- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Minor Doraiswami v. Chidambaram Pillai
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was instituted by a reversioner to the estate of Muruga Pillai seeking declarations on behalf of himself and other reversioners that:
- The private sale by the widow (1st defendant) of items 1 to 8 in the plaint schedule was not binding beyond the widow's lifetime; and
- The Court sale of items 9 to 11 (execution sale) that took place during the widow's lifetime was not binding because the widow had died before the actual auction and no legal representative had been placed on the record.
At trial the District Munsif dismissed the suit in toto. On appeal the Additional Subordinate Judge held the Court sale of items 9–11 to be void and decreed for the plaintiff, while finding that the widow's private sale of items 1–8 was binding on the reversioners to the extent of Rs. 1,000 (and made that sum a charge on those items except item 5 and one-half of item 8). A Second Appeal was taken to the High Court, which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a judicial sale (sale in execution) carried out after the death of the judgment-debtor, when no legal representative has been added to the record, is per se void (a nullity) or is at most an irregularity that can be set aside on proof of substantial injury.
- Whether failure to bring the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor on the record during execution proceedings impairs the jurisdiction of the executing Court or merely constitutes an irregularity remedied under appropriate provisions (e.g., Order 21 Rules 89–92, Rule 90, or by suit).
- Whether a private sale by the widow (the deceased's representative in effect) of certain properties, for an allegedly inadequate price and in suspicious circumstances soon after the husband's death, is fraudulent and liable to be set aside, and if so what relief (e.g., a charge for the amount found binding) is appropriate.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff (Reversioner)'s Arguments
- The Court sale of items 9–11 was void because it occurred after the death of Muruga Pillai and no representatives of the deceased owner were brought on the record.
- The private sale of items 1–8 by the widow was not binding on the reversioners beyond her lifetime.
Defendants' Arguments
- The purchaser at the Court auction (2nd defendant) claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value; no finding displaced that claim in the lower appellate Court.
- The widow's private sale to the 2nd defendant was argued (by the buyer/defendant) to be binding to the extent of the consideration recorded (the Additional Subordinate Judge had held Rs. 1,000 to be binding on the estate for certain items).
- No applications under Order 21 Rules 89, 90 or 91 (CPC) had been made to set aside the execution sale, and the sale was confirmed under Rule 92 with a sale certificate issued.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180 | The report set aside a sale on the ground that further process of sale could not issue without representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor being on the record. | The opinion notes this authority was relied on by the Subordinate Judge to support the view that a sale after death without representatives is void; the Court analysed and distinguished it on the basis that it does not necessarily pronounce the sale a nullity in all circumstances. |
| Krishnayya v. Unnissa Begam (1892?) I.L.R. 15 M. 399 | Omission to bring legal representatives on record treated as a material irregularity that must necessarily cause substantial injury to the legal representative (as reflected in that decision). | The opinion records that this case treats omission as a material irregularity; the Court rejected the proposition that such omission necessarily leads to substantial injury without proof and declined to adopt this absolute rule. |
| Groves v. Administrator-General (1898) I.L.R. 22 M. 119 | Repeated the view (called a fallacy by the present Court) that sale of a dead man's property passes no rights to purchaser; in result the sale was not treated as a nullity but set aside in revision. | The Court records the case and treats its ultimate result as not supporting a rule of automatic nullity; it is placed among authorities showing variation in approach and ultimately weighed against Privy Council authority. |
| Rayarappan Nambiar v. Mallikandai Akketh Mayan (1914) 26 M.L.J. 267 | Followed Ramaswami and Groves and attempted to distinguish the Privy Council decision in Mallikarjun v. Narhari. | The opinion notes this decision follows the earlier Madras view and attempts to distinguish the Privy Council decision; the Court regards it as part of the body of local authorities which it reviews but does not treat as decisive over Privy Council authority. |
| Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 | Held by a Bench of the Court that a sale in execution carried out against a dead person (or no person) is void and should be regarded as a nullity. | The Additional Subordinate Judge relied on this decision to hold the execution sale void; the present Court disagreed with the view that such sales are per se void and considered the decision based on a fallacy, preferring Privy Council authority. |
| Narayana Kothan v. Kalianasundaram Pillai (1895) I.L.R. 19 M. 219 | Discusses the principle of audi alteram partem and treats confirmation of a sale without notice (e.g., where party was insane) as an irregularity rather than voidness. | The opinion cites it for the proposition that lack of notice can be an irregularity; the Court agrees that lack of notice may constitute an irregularity that can justify setting aside a sale if it causes substantial injury. |
