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Janbazar Manna Estate, Limited, In Re
Judgment Summary — Janbazar Manna Estate, Limited (Winding-up Application)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application under Section 166 of the Companies Act 1913 seeking that Janbazar Manna Estate, Limited be wound up by the Court. It is a joint petition presented by two alleged creditors: Messrs K.K. Dutt & Co. (a firm of attorneys) and Surendradeb Manna of No. 2, Taliganj Circular Road. The petition relies upon two grounds: (1) that the company is unable to pay its debts and (2) that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.
The company is a private family company formed to give effect to a family compromise recorded in a consent decree (dated in the judgment summaries as 6th January 1922 / referred in the memorandum as a decree dated 6th June 1922). The consent terms (as summarised in prior reported proceedings) envisaged treating the properties of Mahesh and Debendra as one joint estate, allotting shares in the new company in proportion to interests, leasing certain properties to the company for 99 years at a fixed rent, and making provision for certain payments (including payments to beneficiaries pursuant to the decree). The company was incorporated with its registered office at No. 25, Padmapukur Road (until recently).
A family pedigree and prior litigation (see Sudhirendra Deb Manna v. Ranendra Deb Manna, A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 539) were placed before the Court. The petition was presented on 16th January (year as per the opinion context). The creditors claim statutory notices dated 5th April 1930; K.K. Dutt & Co. claim Rs. 1,894-14-0 (taxed costs), while Surendradeb claims Rs. 8,753-14-6 under the consent decree and the company’s memorandum (object (K)). The application was opposed by various shareholders and persons asserting authority to represent the company.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners are entitled to the statutory presumption under Section 163(i) of the Companies Act by service of statutory notices said to have been delivered on 5th April 1930.
- Whether, on the evidence, the company is unable to pay its debts within the meaning of Section 162(v) of the Companies Act.
- Whether it is just and equitable to wind up the company within the meaning of Section 162(vi) — in particular, whether the substratum of the company has gone or a deadlock exists making it impossible for the company to carry out its objects.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (K.K. Dutt & Co. and Surendradeb Manna)
- The petitioners relied on statutory notices dated 5th April 1930 addressed to the company at No. 2, Circular Road, Taliganj, and claimed entitlement to the presumption under Section 163(i) that the company was unable to pay its debts.
- K.K. Dutt & Co. contended they were owed a taxed bill of costs (Rs. 1,894-14-0) for professional services rendered to the company.
- Surendradeb relied on a claim (Rs. 8,753-14-6) said to be due under the consent decree and reflected in object (K) of the company's memorandum.
Opponents' Arguments (Representatives of the Company and other Shareholders — e.g., Mr. Page for Ranendra and other shareholders)
- The statutory notices were not served at the company's registered office (No. 25, Padmapukur Road) and therefore petitioners could not rely on the statutory presumption under Section 163(i); the registered office remained at Padmapukur Road on 5th April and no notification of change to the Registrar had been given until 14th April 1930.
- With respect to K.K. Dutt & Co.'s claim, opponents alleged that while the firm acted for the company it had drawn large sums and that because the former secretary (Satindra) obstructed access to the accounts in collusion with the petitioners, other shareholders could not admit the attorneys' claim — i.e., a bona fide dispute exists.
- They suggested procedural and credibility problems with the attorneys' presentation: verification by a clerk, supporting affidavit by the firm's cashier (not by a firm member), and the fact that a member of the firm had purchased a share at Court sale — all supporting suspicion of collusion and motive to stifle the company.
- Regarding Surendradeb's claim, opponents contended that (a) the consent decree pre-dated the company so it was doubtful that the company was liable for that debt, (b) inclusion of the payment in the memorandum's objects did not necessarily make it a debt enforceable by winding-up, and (c) limitation questions might arise.
