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Chikkanna Chettiar Alias V.S Nanjappa Chettiar v. V.S Perumal Chettiar And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision petition concerns whether an appeal lies from the decision of a Subordinate Judge appointed by the Provincial Government under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to decide disputes referred by the Collector under S. 30 (or S. 18) of the Act. The Government of Madras had appointed the Subordinate Judge of Salem to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. The petitioner was dissatisfied with the Subordinate Judge's decision and filed an appeal to the District Judge of Salem. The District Judge dismissed that appeal as incompetent, relying on the decision of this Court in Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam. The petitioner accepted that this was the effect of that decision but contended that it did not correctly state the law and relied on Privy Council authorities (Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali) to support his position that an appeal does lie.
The petition proceeded to this Court. The Chief Justice analyzed statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (notably Ss. 3(d), 18, 26, 30, 31, 53 and 54), considered conflicting decisions of this Court and of the Privy Council, and ultimately allowed the petition. The Court remitted the matter to the District Judge with directions to hear and decide the petitioner's appeal in accordance with law and awarded costs to the petitioner. The opinion records concurrences by King J. and Krishnaswami Ayyangar J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies from the decision of a Subordinate Judge appointed under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when that officer decides a dispute referred by the Collector under S. 30 (or S. 18) of the Act.
- Whether an order (or decision) determining a reference under S. 18 or S. 30 should be regarded as a "decree" (and thus appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure and S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act) or as an "award" not giving a further appeal except as expressly provided.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner contended that a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) constitutes a Court and, by virtue of S. 53 and the saving words preceding S. 54 ("Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to appeals from original decrees"), there is a right of appeal from the decision on a reference under S. 18 or S. 30.
- The petitioner relied on Privy Council decisions — particularly Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali — which, he argued, leave no doubt that an appeal lies where disputes as to the persons entitled to compensation or apportionment are determined by a Court.
Respondent's / District Judge's Position (as represented in the opinion)
- The District Judge dismissed the petitioner's appeal as incompetent relying on this Court's earlier decision in Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam (which the District Judge considered authoritative).
- On behalf of the respondent (Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Ayyar) it was conceded that a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) is not a persona designata and indeed constitutes a Civil Court; however, it was argued that it is a special Court (or a Court of special statutory status) and therefore any right of appeal must be given by the statute under which that Court is constituted or by some other express provision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (Privy Council) | Held that where a dispute referred by the Collector concerned the persons to whom compensation was payable (a dispute of title/interests), the resultant decision of the Court amounted to a decree appealable to the Judicial Committee. | Treated as a primary authority establishing that a decision on a reference under S. 18 / S. 30 is a decree (not merely an award) and is appealable; relied upon to support allowing the petitioner's appeal. |
| Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (Privy Council) | Reaffirmed the decision in Ramachandra Rao that determinations on references concerning title/interests are decrees and may be the subject of appeal; discussed res judicata and the character of such determinations. | Considered decisive. The Court held that Bhagwati v. Ram Kali set the controversy at rest and re-affirmed Ramachandra Rao as applicable despite changes in the Code's wording. This led the Court to hold that an appeal lies. |
| Rangoon Botatoung Company, Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon (Privy Council) | Resulted in amendment of S. 26 to provide that an award under S. 18 shall be deemed a decree and the grounds a judgment within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. | Referenced to show legislative response and that awards were brought within the purview of S. 54, affecting the appellate structure under the Land Acquisition Act. |
| Mahalinga Kudumban v. Theetharappa Mudaliar | Held that an order passed by a Subordinate Judge on a reference under S. 30 was a decree within S. 2(2) of the Code and that an appeal lay under S. 96 of the Code. | Used as supporting authority for the proposition that Subordinate Judges' orders on references are decrees and appealable; identified among authorities consistent with Ramachandra Rao. |
| Janapareddi Venkatareddi v. Janapareddi Adinarayana Rao | Interpreted the Land Acquisition Act similarly regarding orders of Subordinate Judges under S. 30. | Cited as another decision interpreting the Act to permit appeals from Subordinate Judges' decisions on references. |
