- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Pallumal Bholanath, In Re
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Reference under Section 66(3), Income-tax Act)
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference arose under Section 66(3) of the Income-tax Act. By an order dated 20th July 1931 a Bench of this Court required the Income-tax Commissioner to state a case on three formulated questions; the case has since been stated and is before the Court.
The material facts stated in the opinion are as follows. The assessee, Sita Ram, was called upon by the Income-tax Officer to furnish a return and he did so. Subsequently the Income-tax Officer issued a notice purportedly under Section 22(4) calling upon the assessee to produce account books for the years 1983 to 1985 Sambat. The assessee produced books for 1984 and 1985 but not for 1983. When questioned later about the missing 1983 books, the assessee stated they had been filed in the Court of the Munsif, Benares. The Income-tax Officer inquired of the Munsif, who replied that no such books had been filed. Thereafter two further notices under Section 22(4) were issued and the Income-tax Officer formed the opinion that the assessee failed to comply with those notices as well. The Income-tax Officer then made an assessment to the best of his judgment under Section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act.
Procedurally, an assessment under Section 23(4) has significance because no appeal lies against it (subject to revisional powers of the Commissioner under Section 33). The assessee pursued remedies under Section 27 (application for annulment of the assessment) without success and an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner was abandoned. After the assessment the assessee preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner who declined to admit it on the ground that an assessment under Section 23(4) was final and no appeal lay. The assessee then sought an order from the Commissioner to state a case for the High Court; the Commissioner refused and the assessee successfully obtained an order from this Court requiring the Commissioner to state a case addressing the three questions now before the Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Assistant Commissioner was right in refusing to admit the appeal when he partially examined the merits to determine whether the Income-tax Officer was right in making an assessment to the best of his judgment (i.e., whether the Assistant Commissioner could examine competence of the appeal).
- Whether the order of the Assistant Commissioner amounted to an order dismissing an appeal under Section 31, and whether, therefore, the assessee had a right to approach the Commissioner to state a case.
- Whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was open to the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under Section 22(4) after the return had been filed, and whether non-compliance with that notice could lead to an assessment to the best of the Income-tax Officer's judgment under Section 23(4).
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The learned advocate for the assessee argued that notices under Section 22(4) could not be issued after the assessee had already submitted his return under Section 22(2); the power to issue a Section 22(4) notice exists only after the assessee has been called upon to furnish a return and before he has actually furnished that return.
- The assessee's counsel referred to Section 37 of the Act in support of submissions about production of evidence, though the opinion records that Section 37 relates to production of evidence from any person and not specially to the assessee.
Respondent / Revenue Position (as reflected in the record)
- The record shows that the Income-tax Officer issued notices under Section 22(4) after the return had been filed and proceeded to assess the assessee under Section 23(4) for non-production of accounts; the Assistant Commissioner took the view after examining the record that, because the assessment had been made under Section 23(4), no appeal lay.
- The opinion records that prior judicial authority (including decisions of this Court and several High Courts, and a recent Lahore High Court decision) supported the view that a Section 22(4) notice may be issued after the assessee has submitted his return.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| re. Lachhman Prasard Babu Ram, AIR 1930 All 49 | This earlier matter involved the same point (whether Section 22(4) notices could be issued after return filed); Mukerji, J. in that matter took a view contrary to the opinion expressed here and the matter had been referred to a Full Bench (reference proved infructuous). | The Court states that the view previously expressed by the present judge was against the assessee's contention and, after reconsideration of Sections 22 and 23, the judge sees no reason to depart from that earlier view. |
| Muhammad Hayat v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1931 Lah 87 | The Lahore High Court reconsidered the question and took the same view as had been taken by other High Courts, i.e., that a Section 22(4) notice may be issued after the assessee has been called upon to furnish a return (and after the return has been filed). | The Court relies on the Lahore decision as evidence of unanimity among High Courts on the point and uses it to support the holding that a Section 22(4) notice may be issued after the return is filed. |
| Division Bench of the Punjab High Court (unnamed decision) | Advocated a contrary view (that Section 22(4) notices could not be issued after return was filed). | The Court notes that decisions of this Court and of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts were against the Punjab case; the Lahore decision and other High Courts' decisions favoured the view adopted by this Court. |
| Unspecified decisions of this Court, Calcutta High Court and Patna High Court | Held against the Punjab Division Bench and in favour of permitting Section 22(4) notices after the return was filed. | The Court refers to these decisions as forming part of the body of authority supporting the conclusion it reaches. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the third question first (whether a Section 22(4) notice could be issued after the return was filed and whether non-compliance could lead to assessment under Section 23(4)). After reviewing Sections 22 and 23 and prior argument, the judge declined to depart from his earlier expressed view that a Section 22(4) notice may be issued at any time after the Income-tax Officer has called upon the assessee to furnish a return. The judge observed that there is unanimity among several High Courts (including a supporting decision of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Hayat) and that decisions of this Court and other High Courts were against the contrary Punjab view.