| Malkarjun / Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 (Privy Council) | Privy Council: a judicial sale is not a nullity if held without notice to the proper legal representative; omission to serve the proper representative is a serious irregularity but does not destroy jurisdiction; treating such errors as destroying jurisdiction would introduce confusion. | The Court expressly prefers and follows the Privy Council's ruling. It treats Malkarjun as authoritative, holding that when the Court has jurisdiction a sale is not per se void but may be set aside for irregularity on proof of substantial injury. |
| Biyyakka v. Fakira (1889) I.L.R. 12 M. 211 | Authority for the proposition that where a judgment-debtor dies between an order for possession and its execution, there is no necessity to bring legal representatives on record before executing the order. | Used by the Court to support the view that execution need not always be suspended by the death of a judgment-debtor and that representation is not required at every intermediate stage. |
| Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 440 (Full Bench) | Full Bench (one dissenting) rejected the Ramaswami view and held that death of a judgment-debtor would not cause an attachment to abate; omission to serve personal notice does not vitiate an execution sale and is at most an irregularity. | The opinion cites this Full Bench decision as part of the body of authority favouring the view that omission is an irregularity. The Court aligns with this approach (subject to Privy Council authority) in holding that failure to add representatives is not automatically fatal to a sale. |
| Aba v. Dhondn Bai (1895) I.L.R. 19 B. 276 | Split decision: one judge followed Sheo Prasad, the other preferred the Madras view; precedes Privy Council's ruling in Mallikarjun. | The opinion records this case as reflecting divided authority in the High Courts prior to the Privy Council decision; it does not treat it as dispositive. |
| Gopal Chunder Chatterjee v. Gunamoni Dasi I.L.R. 20 C. 370 | Treated issue of notice to the legal representative as a condition precedent to issuing a warrant of execution (a jurisdictional requirement). | The opinion notes that the Privy Council condemned the view that notice is a jurisdictional condition precedent because it would introduce confusion; the present Court therefore does not accept Gopal Chunder's rigid jurisdictional approach. |
| Premmoyi Chowdhrani v. Preonath Dhur (1896) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 636 | Followed Sheo Prasad: omission to place heir on record during execution is at most an irregularity. | Noted as one of the authorities supporting the view that failure to add representatives is irregular rather than jurisdictional. |
| Khiarajmal v. Daim (1905) I.L.R. 32 C. 296 | Sale of estate of a deceased man not represented in the suit was held to be without jurisdiction and null and void where the decree itself was void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. | The opinion treats Khiarajmal as belonging to a different class of cases (where the original suit/decree was itself void) and distinguishes it from cases where the decree is valid and execution merely proceeds against the estate. |
| Bepin Behary Beva v. Sasi Bhushan Datta (1913) 18 C.W.N. 766 | Followed Sheo Prasad and Mallikarjun: sale held when Court was aware of death treated not as a nullity but as voidable at instance of affected persons. | Recorded as an authority aligned with the proposition that such sales are voidable/voidable for irregularity, not nullities; cited in the opinion's review of authorities. |
| Jagadish Bhattacharjee v. Sundari Dasya (1919) 23 C.W.N. 608 | Sale where judgment-debtor died after attachment but before sale, and sale held without legal representatives being on record, is not necessarily invalid but open to attack on grounds of irregularity. | Noted by the Court as another decision supportive of the irregularity (rather than nullity) approach. |
| Ruhni Nandan Ghose v. Rajendra Nath Ghose (1920) 61 I.C. 291 | Principal defendant died before preliminary decree made absolute; High Court observed that executing Court had no jurisdiction to sell and the decree or sale would be a nullity as against improperly represented persons (a radical defect in the trial Court's jurisdiction). | The opinion treats this as another example of a case where the underlying proceedings contained a jurisdictional defect (decree void) and distinguishes it from cases of execution against an estate after a valid decree. |
| Baswantappa v. Rami (1885) I.L.R. 9 B. 86 | Example of a case where the decree itself was a nullity; used by Privy Council to distinguish situations where a decree never properly made a debtor subject to liability. | The opinion cites the Privy Council's use of Baswantappa to show that radical nullities in the decree differ from execution irregularities; Baswantappa supports the distinction the Court adopts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a structured analysis of the factual record, statutory provisions, and precedents:
- It began by recording the factual sequence: (a) decree and attachment and proclamation for sale in execution issued during Muruga Pillai's lifetime; (b) Muruga Pillai died before the actual auction; (c) no legal representative was added to the record before the auction; (d) the buyer at auction (2nd defendant) obtained a sale certificate; and (e) the widow (1st defendant) never contested the execution sale's validity.
