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S.V Subba Rao v. The Calicut Co-Operative Urban Bank Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns the proper article of the Limitation Act to be applied to an application for enforcement of an award made by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act.
Procedural facts set out in the opinion: the award in question was passed on 15 July 1931. An execution application arising from that award was filed in 1936. The first application for enforcement had been made to the District Munsiff of Calicut in 1932, and there were other enforcement applications between 1932 and 1936. Both lower courts held that Article 182 of the Limitation Act applied and that the enforcement application was not barred by limitation. The appellant (represented by Mr. Sesha Aiyar) contested that view, arguing that Article 181 applied instead.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the proper article of the Limitation Act to be applied to an application for enforcement of an award passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 51 of the Act — Article 181 or Article 182?
- Whether, given the statutory rules (specifically Rule 15, Clause 7(c)) and relevant statutory provisions such as Section 57-B, an award enforced by a Civil Court should be treated for limitation purposes as a final decree of that Civil Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Sesha Aiyar)
- The applicable article is Article 181 of the Limitation Act; if Article 181 governs, the enforcement application may be time-barred.
- He relied heavily on the decision of Cornish, J., in Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 759 : I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 495, which (as read by the opinion) had proceeded on the assumption that Article 181 applied and treated the only question as whether the application was time-barred.
- He also relied on Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24 (a decision under Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act) as authority for applying the article corresponding to Article 181 in analogous statutory contexts.
- He drew attention to Raghavendra v. Industrial Bank, Guledgud (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24, in which Beaumont, C.J., had doubted whether an award of the Registrar would ever become a decree of a Civil Court within the meaning of Article 182 (the court here notes that that question was left open in that decision).
- One argument noted in the Co-operative Credit Society decision (and referenced by the appellant) was that because the enforcement application was not one under the Civil Procedure Code, the Limitation Act might have no application — an argument overruled in that decision, but noted in this opinion as part of the earlier reasoning.
The opinion does not set out detailed affirmative arguments advanced by the opposing side in this appeal beyond the fact that the lower courts had taken the view that Article 182 applied.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 759 : I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 495 (Cornish, J.) | Assumed Article 181 applied; addressed whether the application was time-barred; rejected the contention that the Limitation Act had no application because the matter was not under the Civil Procedure Code. | The court in the present opinion stated it was unable to agree with that decision. It treated the decision as assuming Article 181 applied and distinguished it on the ground of differing statutory language (Rule 15, Clause 7(c) here) and on the basis that that decision's reasoning was not applicable to the present statutory scheme. |
| Belvedere Jute Mills, Ltd., In re (1927) 31 C.W.N. 1097 | Interpreted Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act (which states an award filed in Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree) to mean that the words were intended to apply to limitation as well as procedure; held Article 183 applied (the article applicable to enforcement of a High Court decree in that context). | This opinion relied on Belvedere as supporting the proposition that statutory words treating an award "as if it were a decree" import the law of enforcement of decrees, including the relevant article of limitation. The court followed the principle laid down in Belvedere. |
| Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras v. Shirur Mutt (1934) 68 M.L.J. 200 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 760 | Applied the principle that words such as "recover the amount as if a decree had been passed" attract the whole procedure and limitation applicable to decrees; held Article 182 applied to enforcement of an order under Section 70(2) of that Act. | The court followed this Madras High Court decision as authoritative and applied the same reasoning to hold that Article 182 applies to enforcement of the Registrar's award by a Civil Court other than a High Court. |
| Lakshmindra Tirta Swamiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (1922) 65 M.L.J. 364 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 712 | Held that the phrase "as if a decree had been passed" brings into play the whole procedure in execution (supporting application of the law of enforcement, including limitation). | The opinion cites this decision (as referred to by the Madras High Court) to support the conclusion that such statutory language brings the law of execution and its limitation into play; the court relied on that reasoning. |
| Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24 | Under Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act, the court placed a purchaser in the position of a decree-holder for the purpose of putting the court machinery in motion, but held that the section did not, by implication, make the law of limitation for execution of decrees/orders of Civil Courts applicable to proceedings under that section; effectively applied the article corresponding to Article 181 in that context. | The present court distinguished Sambasiva Mudaliar on the ground that the language of Rule 15, Clause 7(c) (treating an award as a decree for the limited purpose of execution) is different from Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act; the court therefore considered Sambasiva Mudaliar not to be apposite to the present statutory wording. |
| Raghavendra v. Industrial Bank, Guledgud (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24 | Beaumont, C.J., doubted whether an award of the Registrar under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act of 1925 would ever become a decree of a Civil Court within the meaning of Article 182, but left the question open (the decision dealt with different rule-wording). | The court noted that the question in Raghavendra was left open and that the wording of the relevant rule in that case was different from Rule 15, Clause 7(c) under consideration here; the present court treated the decision as not determinative of the present issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds from statutory text and purpose. The key statutory materials and steps in the analysis as articulated in the opinion are:
- Statutory rule: Under Section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Local Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. Pursuant to that power, Rule 15, Clause 7(c) provides that "On application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decision or award, that Court shall enforce the decision or award as if it were a final decree of the Court."