Bennet, J. concurred and added a structured analysis addressing the principal point:
- Argument from grammar: Section 23(4) contains three disjunctive clauses (failure to make a return; failure to produce accounts or documents required by the Income-tax Officer; failure to attend or produce evidence). The judge reasoned that the middle clause (failure to produce accounts/documents) stands independently and the words proposed to be imported ("before he has made a return") cannot permissibly be read into that clause under ordinary rules of English grammar.
- Argument from logic: It would be illogical to impose the penalty of an assessment under Section 23(4) (which carries no appeal) for non-production of accounts if the notice was issued before the return, but not impose it when the notice was issued after the return. The failure in both scenarios is substantially equivalent and there is no reason to distinguish them.
- Section 37 and related submissions: The judge noted that Section 37 deals with production of evidence from any person and does not specifically supply a penalty mechanism for the assessee's failure to produce accounts/documents; thus Section 37 does not alter the analysis.
- Course of business (practical considerations): It is normal for an Income-tax Officer to examine the return when furnished and then determine which books/documents are required, issuing notices accordingly. The judge found it absurd to construe Sub-section 22(4) so as to limit the time for issuing a notice to the narrow period between service of a Section 22(2) notice and the filing of the return.
On the first question, the Court accepted that the Assistant Commissioner was justified in examining the record to the extent necessary to determine whether the appeal was competent — specifically to establish whether the assessment had been made under Section 23(4) and thus whether an appeal lay. Accordingly the first question was answered in the affirmative.
Because of that conclusion, the Court held that the Assistant Commissioner's order did not amount to a dismissal under Section 31 and thus the second question was answered in the negative.
Holding and Implications
Holding (Core Rulings)
- Question 1: Answered in the affirmative — the Assistant Commissioner was right to examine the record to determine whether the appeal was competent.
- Question 2: Answered in the negative — the Assistant Commissioner's order did not amount to dismissal of an appeal under Section 31 and the assessee therefore did not have the right asserted for that reason.
- Question 3: Answered in the affirmative — it is open to an Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under Section 22(4) at any time after he has called upon the assessee to furnish a return; failure to comply with such a notice may render the assessee liable to assessment under Section 23(4).
Implications and Consequences
- Direct effect on the parties: The Court's answers validate the Income-tax Officer's power to issue Section 22(4) notices after the return has been filed and the consequent use of Section 23(4) assessments where the assessee fails to produce required accounts. The Assistant Commissioner's approach in this case was upheld, and the assessee is found not to have been entitled to the relief he sought on the second question.
- Costs and directions: The Court ordered that a copy of the order be sent to the Income-tax Commissioner. The assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the reference. The fee of the counsel for the Crown was assessed at Rs. 150, to be taxed as costs if a certificate is filed within the prescribed period.
- On precedent: The opinion expressly relies on prior decisions of this Court and various High Courts (including Muhammad Hayat v. Commissioner, AIR 1931 Lah 87) in reaching its conclusion; the judgment therefore situates itself within that body of authority rather than purporting to overrule it. The opinion does not state any broader rule beyond the direct holdings summarized above.
Note: This summary is compiled exclusively from the text of the provided opinion; no information beyond that opinion has been added or inferred.
