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Kopparthi Lingayya And Others (Petitioners Criditors). v. Araveti Chinna Narayana And Others S (S).

Madras High Court
Sep 26, 1917
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — Full Bench Reference on Limitation and the Provincial Insolvency Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from an appeal against an order of the District Judge of Cuddapah dismissing a creditors' application to declare the respondents insolvent under Sect. 15 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The District Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the act of insolvency complained of occurred more than three months before presentation of the petition; the last date for presentation fell during the court's vacation, and the Judge held that the petition could not be presented on the re-opening day because Sect. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act was not applicable and Sect. 10 of the General Clauses Act could not save the petitioners as the matter concerned a question of limitation.

The appeal (provided for by Sect. 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act) was not presented within ninety days of the District Judge's order. The question arose whether the time occupied in obtaining a copy of the order appealed against could be excluded under Sect. 12 or Sect. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act so as to make the appeal timely; if not, the appeal would have to be rejected.

Consequently, the central procedural question referred to a Full Bench was whether the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) — notably Sects. 4, 5, 12 and related general sections — could be resorted to in dealing with petitions and appeals presented after the time prescribed under the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Sects. 4, 5 or 12 (and more generally Sects. 5 to 18 and related provisions) of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) are applicable to proceedings (petitions and appeals) under the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).
  2. Whether, in computing the period of limitation fixed by Sect. 46, cl. (4) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the time taken to obtain copies of the order appealed against should be deducted (i.e., whether the time for obtaining copies can be excluded under the general Limitation Act provisions).
  3. More generally, whether recourse can be had to the general provisions of Act IX of 1908 in dealing with the admission of petitions and appeals presented after the time prescribed under the Provincial Insolvency Act III of 1907.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants' vakil argued that the prior Full Bench decision in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India (which had been relied upon to deny applicability of the general Limitation Act provisions) was wrong and required reconsideration.
  • Appellants' counsel debated the proper interpretation of the word "affect" in Sect. 29 (corresponding to the earlier Sect. 6) and contended that the general provisions of the Limitation Act should be importable to special Acts that were not wholly self-contained.
  • It was contended that in practical cases (for example, where the period for appeal is short and obtaining copies of the order takes time) the legislature could not have intended to deny appellants the benefit of time spent in procuring necessary copies; thus the time for obtaining copies should be considered in computing limitation.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond identification of counsel who appeared for various respondents. Specific respondent arguments were not set out in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sivaramayya v. Bhujanga Rao Oldfield, J., expressed opinion that Sect. 12(2) of the Limitation Act could not be applied to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Full Bench records this dictum and later states that Oldfield J.'s view as to applicability of Sects. 5 and 12 was incorrect.
Veeramma v. Abbiah Deals with applicability of Limitation Act provisions to the Indian Registration Act; held the Registration Act to be complete in itself for limitation purposes (as cited). Noted by the Court as one of the authorities establishing that some special Acts are self-contained; used in the comparative discussion but the Court declined to extend that reasoning to the Provincial Insolvency Act.
Appa Rau Sanayi Aswa Rau v. Krishnamurthi Also related to applicability of Limitation Act to the Registration Act. Cited as part of the body of cases treating some special Acts as complete in themselves; considered in the discussion of conflicting authorities.
Nijabutoolla v. Waizr Ali Followed by a judge (Sadasiva Aiyar) as supporting applicability of Sect. 5 in a particular reading. Cited as an authority followed by one judge in a prior decision that reached a different conclusion from another judge; used to illustrate divergence of opinion.
Abdullah v. Salaru Authority concerning the exercise of High Court's power of superintendence (treating a time-barred appeal as a revision petition under exceptional circumstances). Cited as precedent for the exceptional course of treating a time-barred appeal as a revision in the exercise of superintendence; the Full Bench remarked that such a course can be taken only in special circumstances.
