very opening sentence of the judgment delivered by Lord Macnaghten in Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti, it is pointed out that it was a public trust and that the right of management has: devolved upon all the members of the family. This decision of the Judicial Committee has been applied to public trusts in a very large number of cases in this Presidency, and Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti and Chenna Kesavaraya v. Vaidelinga, quoted by the learned Vakil, have never been regarded as binding authorities. Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar laid stress on certain observations contained in Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar, in the course of which. Sir Walter Phillimore, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, referred to Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti, as relating to a private trust. These observations which were purely obiter, appear to have proceeded on some misconception as to the facts of that case, as it cannot be contended that the trusteeship of a public temple is a private trust. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti proceeded on the view that such a trust was a public trust, and applying that decision to the present case we must hold that in this case also the trusteeship devolved on the general body of the founder's heirs, of whom the plaintiff is one. The learned vakil for the plaintiff-respondent also contended that the second defendant, the widow of the first defendant, Parameswara, who is now in possession and management through her son-in-law, the third defendant, is disqualified by reason of her sex. He relied upon the judgments in the suits of 1866, 1871, etc., which speak of the descendants of the founders as being entitled to the management. We have looked into the original and the language is Yamshasta which is not accurately translated as ‘descendant.’ Even otherwise we fail to see, except when it is established by cogent evidence that there is custom to that effect, how the widows and daughters of a divided member can be excluded from the management of charity property. Even in regard to religious offices, this Court has held in a Full Bench decision that the widows of divided members cannot be superseded by the reversions [Annaya Tantri v. Ammakka Hengau]. A fortiori in the case of a secular office like the present, there is absolutely no justification for the contention that they are not entitled to manage. The evidence as to usage has been fully discussed by the Subordinate Judge and we agree with his conclusion that it has not been shown that females are not entitled to manage this Kattalai.
The result of the above discussion is that the plaintiff is one of the persons entitled to manage the Kattalai along with the second defendant and any other members of the family who have not lost their right. One of them, who has not been made a party to the suit, is the widow of Vythilingam. There may be others about whom the record is silent.
The question on these facts is whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief, and if so, to what. The learned Advocate-General contended that as the plaintiff had not brought a suit for settling a scheme of management, his suit should be dismissed. We are unable to see the force of this, contention. The fact that the persons entitled to the office of the trustee may not be able to work harmoniously together is not a ground for dismissing a suit by one of the heirs of the founder for a declaration of his right to share in the management and for joint possession of the trust properties with the heir who is now in possession and management. If it is found that a, scheme of management is necessary in the interests of the institution, such a scheme may be settled either by the heirs themselves or by resort be the Court. In the absence of such a scheme the plaintiff is entitled to the rights of the joint management and possession claimed in the plaint. We must, therefore, in modification of the decree of the Court below, declare that the plaintiff is entitled to manage the trust along with the second defendant who is now in possession. It is unnecessary to decide anything as to the right's of Vythilinga's widow or other members of the family to share in the management of the Kattalai.
In the circumstances of the case, each party must bear his own costs. No portion of the costs should come out of the charity property.
N.R
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