1. This is a reference-under Section 66(3) of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Commissioner was required by an order of a Bench of this Court dated 20th July 1931, to state a case in relation to three questions therein formulated. The case has since been stated. The only facts which it is necessary to state for the purpose of the reference before us are these:
2. The assessee, Sita Ram, was required by the Income-tax Officer to furnish a return, which he did. Subsequently the Income-tax Officer issued, what purports to be, a notice under Section 22(4), Income-tax Act, calling upon Sita Ram to produce his account books for the years 1983 to 1985 Sambat. Sita Ram produced his account books for the years 1984 and 1985 but not those for 1983. On being questioned by the Income-tax Officer on a later date as regards the circumstances in which he failed to produce the accounts for the year 1983 Sambat, he explained that the same had been filed in the Court of the Munsif, Benares. The Income-tax Officer sent a communication to the Munsif asking whether the assesssee's account books for the year 1983 Sambat, had been filed in his Court, as alleged by the assessee. The Munsif replied in the negative. Subsequently two other notices under Section 22(4) were issued to the assessee. It is not necessary to enter into the details of those notices. The Income-tax Officer was of opinion that the assessee failed to comply with these latter notices as well. Accordingly the Income-tax officer made an assessment to the best of his judgment under Section 23(4), Income-tax Act. The significance of an assessment under Section 23(4), is that no appeal is permitted, and the Income-tax Officer's assessment is final subject to the general revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 33, Income-tax Act. I may however mention that the assessee is not altogether without a remedy where an Income-tax Officer makes an assessment under Section 23(4), on the ground that the assessee failed to comply with a notice issued under Section 22(4), because he can apply, under Section 27, for the annulment of the assessment on sufficient cause being shown and for a fresh assessment being made. In case of an improper refusal by the Income-tax Officer, the law allows an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner under Section 30 of the Income-tax Act. It appears that the assessee in the present case actually took action under Section 27 of the Act, but without success. He also preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner, but I am informed that it was abandoned. It is not necessary to pursue this aspect of the case any further.
3. On the assessment being made by the Income-tax Officer under Section 23(4), Income-tax Act, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner, who, after examination of the record, expressed the opinion that as the Income-tax Officer had made the assessment to the best of his judgment under Section 23(4), no appeal lay. The assessee moved the Income-tax Commissioner to state a case for reference to the High Court on this request being refused, The assessee successfully moved this Court for an order requiring the Income-tax Commissioner to state a case in reference to the three questions which we are now called on to decide. These questions are as follows:
(1) Whether the Assistant Commissioner was right in professing not to admit the appeal, when he partially entered into the merits of the appeal and saw whether the Income-tax Officer was right or not in making an assessment to the best of his judgment. (2) Whether the order of the Assistant Commissioner virtually amounted or not to an order dismissing an appeal under Section 31, and whether or not, therefore, the assessee had a right to approach the Commissioner to state a case? (3) Whether, in the circumstances of the case it was open to the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under Section 22, Clause (4), of the Income-tax Act, and whether on account of a non-compliance with that order an assessment to the best of the judgment of the Income-tax Officer could be made.
4. I prefer to deal with the last question first. The learned advocate for the assessee has pointed out that all the notices purporting to be those under Section 22(4), issued by the Income-tax Officer in this case, were issued after the assessee submitted his return under Section 22(2). His contention is that the Income-tax Officer cannot issue a notice under Section 22(4), after the assessee submits his return and that it is only after the assessee has been called upon to furnish a return and before he has actually furnished a return that the Income-tax Officer can issue a notice under Section 22(4). At one time there was some difference of opinion on this question. I had to deal with this point in re. Lachhman. Prasard Babu Ram AIR 1930 All 49, Mukerji, J., took a different view, and the matter was referred to a Full Bench; but unfortunately the reference proved to be infructuous. The view which I expressed on that occasion is wholly against the contention which is now put forward by the learned advocate for the assessee. I have carefully considered Sections 22 and 23 of the Act in the light of the arguments addressed to me today and I see no reason to depart from the view which I then expressed.