- The Court examined the authorities relied upon by the Subordinate Judge, including Madras decisions and a recent Bench decision (Raghunathaswami Aiyangar), which held that a sale in execution against a dead person is void and a nullity. The Subordinate Judge's reasoning was summarised as: sale occurred after deceased's death and no representatives were on record; execution Court had no jurisdiction to sell in those circumstances.
- The Court considered statutory provisions relevant to execution and representation: Sections 50 and 53 of the Civil Procedure Code (reference to "property of the deceased" and execution against property in hands of legal representatives); Order 21 Rule 22 (which prescribes notice where judgment-debtor is dead or decree is old, and contains proviso enabling Court to dispense with notice for reasons to be recorded); and the exclusion of the operation of Order 22 Rule 4 (which provides for bringing legal representatives on record in suits) from execution proceedings.
-
Applying these provisions, the Court reasoned that:
- Execution proceedings do not abate by reason of death during execution and a decree once validly passed does not lose executability merely because the judgment-debtor dies during execution;
- Order 21 Rule 22 deals with commencement of execution proceedings and allows the Court to dispense with notice in certain circumstances; the absence of notice where the Code prescribes it may be a material irregularity but does not in itself oust jurisdiction;
- Order 22 Rule 4 (bringing legal representatives on record in suits) has been excluded from execution proceedings, so there is no statutory duty on decree-holders to add representatives at every stage of execution;
- The principle of audi alteram partem is important, but where the decree-holder has done what the law requires and there is a valid decree establishing liability, death of a judgment-debtor before completion of sale does not automatically invalidate the sale.
- The Court addressed the conflict in authorities by giving primacy to the Privy Council decision in Mallikarjun (Malkarjun) v. Narhari (1901), which held that a judicial sale without notice to the proper legal representative is not a nullity but a serious irregularity which may require setting aside of the sale if injustices result. The Court asserted that preference must be given to Privy Council authority over conflicting High Court Bench decisions.
- On the question of whether a sale should be set aside, the Court adopted the approach that failure to add legal representatives or to give notice is an irregularity which justifies setting aside the sale only upon proof of substantial injury or loss; if no substantial injury is shown and the purchaser is bona fide, the sale should be upheld.
-
Applying the legal analysis to the facts:
- Execution sale (items 9–11): The Court found that the widow (the proper legal representative) had never disputed the sale's validity and had not shown any substantial injury from not being added to the record. The sale had been confirmed under Order 21 Rule 92 and a sale certificate issued; no application under Rules 89–91 was made to set it aside. On these facts and applying Privy Council authority, the Court held the execution sale was not per se void and reversed the Subordinate Judge's declaration of nullity, restoring the District Munsif's decree as regards these items.
- Private sale by the widow (items 1–8 excluding item 5 and half of item 8): The Court examined the sale price and circumstances (sale shortly after husband's death, related party purchaser, inadequate consideration). It found the sale to be fraudulent or not bona fide: mortgages on certain items were usufructuary and it was unnecessary to sell unencumbered items; the sale price (Rs. 1,000) was inadequate relative to estimated value (about Rs. 1,740). The Subordinate Judge's decision to set that sale aside as fraudulent and to grant the purchaser (2nd defendant) a charge of Rs. 1,000 on the properties was affirmed by the Court.
- Costs and procedural points: The Court accepted the order on costs proposed by the members of the Bench and dismissed the memorandum of objections with costs.