- Legal consequence of the rule: Because Rule 15(c) statutorily directs that, for the purpose of enforcement, an award be treated as a final decree of the Civil Court to which enforcement is sought, the award is given by statute the same status as a decree of that Court for the limited purpose of execution.
- Implication for limitation law: Once an award is to be treated as if it were a final decree for enforcement purposes, the provisions of law relating to enforcement of decrees, "including the law of limitation applicable for such enforcement," apply to the enforcement of that award by necessary implication.
- Application to the facts: The enforcement applications in this case were made to the District Munsiff of Calicut. Therefore, the article of the Limitation Act that governs enforcement of a final decree of the District Munsiff (Article 182) is prima facie the article that should govern enforcement of the Registrar's award in this forum.
- Reliance on precedent: The court relied on Belvedere Jute Mills, Ltd., In re and the Madras High Court decision in Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Shirur Mutt, which applied the same principle to hold that statutory language treating an award or order "as if a decree had been passed" brings limitation into play and that the article applicable to enforcement of the decree of the forum applies. The court regarded these decisions as laying down the correct principle.
- Distinguishing contrary authority: The court examined the decision in Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (Cornish, J.), which had treated Article 181 as applicable, and Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai. The court concluded that those decisions were distinguishable because the statutory language at issue there was different (the Revenue Recovery Act language was said to bring the purchaser to the position of a decree-holder for certain machinery purposes but did not, by implication, import the law of limitation). The court found Rule 15(c)'s explicit direction to treat an award as a decree for the purpose of enforcement to be materially different and decisive here.
- Section 57-B: The court also addressed Section 57-B of the Co-operative Societies Act, which deems the Registrar (or person empowered by him) to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Article 182 when exercising powers under the Act in respect of recovery by attachment and sale or related orders. Although Section 57-B does not, in terms, apply directly to an application for enforcement in a Civil Court under Rule 15(c), the court considered the object of Section 57-B to demonstrate legislative intent that Article 182 be the uniform rule of limitation for enforcement of decrees, awards and orders of the Registrar and when enforced either by the Registrar or a Civil Court.
- Avoidance of anomaly: The court reasoned it would be anomalous to hold that an award enforced by the Registrar is governed by Article 182 but that the same award when enforced by a Civil Court is governed by Article 181. The statutory scheme and legislative intent point to a uniform rule (Article 182) where an award is treated as a decree for enforcement.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court concluded that Article 182 of the 2nd Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to the enforcement of an award passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 51 of the Act when such enforcement is sought in a Civil Court other than a High Court.
Core ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The application for execution made in 1936 in respect of the award of 15 July 1931 is governed by Article 182 in the forum to which enforcement was sought (District Munsiff of Calicut), and therefore, as conceded in the opinion, there is no bar of limitation under Article 182 for the enforcement application at hand.
- The court rejected the contrary view advanced by the appellant (that Article 181 applies) and distinguished earlier decisions relied upon by the appellant on the basis of differing statutory language and context.
