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Jagannatha Pillai v. Kathaperumal Pillai

Madras High Court
May 6, 1927
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs brought a suit seeking cancellation of a revenue sale of the plaint items on the ground of fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale. Both lower courts found for the plaintiffs and set aside the sale. The legal representatives of the 1st defendant (the landholder) appealed to the Second Appeal (the present appeal).

Additional factual detail provided by Jackson, J.: in execution of a decree by a Revenue Court the 1st defendant caused sale of the 1st plaintiff's property. The 2nd plaintiff (his son) applied one month after the sale for two weeks' time to deposit the balance; this was refused. The plaintiffs then sued in the Munsif's Court to set aside the sale as fraudulent. The lower courts decreed the suit and the question on second appeal concerned the competence of such a suit in view of the Madras Estates Land Act and the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit in a Civil Court to set aside a revenue sale held in execution of a rent decree is barred by reason of O. 21, R. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to Section 312 of the old Code) or by the provisions of the Estates Land Act (notably Sect. 192 and related provisions).
  2. Whether the Estate Land Act's provisions (including Sects. 124, 131, 132, 134 and the schedule exemptions under Sect. 189) provide the exclusive remedy and thereby preclude a Civil Court suit to set aside such a sale.
  3. Whether, even if O. 21, R. 92 (or the corresponding old Code provision) were held to bar a suit, an action founded on alleged fraud is nevertheless maintainable in a Civil Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as raised by the vakil for the appellants)

  • No suit lies to set aside a sale in execution of a rent decree on the ground of fraud or material irregularity because such a suit is barred under O. 21, R. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to Sect. 312 of the old Code).
  • Because Sect. 192 of the Estates Land Act makes the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to proceedings under the Act (with specified exceptions), the rule excluding suits to set aside confirmed sales (O.21, R.92) should apply to revenue sales executed under the Act.
  • Relied upon obiter dicta in Jagannadha Charyulu v. Satyanarayana Varaprasada Rau to support the contention that O. 21, R. 92 should be applied by force of Sect. 192 of the Madras Act.

Respondents' Arguments (as summarized in the opinion; submissions by Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar)

  • Sect. 131 of the Estates Land Act provides for setting aside the sale on payment of the purchase money in full; Sect. 124 requires issuing a certificate of sale to the purchaser where no application under Sect. 131 is made or where such application is rejected.
  • There is no remedy provided by the Act against the Collector's refusal to set aside a sale under Sect. 131 (no appeal is provided against an order under Sect. 131), whereas under the Code an appeal is provided against an order under Sect. 312 (old Code) by Sect. 588, Cl. 16; it would be improper to hold that a party is left remediless unless the Act specifically so provides.
  • Even if Sect. 312/O.21, R.92 barred ordinary suits, a suit based on fraud is not barred — under the old Code an application under Sect. 311 could be made on the ground of material irregularity, whereas under the present Code O.21, R.90 an application could be made on the ground of fraud as well.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramanujachariar Held that a sale held in execution of a decree without notice as required by O.21, R.22 was a nullity. The court asked whether noncompliance with O.21, R.22 by a Revenue Court would likewise make a revenue sale a nullity and observed that if it is a nullity the remedy could only be by resort to a Civil Court to set aside the sale; the precedent supported the proposition that noncompliance can render a sale void and justify Civil Court relief.
Jagannadha Charyulu v. Satyanarayana Varaprasada Rau Held in the context of summary proceedings under Sects. 111 and 118 that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction on an application by the landholder to set aside a sale for irregularity, and that a purchaser could institute a Civil suit for declaration that such an order was ultra vires and void. The present court treated the observations in that case concerning suits to set aside sales in execution of rent decrees as obiter. Devadoss, J. expressed disagreement with those obiter remarks and declined to follow them as authoritative on the question whether a Civil suit to set aside a revenue sale is barred by the Estates Land Act or O.21, R.92.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two judgments (Devadoss, J. and Jackson, J.) whose reasoning substantially converges in result.

Devadoss, J. — He began by stating the procedural posture: lower courts set aside the revenue sale on the merits; the 1st defendant appealed. The appellants' new point (not raised below) that suits to set aside sales in execution of rent decrees are barred under O. 21, R. 92 (Sect. 312 of old Code) was nevertheless permitted to be argued because it affected maintainability.