Holding and Implications
CORE HOLDING:
(a) The execution (Court) sale of items 9–11 is not a nullity merely because the judgment-debtor died before the auction and no legal representative was added to the record; the Subordinate Judge's declaration that the sale was void was reversed and the District Munsif's decree (which had dismissed the challenge to that sale) was restored for items 9–11.
(b) The private sale by the widow of items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and one-half of item 8 was set aside as fraudulent. The purchaser (2nd defendant) was allowed a charge of Rs. 1,000 on those properties (the sum found binding on the estate). Item 5 had been found by the District Munsif to belong to the 2nd defendant and was excluded from the charge.
Implications
- The Court emphasised that where an executing Court has jurisdiction (i.e., a valid decree exists), a sale conducted in execution after the judgment-debtor's death is not automatically void for want of representation; such a sale will generally be regarded as valid unless substantial injury or serious irregularity is proved.
- The Privy Council's ruling in Mallikarjun v. Narhari was treated as binding authority: lack of notice or failure to add legal representatives may render a sale vulnerable to attack as an irregularity but does not necessarily destroy jurisdiction or render the sale a nullity.
- Where a private sale by a representative is shown to be fraudulent (e.g., inadequate price, suspicious timing, connected purchaser, and lack of necessity to sell unencumbered property to satisfy usufructuary mortgages), the sale may be set aside and equitable relief (such as charging the properties for the amount found binding) can be granted.
- The direct practical effect on the parties: the execution sale purchaser's title to items 9–11 stands (subject to any collateral proceedings not detailed in the opinion), and the purchaser under the widow's private sale loses ownership by reason of the setting aside of that sale except that he obtains a charge for Rs. 1,000; costs orders were made against the appellants/respondents as set out in the judgment.
- The Court did not purport to lay down any new, broad precedent beyond applying existing authority (particularly the Privy Council) and clarifying that failure to add legal representatives in execution proceedings is ordinarily a curable irregularity rather than an automatic jurisdictional defect.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion states.
1. This suit was brought by one of the reversioners to the estate of one Muruga Pillai for a declaration on behalf of himself and defendants 6and 7 that the private sale of items 1 to 8 in the plaint schedule and the Court sale of items 9 to 11 during the lifetime of Muruga Pillai's widow (1st defendant) are not binding beyond the life time of the widow, who died during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court. The District Munsif dismissed the suit in toto.
2. In appeal the Additional Subordinate Judge held that the Court sale of items 9 to 11 was void and gave the plaintiff a decree accordingly. He held that the private sale of items 1 to 8 by the widow under Ex. B was binding on the reversioners to the extent of Rs. 1,000 only and made that amount a charge on these items excepting item 5 and half of item 8.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge's reason for holding the Court sale to be void was that it took place on January 17th 1916 after Muruga Pillai had died on December 16th, 1915, and that no representatives of the deceased owner were brought on the record. He was of opinion that the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the properties of a deceased person without any representatives being brought on the record and in support of this view he cited Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180, Krishnayya v. Unnissa Begam (1891) I.L.R. 15 M. 399, Groves v. Administrator-General (1898) I.L.R. 22 M. 119 and Rayarappan Nambiyar v. Malikandai Aketh Mayan (1914) 26 M.L.J. 267. Besides these cases there is a recent decision of a Bench of this Court in Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 in which Ramesam, J., in holding that a sale in execution carried out against a dead person (or no person as he says) was void and should be regarded as a nullity and had not got to be set aside, observed that it was "opposed to all notions of justice to allow legal proceedings to be taken against an estate without there being some one on the record to represent the estate." I presume that the learned Judge when he used these words had in his mind the principle of audi alteram partem which in Narayana Kothan v. Kalianasundaram Pillai (1895) I.L.R. 19 M. 219 was spoken of as a principle which could not justifiably be disregarded except where it was necessary to do so in order to protect bona fide purchasers at Court sales. If any order is passed by an executing Court against a party without notice being given to him of the application which gave rise to the proceedings, I entirely agree that the party behind whose back such proceedings are taken, will not be bound by the order. Further, if process is issued without the notice, which Order 21 Rule 22 prescribes in cases where the judgment-debtor is dead or the decree is more than one year old, I consider that the want of notice might constitute a material irregularity entitling a person whose interests have been affected, to apply either under Order 21 Rule 90 or by suit to have any sale of property that has been held upon the decree-holder's application set aside. But if the decree-holder has done all that the law requires him to do and if the judgment-debtor or one of the several judgment-debtors, where there are more than one, happens to die during