Duraiswami Iyengar v. Meenakshi Sundara Aiyar Held that Sect. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act is not applicable to applications under the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Full Bench considered this decision to be wrongly decided and criticized it, stating they do not follow it.
Trasi Deva Rao v. Parameshwaraya Followed Duraiswami Iyengar in respect of another section (Sect. 14 of the Limitation Act) and treated the Limitation Act as inapplicable. The Full Bench treated this decision as incorrectly decided and therefore not followed.
Seshama v. Sankara Authority cited in support of applying general Limitation provisions in some contexts; relied on in Srinivasa Ayyangar. Used by the Court as a supporting authority in the discussion of when general Limitation provisions may apply to special Acts.
Srinivasa Ayyangar v. The Secretary of State for India Applied Sect. 15 of the Limitation Act to a suit under Sect. 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act; held that general provisions apply in the absence of anything to the contrary in the special Act. The Full Bench described the decision, noted its reasoning and that it followed Seshama and Venkata; however, it concluded that this authority did not outweigh the Full Bench decision in Abu Backer Sahib.
Venkata v. Chengadu Full Bench considered computation of limitation periods and the interplay with the Limitation Act (with differing opinions among judges as to applicability of general sections). The Court reviewed this decision closely, noting its composition and that it did not directly overrule the Full Bench authority (Abu Backer Sahib) that they considered controlling.
Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India Full Bench decision that appeals under Sect. 10 of the Madras Forest Act are independent of the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (i.e., special Act is complete in itself in that context). The Court regarded this Full Bench decision as effectively answering the present question and followed its reasoning as controlling, treating it as a primary precedent for the interpretation of the relevant provision (Sect. 29/6).
Sivarama Patter Kariakar v. Krishna Aiyar Followed Veeramma and Appa Rau and held that, independently of the Limitation Act, Sect. 10 of the General Clauses Act could operate to validate presentation on the first day after court re-opened. Cited as an example where the General Clauses Act operated independently of the Limitation Act to validate presentation on reopening day; used in historical discussion of authorities.
Arbuthnot and Co. v. Sabapathy Mudaliar An appeal under the Indian Insolvency Act presented on the reopening day was admitted. Cited as an example in which presentation on reopening day was treated as valid in the insolvency context.
Dropadi… (Petitioner) v. Hira Lal… (Opposite Party) Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court fully discussed the matter and supported a view regarding application of general Limitation provisions (as described in the opinion). The present Court considered the Allahabad Full Bench discussion to be fully reasoned and treated it as persuasive support for its view.
Kullayappa v. Lakshmipathi Pronouncements by some judges that Sect. 6 of the Limitation Act did not bar application of the general sections in certain contexts. Cited as part of the matrix of differing authorities; noted that the decisions were not Full Bench pronouncements conclusively resolving the issue.
Iswara Patter v. Karuppan Applied Sect. 18 of the Limitation Act to a case arising under the Revenue Recovery Act. Referred to among other cases where general Limitation provisions were applied to special Acts; used to demonstrate divergence of views.
Chamela Kuar v. Amir Khan; Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das Authority that an appeal filed without the necessary annexures (copies of decree/judgment) must be regarded as no presentation in law under the Civil Procedure Code. Cited to show the practical requirement (under CPC rules) that appeals must include copies of the order/judgment and the consequence if they are not annexed.
Secretary of State for India v. Assan Illustrates a mode by which the period of limitation fixed in a special Act can be affected. Referred to by the Court when discussing how importing general Limitation rules might indirectly affect special limitation periods.
Mohummud Buhadoor Khan v. The Collector Judicial Committee decision that to Acts of a special kind which are self-contained, the general provisions of the Limitation Act should not be annexed. Cited as authority supporting the settled principle that self-contained special Acts need not take in general Limitation provisions; used in the Court's review of prior authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench framed the substantive question as whether recourse can be had to the general provisions of Act IX of 1908 (the Indian Limitation Act) in dealing with admission of petitions and appeals presented after the time prescribed under the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).