- The opinion reasons that the statutory scheme (including Rule 15(c) and the purpose evident in Section 57-B) demonstrates legislative intent to have Article 182 apply uniformly to enforcement of awards and related orders, whether enforced by the Registrar or by a Civil Court.
- The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court granted leave to appeal further.
The opinion states and applies the legal principle as above. It does not purport to set out any additional broader policy beyond the statutory interpretation and the direct effect on the parties in this case.
1. The question raised in this appeal is as to the proper article of the limitation act for an application for the enforcement of an award passed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under Section 51 of the Act.
2. The execution application in this case, out of which this appeal arises, was made in 1936 in respect of an award which was passed on 15th July, 1931. The first application for enforcement of the award made to the District Munsiff of Calicut was made in 1932 and between 1932 and 1936 there were other applications made for its enforcement. It is conceded that if Article 182 of the Limitation Act applies, there is no bar of limitation. Both the lower Courts have taken the view that Article 182 is applicable and held that the application is not barred by limitation. But it is contended by Mr. Sesha Aiyar that this view is wrong and that the article applicable is Article 181 of the Limitation Act. He places considerable reliance on the decision of Cornish, J., in the Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 759 : I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 495. With due respect, I am unable to agree with the said decision. Under Section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Local Government is empowered to make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act and one of such purposes is the enforcement of decisions or awards in proceedings before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The rule which has been enacted in pursuance of this section is Rule 15, Clause 7. Clause 7 contains three sub-clauses providing three methods of enforcement and the sub-clause, which is relevant for the purpose of the present discussion, is Sub-clause (c) which runs thus:
On application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decision or award, that, Court shall enforce the decision or award as if it were a final decree of the Court.
3. If therefore an application to enforce an award is made to a Civil Court, for the purpose of enforcement the legislature enacts that it should be treated as a final decree of that Court. Thus by statute the award of the Registrar under Section 51 of the Act is given the same status as a decree of a Civil Court for the limited purpose of execution and the provisions of law relating to the enforcement of decrees of such Courts including the law of limitation applicable for such enforcement will apply-by necessary implication. So when the question of limitation arises as to the enforcement of an award of the Registrar of a Co-operative Society, the Court before which the application for its enforcement is made will have to apply the article applicable for the enforcement of the final decree of that Court. In this case, the article applicable for the enforcement of the final decree of the Court of the District Munsiff of Calicut is Article 182. Prima facie therefore the article that should govern the present case is Article 182. In Belvedere Jute Mills, Ltd., In re (1927) 31 C.W.N. 1097, a question arose as to the enforcement of an award under Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act where the language is almost similar. Section 15 runs thus:
An award on a submission, on being filed in the Court in accordance with the foregoing provisions, shall (unless the Court remits it to the reconsideration of the arbitrators or umpire, or sets it aside) be enforceable as if it were a decree of the Court.
4. Rankin, C.J., and Mitter, J., held that Article 181 would not apply to the case but the article applicable was Article 183, the article applicable to the enforcement of the decree of the High Court. Rankin, C.J., in the course of the judgment remarked thus:
If one looks at the question of limitation from the point of view of the different alternatives, there can be one inference only and that is that the words employed by the legislature in the first sub-section of Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act were intended to go to the question of limitation as well as to the question of procedure.
5. This decision was followed in our High Court by the learned Chief Justice and King, J., in the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras v. Shirur Mutt (1934) 68 M.L.J. 200 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 760. There the question arose whether Article 181 or Article 182 is to be applied in regard to the application for the enforcement of an order passed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under Section 70(2) of the Act which ran thus:
The Court shall, on the application of the President of the Board...recover the amount as if a decree had been passed for the amount by the Court against the religious endowment concerned.
6. The learned judges referred to Lakshmindra Tirta Swamiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (1922) 65 M.L.J. 364 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 712, where it was held that the words "as if a decree had been passed" attract to the order the whole procedure in execution and followed the ruling in Belvedere Jute Mills Ltd., In re (1927) 31 C.W.N. 1097, and applied Article 182. In my opinion the above decisions lay down the correct principle. I therefore hold that Article 182 of the 2nd Schedule to the Limitation Act would apply to the enforcement of an award passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 51 of the Act by a Civil Court other than a High Court.