| Appasawmi Vannian v. Velu Vaidyan | Followed Janapareddi Venkatareddi's interpretation. | Counted among decisions supporting appealability from Subordinate Judges on references. |
| Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam | Held (as applied by the District Judge) that an appeal did not lie in the circumstances then considered; expressed views on the effect of Ramachandra Rao. | The District Judge treated this decision as binding and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The present Court considered it but concluded that later Privy Council authority (Bhagwati v. Ram Kali) required a different result. |
| Mahant Bhagvati Doss Bavaji v. Sarangaraja Iyengar | Wallace and Stone, JJ. held that when the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes was appointed under S. 3(d) he did not constitute a "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" — focusing on special statutory status of that Court. | Noted as a conflicting decision; the Chief Justice observed different considerations apply in that case because the Court of Small Causes is governed by a special Act that restricts appeals. |
| Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (Full Bench) | Discussed Ramachandra Rao and took the view (in light of Code of 1908 wording) that an appeal might not lie in a case like the present one; emphasized differences in statutory context. | Identified as a Full Bench decision in conflict with the line of authorities favoring appealability; the Court held that Rajagopala Chettiar's interpretation could not remain authoritative in view of Bhagwati v. Ram Kali. |
| National Telephone Company, Limited v. His Majesty's Post Master General | Indicated that when a Court of record receives a reference by statute or agreement, the statutory consequences of procedure before such a Court follow. | Referred to in support of the view that statutory references to ordinary civil Courts import the ordinary procedural consequences (including application of the Code of Civil Procedure). |
| Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (Privy Council) | Held that when proceedings of a particular character reach the District Court, they are to be treated as proceedings before an ordinary court and governed by the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. | Used to support the argument that references under statutes (including the Land Acquisition Act) which reach District Court or its substitute are governed by CPC procedure and appellate rules. |
| Raja of Sivaganga v. Karuppiah | Applied the Privy Council's decision in Ramachandra Rao and held that an appeal lay from a Subordinate Judge's decision on a reference under S. 30. | Noted as the latest decision of this Court (decided after the District Judge dismissed the petitioner's appeal) and relied upon by the Chief Justice as consistent with allowing an appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Chief Justice proceeded through a statutory and precedential analysis, applying the following steps and considerations strictly as articulated in the opinion:
- Statutory framework: The Court first identified the relevant statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act: S. 3(d) (definition of "Court" and power to appoint a special judicial officer), S. 18 and S. 30 (power of the Collector or of an interested person to refer disputes to the Court, including disputes as to apportionment and as to persons entitled to compensation), S. 26 (amended to treat awards under S. 18 as decrees), S. 31 (procedures when the Collector is prevented from paying awards and must deposit compensation in Court), S. 53 (application of Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings under the Act except insofar as inconsistent) and S. 54 (restrictive appellate provision which provides that an appeal shall lie only to the High Court from the award or any part of the award of the Court).
- Character of the judicial officer and the proceedings: The Court considered whether a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) is a "Court" and, if so, whether proceedings before him are governed by the Code and capable of producing an appealable decree. The opinion records that it had been conceded for the respondent that such an appointed judicial officer constitutes a Civil Court (not merely a persona designata), though in some prior cases a special statutory status of the appointing Court had led to different consequences.
- Precedent analysis — Privy Council primacy: The Chief Justice treated the Privy Council's decisions (notably Ramachandra Rao and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali) as determinative on the question of whether a decision on a reference concerning title/interests amounts to a decree and is appealable. Ramachandra Rao had held that such determinations operated as decrees appealable to the Judicial Committee; Bhagwati v. Ram Kali reaffirmed that view and explicitly addressed and resolved doubts after the Code of 1908's different wording.
- Reconciling conflicting decisions: The Court reviewed a series of decisions of this Court that supported appealability (Mahalinga Kudumban, Janapareddi, Appasawmi Vannian) and others that conflicted (Mahant Bhagvati Doss Bavaji, Rajagopala Chettiar, Krishnamoorthi Ayyar). The Chief Justice explained that some conflicting decisions turned on special features (e.g., Court of Small Causes governed by special statute). The Court concluded that the Privy Council's later reaffirmation in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali settles the matter and that earlier Full Bench interpretations (Rajagopala Chettiar) could no longer be regarded as authoritative to the extent they conflicted with the Privy Council holdings.