- They argued that the petition, particularly insofar as advanced by the attorneys, might be aimed at stifling the company (because winding-up could affect priorities such as a contemplated lease) rather than genuinely enforcing an undisputed debt.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sudhirendra Deb Manna v. Ranendra Deb Manna, A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 539 | Source of factual background and prior decisions regarding family disputes and the consent decree; contains the judgments of Costello, J., Rankin, C.J., and C.C. Ghose, J. | The Court incorporated the pedigree and the terms of the family settlement (as summarized in that reported case) into its understanding of the company's formation and objects. |
| Japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Mills, Ltd., A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 625 | Emphasises that the statutory notice is a formal and important document and that provisions of the Act as to its service must be strictly observed. | The Court relied on Rankin, C.J.'s observation in this case to hold that service at the registered office must be strictly observed and consequently that petitioners could not invoke the presumption under Section 163(i) where service was not effected at the registered office. |
| In re Fortune Copper Mining Company | Held that when a company's registered office had been demolished, service at the company's de facto place of business (on secretary and two directors) could be sufficient. | The Court distinguished that decision from the present facts (No. 25 had not been demolished and remained the registered office on 5th April) and therefore did not apply its principle to excuse service at the registered office here. |
| In re Yenidje Tobacco Co. Ltd. | Example where a two-member private trading company was wound up because a complete deadlock existed between equal shareholders/directors. | The Court held the case inapposite because it involved a two-member trading company with an absolute deadlock; the present company was a non-trading family company of several members and therefore materially different. |
| In re American Pioneer Leather Co. Ltd. | Illustrates a situation where the articles expressly provided a mechanism entitling a shareholder to seek winding-up if other shareholders refused to buy his holding. | The Court distinguished this case on its specific articles-based remedy and found it not applicable to the present facts. |
| Loch v. John Blackwood, Limited [1924] A.C. 783 | Decision where lack of meetings, accounts and dividend recommendations, and shaken confidence in directors justified winding-up of a company established to carry on a testator's business. | The Court regarded this authority as more similar in concept but distinguished it: in the present case appointment of certain directors was disputed and no misconduct by those newly appointed was proved; the Court emphasised the ordinary remedy of obtaining a majority rather than winding-up. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in structured steps addressing representation, service of statutory notices, the existence of undisputed debts, and the "just and equitable" ground.
- Representation and contested corporate authority: The Court noted conflicting claims as to who represented the company (Rabindra and Satindra claimed to be managing director and secretary supporting the petition; others claimed a valid general meeting on 11th April 1930 removing them). The Court did not decide the validity of that resolution because it was unnecessary to the determination.
- Service of statutory notices and Section 163(i): Petitioners relied on statutory notices dated 5th April 1930 addressed to No. 2, Circular Road, Taliganj, with a receipt endorsed by Satindra (then secretary). Opponents objected that the registered office remained at No. 25, Padmapukur Road and that no notification of change had been given to the Registrar until 14th April 1930. Relying on the principle (as explained in Japan Cotton Trading) that service of the statutory notice must comply strictly with the Act, the Court held that the omission to serve at the registered office was not excused in the circumstances (No. 25 was standing and occupied) and rejected the petitioners' claim to the presumption under Section 163(i).
-
Proof aliunde of inability to pay: The Court accepted petitioners could nonetheless prove inability to pay by other evidence. It examined the two claimed debts:
- K.K. Dutt & Co.'s taxed bill — the Court found aspects of the firm’s presentation suspicious: one partner appearing to act for both firm and private petitioner, verification by a clerk, affidavit by a cashier rather than by a firm member, and possible purchases/advances relating to shares. There was also an allegation of collusion involving the company's former secretary obstructing access to accounts. Given these factors, the Court found a bona fide dispute as to the attorneys' claim and therefore that this claim could not, of itself, ground compulsory winding-up.
- Surendradeb's claim under the consent decree and object (K) — the Court considered it was not seriously pressed and raised multiple difficulties: the decree pre-dated the company (so it was doubtful the company was liable); inclusion of the payment in the memorandum did not necessarily convert it into a debt enforceable via winding-up; and limitation questions might apply. Consequently, the Court held petitioners had not shown inability to pay within S.162(v).
-
Just and equitable ground (S.162(vi)): The Court analysed whether the substratum of the company had gone or a deadlock existed. It found:
- The substratum (the Manna Estate) still existed and the company had been in possession for several years.
- Although the formation of the company had not resolved family disputes, that fact alone did not justify winding-up.
- There was no proved deadlock of the character found in cases such as In re Yenidje Tobacco Co. Ltd., and distinctions were drawn from cases cited by the parties (including Loch v. John Blackwood and In re American Pioneer Leather Co. Ltd.).
- The Court emphasised that dissatisfied shareholders' ordinary remedy is to obtain a majority and elect a new directorate; practical difficulties alone did not justify winding-up.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the combined analysis of service, disputed debts, and absence of the type of deadlock or destruction of the substratum required by the "just and equitable" clause, the Court concluded the grounds for compulsory winding-up had not been established.