the course of the execution of the sale warrant, or, it may be, while the auctioneer is actually holding the auction, with due respect I tail to see how the sale is invalidated by the accident of the owner's death before the sale is completed. It has been suggested that as soon as a judgment-debtor dies his interest in the property passes to his legal representatives, and that the law nowhere permits the sale of a dead man's assets. On the other hand Sections 50 and 53, Civil Procedure Code, speak of "the property of the deceased and Section 50 provides for decrees being executed against such property in the hands of legal representatives. Although it may not be accurate to speak of a dead man as owning property, it is well understood that in law there are estates of deceased persons. The definition of "legal representative" in Section 2, Clause 11, C.P.C. speaks of such estates. So long as Order 21, Rule 22(2) permits art executing Court to dispense with notice for reasons to be recorded, it is difficult to see how the issue of process without notice and without recording reasons would affect the jurisdiction of the Court or would be more than an irregularity. The operation of Order 22, Rule 4, which provides for the legal representatives of defendants who die during the pendency of a suit being brought on the record, has been excluded from execution proceedings. So a decree once passed does not become barred or incapable of being executed by reason of the death of a judgment-debtor, nor do execution proceedings abate owing to the failure of the decree-holder to bring the legal representatives of a judgment debtor on the record. Order 21, Rule 22 is the only provision which deals with legal representatives of parties to decrees and that only applies to the commencement of execution proceedings. The legal representatives of judgment-debtors, who die during the course of the processes of Court being executed, are able to watch public sales without being personally served with notice. When the law only prescribes the issue of notice to them at the commencement of execution proceedings, they cannot claim as a matter of right to have fresh notice if their representation of the deceased estate commences during the progress of the carrying out of the processes of the Court, nor are they justified in treating such processes as invalid for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Court and its officers. In my opinion the view taken in Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopala Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 that a sale in execution carried out against a dead person is per se void is based on a fallacy, and I think we are bound to follow the Judgment of the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 (P.C.) in preference to the decision of a Bench of our own Court. Their Lordships distinctly say that a judicial sale is not a nullity if it is held without a notice being given to the proper legal representative of a deceased person. They observe that to treat such an error (that of serving with notice a person who did not legally represent the estate) as destroying the jurisdiction of the Court is calculated to introduce great confusion into the administration of the law. They add that strangers to a suit are justified in believing that the Court has done that which by the directions of the Code it ought to do. They point out that when a Court tries a suit without a debtor or his estate being subject to its decree it actually never possesses the jurisdiction which it purports to exercise, but it is a different matter when the Court has by its decrees established the debtor's liability and is in the process of working it out against his estate.
4. My learned brother Ramesam, J. distinguished this case on the facts from those in Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547. He observed that in Malkarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 (P.C.) tin application was made to bring the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor on the record, the Court received the application and did issue notice to the party named as the heir. Only it issued notice to the wrong heir. But in the case before him he said that the procedure laid down by the Code was not followed. He does not state what procedure he means, but from what precedes he can only mean that general obligation of bringing some one on the record at every stage to represent the estate of the judgment-debtor. I have tried to show already by a reference to Order 22, Rules 4 and 12, Civil Procedure Code that, there is no statutory obligation of such a kind cast upon decree-holders during the processual stages of execution of their decrees. The above are my reasons for considering that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in reversing the decree of the District Munsif and that we should now restore the trial Court's decree so far as these items are concerned. But some of the reported decisions relied on by the Subordinate Judge and some quoted in the arguments in this Court remain to be noticed.
5. The Judgment in Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180 is a very short one. The learned Judges do not say that the sale was a nullity, but they set it aside on the ground that the further process of sale could not legally issue without some representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor being on the record. In revision they reversed the order of a Subordinate Court which confirmed a sale under Section 312 of the old Code (Order 21, Rule 92 of the present Code). It is not clear from the report whether the order for sale was passed behind the back of the legal representatives. If that was the case, they naturally objected under Section 311 to its legality.