- Supporting authorities and policy: The opinion further noted authorities (National Telephone Company; Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao) to show that when statutory references reach an ordinary civil Court that Court's ordinary procedural consequences (including application of the Code and appeal rights) follow — reinforcing the statutory reading of S. 53 and the saving language before S. 54.
- Conclusion from law and precedent: Because the Privy Council had decided that determinations on references as to persons entitled to compensation or apportionment constitute decrees and are appealable, the Chief Justice held that the decision of the Subordinate Judge (appointed under S. 3(d)) is of the character that permits an appeal. Consequently, the District Judge's dismissal of the petitioner's appeal as incompetent (based on earlier conflicting authority) was incorrect.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The petition was allowed. The Court held that an order determining a reference under S. 18 or S. 30 (including where decided by a Subordinate Judge appointed under S. 3(d)) is to be regarded as a decree and that an appeal lies. The Court remitted the case to the District Judge with the direction that he shall hear and decide the petitioner's appeal in accordance with law. The petitioner was awarded his costs.
Implications:
- The Court treated the Privy Council's decisions in Ramachandra Rao and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali as decisive and held that they resolve the controversy in favour of appealability; accordingly, earlier conflicting interpretations by Full Benches of this Court (to the extent inconsistent) can no longer be regarded as authoritative on this point.
- The immediate practical effect is that the petitioner's appeal must be heard by the District Judge; the petitioner is entitled to costs.
- The opinion records that a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) constitutes a Civil Court for these purposes and that proceedings before such an officer fall under the procedural consequences reflected in the Code of Civil Procedure and the relevant sections of the Land Acquisition Act (as explained in the opinion and by the cited authorities).
- The Court did not purport to create a novel rule beyond applying and following the Privy Council's determinations; it treated the matter as settled by Bhagwati v. Ram Kali and Ramachandra Rao and applied those authorities to the present facts.
Petition allowed. (Concurred: King J.; Krishnaswami Ayyangar J.) N.R.R
The Chief Justice:— This revision petition raises the question whether an appeal lies from the decision of a Subordinate Judge appointed by the Provincial Government under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to decide a dispute referred by the Collector under S. 30 of the Act. That Section empowers the Collector to refer to “the Court” a dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation settled under S. 11 or as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable. S. 3(d) defines the word “Court” as meaning a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the Provincial Government has appointed (as it is empowered to do) a special judicial officer to perform the functions of the Court. In this case the Government of Madras appointed the Subordinate Judge of Salem to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. The petitioner was dissatisfied with the decision of the Subordinate Judge and filed an appeal to the District Judge of Salem, but the District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was incompetent by reason of the decision of this Court in Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam (1). The petitioner conceded that this was the effect of the decision, but he contends that it does not correctly state the law. He says that the judgments of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (2) and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (3), leave no doubt that an appeal does lie.
Before proceeding to examine the authorities which have been quoted to us in the course of the arguments I will refer to other provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have bearing on the question under discussion. S. 18 says that any person who has not accepted an award may require the Collector to refer the matter for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Therefore a person interested can require the Collector to refer a dispute as to the apportionment to the Court, just as the Collector may refer it on his own initiative under the provisions of S. 30. As the result of the decision of the Privy Council in Rangoon Botatoung Company, Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon (4), S. 26 of the Act was amended, and it is now provided that an award made under S. 18 shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of the award a judgment within the meaning of S. 2, Cl. (2), and S. 2, Cl. (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The effect of this amendment is to bring the award within the purview of S. 54. S. 31 says that on making an award under S. 11 (which relates to the inquiry into the area of the land, the compensation payable for it, and the apportionment of the compensation) the Collector shall pay the compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled thereto, unless prevented by one or more of the following contingencies:—(i) If they shall consent to receive it, (ii) or if there be no person competent to alienate the land; or (iii) if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it. In such circumstances the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under S. 18 would be submitted. S. 53 says that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. S. 54 reads as follows:—
“Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie only in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council subject to the provisions contained in S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in O. 45 thereof.”
The petitioner says that a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) constitutes a Court and that by virtue of the provisions of S. 53 and of the saving words “Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to appeals from original decrees” which precede the restrictive provisions of S. 54 there is a right of appeal.
In Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao a dispute arose as to the apportionment of compensation awarded by the Collector. This dispute was decided by the District Court of Tanjore and resulted in an appeal to this Court. In a subsequent suit the title to the land with which the acquisition proceedings were concerned was again disputed and it was this suit which gave rise to the appeal to the Judicial Committee. The area in the subsequent suit was larger than the area with which the proceedings were concerned, but this did not affect the question of title. The judicial Committee held that the decision of this Court on appeal from the District Court's order of apportionment operated as res judicata. It was argued that the decision of this Court in the proceedings arising out of the land acquisition case could not be regarded as a decree, but their Lordships said that how the proceedings were commenced was a matter which was not material, provided that they were instituted in the manner that gave the Court jurisdiction “for they ended in a decree made by the High Court and appealable to this Board.” The Board in effect held that the decision of the District Judge amounted to a decree and that the decision of this Court was a decree appealable to the Board. As the proceedings had resulted in a decree which had decided the question raised in the subsequent suit the decree operated as res judicata. The ground of the decision was stated in these words:—
“Such dispute” (the dispute regarding apportionment) “forms no part of the award and it would indeed be strange if a controversy between two people as to the nature of their respective interests in a piece of land should enjoy certain rights of appeal, which would be wholly taken away when the piece of land was represented by a sum of money paid into Court.”
In Bhagwati v. Ram Kali the Privy Council considered the judgment in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and reaffirmed it. Delivering the judgment of the Board, Lord Porter said:—
“In order successfully to establish a plea of res judicata or estoppel by record it is necessary to show that in a previous case a Court having jurisdiction to try the question came to a decision necessarily and substantially involving the determination of the matter in issue in the latter case.
It was at one time a matter of doubt in India whether the determination of a Court to which a matter has been referred by the Collector under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was such a decision. That doubt was resolved by the judgment of this Board in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao which decided that where a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation has been referred to the Court, a decree thereon not appealed from renders the question of title res judicata in a suit between the parties to the dispute. In that case some question arose as to whether any appeal lay to His Majesty in Council in a case where the determination of the Judge ended in an award and not in a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the persons claiming compensation, involving, it may be, difficult questions of title, the resultant decision was not an award but a decree.”
It will now be convenient to refer to the other authorities which have been referred to in argument. In Mahalinga Kudumban v. Theetharappa Mudaliar Devadoss and Jackson JJ. held that an order passed by a Subordinate Judge on a reference under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was a decree within the meaning of S. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and an appeal lay from it under S. 96 of the Code, which provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by a Court excercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals. S. 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, says that regular or special appeals shall, when such appeals are allowed by law, lie from the decrees and orders of a District Court to the High Court and that appeals from the decrees and orders of Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs shall, except when such appeals are allowed by law, lie to the District Court, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 5,000, in which case the appeal shall lie to the High Court. In Mahalinga Kudumban v. Theetharappa Mudaliar the Court considered the decision of the Privy Council in Rangoon Botatoung Company, Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon and Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao . The Land Acquisition Act was similarly interpreted by Ramesam and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ. in Janapareddi Venkatareddi v. Janapareddi Adinarayana Rao which also had reference to an order of a Subordinate Judge under S. 30. Varadachariar and Burn JJ. followed Janapareddi Venkatareddi v. Janapareddi Adinarayana Rao in Appasawmi Vannian v. Velu Vaidyan .
There are three decisions of this Court which are in conflict with those I have mentioned, namely, Mahant Bhagvati Doss Bavaji v. Sarangaraja Iyengar (5) Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (6) and Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam (7). In the first of these cases Wallace and Stone, JJ. held that where the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, had been appointed the special Judicial Officer under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, he did not constitute a “principal Civil Court of original Jurisdiction” within the meaning of that Section, but was a special Court having its own statutory status which did not follow the status of the Court ordinarily presided over by the person who happened to be appointed as its Judge. What the learned Judges here evidently had in mind was that the special judicial officer was the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, a Court governed by a special Act of the Legislature which gives no right of appeal to another Court. An appeal from the decision of a Single Judge lies to a Bench of Judges of the Court of Small Causes and the High Court has only powers of revision. It is not necessary to pause to consider whether the judgment in that case is open to question as different considerations apply from those which apply in the present case.
Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras was decided by a Full Bench consisting of Madhavan Nair, Jackson and Lakshmana Rao JJ. and the case had reference to the question whether there was appeal to the High Court, either under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, or under the Code of Civil Procedure, from an order passed by the District Judge under S. 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The provisions of that Act have nothing really in common with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, but in Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras the effect of the judgment of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao was discussed at length, and the respondent places great reliance on the observations made by Madhavan Nair J. as they are to the effect that the Privy Council was only considering whether the order of the Court on appeal constituted a decree within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. Under the Code of 1882 the word “decree” was defined as “the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed, or defence set up, in a Civil Court when such adjudication so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal.” The words “or appeal” have been omitted from the present Code and the Full Bench considered that the presence of these words made all the difference. If the Court had to decide the present petition in the light of the interpretation of Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao in Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras we should be bound to hold that an appeal does not lie in a case like the present one. But the matter does not rest there, because in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali the Privy Council considered its decision in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao in a case which arose after the Code of 1908 came into force, and it has re-affirmed it. Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam was decided by Madhavan Nair and Stone JJ. and the same view of the effect of the decision in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao was taken. The fact that this opinion was expressed in a case relating to the decision of a special judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act led to the conclusion of the Court below that it was binding in the present case.
The latest decision of this Court is that of King J. in Raja of Sivaganga v. Karuppiah and was decided after the District Judge had dismissed the petitioner's appeal. This was a reference to the Subordinate Judge under S. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act relating to dispute between a zamindar and a number of ryots with regard to the distribution of compensation awarded in respect of land which had been acquired. My learned brother King considered that the case was governed by the decision of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and held that an appeal lay, an opinion which I share, although had it not been for the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali I should have felt constrained to hold that the interpretation of Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao by the Full Bench in Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras was binding on us.
In my opinion all controversy is set at rest by the judgment of the Privy Council in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali . The opinion expressed in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao was there re-affirmed, notwithstanding the alteration made by the present Code in the definition of the word “decree”. In the light of the recent pronouncement of the Privy Council, Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao must be taken to decide that an order, not merely the order on appeal, but an order determining a reference under S. 18 or under S. 30—it is admitted that there is no difference in principle between the two Sections—is to be regarded as a decree and not as an award. It follows that the interpretation of Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao given by the Full Bench in Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras can no longer be regarded as being authoritative.
It has been conceded by Mr. T.M Krishnaswami Ayyar on behalf of the respondent that a judicial officer appointed under S. 3(d) cannot be regarded as a persona designata and that he constitutes a Civil Court. But he says that it is a special Court, not one of ordinary civil jurisdiction and therefore a right of appeal must be given by the Act under which the Court is constituted or by some other express provision. That the judicial officer who is appointed by the Provincial Government to take the place of the District Judge constitutes a Civil Court was recognised in Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam . In National Telephone Company, Limited v. His Majesty's Post Master General Lord Shaw of Dunfermline pointed out that in the general case, when a Court of record becomes possessed, by force of agreement and statute, of a reference to it of differences between parties, the whole of the statutory consequences of procedure before such a Court ensue. The Subordinate Judge who is appointed under S. 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act to decide a dispute with regard to the allocation of compensation money does not constitute a Court of record, but admittedly he does constitute a Civil Court and on the strength of the decision in the National Telephone Company's case it might reasonably be argued that the proceedings before him are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Support for this argument is to be obtained from the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao . There a claimant whose claim was rejected by the forest settlement officer appealed to the District Court under the Madras Forest Act 1882, which makes no provision for a second appeal and consequently it was contended that there was no right of further appeal. Their Lordships refused to accept this contention, holding that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees, the ordinary Rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. It is not going much further to say that the same principle applies when an Act like the Land Acquisition Act provides for reference of disputes to the District Court and gives the Provincial Government power to substitute for the District Judge another judicial officer who admittedly decides the dispute as a Civil Court. The argument that there is here a right of appeal is made all the stronger by the provisions of Ss. 53 and 54 of the Act. Any controversy, however, is settled by the decision of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali .
I would allow this petition and remit the case to the District Judge with the direction that he shall hear and decide the petitioner's appeal in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.
King. J: I agree.
Krishnaswami Ayyangar J: I agree.
Petition allowed.
N.R.R
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