Holding and Implications
Application dismissed.
Direct consequences:
- The petition for compulsory winding-up of Janbazar Manna Estate, Limited was dismissed.
- In the peculiar circumstances of the case the Court made no order as to costs.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; the Court distinguished and applied existing authorities to the facts and resolved the petition on those grounds. No broader legal rule beyond the application of established principles (strictness of service for statutory notices, requirement of undisputed debt for S.162(v), and the necessity of substratum destruction or deadlock for the "just and equitable" ground) was announced.
(End of summary)
1. This is an application under Section 166 of the Companies Act 1913, praying that the Janbazar Manna Estate, Limited, be wound up by the Court. It is a joint petition presented by two alleged creditors, Messrs K.K Dutt & Co., a firm of attorneys, and one Surendradeb Manna of No. 2, Taliganj Circular Road. The grounds on which the order is sought are: (1) that the company is unable to pay its debts and (2) that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up. The company is a private company and it is necessary to state briefly the circumstances which led to its formation. These are set out in some detail in a case, Sudhirendra Deb Manna v. Ranendra Deb Manna . A.I.R 1930 Cal. 539, where will be found the judgments of Costello, J., sitting as Judge of first instance and also of Rankin, C.J, and C.C Ghose, J., dismissing an appeal against the decision of Costello, J.
2. A pedigree of the Manna family has been tendered in this application and I Incorporate it in my judgment:
3. Long and bitter family disputes arose concerning the administration and distribution of the estate of Mahesh and Debendra, and, in 1915, Rabindra instituted a partition suit on the original side of this Court, asking for the administration and partition of those estates. After a fruitless reference to arbitration, a consent decree was made on 6th January 1922. The terms of settlement are thus summarized in the judgment of Rankin, C.J
“The main outline of the terms of settlement was as follows; that the properties left by Mahesh and the properties left by Debendra were to be treated as one joint estate, Sudhirendra and his three brothers being between them entitled to a one-seventh share thereof; that the parties were all to lease out their interest in the properties set out in the schedule for 99 years, at a monthly rent of Rs. 770 to a joint stock company in process of formation to be called the Janbazar Manna Estate Company, Limited, this company to have a capital of Rs. 1,40,000, divided into 1,400 shares of Rs. 100 each, the shares to be allotted to each of the parties in proportion to his interest in the joint estate. The company was to carry on the worship of the Thakurani through the heirs of Debendra, the palas being of two years' duration. The company was also to pay off money which had been raised for the payment of a certain legacy. The company was further to pay certain of the parties sums which were due to them by the joint estate at the date of Jogendra's death.”
4. In accordance with these terms, the company was duly incorporated as a private company, its registered office being until recently at No. 25, Padmapukur Road.
5. Among the objects of the company, as set out in the memorandum of association, is the following:
(K) To pay, as soon as possible, the sum of Rs. 8,753-14-6, Rs. 713-11-3 and Rs. 984-9-3 and Rs. 193-8-0 together with interest hereinafter mentioned, to Surendradeb Manna, Jatindradeb Manna, Rabindradeb Manna and Jogendradeb Manna, respectively, pursuant to the said decree, dated 6th June 1922, in Suit No. 372 of 1915. The sum of Rs. 984-9-3 payable to Rabindradeb Manna is to carry interest at the rate of 31/2 per cent per annum from the date of the marriage of Rabindradeb Manna until repayment. If the amounts due to the said parties be not paid within three years from the date of the said decree, the company is to pay interest at 6 per cent thereon until repayment.
6. The hope that the compromise would put an end to the family disputes has not been fulfilled. In 1928, Sudhirendra, who had then attained majority, filed the suit to which I have referred, for the purpose of setting aside the consent decree. That suit was dismissed with costs by Costello, J., whose decision was, on 19th February of this year, upheld on appeal.
7. This petition was presented on 16th January. The creditors K.K Dutt & Co., claim, in respect of a sum of Rs. 1,894-14-0, the balance of a taxed bill of costs in respect of professional services rendered to the company. The creditor Surendradeb Manna claims, in respect of Rs. 8,753-14-6, due under the consent decree and payable in terms of object (K) appearing in the memorandum. Both creditors claim to have given statutory notices in terms of Section 163(i) of the Companies Act.