The Court's analysis proceeded principally by statutory interpretation of the provision corresponding to Sect. 29 (previously Sect. 6 of earlier Limitation legislation), which states that nothing in the Limitation Act shall "affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India."

Key steps in the reasoning were:

  1. The Court examined existing authorities and noted that a controlling Full Bench decision (Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India) had interpreted the corresponding provision to mean that where a special Act prescribes its own limitation periods (and the enactment is self-contained with respect to those rights), the general provisions of the Limitation Act should not be applied to vary those periods. The Court regarded that Full Bench ruling as effectively decisive on the interpretive question and expressed concurrence with it.
  2. The Court addressed the meaning of the pair of words "affect" and "alter." It emphasized that the juxtaposition of those words requires giving independent meaning to "affect" and held that an application of the general Limitation provisions which, even indirectly (by computation, exclusion, or deduction), results in enlargement or change of the special period, would "affect" that period and therefore fall within the restriction of Sect. 29.
  3. The Bench reviewed the divergent earlier authorities (including Venkata v. Chengadu, various Full Bench and multi-member decisions in Madras, and the Srinivasa Ayyangar decision) and explained why those authorities did not displace the Full Bench Abu Backer Sahib ruling. The Court explained that although some decisions (and some judges) had favored importing general provisions where the special Act was not wholly self-contained, the Full Bench holding was binding and decisive for the present question.
  4. The Court considered whether the Provincial Insolvency Act is self-contained. It observed that Sects. 6 and 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act show reliance upon the Civil Procedure Code and that the Insolvency Act is not independent of ordinary rules of civil procedure. Thus the Act is not "complete in itself," and ordinarily might be supplemented by general procedural rules.
  5. Despite the Insolvency Act not being self-contained, the Court held that the decisive interpretive rule was the meaning given to "affect" in Sect. 29: if the importation of general Limitation provisions would serve to alter or extend the special period fixed by the local enactment (for example, by excluding time during which copies were obtained or during which another litigation was pending), that would be to "affect" the special period and therefore is barred by Sect. 29. The Court therefore concluded that the general provisions could not be used to change the specific periods prescribed by the Provincial Insolvency Act.
  6. The Court acknowledged practical difficulties — for instance, that an appeal period of thirty days (Sect. 47(4) Provincial Insolvency Act) might in some cases be too short to enable obtaining necessary copies of the order/judgment for annexure to an appeal as required by order and rule (O. 41, R.1 CPC mutatis mutandis). While expressing sympathy for the hardship this might create and suggesting legislative or procedural remedies (including an amendment of rules), the Court made clear that it was bound to interpret the statute as it stood and would not permit the general Limitation Act provisions to be used to extend or alter the prescribed insolvency periods.

The three judges (Ayling, Seshagiri Aiyar, and Bakewell) concluded after reviewing authorities and the statutory text that the correct answer to the reference question was negative: recourse to the general provisions of the Limitation Act to alter or extend the special limitation periods prescribed by the Provincial Insolvency Act is not permissible.

Holding and Implications

Question answered in the negative.

Holding (core ruling): The Full Bench held that parties cannot resort to the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) so as to alter or extend the specific periods of limitation prescribed by the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907). In short, where the effect of invoking general Limitation provisions would be to "affect" (i.e., extend or change) the special period fixed by the Provincial Insolvency Act, such recourse is not permissible under Sect. 29.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties in the present case: an appeal or petition presented after the specific time fixed by the Provincial Insolvency Act cannot be saved by invoking general Limitation Act provisions that would have the effect of extending or altering that fixed period.
  • The Court recognized practical hardships that may arise (for example, where statutory appeal periods are short and obtaining copies of orders for annexure is time-consuming) but declined to relieve such hardships by judicial application of the general Limitation Act. The Court suggested that remedies are more appropriately provided by legislature or by amendment to procedural rules such as the orders under the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The Full Bench considered prior decisions (including Duraiswami Iyengar and Trasi Deva Rao) to be wrongly decided insofar as they held that certain Limitation Act provisions applied to Provincial Insolvency Act proceedings; those decisions were accordingly not followed by this Bench.
  • No enlargement of time in the present case was granted on the basis of the general Limitation Act. The judges indicated that special circumstances might call for different treatment under superintendence powers (e.g., treating a time-barred appeal as a revision petition), but such extraordinary processes were not invoked in the case before them.