He examined Sect. 192 of the Estates Land Act, which makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act "with a few exceptions" and asked whether this had the effect of barring suits in Civil Courts under O. 21, R. 92. He noted Sect. 189 expressly takes away Civil Court jurisdiction only in certain specific classes of suits listed in Schedules A and B, and the present suit was not among those. He stressed that the right to seek relief in a Civil Court is a common-law right which is not to be taken away by implication by a special Act unless expressly provided.

On the respondents' point concerning Sects. 124 and 131, Devadoss, J. observed that Sect. 131 provides for setting aside a sale on payment but that there is no appeal against a Collector's order under Sect. 131; by contrast an appeal exists against an order under Sect. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code. He considered it improper to conclude that a party is left without remedy unless the Act expressly provides so.

Addressing the fraud point raised by Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar, Devadoss, J. noted that even if Sect. 312 were a bar to a suit to set aside a revenue sale, the old Code distinction (Sect. 311/311/ O.21 R.90) and the present Code's treatment of fraud could allow relief, but he found it unnecessary to explore this further because he was satisfied the Estates Land Act did not expressly or impliedly take away the right to sue in Civil Court to set aside a revenue sale. He rejected any broad enlargement of the Act's exemptions beyond those expressly enumerated in the schedules.

Devadoss, J. further distinguished and disagreed with the obiter remarks in Jagannadha Charyulu (quoted above), holding that those comments concerning suits to set aside sales executed under rent decrees were not binding and that, on a full consideration of the relevant sections of the Estates Land Act, a Civil Court suit is not barred either by the Act or by the old Code provision corresponding to O.21, R.92.

Jackson, J. — He recited the narrower factual matrix (application for two weeks' time refused; plaintiffs sued for fraud; lower courts decreed). He addressed Sect. 192 of Madras Act I of 1908 which makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable except where inconsistent and which expressly excepts several Code provisions under Sub‑clause (a).

Jackson, J. acknowledged that O.21, R.92 is not among the rules expressly excluded in Sect. 192(a) and that a literal argument could be made that O.21, R.92 therefore applies and would bar the present suit. He rejected this literal application as inconsistent with the structure of the Madras Act. He emphasized Sect. 132 (making Chapter VI applicable to execution by a Revenue Court of a decree for arrears of rent) and Sect. 134, which confines the procedure to Chapter VI, and reasoned it was inconceivable that the legislature intended to import a partial or "maimed" form of the O.21 procedure into the specific, fully-prescribed regimen of the Madras Act.

Jackson, J. concluded that O.21, R.92 has no application in the circumstances because the Madras Act itself prescribes the special procedure and thereby restricts the application of the Code as contemplated by Sect. 192. Once O.21, R.92 was found not applicable, a Civil suit clearly lay (the suit here pleads fraud in the conduct of the sale rather than contesting the right of sale). He noted the existence of a concurrent finding of fraud and agreed the appeal must fail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Second Appeal is DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties: The decrees of the lower courts setting aside the revenue sale in favour of the plaintiffs are upheld; the appeal is dismissed with costs in favor of respondents (the opinion states: "dismissed with costs of 1, 2 and 4 to 6 respondents"). The Court found that a suit in a Civil Court to set aside a revenue sale held in execution of a rent decree is not barred by the provisions of the Estates Land Act or by the old Code provision corresponding to O.21, R.92, and that the obiter remarks in Jagannadha Charyulu v. Satyanarayana Varaprasada Rau concerning that question are not authoritative for this point.

Broader implications: The court addressed and rejected the contention that the Estates Land Act (via Sect. 192) and O.21, R.92 operate to extinguish the common-law right to bring a Civil Court suit to set aside a revenue sale for fraud or material irregularity. The opinion confines its resolution to application of the Madras Act and the Code as they stand and does not purport to lay down a novel general principle beyond the conclusions reached in this statutory context.

N. R. R. — Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

Devadoss, J. — The plaintiffs' suit is for cancellation of a revenue sale of the plaint items on the ground that there was fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting it. Both the lower Courts have found on the merits in plaintiffs' favour and set aside the sale. The legal representatives of the 1st defendant, the landholder, have preferred this Second Appeal.