5. I understand that my learned brother is also inclined to take the same view. The decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court was strongly relied on when the case already referred to was argued in this Court. The decisions of this Court and of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts were against the Punjab case. The Lahore High Court has since had the occasion to-reconsider the question in Muhammad Hayat v. Commissioner of Income-tax AIR 1931 Lah 87, and has taken the same view as had been taken by other High Courts. There is thus a unanimity of opinion on the question raised by the learned advocate for the assessee. I hold that it is open to an Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under Section 22(4), at any time after he has called upon the assessee to furnish a return. This being so, the failure of assessee to comply with' the first notice issued by the Income-tax Officer calling upon him to produce the account books for the year 1983 Sambat rendered him liable to be assessed under Section 23(4). In this view, I answer both parts of the third question in the affirmative. As regards the first question, I think the Assistant Commissioner was right in so far examining the case as to satisfy himself whether the appeal before Mm was competent. Without examining" the record to some extent he could not have been in a position to find whether the assessment was under Section 23(4), and whether an appeal lay. Accordingly I answer the first question also in the affirmative. It follows from what I have said in answering the first question that the second question must be answered in the negative. Accordingly I answer it in the negative.
Bennet, J.
6. I agree with the observations which have fallen from the lips of my learned brother and I desire to add a few words on my own account on one of the points which have been raised and which is the main point-in this case, that is, whether the issue of a notice under Section 22(4), of the Income-tax Act, after the filing of the return under Section 22(4), was ultra vires or not. On this I would make the following comments:
Argument from grammar.-- Section 23(4), deals with three clauses. The first clause is failure to make a return. he second clause is failure to produce accounts or documents required by the Income-tax Officer. The third clause is failure to attend or produce evidence. Now these three clauses are separated by the disjunctive conjunction "or." The middle clause is not connected with the other clauses, but is separated from them by these two disjunctive conjunctions "or, or". I consider, therefore, that the words cannot be imported into the middle clause from the other clauses and that the middle clause as it stands is complete in what it expresses. The learned advocate for the assessee desires to add to the middle clause the words "before he has made a return". I consider, that, under the ordinary rules of English grammar, these words cannot be imported into the middle clause. The reason which the learned Counsel gives for desiring to import these words is that the last clause begins with the words "or having made a return..." The mere fact that the last clause uses these words is not a reason for importing the' negative into the second clause.
Argument from Logic.-- The second argument I would call the argument from logic. In my opinion it would be illogical to impose the penalty of assessment under Section 23(4), against which there is no appeal, for the non-production of accounts or documents when the order of the Income-tax Officer was issued before the return was filed, and hold that the penalty could not be imposed if the order was made after the return was filed. There is no reason whatever to distinguish these two cases. The failure in the one case is equally worthy of penalty with the failure in the other case. To draw a distinction between the two cases will be illogical, and it is incorrect to interpret an Act in an illogical manner if it can be interpreted in a logical manner. The third point is that, if the argument for the assessee were accepted there would be no penalty provided for the failure of the assessee to produce accounts or documents required by the Income-tax Officer if the order was made after the return was filed. The learned Counsel for the assessee referred to Section 37; but that section really provides for the production of evidence from any person and not specially from the assessee, and therefore we cannot look to that section for a penalty for the assessee's non-production of the accounts or documents.
7. The fourth argument is from the course of business. It is natural for the Income-tax Officer to take up a case of an assessee when his return is furnished, and the Income-tax Officer then sees what books or documents are required, and he issues a notice on the assessee to produce his books or documents. Such will be a natural course of procedure in assessment. Further., Sub-section 22(4), itself provides that the notice is to issue to a person upon whom a notice has been served under Sub-section (2). It is, in my opinion, absurd]1 to suggest that the time during which the Income-tax Officer could issue a notice under Section 22(4), is limited to the time between the service of a notice on an assessee under Section 22(2), and the return furnished by the assessee in compliance with that notice. For these reasons I agree with the view expressed by my learned brother, and I answer the questions as he has answered them.
8. Let a copy of our order be sent to the Income-tax Commissioner. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. We assess the fee of the counsel for the Crown at Rs. 150, which shall be taxed as costs if a certificate therefor is filed by him within the period prescribed by rules.
Alert