The Bench also remarked that the question raised significant policy and procedural considerations best addressed by legislative amendment or by appropriate amendment of court rules (for example, the rules requiring annexure of copies of orders to appeals). The Court confined itself to statutory interpretation and the authorities cited.

Outcome certification: The Full Bench (Ayling, Seshagiri Aiyar and Bakewell, JJ.) answered the referred question in the negative; the individual reasons are as summarized above, and Bakewell, J. expressly recorded agreement with Ayling, J.

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ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH.

This is an appeal against an order of the District Judge of Cuddapah passed under Sect. 15 of the Provincial Insolvency Act dismissing an application made by creditors to declare the respondents insolvent. The learned Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the act of insolvency complained of occurred more than three months before the presentation of the petition, the last date for presentation having fallen in the period during which the Court was closed for vacation. He held that the petition could not be presented on the re-opening day as Sect. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act was not applicable, and that Sect. 10 of the General Clauses Act could not save the petitioners, as a question of limitation was insolved.

The appeal against the District Judge's order, for which Sect. 46 of the Act provides, has not been presented within ninety days of the order. Unless the time occupied in obtaining a copy of the order appealed against be excluded under Sect. 12 or Sect. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, this appeal must be rejected.

The question for our decision therefore is whether Sects, 4, 5 or 12 of the Indian Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act.

The latest decision of this Court on the point is Sivaramayya v. Bhujanga Rao, wherein Oldfield, J, expressed his opinion that Sect. 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act could not be applied to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act. The learned Judge was inclined to think that Sect. 5, being one of the general provisions of the Act and not altering or affecting any period of limitation within the meaning of Sect. 29 (I) (b), might be applicable, but he felt himself bound to follow the decisions in Veeramma v. Abbiah(2) and Appa Rau Sanayi Aswa Rau v. Krishnamurthi(3). Sadasiva Aiyar, J., who sat with him, considered that Sect. 5 was applicable. He distinguished Veeramma v. Abbiah, dissented from Appa Rail Sanayi Aswa Rau v. Krishnamurthi and followed Nijabutoolla v. Waizr Ali, Reference under Forest Act V of 1882(4) and Seshama v. Sankara(5). Both learned Judges agreed to cut the Gordian knot under the exceptional circumstances of that case by treating the time-barred appeal as a revision petition and dealing with it under Sect. 15 of the Charter Act, a course which can be taken only when the High Court in the exercise of its power of superintendence considers that a Subordinate Court has failed to do its duty: vide Abdullah v. Salaru(6).

The present appeal purports to have been brought under Sect. 15 of the Charter Act, as well as under Sect. 46, Cl. (2) of Act. III of 1907, but the circumstances are not such as to warrant our proceeding under the Charter.

Duraiswami Iyengar v. Meenakshi Sundara Aiyar(7) to which Oldfiled, J., was again a party, is a direct decision that Sect. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act is not applicable to applications under the Provincial Insolvency Act, and was followed by the same learned Judge in Trasi Deva Rao v. Parameshwaraya(8), in respect to another section, namely, Sect. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, with the remark that the whole of that Act is inapplicable to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act.