The vakil for the appellants raises the contention that no suit lies to set aside a sale in execution of a rent decree on the ground of fraud or material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale as a suit is barred under O. 21, R. 92 Civil Procedure Code. This point was not raised in the lower Courts. But we allowed it to be raised as it affected the maintainability of the suit. The argument is that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 with a few exceptions are made applicable to the proceedings under the Estates Land Act and therefore a suit to set aside a sale is barred under Sect. 312 of the Old Code corresponding to O. 21, R. 92 of the present Code, and a sale can only be set aside under Sect. 311 corresponding to O. 21, R. 90 of the present Code.

Sect. 192 of the Estates Land Act provides that with a few exceptions the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all suits and other proceedings under the act so far as they are not inconsistent therewith. The question is, is a suit in a Civil Court for setting aside a revenue sale held in execution of a rent decree barred either by reason of Sect. 312 or by reason of the provisions contained in the Estates Land Act? By Sect. 189 of the Act only certain classes of suits which are mentioned specifically in Schs. A and B are exempted from the cognizance of the Civil Court. The present suit is not one of those specifically mentioned in parts A and B of the schedule. When the Act specifically says that the right of action in a Civil Court is not taken away except in the cases specifically mentioned in the Act it would be opposed to the principles of construction of a special Act to hold that it takes away the right of a party to seek redress in a Civil Court in other cases. The right of a person to seek relief in a Civil Court is a common law right and as long as he can show cause of action he can bring a suit for redress, in this case on the allegation made by the plaintiffs, they have a cause of action and unless the suit is expressly barred by some provision of the Estates Land Act they would be entitled to seek relief in the ordinary Civil Courts of the land.

It is urged for the respondents that Sect. 131 provides for setting aside the sale on payment of the purchase money in full, and Sect. 124 does not contain any provision for confirmation of the sale. Under Sect. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court is required to pass an order confirming the sale if no application under Sect. 311 is made or if such application is made and disallowed. Under Sect. 124 the Collector is required to issue a certificate of sale to the purchaser if no application has been made under Sect. 131 or if an application has been made and rejected. As pointed out by Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar, there is no remedy to the ryot if the Collector refuses to set aside the sale, for no appeal is provided against an order under Sect. 131. In the case of an order under Sect. 312 an appeal is provided for by Sect. 588, Cl. 16. It is by reason of Sect. 132 that the provisions of Chapter VI are made applicable to the execution by a Revenue Court of any decree for arrears of rent. When no remedy is provided by the Act itself against the order under Sect. 131 and when it is not specifically enacted that the order of the Collector shall be conclusive, is it proper to hold that the party against whom the order is made has no remedy at all? Unless there be a specific provision in the Act itself, it would not be right to hold that the unsuccessful party is without a remedy.

It is urged by Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar that even if Sect. 312 be held to be a bar to a suit to set aside a revenue sale it does not bar a suit which is based upon fraud, for under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 an application under Sect. 311 to set aside a sale could be made only on the ground of material irregularity in publishing and conducting it. Under the present Code O. 21, R. 90, an application could be made on the ground of fraud as well It is unnecessary to consider this point at length as we are satisfied that the right of suit in a Civil Court to set aside a revenue sale is not taken away expressly or impliedly under the provisions of the Estates Land Act. Sect. 189 of the Estates Land Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the case of suits and applications of the nature specified in parts A and B of the schedule to the Act, and there is no warrant for enlarging the scope of the exemption to other suits.

In Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramanujachariar it was held that a sale held in execution of a decree without notice as required by O. 21, R. 22 was a nullity. Could it be said that in the case of a revenue sale the noncompliance with the provisions of O. 21, R. 22 by a Revenue Court would not make the sale a nullity? and if it is a nullity, what is the remedy of the aggrieved party? The remedy could only be by resorting to a Civil Court for setting aside the sale. In the case of a sale by a landholder under the summary proceedings under Sects. 111 and 118 of the Estates Land Act it was held that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction on an application by the landholder to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity in the publication and conduct of the sale and if such an order was passed the purchaser could institute a suit in the Civil Court for a declaration that the order is ultra vires and void. Vide Jagannadha Charyulu v. Satyanarayana Varaprasada Rau(2). The observations of the learned Judges who decided that case with regard to suits to set aside sales in execution of rent decrees are only obiter and with very great respect I am unable to agree with them. On a full consideration of the relevant sections of the Estates Land Act, I have no hesitation in holding that a suit in a Civil Court is not barred by reason of the provisions of the Estates Land Act or by reason of the provisions contained in Sect. 312 of the Old Code corresponding to O. 21, R. 92 of the present Code which are applicable to the proceedings in execution of a rent decree.