6. Biyyakka v. Fakira (1889) I.L.R. 12 M. 211 is an authority for the proposition that if a judgment-debtor dies between an order for possession being made under Section 318, Civil Procedure Code (now Order 21, Rule 95) and being executed, there is no necessity to bring his legal representatives on record between that date and the date of executing the order. This supports the view I have taken, the difference being only in the nature of the decree to be executed.
7. In Krishnayya v. Unnessa Begum (1892) I.L.R. 15 M. 399 the omission to bring legal representatives on the record is treated not as making the sale void but as being a material irregularity which the learned Judges say must necessarily cause substantial injury to the legal representative. (Why this is necessary is not made clear).
8. In Narayana Kothan v. Kaliyanasundaram Pillai (1896) I.L.R. 19 M. 219 the confirmation of a sale without notice to a judgment-debtor, who had been declared insane after the decree and before the sale, is treated as an irregularity but not as making the sale void. In Groves v. Administrator-General (1898) I.L.R. 22 M. 119, Boddam, J. repeats the fallacy about the sale of a dead man's property passing no rights to the purchaser but in the result the sale was not treated as a nullity, but it was set aside in revision of an order passed in execution. Rayarappan Nambiar v. Mallikandai Akketh Mayan (1914) 26 M.L.J. 267 follows Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180 and Groves v. Administrator-General (1898) I.L.R. 22 M. 119 and attempts to distinguish Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 (P.C.) as being a case of a bona fide purchaser. It is not clear whether there was an order for sale made in this case without notice to the legal representative of the deceased mortgagor. If an order of Court was made without notice to the party concerned, the decision may be right.
9. Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 440 the judgment of a Full Bench of five Judges (one dissenting) dissents from Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180 and refutes the theory that the death of a judgment-debtor would cause an attachment to abate or make it necessary for a judgment-creditor to take steps to keep the attachment alive. The observations of Edge, C.J. at p. 446 are very pertinent to the present case. H says "I do not find in the Code of Civil Procedure any provision requiring notice to be given personally to a judgment-debtor or his legal representative of a sale of property under atachment.
10.
"To hold otherwise would be to impose upon the purchaser at an execution sale under a decree, the necessity of ascertaining before he paid the purchase money whether the judgment-debtor was alive at the actual moment when the sale took place, on the risk of losing the purchase money which he paid and the property in respect of the purchase of which that money was paid, and would in any event render it difficult for such a purchaser to maintain his title under his sale certificate if subsequently challenged by the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor the exact date of whose death it might be impossible for the purchaser to ascertain or prove."
11. In Aba v. Dhondn Bai (1895) I.L.R. 19 B. 276 one of the learned Judges (Jardine, J.) follows Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 440 and the other (Ranagle, J) prefers the Madras view. This was prior to the Privy Council decision in Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 which settled the question.
12. Gopal Chunder Chatterjee v. Gunamoni Dasi I.L.R. 20 C. 370 treats the issue of a notice to the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor as a condition precedent to the issue of a warrant of execution. This is the view about jurisdiction in execution matters which the Privy Council condemn as being calculated to introduce great confusion into the administration of the law.
13. Premmoyi Chowdhrani v. Preonath Dhur (1896) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 636 follows Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 440. The learned Judges observe that the omission to place on the record the heir of a judgment-debtor who died during the course of execution did not vitiate the sale but was at most an irregularity.
14. In Khiarajmal v. Daim (1905) I.L.R. 32 C. 296 there was a sale of the estate of a deceased man which estate was not represented in the suit itself. This made the sale of property without jurisdiction and null and void. This is not an authority on the legal consequences of failure to get representation of a deceased judgment-debtor's estate in execution, but it belongs to the first class of cases described in Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B 337 where a defendant does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court that tries the suit and passes the decree.
15. Bepin Behary Beva v. Sasi Bhushan Datta (1913) 18 C.W.N. 766 is another case that follows Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A 440 and Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B 337. A sale held when the Court was aware of the death of one of the judgment-debtors was treated not as a nullity but as voidable at the instance of the persons affected. It again was followed in Jagadish Bhattacharjee v. (sic) Sundari Dasya (1919) 23 C.W.N. 608 where the judgment-debtor died after attachment but before the sale and the sale held without his legal representatives being brought on the record was held to be not necessarily invalid but open to attack on the ground of irregularity.