In none of the above cases was the decision in Srinivasa Ayyangar v. The Secretary of State for India(9) considered. That was a case wherein Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., after a very full consideration of the law on the subject, applied Sect, 15 of the Indian Limitation Act to a suit instituted under Sect. 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act (II of 1864). They held (we think rightly) that the special period for bringing suits under that Act was governed by the provision in Sect. 59, which allows six months time, rather than by any article in the schedules to the Indian Limitation Act, but that the general provisions in the body of the Act were intended to be applicable in the absence of anything to the contrary, to proceedings under special or local laws. In so doing, they followed the authority of a Bench of this Court in Seshama v. Sankara and of a Full Bench in Venkata v. Chengadu(10),

The Full Bench decision in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India, which formed the basis for the decision in Duraiswami Iyengar v. Meenakshisundaram Aiyar was to the effect that appeals under Sect. 10 of the Madras Forest Act (V of 1882) are independent of the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act.

The rights conferred by Sects. 10 and 14 of the Madras Forest Act to appeal against decisions of Forest Settlement Officers upon claims to have certain rights recognised at the time of afforestation, to a District Court and to a Forest Court, respectively, are evidently rights of a very special nature. As pointed out by the Chief Justice, the vesting of a power to extend time for appealing in the hands of the Governor-in-Council is in itself an indication that the Courts were not intended to exercise a similar power under the Indian Limitation Act in regard to these so-called appeals.

The cases in Veeramma v. Abbiah and Appa Rau Sanayi Aswa Rau v. Krishnamurthi related to the applicability of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to acts done in relation to the Indian Registration Act. Sivarama Patter Kariakar v. Krishna Aiyar which followed these two decisions, held that independently of the Indian Limitation Act, Sect. 10 of the General Clauses Act, would operate to make a presentation on the first day after the Court reopened, though after the time allowed in the Registration Act, a good presentation. So too, in Arbuthnot and Co. v. Sabapathy Mudaliar an appeal presented under the Indian Insolvency Act on the reopening day, when the last day for filing it fell on a holiday, was admitted.

In Veeramma v. Abbiah and Appa Rav Sanayi Aswa Ran v. Krishnamurthi as in other decisions, it has always been held that what must be looked to in deciding whether the Limitation Act can be applied to a special or local law is the question whether the particular Act is or is not self-contained and complete in itself.

It has been settled by a course of decisions that the Madras Forest Act and the Indian Registration Act are special Acts complete in themselves and we do not here propose to question, the reasoning by which that result has been arrived at.

But Sects. 6 and 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act show that that enactment is at least not independent of the rules of Civil Procedure, followed in the trial of regular suits and appeals under the Civil Procedure Code.

We also think that the analogy of the Madras Forest Act did not justify the assumption in Duraiswami Iyengar v. Meenakshisundaram Aiyar, that the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act were not applicable to the Provincial Insolvency Act on the strength of Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India.

In our opinion the correct view is that taken by the Allahabad High Court in Dropadi…(Petitioner); v. Hira Lal…(Opposite Party).*, where the matter has been fully discussed by a Full Bench.

We consider that Duraiswami Iyengar v. Meenakshisundaram Aiyar and Trasi Deva Rao v. Parameshwarayu, were wrongly decided and that the dictum of Oldfield, J., in Sivaramayya v. Bhujanga Rao, as to the applicability of Sects. 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act was also incorrect. But as there is so much divergence of opinion on the point, we refer to a Full Bench the question,

“whether recourse can be had to the general provisions of Act (IX of 1908), in dealing with the admission of petitions and appeals presented after the time prescribed under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).” [This above appeal came on for hearing, in pursuance of the above order of reference, before the Full Bench as constituted above.]
Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar with Mr. C. A. Seshagiri Sastriar for the Appellants.
Dr. S. Swaminadhan for the 5th Respondent.
Mr. P. Somasundaram for Mr. V. Subramaniam Pantulu for the Respondents 4 and 9.
Mr. V. S. Narasimhachari for the Respondents 1, 7 and 8.

OPINIONS

Ayling, J. — The question propounded for our decision is—

Whether recoruse can be had to the general provisions of Act IX of 1908 in dealing with the admission of petitions and appeals presented after the time prescribed under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act III of 1907?