8. The present position of the company is peculiar. It is not denied, as far as I understand, that, up to April of this year, Rabindra was the managing director and Satindra the secretary. These two gentlemen support Surendra; and Mr. Sett also appears on behalf of the company, as he claims, to support the petition. He can however only represent the company if Rabindra and Satindra are still managing director and secretary respectively. Mr. S.M Bose also claims to represent the company and oppose the application, as it is claimed that, on 11th April 1930, a general meeting was validly held and a resolution passed removing Rabindra and Satindra and appointing Nagendra and Kshitindra in their places.
9. I have not been asked to decide whether this resolution is valid. The application is also opposed by Mr. Page on behalf of Ranendra and other shareholders. I will now proceed to deal with the allegation that the company is unable to pay its debts. The petitioners claim the benefit of the presumption created by S. 163(i). The statutory demands are dated 5th April 1930, and are addressed to the company at No. 2, Circular Road, Taliganj, Calcutta. Their receipt is evidenced by an endorsement by Satindra of the same date, a time when he was admittedly the company's secretary.
10. The objection is taken that they do not come within the sub-section, since the registered office is not at Taliganj, but at Padmapukur Road. The facts with regard to this are that, in January 1929, owing to certain difficulties raised by Kshitindra, the owner of No. 25, the records and books of the company were removed from Padmapukur Road to Taliganj. From the correspondence, it appears that no exception was taken to this by any share-holder. Yet the fact remains that no notification of the change was given to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies until 14th April 1930.
11. Now, as pointed out by Rankin, C.J, in Japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Mills, Ltd.* . A.I.R 1927 Cal. 625, the statutory notice is a highly formal and important document and it would appear to follow that the provisions of the Act as to its service upon the company must be strictly observed. I have been referred to In re Fortune Copper Mining Company3, where it was held that when the company's registered office had been demolished, service of a winding up petition on the secretary and two directors at the company's de facto place of business was sufficient. However, the facts with which I have to deal are different. No. 25 was not only still standing on 5th April but Ranendra and Kshitindra were still residing there. I find myself unable to accept Mr. S.C Roy's contention that S. 72 shows that a resolution to change the registered office is sufficient, and that the only effect of failure to notify the change is to render the company liable to fine under sub-S. (3). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in this case, the, omission to serve the statutory notice at No. 25 was deliberate. In any event, in my opinion, there was, in the circumstances of the case on 5th April, still a registered office at No. 25, Padmapukur Road, to which all communications and notices might be addressed and no situation had arisen to excuse service of the statutory notice at that address. I therefore hold that the petitioners are not entitled to rely on the presumption afforded by Section 163(i) of the Companies Act.
12. This however is not the conclusion of the matter since the petitioners are entitled to show aliunde that the company is unable to pay its debts, and I suppose that failure to pay an undisputed debt would be as a rule conclusive evidence of this.
13. Mr. Page however maintains that neither debt is undisputed. With regard to the debt of K.K Dutt and Co. he does not question the fact or the conclusiveness of the taxation but he points to allegations in the affidavits used in opposition to the application to the effect that while acting for the company, the firm has drawn large sums from the company and that owing to the obstructive attitude adopted by the former secretary, Satindra, in collusion with the petitioners, the other share holders have not been able to go into the accounts and are therefore not in a position to admit the attorneys' claim.
14. In reply, an affidavit by the cashier of the firm has been used, alleging an adjustment of 31st March 1930 made with the secretary, Satindra, at which all sums paid on any account whatever to the firm were taken into consideration and the balance now claimed settled. Mr. S.C Roy describes this so-called denial of the firm's claim as evasive, and I myself do not consider it to be wholly satisfactory. There are however certain aspects of the situation that compel me to view the claim with some degree of suspicion. Both petitioners appear through one of the partners, it is said, with what truth I know not, really the sole partner, of the attorneys' firm. I certainly have never known of a case where a solicitor of a company has joined with an alleged creditor who is also his client in presenting a winding up petition. Again I do not understand why there is nothing on oath from any member of the firm, the petition is verified by a clerk and the affidavit in reply is by the firm's cashier. It would, to my mind have been far more satisfactory had the allegations as to the debt been supported by the oath or solemn affirmation of a member of the firm, and had the firm itself been represented in the proceedings by an entirely independent attorney.