16. In Ruhni Nandan Ghose v. Rajendra Nath Ghose (1920) 61 I.C. 291 the principal defendant died before the preliminary decree was made absolute in a mortgage suit and his legal representative was not brought on the record. The High Court observed that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to sell the property and the decree or sale would be a nullity as against persons who were not properly represented, and might be disregarded. The want of jurisdiction here was in the Court and that tried the suit, not in the executing Court and therefore it was a radical defect like it was in Khiarajmal v. Daim (1905) I.L.R. 32 C 296.
17. These decisions show that, apart from the Privy Council decision in Mallkarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B 337, the balance of authority is in favour of the view taken in Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A 440 and against that in Ramaswami v. Bagiralhi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 180, Rayarappan Nambiar v. Malikandi Aketh Mayan (1914) 26 M.L.J. 267 and Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547.
18. As regards items 1 to 8 excluding item 5 which was found by the District Munsif to belong to the 2nd defendant the Subordinate Judge found that the sale of these items was not for a proper price and that out of the sale price of Rs. 1,740 only Rs. 1,000 was received for purposes binding on the estate. I do not think that sales should be revised long after they have taken place on a mere estimate as to what price the property sold ought to have fetched. The mortgages on items 2, 3, 6 and 7 were usufructuary and there was no necessity to sell items 1, 4, 5 and 8 which were not encumbered in order to discharge usufructuary mortgages. When the mortgagee gets the usufruct of the land in lieu of interest the debt does not by lapse of time become an increased burden on the land, but if such mortgaged property is sold outright the reversioners are deprived of the chance of redeeming it. The sale of these items was evidently neither a prudent nor a bona fide transaction. The Second Appeal is dismissed as regards this part of the claim. Each side will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout. The memorandum of objections is not pressed and is dismissed with costs.
Krishnan, J.
19. This Second Appeal arises from a suit brought by a reversioner to have it declared that certain alienations of properties of one Muruga Pillai the last male owner after his death, are not binding on the reversioner. One of the sales so challenged is a Court sale of items 9 to 11, in execution of a decree obtained against Muruga Pillai. These items had been attached in execution of that decree, and ordered to be sold by the Court and the proclamation for sale had been also issued during the life-time of Muruga Pillai. Muruga Pillai seems to have died sometime thereafter and just before the auction sale actually took place; and no one had been added to the record as his legal representative. His widow the 1st defendant was the proper party to be so added. The 2nd defendant who, though a reversioner himself, was not a party to that decree, purchased the properties in Court auction and he claims to be a bona fide purchaser for value and that claim has not been displaced by any finding of the lower appellate Court. No applications under Rules 89, 90 or 91 of Order 21, C.P.C. having been made the sale was in due course confirmed under Rule 92 and a sale certificate issued to the and defendant. The legal representative, the widow has never challenged the validity of the sale but the reversioner, the plaintiff contends that the sale was a nullity and was void because at the time it took place the estate was not represented by any one on the record. The Subordinate Judge has upheld his contention and declared the sale void following Ramaswami v. Bagirathi (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. , Krishnayya v. Unnissa Begum (1892) I.L.R. 15 M. 399, Gloves v. Administrator-General (1898) I.L.R. 22 M. 119 and Rayarappan Nambiar v. Malikandi Aketh Mayan (1914) 26 M.L.J. 267. It may be mentioned that there is further a recent ruling of a Bench of this Court in Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 in support of his view where it was held that
"a sale in execution carried out against a dead person (or no person) is void and should be regarded as a nullity and has not got to be set aside."