The obstacle to the application of these general provisions is Sect. 29 of the same Act which says:—

“Nothing in this Act shall …. affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India.”

The meaning of this section has been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India, and in my opinion that judgment effectively answers the question before us. In place of Sect. 29 of Act IX of 1908 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, the learned Judges were dealing with Sect. 6 of Act XV of 1877 (the previous Limitation Act.)

The learned Vakil for the Appellants has in fact been forced to argue that the decision in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India was wrong and requires reconsideration. How far we are entitled to question the correctness of a considered ruling of a Full Bench of an equal numerical strength is a matter into which I do not propose to enter: for I entirely and respectfully concur in the ruling now called in question. It is a pure question of interpretation of a statute. The juxtaposition of the words “affect” and “alter” compel us to give an independent meaning to the word “effect”; and I cannot understand how the application of the general provisions extending in certain circumstances the period fixed by law can be held not to ‘effect’ that period.

The cases mainly relied on by appellants' vakil are Venkata v. Chengadu and Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Secretary of State. In the latter case the two learned Judges were inclined to question the correctness, or rather the general applicability of the decision in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India largely because the Full Bench Ruling in Venkata v. Chengadu had not been considered; but they deemed it unnecessary to decide whether Sect. 29, Indian Limitation Act, renderd the general sections of the Limitation Act inapplicable to special and Local Acts generally. They disposed of the case before them with an eye solely to the peculiar features of the Act with which they were dealing—Act II of 1864, and I need hardly point out even if the two were mutually destructive, the authority of this ruling cannot be held to counterpoise the Full Bench decision.

The decision in Venkata v. Chengadu was that of a Bench of four Judges, the main judgment being that of Muttusami Aiyar, J.; the question referred for their decision did not relate to the applicability of the general sections of the Limitation Act or the interpretation of Sect. 6 of the same Act (corresponding to Sect. 29 of the present Act), but to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act (Art. 95, Schedule II) or Sect. 59 of Act. II of 1864 should be followed in computing the period of limitation. No doubt Muttusami Aiyar, J. expressed the opinion, with the concurrence of Kernan, J., the Sect. 6 of the Limitation Act did not bar the application of the general sections, Kullayappa v. Lakshmipathi is another pronouncement of the same two learned Judges to the same effect. But the other two Judges, who were parties to Kullayappa v. Lakshmipathi (Parker and Wilkinson, JJ., expressed no opinion on the point; and this is remarked by Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., in their judgment in Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Secretary of State. The decision in Kullayappa v. Lakshmipathi is certainly not entitled to be treated as a Full Bench decision on the question now before us.

Veeramma v. Abbiah is another Full Bench case in which Muttusami Aiyar and Shephard, JJ., expressed contrary views as to the effect of Sect. 6 of Act XV of 1877. Collins, C.J, does not refer to the section; but, by implication, he would seem to have favoured Shephard, J's view.

I can find nothing in these cases, which would induce me to differ from the view of the learned Judges in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India.