15. Reference has been made to another matter. It is not denied that the particular member of the firm, who now represents them has purchased Satindra's share in the estate at a Court sale, and it is further alleged that clients of the firm have advanced money on the security of the shares of Satindra, Rabindra and Surendra. The lease to the company contemplated by the terms of settlement has never been executed, but if is were to be executed it would appear from the concluding passage in the judgment of the Chief Justice to which I have referred, to be at least arguable that it will have priority over assignments made and barges created in the meantime. It is clear that this danger would be effectively countered by the winding-up of the company and Mr. Page therefore argues that the application, as far as the attorneys are concerned, is brought for the purpose of stifling the company and not of enforcing the debt. I am not prepared to say that there is no foundation for this suggestion and, taking the situation as a whole, I have come to the conclusion that there is a bona fide dispute as to the attorney's claim, which can therefore not be a ground for an order for compulsory winding-up.
16. The claim of Surendradeb Manna has really not been seriously pressed. Indeed, it is clear that it raises more than one point of difficulty. In so far as it is based on the consent decree of 1922, it is hard to see how it can be a debt due from the company which did not then exist. I also consider it highly doubtful, to put it at its lowest, whether the fact that its payment finds a place among the objects for which the company was incorporated is sufficient to make it a debt upon the non-payment of which an application to wind up can properly be grounded. Mr. Page also indicates that if it is a debt there are questions of limitation to be considered. This being so, I hold that the petitioners have not succeeded in showing that the company is unable to pay its debts within the meaning of S. 162(v), of the Act.
17. It remains to be considered whether it has been shown that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up within the meaning of sub-section (vi). I am in no position to say what would have been the most satisfactory way of dealing with the partition suit, bub it is now reasonably evident that the formation of the family company has not proved a successful solution, but that of itself is no reason for winding-up.
18. To bring the company within the “just and equitable” clause, it must, I think, lin this case, be shown that the substratum of the company has gone, or that a deadlock has arisen in the sense that it is now impossible for the company be carry out the objects for which it was formed. The substratum of the company—namely the Manna Estate—is still in existence and it is not denied that the company has been in possession of it for some years past. As regards the deadlock, it is significant that the party in the family feud represented by Surendra raised no such contention as long as the offices of managing director and secretary were filled by two of its members.
19. My attention has been drawn to certain reported cases on the subject of deadlock. In In re Yenidje Tobacoo Co. Ltd.4, a private company, formed for commercial purposes, consisted of only two directors and shareholders with equal voting power. The two members fell out and relations, became so strained that they would nob speak be one another. The Court of appeal affirmed the order of Astbury, J., to wind up the company on the ground that a complete deadlock existed. The differences between a trading company of two members and a nontrading company of several members are so obvious that I do not see how that case can have any bearing on the one before me. In In re American Pioneer Leather Co. Ltd.5, there was this distinguishing feature: that it was expressly provided by the articles that if one of the three shareholders offered to sell his holding to the other two and they refused to purchase, such shareholder might have the company wound up, the other shareholders undertaking to consent to an order for that purpose if necessary.
20. At first sight the decision of the Judicial Committee in Loch v. John Blackwood, Limited . [1924] A.C 783 seems to be mora in point, for there the company was established as a public company to carry on the business of a testator and divide the profits in accordance with the provisions of his will. When the petition to wind up was presented, the directorate had held office for many years and had also a preponderating voting power. The directors had however omitted to hold general meetings, to submit accounts, or to recommend a dividend and the Judicial Committee considered that, in the circumstances, the confidence of the petitioning shareholders not only in the policy but also in the probity of the directors had been justifiably shaken, and that they were entitled to the order prayed. In this case, it is not even admitted that the appointment of directors on 11th April is valid, nor has it been shown that since that date the “new” directors have misconducted themselves. It is conceded that one party or the other holds a majority of the shares and it seems to me that, although this is a private company and the transfer of shares restricted in the first instance to members of the family or their representatives, the ordinary principle of company law must be observed, namely, that the dissatisfied shareholders' remedy is to obtain a majority in favour of their views and through such majority elect a new directorate. The practical difficulties may be considerable, but this does not, in my opinion, entitle them to the order asked for. I find that the grounds, on which the winding-up order is sought, have not been established and I dismiss the petition, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
B.V/R.K
21. Application dismissed.
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