There is no other point in the second appeal, which fails and is dismissed with costs of 1, 2 and 4 to 6 respondents.

Jackson, J.—In execution of a decree by a Revenue Court, the 1st defendant brought the properly of the 1st plaintiff to sale. The 2nd plaintiff, his son, applied a month after the sale for two weeks' time in order to deposit the balance of the decree amount. This was refused (Ex. II). So plaintiffs have brought this suit in the Munsif's Court to set aside the sale as fraudulent.

The lower Courts have decreed the suit. The question raised on second appeal is whether, having regard to Sect. 192 of Madras Act I of 1908, any such suit can lie. Sect. 192 enacts that subject to the other provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings under the Act, so far as they are not inconsistent therewith. It specially provides in Sub-Cl. (a) that (among other sections) O. 21, R. 83, the postponement of sales, O. 21, R. 89, the deposit of the sale amount, O. 21, R. 91 cancellation if judgment-debtor has no saleable interests shall not apply. O. 43 is also not applicable.

It is argued that because O. 21, R. 92 is not specially excepted, therefore it applies. Under Sub-Cl. (3) of that rule, no suit to set aside an order confirming a sale shall be brought by the person against whom the order is made. Therefore the present suit is incompetent. In support of this argument, the appellant relies upon obiter dicta in Jagannadha Charyulu v. Satyanarayana Varaprasada Rau.

There the question was whether an order under O. 21, R. 90 could be passed in the case of a sale not under a decree but under the special provisions of the Act, Sects. 111, 118 and 124. The learned Judges remark in passing that if the sale had been in execution of a decree passed by the Revenue Court:

“O. 21, R. 92 would by the force of Sect. 192 of Act I of 1908 have become applicable.” Sect. 192 of Madras Act I of 1908 no doubt makes Rr. 90 and 92 applicable for (these rules, are not excepted in Sect. 192 (a).”

With the greatest respect, now that this point has been substantially in issue and fully argued, I am not prepared to hold that O. 21, R. 92 must be applicable merely because it is not in terms made inapplicable by Sect. 192 (a) Sect. 192 provides that where the procedure proper to any proceeding is not laid down by the provisions of the Act, it can be looked for in the Code of Civil Procedure. In this matter of sales in execution of a decree of the Revenue Court Sect. 132 lays down that the provisions of Chapter VI shall be applicable. In other words a ryot whose holding is sold up summarily under Sect. 77 (ii) and a ryot whose holding is sold up in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court, shall each alike undergo the procedure set forth from Sect. 111 to Sect. 181. It seems inconceivable that the Madras Legislature after fully providing for the procedure in this chapter, should have intended to import as a concurrent procedure, a maimed form of that prescribed under O. 21.

Thus under the Madras Act, the vendor is given a certificate under Sect. 124, and the vendee if aggrieved can sue before the Collector under Sect. 213, which also specially reserves under Sub-Cl. 2, his right of action in a Civil Court unless such action is barred in Sch. A; under the Code of Civil Procedure, the sale is confirmed and becomes absolute under O. 21, R. 92; there is an appeal for the aggrieved party under O. 43; and no suit lies.

Under the procedure which, as now suggested, Sect. 192 is supposed to import, the sale is confirmed, and the aggrieved party has no appeal because Sect. 192 excludes Chapter (Order) 43, and no suit, because O.21, R. 92 precludes a suit.

Surely it is plain that the Madras Act instead of introducing such anomalies, has confined the procedure to Chapter VI as Sect. 134 in terms provides; and O. 21, R. 92 has no application because the very provision in Sect. 134 is a provision such as is contemplated by Sect. 192 as restricting the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Madras Estates Land Act. Once it is found that O. 21, R. 92 has no application, a Civil suit clearly lies, because the only form of suit in which the ordinary jurisdiction is barred in Sch. A of the Madras Act at all resembling the present suit is that described in item 12:

“To contest the right of sale of a holding;”

and that is not the present suit. Here the plaintiff does not contest the right of sale; he pleads that the sale itself is fraudulent.

There is a concurrent finding of fraud.

I agree therefore that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.