It has been suggested that in the case of an appeal to a District Court (with which we are not concerned here) the period allowed by Sect. 47 (4), Provincial Insolvency Act (thirty days), is so short that it might be impossible to procure a copy of the order in time for presentation with a appeal, as required by O. 41, R. I (mutatis mutand is), and that in such a case a Court could not be asked to enforce the limitation clause, Sect. 46 (4). This is the case here: and we are not called on to say what a Court should do, if such facts were established. The possibility of such a difficult case may be a ground for legislation, or, possibly, the provision of a remedy in the rules and orders under the Civil Procedure Code. But we have merely to interpret the law as it stands; and I feel no hesitation in answering the reference in the negative.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.— Both sides are agreed that the only question to be considered in this reference is whether the time taken up for obtaining copies of the order appealed against should be deducted in computing the period of limitation fixed by Sect. 46, Cl. (4) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The decision of the question turns largely upon the interpretation to be placed upon Sect. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. A very learned argument was addressed to us by Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar upon the meaning to be attached to the word ‘affect’ in Cl. (1) (b) of that section. Apart from authority, if 1 were deciding this question for the first time, I would have respectfully concurred in the view taken by three learned Judges of this Court including the present Chief Justice in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India. The word ‘alter’ would apply directly to similar provisions in the Limitation Act, if any, giving an extended period to suits or appeals of the nature provided for in the Special Act. The word ‘affect’ is more comprehensive. Whenever by a process of computation or exclusion or deduction the special period fixed by the enactment is indirectly extended or cut down, it must be taken that that period has been affected. The illustration which Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar suggested would also be connoted by the term ‘affect’; for example, there may be a special period compelling a party to take steps to set aside the order of a Special Officer under the Boundaries Act. When a party instead of adopting that course wants to avail himself of the general period of limitation prescribed for a declaration of title in Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, the relief granted to him would indirectly affect the period of limitation prescribed in the special law. The decision of the Full Bench in The Secretary of State for India v. Assan is an illustration of this mode of affecting the period of limitation fixed in a special Act. But I am not prepared to agree with the learned vakil that this category of cases exhausts the significance of the word “affect”. Nor am I prepared to accede to the contention that a computation of period of limitation which in effect extends the time fixed does not affect the period of limitation. In my opinion, wherever an attempt is made to construe a special period fixed by an enactment with reference to the general provisions of the Limitation Act contained in Sects. 5 to 18, the effect of such a process would be to affect the period of limitation prescribed by the local Act. Therefore my reading of the section apart from authority is in accordance with the pronouncement in Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India. But the matter has been complicated a great deal by other decisions to which I shall presently very briefly refer.

Before dealing with the cases quoted at the Bar, I may dispose of one aspect of the case which was very strongly pressed upon us by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar. He did not dispute the proposition that where a special Act is self-contained the general provisions of the Limitation Act should not be imported into the consideration of questions arising under the former Act. Upon this point we have the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Mohummud Buhadoor Khan v. The Collector of Bareilly that to Acts of a special kind which are self-contained, the general provisions of the Limitation Act should not be annexed. Sir Arthur Collins, C.J, and Muttuswami Aiyar, J., followed this decision in Veeramma v. Abbiah. There are other decisions to the same effect; and therefore it may be taken as settled that where the Code is complete in itself the general provisions of the Limitation Act commencing from Sects. 5 to 18 should not be read as forming part of that Code. In the present case it was contended that the Provincial Insolvency Act is not a Code complete in itself. I think this contention is well founded.

We have only refer to Sects. 6 and 47 to show that the Civil Procedure Code was intended to be largely utilized in regard to proceedings under the Act. Therefore the Act has to be supplemented by the importation of the general rules of procedure as to suits.

One special matter affecting limitation may also be pointed out, and that is, by Sect. 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the procedure to be followed in presenting appeals under that Act are to be the same as in the case of appeals under the Civil Procedure Code. As the learned vakil pointed out, under the Civil Procedure Code an appeal can be filed only if the memorandum is accompanied by copies of the decree and in the judgment. It is well recognised that an appeal filed without these annexures must be regarded as no presentation in the eye of law: see Chamela Kuar v. Amir Khan and Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das. It therefore follows that under the Provincial Insolvency Act, it is incumbent upon the party preferring an appeal that he should file copies of the order or judgment appealed against. It is not disputed that in a considerable number of eases such a copy may not be obtainable within the thirty days allowed for presenting an appeal to the First Appellate Court. It was not therefore unreasonably suggested that the legislature could not have intended that the period of thirty days fixed by Sect. 46, cl. (4), should be inclusive of the period for obtaining copies of the order appealed against. The result of such a construction would be to deny the right of appeal in many cases. If it were shown in the present case that an application was made immediately after the order was passed and that more than ninety days had elapsed before the copies were obtained, I would have hesitated a great deal before coming to the conclusion that the party is not entitled to prefer the appeal after obtaining the copies, because to hold otherwise would be to deny the right of appeal given by the section. However, it has not been shown that in this particular case the copies were not granted expeditiously.