7. I shall now deal with the decisions relied on by Mr. Sesha Aiyar. The first case relied on by him is Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 759 : I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 495. On a perusal of the said decision, it looks as if it was assumed that Article 181 applied to the case and the only question was whether the application was time barred. This appears clear from the following observations of the learned Judge in that case:
The only question in this appeal is whether the application is time barred. Admittedly it is, if Article 181 of the Limitation Act governs it. But the argument is that the application not being one under the Civil Procedure Code, the Limitation Act has no application.
8. The learned Judge after overruling this contention held that the application being one under the Code, Article 181 would apply and he purported to follow the decision in Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24, which is another decision relied on by Mr. Sesha Aiyar. That was a decision under Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The question there was what article would apply for an application by a purchaser at a revenue auction sale for delivery of possession. The learned Judges applied Article 178 of Act XV of 1877, corresponding to Article 181 of the present Limitation Act and the decision turned on the language of Section 40 of the Revenue Recovery Act which runs thus:
Where, notwithstanding such publication, any lawful purchaser of land may be resisted and prevented from obtaining possession of his purchased land, any Court of competent jurisdiction, on application and production of certificate of sale provided for by Section 38 shall cause the proper process to be issued for the purpose of putting such purchaser in possession in the same manner as if the purchased lands had been decreed to the purchaser by a decision of the Court.
9. It is with reference to this language the following observations were made:
The section as we read it places the purchaser in the position of a decree-holder for the purposes of putting the machinery of the Court in motion in order that the certificate of sale granted by the Revenue authority may be given effect to. It does not, by implication, make the law of limitation with reference to the execution of decrees or orders of Civil Courts applicable to proceedings under Section 40 of the Act.
10. But the language of Rule 15, Clause 7(c) given above is quite different. For the limited purpose of execution an award is treated as a decree of the Court. On this ground the decision in Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24 is distinguishable as it may be possible to contend that the use of the words "the proper process to be issued" and "in the same manner" connote only the bare machinery of the Court for putting the purchaser in possession. The other cases relied on by Cornish, J., in his judgment seem to me to have no bearing on the actual point for decision before me, and I think it unnecessary to deal with them.
11. Mr. Sesha Aiyar brought to my notice the decision in Raghavendra v. Industrial Bank, Guledgud (1907) 17 M.L.J. 441 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 24, where Beaumont, C.J., doubted whether the award of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act of 1925 would ever become a decree of a Civil Court within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act but left the question open. It may be pointed out that the wording of the rule which the learned Chief Justice was dealing with is different from the rule in the present case. The question is not, if I may say so, with respect whether the award becomes a decree of the Civil Court but whether the law of limitation governing the execution of the decree of a Civil Court is made applicable by statute by necessary implication. Both the lower Courts took the view that the decision; in Co-operative Credit Society v. Chinnaswami Udayan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 759 : I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 495 would not apply in view of Section 57-B of the Act which runs thus:
The Registrar or any person empowered by him in that behalf, shall be-deemed, when exercising any powers under this Act for the recovery of any amount by the attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of any property, or when passing any orders on any application made to him for such recovery or to take some step-in-aid of such recovery to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Article 182 of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
12. In terms this section would not be applicable to an application for the enforcement of an award in a Civil Court as provided in Rule 15, Clause 7(c) but the object underlying the section in my opinion establishes beyond doubt that the legislature intended by necessary implication in enacting the said Clause (c) that Article 182 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications made in pursuance thereof because the award has to be treated by a Court as a decree of that Court. The object in enacting Section 57-B is to have one uniform rule of limitation for the enforcement of decrees of Civil Courts and the decrees and awards and orders of a Registrar of Co-operative Societies and whether they are enforced by a Registrar or a Civil Court. It would be anomalous to hold that an award when enforced by a Registrar would be governed by Article 182 but when enforced by a Civil Court is governed by Article 181. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal granted.
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