20. This extreme view introduces a most serious uncertainty into Court sales and will tend to further dissuade bidders from coming forward in Court auctions, a result to be avoided if possible. As pointed out by my learned brother it does not seem to be in accord with the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 and we must of course follow the former in preference to the decisions of our own Court. In Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 Ramesam, J. has tried to distinguish this case by confining its effect to its own facts; the principles laid down in that case do not however seem to me to be affected by the particular facts here. Their Lordships say that "if the Court took proceedings wholly without jurisdiction the plaintiffs (the legal representatives) would remain unaffected by them but a decree had been made and partially though to a minute extent executed against Nagappa (the original debtor) and his estate was liable to make good the balance, and that to enforce this liability was within the jurisdiction of the Court." Then they go on to distinguish the case of Baswantappa v. Rami (1885) I.L.R. 9 B. 86 on the ground that the decree there was itself a nullity They say that in that case "neither the debtor nor his estate was ever made subject to the decree, the liability was never established and the process of execution had nothing to rest upon" and they point out that "it is a different matter when the Court has by its decree established the debtor's liability and is in the process of working it out against the estate." The case of Kkairajmal v. Daim (1905) I.L.R. 32 C. 296 (P.C.) relied on by Ramesam, J. in Raghunathaswami Aiyangar v. Gopal Rao (1921) 41 M.L.J. 547 above cited is a similar case where the decree was itself void. Their Lordships proceed to say in Malkarjun's case (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 that "it was necessary for the plaintiffs to set aside the sale and that the omission to serve notice on the proper legal representative was a serious irregularity." Now under Order 21, Rule 22, C.P.C. a proviso has been added enabling the Court in certain circumstances to dispense with such notice so that even the non-service of notice may not always be an irregularity. It is clear from Malkarjun's case (1901) I.L.R. 25 B. 337 that when the Court has jurisdiction its sale cannot be treated as a nullity but can only be set aside if at ail for irregularity. I am inclined to agree with the view of Mahomood, J. in the Full Bench case in Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal (1890) I.L.R. 12 A. 440 (P.C.) that failure to add the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor is only an irregularity and that to set aside a sale on the ground of irregularity, it must be shown that it has led to substantial loss or injury otherwise the sale must be supported more especially when the purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value. I am unable to adopt the view in Krishnayya v. Unnissa Begum (1892) I.L.R. 15 M. 399 that the failure to add the legal representative to the record is a material irregularity which necessarily leads to substantial injury. Such injury must be proved whether the sale is sought to be set aside by an application under Order 21, Rule 90 or by suit.
21. That the failure to add the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor to the record after attachment is only an irregularity is the view accepted by the other High Courts and the weight of authority as my learned brother who has dealt with the authorities cited at length points out is in favour of that view. 1 should have however in view of the Madras cases cited referred the point to a Full Bench but the ruling of the Privy Council in Mallikarjun v. Narhari (1890) I.L.R. 12 A 440 (P.C.) renders it unnecessary to do so.
22. Now in the case before us though the suit has been brought within one year as provided in Article 12 it has not been established that any substantial injury has been caused by the failure to add the widow to the execution record. As already stated she does not dispute and she has never disputed the validity of the sale nor has she asserted that by not being added to the record she has been injured by losing any opportunity that she otherwise would have had for getting the sale set aside. For the above reasons I agree with my learned brother that the decree of the Sub-Judge must be reversed and that of the District Munsif restored with regard to items 9 to 11.
23. The next question is as regards items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and half of item 8. These items were sold by the widow to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 1,000, Rs. 875 were due under a usufructuary mortgage by Muruga Pillai himself on items 2, 3) 6 and 7 and Rs. 125 were required for 1st defendant's maintenance. The Subordinate Judge finds that the consideration of Rs. 1,000 is binding on the estate. But he holds that the sale was fraudulent as it was for a very inadequate price, the properties being worth at least Rs. 1,740 at the time of the sale and as it was made by the widow very shortly after her husband's death and in favour of her brother's brother-in-law, the 2nd defendant. There was no real necessity to sell all the 7 items to pay off a usufructuary mortgage on only 4 of them. I think therefore that the Subordinate Judge was right in setting aside the sale as fraudulent and giving the 2nd defendant a charge for Rs. 1,000 on the properties. It was not argued that the sale should be upheld as the whole of the consideration for it under the sale deed had been found to be for purposes binding on the estate; but it was only contended that the purchaser should be allowed to pay Rs. 740 more, the deficiency in the price and to the reversioners and the sale should thereupon be affirmed. I do not think that that can be done as the salt is shown to be fraudulent one; this is not the case of a sale, being a proper sale, where a small portion of the consideration is shown to have been not binding on the reversioners.
24. I agree in dismissing the Second Appeal as regards these items and to the order of costs proposed by my learned brother and also to the dismissal of the memorandum of objections with costs.
Alert