Apart from this particular aspect of the case, the general question now remains whether by virtue of the fact that the Provincial Insolvency Act is not self-contained we are at liberty to introduce into the construction of Sect. 46, cl. (4), the general Provisions of the Limitation Act. In Venkata v. Chengadu, a Bench of four Judges had to consider this question with reference to Sect. 18 of the Limitation Act. That was a case under the Revenue Recovery Act. Two Judges Kernan, J. and Muttuswami Aiyar, J., held that Sect. 18 was applicable to the Revenue Recovery Act. Justices Parker and Wilkinson expressed no definite opinion on the question. In Seshama v. Sankara, Collins, C.J and Muttuswami Aiyar, J., in dealing with a case under the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860 held that Sect. 14 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the special period fixed in that Act. In Kullayappa v. Lakshmipathi, Kernan and Muttuswami Aiyar, JJ., applied Sect. 14 of the Limitation Act to a case arising under the rent Recovery Act. In Iswara Patter v. Karuppan, Collins, C.J, and Davies, J., applied Sect. 18 of the Limitation Act to a case arising under the Revenue Recovery Act. In Veeramma v. Abbiah, which was a case under the Registration Act, all the three learned Judges who took part in it, viz., Collins, C. J., Muttuswami Aiyar, J., and Shephard, J., held that the Act was complete in itself and that consequently there was no occasion for invoking the aid of the general provisions of the Limitation Act. The Chief Justice and Justice Muttuswami Aiyar once again reiterated the proposition that if the Act was not complete in itself, the general provisions of the Limitation Act may be looked into for construing a special Act. On the other hand, Shephard, J., gave an interpretation of the term ‘affect,’ which subsequently found favour with the Judges who decided Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India. All these decisions were passed under Sect. 6 of the Limitation Act of 1877. There was thus a considerable divergence of opinion regarding the interpretation to be placed upon the word ‘affect’ at least in Madras, and yet when the New Limitation Act of 1908 was passed, the legislature did not choose to give an authoritative interpretation of the term. My mind has been exercised considerably as to whether the legislature intended to adopt the interpretation placed upon the term by Collins, C.J, Muttuswami Atyar J., Kernan J., and Davies J., or whether it preferred the interpretations placed upon the word by Shephard, J. The opinion of Arnold White, C.J, Miller, J. and Wallis, J., was not given until after the new Act was passed although they had to construe the language of Sect. 6 of the Act, The view by taken Shephard, J., is shared by a very large number of Judges in the other High Courts, and as that view is in consonance with the natural interpretation to be placed upon the word ‘affect,’ I prefer to hold with the Judges who decided Abu Backer Sahib v. The Secretary of State for India that even in cases where the Act is not complete in itself, if by importing the general provisions of the Limitation Act the period fixed in a special Act is likely to be enlarged either by the process of computation in obtaining copies or by excluding the period during which a fraud was practised or during which another litigation was proceeding in a different Court, still the period of limitation would be ‘affected’.

It seems to me that this is eminently a matter in which the legislature should interfere. I fail to see why litigants preferring appeals under special Acts should not have the same privilege of extension provided by the general provisions of the Limitation Act as they have in cases directly coming under the Civil Procedure Code. There is no conceivable reason for putting one class of litigants under a disability of this kind. I may also be permitted to suggest that until the legislature intervenes to amend the Limitation Act, our High Court should amend the rule in O. 41, by saying that the presentation of an appeal in cases under the Insolvency Act need not be accompanied by copies of the order, decree or judgment appealed against. My answer is in the negative.

Bakewell, J.—I agree with Mr. Justice Ayling.

M.RQuestion answered in the negative.